



C. IULIVS CÆSAR.

J. H. Van Houe. fecit.

THE
COMMENTARIES

OF

C. Julius Cæsar,

Of his WARS in

GALLIA;

And the CIVIL WARS betwixt him and

POMPEY.

Translated into ENGLISH;

With many Excellent and Judicious Observations thereupon.

As also the ART of our

Modern Training,

OR

TACTICK PRACTICE.

By CLEMENT EDMONDS Esquire,
Remembrancer of the City of LONDON.

Whereunto is adjoyned the EIGHTH COMMENTARY
of the Wars in GALLIA; with some short Observations upon it.

Together with the LIFE of CÆSAR,
And an Account of his Medals;


REVISED, CORRECTED, and ENLARGED.

In the SAVOY,

Printed by Tho. Newcomb, for Jonathan Edwin, at the Three Roses in Ludgatestreet, 1677.

TO THE
P R I N C E.

SIR,



Having ended this task of Observations, and, according to Your Gracious Pleasure and Command, supplied such parts as were wanting to make up the Totall of these Commentaries: it doth return again, by the lowest steps of humbleness to implore the High Patronage of Your Princely favour; emboldened specially, because it carrieth Cæsar and his Fortunes, as they come related from the same Author: which, in the deep Judgment of His Most Excellent MAJESTY, is preferred above all other prophane Histories; and so commended, by His Sacred Authority, to Your Reading, as a Chief Pattern and Master-piece of the Art of War. And, herein, Your Admired Wisdom may happily the rather deem it capable of freer passage, in that it is not altogether unproper for these happy dayes; as knowing, That War is never so well handled, as when it is made an Argument of Discourse in times of Sweet and Plenteous Peace. The Blessings whereof may ever Crown Your Years; as the Sovereign good of this Temporary Life, and the chiefest Ornaments of Princely condition.

BASILAIKON
ANON.

The Humblest of Your Highnesses Servants,
CLEMENT EDMONDS.

IN
CLEMENTIS EDMONDI

De re Militari ad
JUL. CÆSARIS *Commentarios Observationes.*

CUr creperos motus, & aperto praelia Marte
Edmondus nobis pace vigente refert;
Curſusq; mentisq; Ducum rimatur, & effert?
Diſſerteque Anglos bellica multa docet?
Scilicet, ut media medietur praelia pace
Anglia bellipotent, nec moriatur bonos,
Providus hec certe patrie depromit in usus;
Ut patrie pacem qui cupit, arma parat.

Guil. Camdenus, *Cl.*

To my Friend, Maſter CLEMENT EDMONDS.

WHo thus extracts, with more than Chymick Art,
The ſpirit of Books ſhews the true way to find
Th'Elixer that our leaden Parts convert
Into the golden Metall of the Mind.
Who thus obſerves in ſuch material kind
The certain Motions of his Practiſes,
Knows on what Center th' Actions of Mankind
Turn in their courſe, and ſees their fatalneſs.
And he that can make theſe obſervances,
Muſt be above his Book, more than his Pen—
For, we may be aſſur'd, he Men can gueſs,
That thus doth CÆSAR know, the Man of Men.
Whoſe Work, improv'd here to our greater gain,
Makes CÆSAR more than CÆSAR to contain.

Sam. Daniel,

To his Worthy Friend, Maſter CLEMENT EDMONDS.

Obferving well what Thou haſt well Obſerv'd
In CÆSAR'S Works, his Wars and Diſcipline;
Whether his Pen hath earn'd more Praise, or Thine,
My ſhallow cenſure doubtfully hath ſwerv'd.
If ſtrange it were, if wonder it deſerv'd.
That what He wrought ſo fair, He wrote ſo fine;
Methinks it's ſtranger, that Thy learned Line
Should our beſt Leaders lead, not having ſerv'd,
But hereby (Clement) haſt Thou made thee known
Able to counſel, apteſt to record
The Conqueſts of a CÆSAR of our own;
HENRY, thy Patron, and my Princely Lord.
Whom (O!) Heav'n proſper, and protect from harms,
In glorious Peace, and in victorious Arms.

Joſuah Silveſter,

To my Friend Maſter CLEMENT EDMONDS.

EPIGRAMME.

Not Cæſar's deeds, nor all his honors wonne
In theſe Weſt-parts; nor, when that War was donè,
The Name of Pompey for an Enemy;
Cato to boot; Rome, and hex libertie;
All yielding to his fortune: nor, the while,
To have ingrav'd theſe Acts with his own ſtile;
And that ſo ſtrong, and deep, as might be thought
He wrote with the ſame ſpirit that he fought;
Nor that his Work liv'd, in the hands of foes,
Un-argu'd then; and (yet) hath fame from thoſe:
Not all theſe, Edmonds, or what elſe put to,
Can ſo ſpeak Cæſar as thy Labors do.
For where his perſon liv'd ſcarce one juſt age,
And that 'midſt envy and Parts; then, fell by rage;
His deeds too dying, ſave in Books: (whoſe good
How few have read! how fewer underſtood!)
Thy learned hand, and true Promethean Art,
As by a new creation, part by part,
In every Counſel, Stratagem, Deſign,
Action, or Engine, worth a Note of thine,
T'all future time not only doth reſtore
His Life, but makes that he can dye no more.

Beni Johnson

Another of the ſame.

WHo, Edmonds, reads thy Book, and doth not ſee
What th' antique Souldiers were, the modern be;
Wherein thou ſhow'ſt, how much the later are
Beholden to this Maſter of the Warre:
And that in Action there is nothing new,
More then to vary what our Elders knew.
Which all but ignorant Captains will confeſs:
Not to give Cæſar this makes oute the leſs:
Yet thou, perhaps, ſhalt meet ſome Tongues will grutch
That to the World thou ſhouldeſt reveal ſo much;
And thence deprave thee, and thy Work. To thoſe
Cæſar ſtands up, as from his Urne late roſe
By thy great Art; and doth proclaim by me,
They murder him again, that envy thee.

Beni Johnson




CÆSARIS ELOGIUM.

C. Julius Cæsar.

Lux Cæsarum & Pater,
 Romanus Alexander, Terræ Mars:
 Omnibus tam metuendus, quam mitis;
 Pretium fecit servituti.
 Victo orbe Urbem victricem orbis vicit.
 Desuere illi hostes, hostem habuit Patriam;
 Ne deesset unquam quod vinceret.
 Ingratam Patriam patriis armis punit.
 Eam vicit invitus, quæ vixit invita.
 Qui Romæ propugnator non regnavit, regnavit expugnator;
 Pro Romæ triumphavit, de Romæ triumphavit:
 Amavit tamen inimicam, nolenti profuit.
 Sæpe à fulmine lauro servatus regis,
 Quem inermem timerunt arma, armata necavit toga.
 Cessit Gigibus Cæsar Cæsar;
 Sero cognitus luxat Patria;
 Viventem hostem, mortuū vocavit Patrem;
 Parricidium confessa cum Patrem dixit.
 Disce lector:
 Melius sæpe quæ non habes vides, quam quæ habes.

THE LIFE

OF C. Julius Cæsar; WITH CERTAIN HISTORICAL OBSERVATIONS UPON His Medalls.



THe excessive Lustre of a Million of Gallant Achievements, successfully performed by CÆSAR (the most Illustrious and Celebrated Favourite of Fortune) hath, through all Ages, so dazzled the greatest part of Mankind, especially those, both *Antient* and *Modern*, who made it their business to describe the great Transactions, either of their own, or former Ages; that they have not onely parallel'd Him with the greatest Heroes of the First Ages, but have ballanc'd Him with *Alexander*, the most Generous, and the most Glorious of all Monarchs. Nay, in their account, *Cæsar* far outweighs him, since that all that may be call'd Great or Illustrious, either as to *Virtue*, *Valour*, true *Magnanimity*, or *Clemency*, is more conspicuous in Him, then in all the *Roman* Emperours, who after him sat at the Helm of that Monarchy. Those who made difficulty to assign him the first place among the *Roman* Emperours, considered not certainly, that the Designation of a Building is the Master-piece of the Architect, add that superstruption may require no eminency of perfection. For, having consummated those innumerable Temples he had erected among the *Galls*, by those about *Pharsalia*, he laid the

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foundation of that eternal fame, the World hath deservedly honoured him with since: nay, to that height of Adoration had he rais'd the minds of Posterity, that his very Successors thought it their greatest glory to wear the Livery of his Name, and after him to be called *Cæsars*.

To offer at a perfect Anatomy of this Great Man's Actions, were to quote most Authors and Writers that have been, and consequently a work of too long a breath. It shall therefore suffice, to trace him out in those great designs, whereby he laid the foundations of the *Roman* greatness.

The first thing worthy, not onely notice, but admiration, is the strange Judgement of *Sylla* of him: who, reflecting on the great perfections of *Cæsar* when yet a youth, and the strange vivacity and conduct of his first actions, made that inhumane proposition that he might be killed, (as if even Vertue may be excessive, and a Crime as he had caus'd divers of the Kinred and party of *Marius*, who had Married *Julia* an Aunt of *Cæsar's* by the Mother side. Nor doth Envy want pretences, since as he conjectur'd, one *Cæsar* contain'd many *Marius's*, and should, if suffer'd to live; prove the *Viper* of the *Common-wealth*. But, this may be easily pass'd by, since that they are indeed the greatest actions that must expect Censure. But it must in the mean time denote a strange transcendency of courage and confidence, to think to Conquer that People, who had Conquer'd the *Universe*; it must be the effect of an ambition, more then Humane, for this is commonly fetter'd to probabilities. The Emperor *Julian*, though he hath made it his business to Satyrize against his Predecessors, yet having to do with *Cæsar*, he, by a strange fiction, discovers the greatness of his Designations. *Cæsar*, sayes he, a person of a gallant and gracefull Presence, being entered the place, where *Romulus* was; to entertain the *gods*, and *Roman* Emperours at the *Saturnalian* feasts, came in with such an insolent deportment, that the *gods* were of opinion, he was thrust by, till at last *Mars* and *Venus* made him place. The ingenuity of this *Satyrist* amounts onely to thus much, to paint over that great Vertue, that great indulgence of Nature, and Fortune, in the colours of an Insatiable Ambition; which, had not this Censor been excessively guilty of, might have prov'd somewhat.

But, the endowments of Nature, the constant presence of Fortune, and the surprising Glory consequentiall to his Actions, were the Genius's that rais'd him to such high adventures, as the sudden change of the *Democratically* State of *Rome* into a *Monarchicall*, to pretend a Title to the great Acquests of a Valorous People for 700. years, and to assume to himself an Empire far greater than the *Assyrian*, *Persian*, or *Macedonian*, both in extent of time, greatness, and power. For, not to descend to the acquisitions of the later Emperours, we shall onely take a view of the *Roman* Empire as it stood, before *Cæsar* seiz'd the Reines of Government. In Europe, they were Masters of all *Italy*, and *Gallia Cisalpina*, or *Lombardy*, *Austria*, and *Illyricum*, now call'd *Slavonia*, reaching as far as *Danubius*; They had reduc'd all Greece, the States of *Athens*, *Lacedemon*, *Thebes*, *Corinth*, and all *Peloponnesus* now call'd *Morea*; *Macedon*, and *Epire*, now call'd *Albania* and *Thrace*. They had the Islands of *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, *Creta*, *Cyprus*, *Rhodes*, and *Negrepont*, and divers others in the *Mediterranean* Sea. They had taken in all *Spain*, and (which was *Cæsar's* own Work) all *France*, that part of Germany lying on the *Rhine*, call'd *Gallia Belgica*, and Great Britain. They were

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were Masters of all *Africa*, (the third part of the World then) even to pull down the Pride of *Carthage*. The best Provinces of *Asia* were Tributaries, as *Syria*, *Phenicia*, *Palestina*, *Judea*, *Phrygia*, *Caria Cilicia*, and *Bithynia*. *Egypt* and *Cappadocia* were Confederates. In *Armenia* and *Colchos* they had Forces. *Albania*, *Iberia*, and some other Countreys, paid Contributions, and did homage. In fine, they were so great, that they were unconquerable, unless by their own strength, that so they might have this satisfaction and glory in their Conquest, that they Triumph'd over themselves.

It is easie to attribute to Ambition and Discord, what is the design of Fate. Greatness must expect a period; and, to be successfull, presumes a happy conjuncture of men and affaires. Some differences there were between *Cæsar* and *Pompey* (the most eminent and the most powerfull in *Rome*) rak'd up in the embers of the Civil War between *Sylla* and *Marius*, wherein the later being slain, the other made himself *Dictator*; and seiz'd *Rome*, but quitted both before his death. *Pompey* had sided with *Sylla*, *Cæsar* with *Marius*, as being his Kinsman. But, to ascend a little higher in these Broiles, we are to note, that *Sylla* having dispossessed himself, *Pompey* and *Crassus* came into repute. The latter was the more recommended by his Witdome, Eloquence, Nobility, and excessive Riches; the other had gain'd the Popalar esteem by his Victories and great Actions in War, even in *Sylla's* time. While the differences of these two encreas'd with their greatness, *Cæsar* returns to *Rome* from his Pratorship in *Spain*, bringing that reputation with him, that swell'd the greatness and ambition of his thoughts. He had gone through most charges Civil and Military; he had been *Questor*, *Tribune* of the Soldiers, *Ædile*, *High-Priest* and *Prætor*. All which, with other accomplishments, he was furnish'd with, which we shall mention elsewhere, though they brought him into much esteem, yet was he not arriv'd to near the Authority and Reputation of either *Crassus* or *Pompey*.

Cæsar, though he were come to *Rome*, yet stifled all thoughts of aspiring for a while: so that both *Crassus* and *Pompey* apply'd themselves to him, hoping, by his accession, to ruine one the other. But *Cæsar* declin'd both, and carried himself with circumspection, that he endeavour'd to reconcile them, so hoping, by his Neutrality, to undermine them both; which was, as *Plutarch* sayes, observ'd onely by *Cato*. At length, he so order'd things, that he made an agreement between them, and so oblig'd both; which caus'd that, retaining some jealousies of each other, they equally Court'd *Cæsar's* Friendship, by which means he became equal to either: so that the Power which before was between two, became now tripartite. Things being thus appeas'd, *Cæsar* demands the Consulship: which obtain'd, he carried himself in it with that reputation, that his Co-Consul *Bibulus* left all to his management. To maintain the Authority he had got, he himself took to Wife *Calpurnia*, the daughter of *Lucius Piso*, who was to succeed him in the Consulship; and bestowes his own daughter *Julia* on *Pompey*; and so taking in *Crassus*, they make a League, and being equally ambitious, conspire to invade the *Common-wealth*. *Cæsar* chuses for his Province, the *Galls*, or *France*; *Crassus*, *Asia*; *Pompey*, *Spain*; whither they went with three puissant Armies, as if the World had been to be Trichotomiz'd among these three. What *Cæsar* did in his Province, what Battels he fought, what People he subdu'd, what Valour, Policy, Success follow'd him every where, may be seen in his own *Commentaries* of that War, approv'd, by his very Enemies, as modest and impartial, and attested by *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Suetonius*, *Appianus*, *Alexandrinus*;

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Alexandrinus, Lucan, Paulus Orosius, Florus, Eutropius; too great a Testimony against one censorious *Astinus Pollio*. By this War *Cæsar* got the reputation of the greatest Captain that ever was, subduing all *France*, from the *Pyrenean Hills* to the *Alps*, and so to the *Rhene*. But, to forbear particular instances, as that he Conquer'd the *Swissers* and *Tigurins* (who were, according to *Plutarch*, 300000. men, whereof 19000. were well Disciplin'd) this is most worth our remark, that during these so great Wars, he omitted not, both by intelligence and presents, to endear his Friends both at *Rome* and elsewhere, doing many things without the Senate's leave, upon the score of the League with *Pompey* and *Crassus*. Nay, his Courting of all sorts of People, both Soldier and Citizen, was none of his least Master-pieces, by which means he had supplanted *Pompey*, in matter of esteem, before he perceiv'd it. To this purpose hath *Pliny* observ'd, *Lib. 33. cap. 3.* that in the time of his *Ædility*, that is to say his *Shrievedome*, he was so prodigal, that all the *Vtensils* and Armes that he made use of at Publick Sports and Combats, were all of Silver, which yet afterwards were bestow'd among the People; and that he was the first that ever brought forth the Beasts in Chariots and Cages of Silver. This it was made some suspect him guilty of Rapine, and that he plunder'd Temples and Cities *Sepius ob prædam quam ob delictum*.

But, this reputation of *Cæsar* begat jealousy in *Pompey*, which (the type of their correspondence being loos'd by the death of *Julia*) was easily seen to break forth into a flame, especially now that *Crassus*, the third man, was, together with divers stout *Roman* Legions, buried with infamy in *Parthia*. Thus the foundations of Friendship and Alliance in great ones, being once taken away, the superstructures fall down immediately. Nothing could decide the emulation of two so great persons, as *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, (the one defying superiority, the other equality) but as great a War. It could not but be universal, when Senate, Armies, Kingdoms, Cities, Allies, all were some way or other imbarqu'd in the Quarrel. There was on one side 11. Legions, on the other 18. The Seat of the War was *Italy*, *France*, *Epirus*, *Thessaly*, *Ægypt*, *Asia* and *Africk*; through all which, after it had ravag'd five years, the controversy was decided in *Spain*. That Ambition (the imperfection onely of the greatest minds) might have been the occasion of so inveterate a War, hath been the opinion of divers others, who charge not *Pompey* with so great discoveries of it as *Cæsar*, to whom they assign a greater then the Empire; as if their mutual distrust and jealousy of one another, should be able to cause so many Tragedies through so many Countries. Besides, *Cæsar* had his Enemies at *Rome*, and, among others, *Cato*, who threatened to impeach him when he was once out of Command. What bandying there was against him, we find somewhat in the latter end of the Eighth Commentary, to this purpose. *Lentulus* and *Marcellus*, both of *Pompey's* Faction, being Consuls, it is mov'd in the Senate, That *Cæsar* might be called home, and another sent to supply his Command of the Army then in *Gallia*; since that he, having written for the Consulship, should, according to Law, have been personally in *Rome*. *Cæsar* demands to be continued in Commission and Government, and that he might demand the Consulship absent. This *Pompey* opposes, though he himself, as much contrary to Law, had had the Consulship, and other Dignities, before he was at full age.

This deny'd, *Cæsar* proposes, That he would come to *Rome* as a private man, and give over his Command, so that *Pompey* quitted his Employment in

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in *Spain*. About this the Senate was much divided. *Cicero* proposes a Mediation; but *Pompey's* party prevailing, it was decreed that *Cæsar* should, by a certain time quit his Command, and should not pass his Army over the River *Rubicon*, which bounded his Province; declaring him an Enemy to the *Roman State*, in case of refusal. *C. Curio* and *M. Antonius* the Tribunes of the people, out of their affection to *Cæsar*, endeavoring to oppose this decree, were thrust disgracefully out of the Senate, which occasioned them to repair to *Cæsar*; whereby they endeared the affections of the Souldiery to him, the office of the Tribunes being ever held sacred and inviolable.

Cæsar understanding how things stood at *Rome*, marches with 5000 foot and 300 horse to *Ravenna*, having commanded the Legions to follow. Coming to the fatal passage of *Rubicon*, he entered into a deep deliberation, considering the importance and miseries that might ensue that passage. At last, in the midst of his anxiety, he was animated to a prosecution of his designs, by the apparition of a Man of extraordinary stature and shape, sitting near unto his Army, piping upon a Reed. The Souldiers went down to the River side to hear him, and approached so near, that he caught one of their Trumpets, and leaping into the River, began with a mighty blast to sound, and so went to the bank on the other side. This resolves *Cæsar* who cried out, Let us go whither the Gods, and the injurious dealings of our Enemies call us. With which he set spurs to his horse, and pass'd the River, the Army following. Who would be more particularly informed, may be satisfied out of *Appianus Alexandrinus, Suetonius, Plutarch*, in the Lives of *Cæsar, Cato*, and *Cicero*, *St. Augustinus* l. 3. de c. d. *Cæsar* himself in his Commentaries, *Florus, Livy, Paulus Orosius, Eutropius, Lucan, Pliny de viris illustribus, Valerius Maximus*, &c.

Having pass'd the River, and drawn the Army together, the Tribunes came to him in those dishonorable garments wherein they had fled from *Rome*. Whereupon he made an excellent Oration to the Souldiery, opening to them his cause: which was answered with general acclamations, and promises of duty and obedience to all his commands.

This done, he seizes *Ariminum*, and divers other Towns and Castles as he pass'd, till he came to *Corfinium*, where *Domitius*, who was to succeed him in his command, was garrisoned with thirty Cohorts.

Cæsar's advance and intentions astonished *Rome, Senate*, and People, nay, so surpris'd *Pompey*, that he could not believe *Cæsar* would thrust himself into so much danger, or that his forces were so considerable. But though *Pompey* was empower'd by the Senate to levy forces, recal the Legions, and provide for the defence of *Italy*, yet all could make nothing against *Cæsar*. The rumor of his advance spreading, *Pompey* and the Senate leave *Rome*, and repair to *Capua*, from thence to *Brundisium*; from whence the Consuls were dispatched to *Dyrrachium*, to unite what Forces they could, since they despair'd of resisting *Cæsar* in *Italy*, who hearing the Consuls and *Pompey* were at *Brundisium*, march'd thither, and having invest'd the Town, *Pompey* in the night time embarks for *Dyrrachium*, where the Consul expected him: so that *Cæsar* became absolute Master of *Italy*. Having not shipping to pursue him, he resolv'd for *Spain*, which he left for *Pompey*, where his best Legions were, and two Captains, *Petereius* and *Afranius*.

Returning from *Brundisium*, he in sixty days master'd all *Italy*, without any bloodshed, and coming to *Rome*, the memory of the devastations of

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Sylla's days, frightened the people extremely. But *Cæsars* clemency, and his attributing the cause of all the distractions to *Pompey*, quieted all things. He so far justified his own cause, that he moved that Embassadors might be sent to *Pompey* for peace, and causing himself to be chosen Consul, he opened the *Roman* Treasury, and made a dividend of it among the Souldiery. This done, he provides for *Spain*, having taken care for the Civil, as well as Military Government. *Brundisum*, *Otranto*, and other Maritime places, he fortifies against *Pompey's* entering into *Italy*, in case he should attempt it. *Hortensius* and *Dolabella* were to provide shipping for him at *Brundisum* against his return. *Quintus Valerius* he sends with a Legion into *Sardinia*, against *Marcus Cotta*, who held it for *Pompey*. To *Sicily* he sends *Curius* against *Marcus Cato*, which when he had taken in, he was to march into *Africk*. He leaves *Lepidus* to govern at *Rome*, and *Antonius* for all *Italy*. Thus intending to leave *Licinius Crassus* in *France*, he with his wonted celerity went on his journey, meeting with no resistance, but at *Marseilles*; which leaving *D. Brutus*, and *C. Trebonius* with sufficient forces to Besiege, he went forward towards *Spain*, where he was expected by *Petreus* and *Afranius*: with whom, though he met with the inconveniences of the Winter, and high Rivers, he had divers skirmishes; yet at length, he carried his business so, that the Enemies were forced by hunger to a composition, the Legions and Captains, such as would not remain with *Cæsar*, having leave to depart whither they pleas'd.

The Spring now coming on, (to leave nothing unsubdued) he marches into *Betica*, now called *Andalusia*, where quartered *Marcus Varro* with one Legion of Souldiers, as *Pompey's* Lieutenant; who conceiving himself unable to make opposition, resigned both the Countrey and Legion to *Cæsar*, whereby all was quieted.

Thence he marched to *Cordova*, where assembling the estates of the Provinces, he acknowledged their affection and devoirs, and so went to *Cales*; where he took such ships and Gallies, as *Marcus Varro* had there, with what others he could get, and embarked. Having left *Q. Cassius* with four Legions in that Province he marches to *Narbona* and so to *Marseilles*, which having suffered great miseries during the Siege, at length surrendered; yet he protected it from any violence, preferring the consideration of the Antiquity of the place, before the affronts he had received from it, and so having sufficiently garrison'd it, he marches into *Italy*, and so to *Rome*, all things succeeding prosperously to him, though not so to his Captains. For *Antonius* (who was joint General at sea with *Dolabella*) was overthrown and taken Prisoner by *Octavius*, *Pompey's* Lieutenant, in the Gulfe of *Venice*, and that by a strange Stratagem. *Antonius* being forced for want of ships to put his men into long boats, the *Pompeians* tyed ropes under the water, by which means one of them which carried a thousand *Opitergins*, stout young men, was surpris'd and assaulted by the whole Army, yet making resistance from morning till night, they at last seeing all their efforts ineffectual, did by the instigation of their Commander, *Vulturnus*, kill one another. *Dolabella* was also overcome, as also *Curo*, who was ordered to go into *Africa*, was overthrown by *Pompey's* friend *Juba*, King of *Mauritania*.

While *Cæsar* was at *Rome* busy in causing himself to be made Dictator, and then putting off that Consul, that so he might send Prætors into the Provinces,

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Provinces, as *Marcus Lepidus* into *Spain*, *A. Albinus* into *Sicily*, *Sextus Peduceus* into *Sardinia*, and *Decius Brutus* into *France*, and taking such farther order as he thought fit; *Pompey* was as busy in *Macedonia*, raising of Men and Money, and providing Ships, in order to his return into *Italy*. What his forces might amount unto, may be judged from the almost infinite assistances came in to him from divers Kingdoms and Provinces of *Asia* and *Greece*, from *Syria*, *Pontus*, *Bythmia*, *Cilicia*, *Phœnicia*, (*capadocia*, *Pamphilia*, *Armenia* the less, *Egypt*, *Greece*, *Thessaly*, *Ætolia*, *Achaia*, *Epire*, *Athens*, *Lacedæmonia*, the Isles of *Creta* and *Rhodes*, and divers other places, there coming to his assistance in person the Kings *Deiotarus* and *Ariobarzanes*. These certainly, with those he had brought with him out of *Italy*, must needs make up a vast Army by land, nor could the number of Ships and Gallies but be proportionable. However, *Cæsar* knowing all this, leaves *Rome* in *December*, and so marches to *Brundisum*, whence he was to embark for *Macedonia*; out of this consideration, that his Victory consisted in expedition, though *Pompey* in the mean time, upon intelligence of *Cæsars* being at *Rome*, had scattered his people into *Macedonia* and *Thessaly*, conceiving the inconveniences of the winter would have deterred him from crossing the Seas. But *Cæsar* being come to *Brundisum*, (now called *Brindze*) he embarks seven Legions of his choicest men in the beginning of *January*, leaving order to those that were coming, to make halt and join with those which remained behind, all whom he would speedily send for.

Three days after he arrives upon the Coast of *Macedonia*, before *Pompey* had so much as heard of his embarking, and lands in spite of *Pompey's* Captains, and presently commands the ships to return for the remainder of his Army, which done, he takes it by storm, *Apollonia* (now called *Bellona*) and *Oricum*, two Cities kept by *L. Torquatus* and *L. Straberinus*, for *Pompey*; who alarm'd by this, sends for such Troops as were nearest, and marches to *Dyrrachium*, where all his Ammunition and Provision lay, to secure it from being surpris'd by *Cæsar*; which indeed he had attempted, but by reason of the natural strength of the place, to no purpose.

Pompey being come, both Armies lodged not many furlongs from one another, onely they were divided by a River. Which Post as it gave occasion of divers skirmishes, so it begat many overtures of Peace from *Cæsars*, which *Pompey*, presuming upon his strength, would not hear of. This proposition of *Cæsars*, though it proceeded from his meekness, which was not the least of his Vertues; yet argued some Conscience of his own weakness at this time. For he was extremely perplexed; that the other part of his Army was not come, inasmuch that he embarked in a Brigantine disguised to fetch them. Having passed down the River, the Sea was so tempestuous, that the Master of the Vessel would not adventure out, whereupon as it is said, *Cæsar* discovered himself; and said to him, *Friend; thou carriest Cæsar and his Fortune*. Whereat the Master being encouraged, ventured out into the sea, but the Tempest was so violent, that it brought *Cæsar* back again. This action of his, was like to have raised a mutiny in his Army, as a thing, which though it spoke courage, yet was a stranger to discretion: which it may be the reason that *Cæsar* hath made no mention of in his Commentaries.

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But some few days after, *Antonius* arrives with four Legions of the remaining part of the Army, and sends back the Ships for the rest. These joining with *Cæsar*, there past divers skirmishes and pickerings (being nearly lodged) between both Armies: but that which was most remarkable, was near the City of *Dyrrachium*, wherein *Cæsar's* Troops were so routed, that no threats or intreaties could stay them from running to their Camp, which though fortified, yet was abandoned by some. *Pompey* in the mean time, either out of fear that the flight might be feined, and in order to some ambush, or that he thought *Cæsar* sufficiently conquered, doth not prosecute the Victory. Which weakness in him, *Cæsar* dissembled not, when afterwards he said to his Men, that *that day had ended the War, if the enemy had had a Captain that knew how to overcome*. But *Cæsar*, as no prosperity disordered him, so in adversity he had a courage and such a confidence of Fortune, that he was nothing cast down. He lost in that engagement, besides the Common-Souldiery, 400 *Roman* Knights, 10 Tribunes, and 32 Centurions, with as many Colours. This success obtained, *Pompey* sends the news of it into all parts of the World, so advantageously to himself, as if *Cæsar* were utterly routed; who though he did not decline fighting, yet thought it not policy to engage his Men lately worsted (though indeed exasperated with shame and indignation at their loss) with those that were animated and fleshed with a Victory. He therefore disposes his maimed men into *Apollonia*, and in the night takes his way towards *Thessaly*, both to hearten and refresh his Army, as also to draw the enemy farther from the Sea-coast, where his main force, and all his provisions lay, or at least to meet with *Scipio*, who, he had intelligence, was to join with *Pompey*.

This unexpected departure of *Cæsar*, brought *Pompey* almost to a Resolution to return into *Italy*, to recover that, with *France* and *Spain*, and afterwards to meet with *Cæsar*. But the *Roman* Lords that were about him (a sort of proud, insolent, indisciplinable people, who indeed proved his ruine) dissuaded him, and caused him to alter his design; and so he fell upon the hot pursuit of *Cæsar*, who making a stay in the fields of *Pharsalia*, till that his men had reassumed their courage and resolution, was now willing and eager to fight. But *Pompey* perceiving this readiness of *Cæsar* to proceed from want of provision, and a fear his Army should diminish, purposely avoided fighting, and would have prolonged the War, and so have defeated his enemy without hazarding his own Army. But the murmurings, mutinies, and importunity of those that were about him, had such a prevailing influence over him, (as *Plutarch*, *Lucan*, and *Cæsar* himself acknowledge) that they forced him contrary to his intentions and policy, to give Battel; which was such, that all the flower and force of *Rome* was engaged in it. *Cæsar's* Army (according to the computation of most Writers) amounted to half *Pompey's*: but in compensation, his men were more active, and versed in War, and knew their advantages; whereas the others was a tumultuary sort of people raked together, (besides what *Romans* he had.) The exact number of both these Armies is not agreed on by Authors: some raise them to 300000. of which opinion was *Florus*; others bring them down to 70000. But if we agree with *Appianus*, we must conceive, that so many Countries and Nations having sent in their assistances on either side, there must needs be vast Armies on both sides: and therefore those who pitched upon the lesser number, meant only the number of *Romans*, who were the main force and hope of both Generals. But here we may make

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a strange Remark upon the uncertain events of War. We have two of the greatest Captains that ever were: the stoutest Armies that ever met: such, as experience, force, and valour, was equally divided between; and, to be short, the most exasperated parties that could be, and yet it proved but a very short Fight: so weak is the confidence and assurance that is only placed in number. We may further note, the strange influence of Religion upon Mankind in general, in that it enforces Man in the greatest exigencies to consultation: for, *Pompey* met with divers things, that might somewhat have informed him of the success of that famous Battel; The running away of the Beasts destined for Sacrifice, the Swarming of Bees, the Sky Darkened, and his own fatal Dream of being in Mourning in the Theater, seconded, by his appearance in the head of his main Battel the next day in a black Robe, which might signifie, he mourned for the Liberty of *Rome* beforehand.

Being both resolved to give Battel, they put their Armies in such order as they thought fit, and harangued their Soldiers according to their several pretences. In the beginning, *Pompey's* Horse, consisting most of the *Roman* Gentry and Nobility, prevailed over *Cæsar's*, and made them give ground: which he perceiving, causes a Battalion, set apart for that purpose, to charge them; with Order, to ayme altogether at the Face: which *Pompey's* Horse not able, or not willing to endure, began to retreat, and so made way for the total overthrow; by which means, the Foot being discouraged, and seeing *Cæsar's* Horse falling on, the Victory was soon decided on *Cæsar's* side, *Pompey* flying to his Camp, and leaving the Field to his Adversary. Here was the greatest misfortune of *Pompey*, to out-live the Liberty of his Country (which he pretended so much to fight for) and his own Glory in this Battel, being forc'd to a dishonourable flight, and to deliberate, whether he should retire, whether into *Parthia*, *Africk*, or *Egypt*.

Cæsar being thus Master of the Field, and meeting with no opposition, fall's upon *Pompey's* Camp, which, without any great difficulty, he entered. Whereupon, *Pompey* disguising himself, takes up the first Horse he met, and, with four more (his own Son *Sextus Pompeius*, the two *Lentuli*, and *Favonius*) makes his escape, and stays not till he came to *Larissa*: where, meeting with some of his own Horse, who were in the same condition of running away, he continued his flight until he came to the Shore of the *Ægean* Sea; where, meeting accidentally with a certain Merchants Ship of *Rome*, he embarks himself in her, and sayles to *Mitylene*, where his Wife and Family were. Having taken them with him, and got together what Men and Ships a shattered fortune could furnish him with, he departed thence in very great doubt and perplexity, not able to resolve whether to dispose of himself. He was advised by some to march into *Africa*, and shelter himself with *Juba*, whose friendship and affection towards him he had receiv'd testimony of but very lately; others were of opinion, his best course was to retire among the *Parthians*: but at last, by his own wilfulness, it was voted he should go into *Egypt*; which he was the more inclin'd to, out of a consideration of the friendship and correspondence which he had had with King *Ptolemy*, Father to him who then Reign'd: and so touching at *Cyprus*, he sailes towards *Egypt*, and arrives at *Alexandria*.

Thus was the Controversie, for no less than the known World, decided in one day, *Cæsar* being Master of the Field and Victory. Of *Pompey's* side there were slain Fifteen thousand, if you will take it upon *Cæsar's* credit, and of his own not Two thousand. *Cæsar* having intelligence of *Pompey's*

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flight, pursues him, without any stay, with the swiftest and lightest of his Army, so to give him as little breath as he could afford, that he might not meet with any means or opportunity to recover or repair himself. Reducing all Cities as he passed, he comes to the Sea side, and taking up all the Ships and Gallies he could meet with, and such as *Cassius* (who was receiv'd into his favour) could furnish him with, he embarks such Troops as he could, and passed into *Asia* the Less: where, understanding that *Pompey* had been at *Cyprus*, he easily presumed he was gone for *Ægypt*. He thereupon resolves to take the same course, and taking with him only two Legions of his old Soldiers, he safely arrives at *Alexandria*: where he soon understood that *Pompey* was arrived, upon a confidence (as was said before) there might have remain'd some sense and memory in young *Ptolemy*, of the entertainment and favours he had done his Father. But, he was as much mistaken in this, as he had been eluded by Fortune in the War: for he finds that the Friendship of great men and Princes seldom out-lives their Prosperity, and that adversity makes them the greatest strangers that may be. Being by this King *Ptolemy* invited into Protection; and, upon that confidence coming towards the shore in a small Boat, he was, ere he could reach the Land, Murdered, by the same King's Commandment, by *Septimius* and *Achillas*, who thought, by that means, to purchase *Cæsar's* favour. This was done by the contrivance of *Photinus* an Eunuch, whose Authority both with King and Court was very great. *Cæsar* receives also news, that *Cornelia*, *Pompey's* Wife, and his Son *Sextus Pompeius*, were fled from that Port in the same Vessel wherein they came. Being landed and received into the City, he was soon presented with the Head of the Great *Pompey*; which, out of a consideration of the horridness of the Fact, he would not by any means see. His Ring also and his Seal, with his Coat of Armes upon it, were presented to him: which causing him to reflect on the great Successes, Adventures and Prosperities of that great and glorious Man (besides, that he was to look on him as his Son in Law) it drew Tears from him, to compare them with his unfortunate end. Thus is he, who had three times Triumph'd, been so many times Consul, been the most eminent and the most concerned person that *Rome* had for many yeares together; one, who had been acquainted with all the Dignities so great a Common-wealth could confer upon a deserving Citizen, most Inhumanely and Perfidiously Assassinated, to the greatest regret of him, who was look'd on as most desirous of it. This, in the mean time, concludes that opinion erroneous, that *Cæsar* was so extremely over-joy'd at the newes of *Pompey's* death, that he caus'd, upon that very place where he had ordered his Head to be interr'd, a Temple to be built to the goddess *Nemesis*; which some interpret a most unnatural revengefulness, a horrid insultation over a Calamitous Vertue, and a Prophanation of Divine Worship, to abuse the name of a goddess, for to immortalize the memory of his Vengeance, and to Authorize the Injustice of it. But, it is as easie to give the Title of Barbarisme and Cruelty to Magnanimity and height of Courage, as to say the contrary: and therefore *Cæsar* certainly could not be guilty of so great an Hypocrisie, as to shed Teares over his Enemy's Head, when he was inwardly surpriz'd with Joy.

Cæsar, upon his arrival into *Ægypt*, finds it embroil'd in Civil Wars, arising from some differences between young *Ptolemy* and his Sister *Cleopatra*, about the Division and Inheritance of the Kingdom, wherein *Cæsar* (as Consul of *Rome*) thought fit to be a Mediator. *Photinus* and *Achillas*, the Plot-

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ters and Practicers of *Pompey's* death, fearing from *Cæsar* a Reward of Vengeance proportion'd to so horrid a Crime; and perceiving his inclination to favour *Cleopatra*, take such order, by their great influence over King and Court, that they brought what Army the King had near the City; which consisted of about 20000 able men: and this they did out of a design to entrap *Cæsar*, and act the same Perfidious Butchery upon him, as they had done upon *Pompey*. By this means, there began between what Forces *Cæsar* had brought him, and those of the *Ægyptians*, within and about the City, as also between the Ships and Gallies in harbour, the hottest Disputes, and sharpest Encounters he ever met with: which we shall not particularize here, because it is the proper Work of a compleat History. One thing our observation cannot balk in these hot and occasional Engagements, that *Cæsar* himself was Personally engag'd in most Disputes, both within the City, and among the Ships, and that to the great hazard of his Person; as may appear by that one adventure, when he was forc'd to leap out of the Boat wherein he was, into the Sea, and, by swimming, to recover one of his Gallies: and, being in this great extremity (if you will believe *Suetonius*) he carried his *Commentaries* in one hand above the Water, and his Robe in his Teeth, that it might not fall into the Enemies hands. In these Conflicts were there nine moneths spent: at which time *Cæsar* receiving his Forces out of *Asia*, made an end of the Controversie, with the same attendance of Fortune and Victory, which had waited on him every where else. Had *Cæsar* been acquainted with no War but this, he might justly challenge the Title of the greatest Captain in the World, so much Personal Valour, Wisdom, Conduct, Circumspection and Policy did he express in all passages thereof, though encompassed with all the inconveniences and disadvantages imaginable.

Ægypt being thus quieted, the Murderers of *Pompey* punish'd, and *Cleopatra* (by whom *Cæsar* had a Son call'd *Cæsario*) establish'd Queen, *Cæsar* takes his March towards *Asia* through *Syria*, having receiv'd intelligence, that while he was engag'd in the Wars of *Ægypt*, King *Pharnaces*, the Son of the Mighty *Mithridates*, taking his advantage of the dissensions among the *Romans*, entertain'd some hopes of recovering what his Father had lost; having, in order thereto, overthrown *Domitius*, whom *Cæsar* had left Governour in those parts, and taken in by force the Provinces of *Bithynia* and *Cappadocia*; expelling thence *Ariobarzanes*, a Friend and Subject to *Rome*. The like he intended to have done with *Armenia* the Less, which King *Deiotarus* had made subject to the *Romans*. But *Cæsar* coming upon *Pharnaces* before he expected him, they, in a few dayes, came to a Battel, which in a few hours was dispatched, to the overthrow of the King, and the infinite slaughter of his People, which he himself escaped by flight. This Victory gave *Cæsar* more satisfaction than any of his former, because of the great desire he had to return to *Rome*, where, he was inform'd, many scandals were spread, and insolencies committed by the encouragement of his absence. He had also understood that *Pompey's* eldest Son had seiz'd a great part of *Spain*, and, out of those that *M. Varro* had left there, and some gleanings of his Father's troops, had gotten together some considerable force. He also knew, that most of the principal *Romans*, who had escaped the Battel at *Pharsalia*, were gathered together in *Africa*, and headed by *M. Cato*, (surnamed *Uticensis*, for having kill'd himself at *Utica*) and *Scipio Pompey's* Father-in-Law; that they had a great part of *Pompey's* Navy; that with the assistance of *Juba* King of *Mauritania*, they had subdu'd all that Country, and had a great Army in readines against *Cæsar*, ha-

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ving chosen *Scipio* for their General, because that name had been fortunate in *Africk*. *Cæsar*, upon intelligence of all these transactions, with his wonted celerity and diligence recovers all that *Pharnaces* had usurped, and chasing him from *Pontus* regained all those Countries, which he recommended to the government of *Cælius Minusius*, with two Legions; where, having reconciled differences, decided all controversies, and settled all things, by rewarding and gratifying those Kings and Tetrarchs who had continued firm to the Commonwealth and interest of *Rome*, he made no longer aboad in *Asia*, but passing with all expedition into *Italy*, he came to *Rome* within a little more than a year after he had departed thence: wherewith, if we compare his great expeditions and adventures, it would prove matter of faith and astonishment, to consider how such vast Armies should pass through so many Countries in so short a time.

Some few dayes after his coming to *Rome* he is created the third time Consul, and, as far as time and the exigencies of his affairs permitted, studied the reformation of what disorders there then were. For that his Enemies before-mention'd should be Masters of *Africk*, was a thing he could not easily digest. Therefore, with his ordinary expedition, he marches thitherward, and commands his Forces to follow. He took shipping in *Sicily*, and so passed into *Africk*, having no great force with him; however, such was his confidence of his fortune, that he laid not the arrival of either his Army or Navy. Being landed with his small forces near unto the City of *Adrumetum*, he marches unto another called *Leptis*; where he was received, and where he took occasion, by some conflicts, to keep the Enemy in action, so to divert them from augmenting their forces. In fine, his Legions being arrived, he very earnestly set himself to the prosecution of the war: in which, though it lasted but four months, (from the beginning of *January* to the end of *April*) there happened many Encounters and Battels. For, having dispatched what work *Petereius* and *Labienus* found him, he came to deal with *Scipio* and *K. Juba*, who had brought an assistance of 8000. men, whereof one half were Cavalry, *Africa* at that time being very abundant in horse, as may appear partly in that *Cæsar's* Enemies had, among them, raised in that Country, besides eight Legions of foot, 20000. horse. *Hirtius*, *Plutarch*, *Lucan*, and *Florus* have written at large of this War, and tell you, that *Cæsar* was many times in very great danger as to his own person, yet at last, by the assistance of his Forces, and the compliance of his great Fortune, he put a period to that War by one signal Battel, wherein there being slain of the Enemies side 10000. they were utterly defeated; *Cæsar* remained Master of the field, and shortly after of all the Country. The principal Captains of the adverse party, though they escaped death at the fight, died most of them miserably and unfortunately. King *Juba* himself being for want of refuge brought to that despair, that fighting with *Afranior*, and killing him, he commanded one of his own slaves to dispatch himself. *Marcus Cato*, being in *Utica*, hearing of *Cæsar's* approach, though confident, not only of his pardon, but his particular favour, yet either out of an indignation to be oblig'd by his Enemy, or an extravagant zeal to Liberty, laid violent hands on himself. *Cicero* wrote a Book in commendation of *Cato*, to justify that action, which *Cæsar* answer'd with another, which he call'd *Anti-Cato*, both which are lost. The Ceremony of his death was very remarkable; for, upon hearing of the miscarriages of most of his Partners, he embraces his Son and Friends, and bids them good-night, pretending to go to bed. Resting upon his bed, he took into his hand *Plato's* Book of the immortality of the Soul: wherein having

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ving satisfied himself, he about the relieving of the watch, with a *Roman* resolution drew his Sword, and ran himself into the Body. Being not quite dispatched, Physicians came in and applyed something to the wound, which he suffered while they stayd with him, but as soon as they departed, he pulled all off, and thrust his dying hand into the wound. *Scipio* the General in this War, having escaped, and shipped himself in certain Gallies, was met by *Cæsar's* Navy; but to avoid being taken by them, he gave himself some wounds, and leapt over-board, and so was drowned.

Cæsar being by this means absolute Victor, spends some time in ordering the Provinces of *Africk*: which done, and reducing *Juba's* Kingdome into a Province, he comes to *Utica*, whence he embarked the third of *June* for *Sardinia*, where having stayd some few days, he arrives at *Rome*, *July* 25. whither as soon as he was come, there were granted unto him four Triumphs. The first was for his conquest and Victories in *France*, wherein were set forth the Rivers of *Rhodanus* and the *Rbene* wrought in gold. In the second, which was for *Ægypt*, and King *Ptolemy*, were presented the River *Nile*, and the *Pharos* of *Alexandria* burning. The third was for his Victory over King *Pharnaces*, wherein a certain writing represented the celerity he used in the prosecution of that Victory, which only contained three words, *Veni, Vidi, Vici; I came, I saw, I overcame*. The fourth was for his reduction of *Africk*, wherein was placed *Juba's* Son as a Captive. As for the Battel against *Pompey*, *Cæsar* would not triumph for it, because it was against *Roman* Citizens.

These triumphs ended, and great rewards scattered among the souldiery, who had been assistant in so great Transactions, the People being also entertained with feasts, sports, and presents, *Cæsar* is chosen the fourth time Consul. But there yet remained some sword-work to do, for *Gneius Pompeius*, great *Pompey's* Son, had got together most of the remainder of the *African* Army, and was gone into *Spain* to join with his Brother *Sextus* (who as was hinted before) was there, and had possessed himself of a great part of *Spain*, with the Cities of *Sevill*, and *Cordova*, the *Spaniards* being ready enough to come in to their assistance. *Cæsar* takes with him his most experienced veterane Souldiers, and with extraordinary speed arrives in *Spain*, within a few days, being accompanied with his Nephew *Octavius*, who was about sixteen years of age.

Being come into *Betica* (now *Andalusia*) where the two *Pompeys* were with such Legions as they had got together, he soon began a hot and bloody War, whereof to be short, the issue was this. *Cæsar* and *Gneius Sextus* being in *Cordova* near *Munda*, join battel, which proves the sharpest and most obstinate that ever was. It lasted almost a whole day, and that with such indifference as to point of Victory, that it was adjudged sometimes to one side, sometimes to another. *Suetonius* and *Eutropius* tell us, that *Cæsar* one time, upon his mens giving ground, was in such a plunge, that he was almost resolved to have kill'd himself, so to have avoided the shame and dishonor of being conquered; and that in that heat of indignation and despair he snatched a Target from one of his Souldiers, laying with a loud voice (as *Plutarch* relates) *If you are not ashamed, leave me, or deliver me into the hands of these boys, for this shall be the last day of my life, and your honor*. With which words the Souldiers being animated and heightened by his example, regain their lost ground, turn by degrees, the scales of the Battel; and towards the evening, the enemy fainting and flying, become apparent Victors. The Enemy lost in this field 30000 Men: *Cæsar*, beside the common Souldiery, 1000. all persons of Quality. This did *Cæsar* account the most glorious of all his Victories, (the commemoration of hazards

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zards and suffering being to some the greatest satisfaction conceivable) for he would often say afterwards, that at other times he fought for *Fame* and *Victory*, but that that day he fought for his *Life*, which he had never fought for before. *Pompey*, who had performed all that a wife and stout Captain could, persecuted by a malicious fortune, and seeing there was no other remedy, escaped by flight: but being hopeles and refugeles, he was at last surprized by some of *Cæsar's* friends, killed and his head brought to him, which was also the fate of *Labienus*. *Sextus* upon this quits *Cordova*, and shortly after *Spain*, leaving all to *Cæsar*, who in a short time reduced and settled the whole Country. Which done, he returns to *Rome*, and triumphs for the Wars of *Spain*, which was his fifth and last Triumph.

Having thus conquered the greatest part of the World, and by consequence gained the reputation of the most famous and most powerful man in it, it was at least a pardonable ambition; if he thought no title, name, or dignity too great for him. It requires some faith to believe that such vast bodies as *Roman Armies*, consisting of many Legions, could at an ordinary rate march through so many Countries, and cross so many Seas, had they had no enemy to engage: but to conquer them transcends it, and must be attributed to Miracle; for within less than five years, through infinite Conquests and Victories, he consummated the *Roman Monarchy*, making himself perpetual Dictator, Sovereign Lord or Emperor. Which later title though it had not that height of signification which his Successors have rais'd it to, yet was it the greatest attribution of honor which that, or after-Ages have acknowledged.

But if his thoughts were so high, and his ambition so exorbitant, as to deserve a severe censure, certainly it may prove so much the more excusable, by how much it was inflamed by the general acclamations and acknowledgments. For both the Senate and people of *Rome*, some out of fear, some out of affection, some out of dissimulation, were forward enough to invent those appellations of honor and preeminence, and afterwards to elevate them to the height of his ambitious mind. Hence was he called *Emperor*, *Father*, *Restorer*, and *Preserver* of his Country; hence created perpetual Dictator, and Consul for ten years, and perpetual Censor of their Customs; his Statue erected among the Kings of *Rome*: hence he had his Thrones and Chairs of State in the Theatre and Temples, which, as also all publick places, were filled with his pictures and images. Nay, their adoration ascended to that point, that from these humane honors they attributed to him divine; finding Marble little enough for Temples and Statues for him, (which were dedicated to him with the same veneration as to their Gods) and metal little enough to represent his high and almost incredible adventures.

But all the power and command of so many Nations as he had conquered was inconsiderable as to the extent of his mind: whereby we may see what small acquaintance there is between Ambition and Acquiescence. It was not sufficient to have been personally engaged in fifty signal Battels, and to have lay'd with their Bellies to the Sun a million ninety and odd thousand men, (abating all those that fell in the Civil Wars) but there yet remains something to do greater than all this. The fierce *Parthians* break his sleep, they are yet unconquered, which once done, were easy like lightning, to pass through *Hircania* and other Countries to the *Caspian Sea*, and so scour the Provinces of *Cythia* *Alatica*, and so passing over the River *Tanais*, to come into *Europe*, and bring in *Germany* and the bordering Provinces under

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der the wings of the *Roman Eagle*. In order to this expedition had he in sundry places raised 10000 horse, and 16 Legions of choice foot: but another greater power thought fit he should leave some work for his successors.

Nay, some things he aimed at beyond Mans attempt, correcting even nature itself. As that design of making *Peloponnesus* and *Iland*, by cutting off that neck of Land which is between the *Aegean* and *Ionian Seas*. He thought to have altered the courses of the Rivers *Tiber* and *Amien*, and made them navigable for ships of the greatest burthen. He had begun to level divers Hills and Mountains in *Italy*, and to dry up Lakes and Fens. He re-edified and re-peopled the once famous *Carthage* and *Corinth*. These and many other things he had done without doubt, had not an unexpected and barbarous death surprized him in the midst of his designations. Which because it is the tragical part of this Relation, we shall refer to the last place, while in the mean time we shall divert our thoughts, with a short entertainment of his personal excellencies and endowments, his extraction, birth, dedication, and names; as we have already satisfied our selves with the consideration of his Actions: and so to pass to that part of our undertaking, wherein we presume to promise the curious and critical Reader, no less content then he hath found in what he hath already reflected on, that is to say, the description and dilucidation of what MEDALS have been snatched out of the jaws of hungry Time, That have had any relation to the great name of CÆSAR.

CÆSAR was of a full and handsome composition of body, of a graceful carriage and deportment, of a whitish complexion, his eyes were somewhat big, black, quick and piercing, his nose straight and large enough, but his mouth was more then ordinary wide, his cheeks lean. In his later days he became bald towards the fore-part of his head, and through his continual hazards and hardships, much wrinkled in the forehead. These last imperfections are easily discernable in his Medals, as also in some graven stones and Marbles: and this made him seem somewhat older then he was, his baldness, wrinkles, and wide mouth taking away much of the gracefulness of his countenance, and causing him to have a rustick Physiognomy. This gave occasion to *Silenus* the oldest among the *Satyr*s, very pleasantly (in the CÆSARS of the Emperor *Julian*) to boast, that besides other similitudes between them, he had a head like *Julius Cæsar's*. But as to the baldness, it is no more to be objected to him as indecent, then to diverse other great personages of Antiquity, as may be frequently seen in Medalls and Marbles, *Hercules* himself being one of the Tribe. They are the highest and sublimest things, nay the more divine, as approaching the sky, that are freed from all superfluities. The highest mountains are bald on their tops, though in other parts they are perruqu'd with Woods, and have fertile descents. *Cæsar* was much troubled at the loss of his hair, in so much, as having effected his designs, he always wore a Crown of Laurel, the better to cover the nakedness, thrusting up the hair he had towards the hinder part of his head, as much as he could, as may be remarked out of his effigies in the Medalls. He had a strong and vigorous body, able to endure any thing of labor or hardship; an active and lively mind, capable of any undertaking, his judgment and common sense most exquisite. He was furnished with a strange foresight and vigilance, a dexterity and presence of mind,

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mind above ordinary, and an incredible resolution and courage in all exigences and emergencies. In the War of *Asia*, under the Prætor *Marcus Terentius*, he obtained a Civical Crown. He was admirable for his Eloquence and incomperable Memory. He was well versed in Astrology, and by the assistance thereof knew many things. It was by that that he was jealous of the *Idea* of the Month, as being fatal to him. Nay, he writ Books of the motion of the Stars, regulated the year, and reduced it to the course of the Sun; which Science he learned from the *Egyptians*. From his skill in that Science he raised himself to attempt that great change and alteration which he brought about, from the strange prodigies which had happened not long before, as you have them elegantly described by *Petronius* and *Lucan*, the heavens, earth, sea, nay the very mountains and Rivers intimating that great vicissitude.

But in the whole constellation of his Vertues and perfections, none shines brighter than his *Clemency* and *Generosity*. His propensity to pardon his Enemies, when conquered, whether Barbarians or Citizens, was exemplary: and it is much to be questioned whether his Lenity raised him more friends or enemies. When he had passed the *Rubicon*, he takes the City *Corfinium*, and in it *Domitius*, whom the Senate had designed to succeed him in his command in *France*: yet though all were at his mercy, he dismissed *Domitius*, with what part of the Legions would go with him, to repair to *Pompey*. Nor was his Clemency and Liberality less remarkable at the Battel of *Pharsalia*, where he not only pardoned his enemies, but received some of the most inveterate into favor and familiarity, and engaged them into the Government of Provinces and Countries: not to mention the confidence in him of *Cato Uticensis*, and his severe punishing of the Murderers of *Pompey*. Much more might be said of him, but since it is not our business to write any *Panegyrics* on him, we come to his extraction.

As for his extraction, we find that those of the *Julian* Family, boasted that they were originally descended from *Julus*, the Son of *Æneas*, the Son of *Anchises* and *Venus*, which was a common and yet no criminal ambition in those times. The Poets above all other, those that lived in the times of *Cæsar*, and *Augustus*, strove who should most celebrate this Genealogy, and that by very remarkable casts of their inherent Flattery. To omit what may be gathered out of *Lucan*, *Petronius*, and others, we shall content our selves with what we have from *Mamilius*, *Altron*. lib. 1.

Venerisque ab origine proles
Julia descendit cælo, cælumque replevit.

And *Propertius*, lib. 4. Eleg. 1.

Tunc animi venero Decii Brutique secures,
Vexit & ipsa sui Cæsaris arma *Venus*,
Arma resurgentis portans victricia *Trojae*:
Felix terra tuos cepit, *Julæ*, deos.

But that which *Cæsar* suffers in this business, is, that it was objected to him as a great vanity to derive himself from this Goddess, as being so far guilty of it, that he recommended to her the success and conduct of his most signal enterprises, trusting her with all his good fortune. We mention not his dalliances with *Cleopatra*, because the temptation on her side was more

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more than ordinary; not only that of her beauty, but her strange prostitution of her self, even to that point, that before she had seen *Cæsar*, she caused her self to be put up into a Basket, and, as if it had been some Present, to be brought to him, fearing, if she had come without this surprise, she might not have access. But, if it be a vanity, 'tis easily discover'd in his Coins, being furnish'd with several shapes of this *Venus Genetrix*, this Goddess of Generation, sometimes sitting on the prow of a Ship, sometimes standing, bearing a Victory in her right hand, to represent a *Venus Victrix*, such as whereof *Hypermetra* dedicated a Figure in the City of *Argos*, calling it *Niképhoros*, bearing a Victory, which was the Word *Cæsar* gave at the Battel of *Pharsalia*, wherein he was afterwards imitated by *Augustus* at the Fight of *Actium*. The same reason may be given for his placing a *Venus Victrix* upon the other side of his own Effigies in his Medalls, with a Globe, as conceiving, she ought him the conquest of the Universe. Besides, at the Battel of *pharsalia*, he made a Vow, to build her a Temple (as *Appianus* records, l. 2.) and afterwards caused his Statue to be plac'd next to that of this goddess of Generation. To which, Monuments seem to relate those antique Inscriptions, which *Gruterus* mentions, for as much as concerns the worship of this *Venus*, observ'd by the *Romans*, out of their Veneration of her, and the *Julian* Family.

DIVO JULIO
LIB. JULIA EBORA
OB ILLIUS IMMUN. ET MUN.
LIBERALITATEM
QUO IUS DEDICATIONE
VENERI GENETRICI
CESTUM MATRONE
DOMUM TULERUNT.

VENERI GENETRICI
D..... JULI
IN MEMORIAM GENT.
JULIÆ
STATUAM CUM....
JUNIUS VIRBIUS ATTICUS
FLAM DIVI JULI
D. S. P. D.

But, we shall have more to say of this goddess, when we come to the *Medalls*, we therefore proceed to his *Nativity*.

Cæsar was born under *Sagittary*, that is to say, upon the Twelfth day of *July*, which denoted to him great Victories, and many famous triumphs in his own Country, according to *Mamilius*, lib. 4. in these Verses.

Nec non arcitenens prima cum veste resurgis,
Pectora clara dabit bello, magnisque triumphis
Conspicuum patrias Victorem ducet in arces;
Sed nimium indulgens rebus Fortuna secundis
Invidet in facie, lævitque asperissima fronti, &c.

but the end should be dismal and unfortunate: as indeed it happen'd. But *Apollinaris Sidonius* in his *Panegyrick of Anthemius*, vers. 120. makes another observation, wherein, of all Authors he is singular, saying, That *Cæsar* was born at the same time when a Crown of *Lawrell* was burning.

Julius in lucem venit dum *Laurea* flagrat.

What preface could arise hence, to signify his innumerable Victories, we have only this Author to inform us. But indeed, there is one other discover

[d] this

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this Mystery, but another way: for when they would presage the fertility or sterility of the ensuing year, they were wont to cast a Crown of Lawrell into the fire, and, according to the crackling of the leaves, they gave their judgment. This is *Tibullus*. l. 2. Eleg. 5.

*Ut succensa sacris crepitet bene laurea flammis,
Omne quo felix & sacer annus eat.
At Laurus bona signa dedit, gaudete coloni,
Distendet spicis aurea plena Ceres.*

Therefore at *Cæsar's* birth, it may be thought, some one out of superstition bethought him of this Ceremony, or it happened by chance. But in fine, those that were assistant at the birth, were, by that accident raised to a certain confidence, that the Child then born should prove a most fortunate man, and should arrive to great fame and wealth.

As concerning his *Deification*, there is not much to be said. In the first place, we suppose it a thing not so miraculous, that the *Romans* should believe, that one who had done such great and transcendent actions, as *Cæsar* did, might be thought somewhat more than a man, and had in him something divine; besides, that he was one acknowledg'd to have descended from *Venus Genetrix*, the mother of the Universe. Other Nations had that custome of adoring and Invoking their Kings, as Gods, after their death; as the *Egyptians*, *Persians*, and the *Moors*, who, in *Cæsar's* time, put *Juba* into the number of the gods. In the second place, we meet with two censorious remarks upon this Deification. First, how that Genius of Vertue and Generosity, which was wont to animate the *Roman* People, was so metamorphosed into that of flattery and vanity, as to deify one, who, by the greatest, if not the most, was look'd on as the greatest oppressor of the *Roman* Liberty, and onely the most fortunate Malefactor that ever was, when they had not vouchsafed that Honour to *Numa Pompilius*, who had been the *Moses*, the Law-giver, the most just and the most pious among the *Roman* Princes. Secondly, whether, if he had miscarried at the Battel of *Pharsalia*, he had not been the most infamous person among the *Romans* that ever was, and more abominable than *Catiline*; and on the contrary, whether Rocks, Mountains, Seas, and the Cabinets of Conquer'd Kings and Citizens, had furnished Marble, Porphyry, Jasper and Precious Stones, enough to erect Pillars, Statues, and Temples to celebrate the glory of the great *Pompey*, who was so zealous for the Liberty of *Rome*. But, *Divine Providence* was pleas'd to use *Cæsar* as an Instrument to change that *Common-wealth* into a *Monarchy*, that the *Prince of Peace* and *Saviour* of the World, should be born under the Peaceable reign of one sole *Monarch*.

As for the name of *Julius*; since, as is before noted, the *Julian* Gens derived it self from *Julus*, the son of *Æneas*, the son of *Anchises*, by a prodigious coition with *Venus*, it must be granted *Julus* was the Author of this Family.


Julius à magno deductum nomen Iulo.

as *Virgil* says. This *Julius* was also called *Ilus*, and more frequently *Ascanius*, from a place in *Phrygia* called *Ascanium*, or from a River named *Ascanius*. That of *Ilus* was in memory of *Ilus* the most renowned King of the
Trojans,

IULIUS



CÆSAR



MIVIRS

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Trojans, from whom *They* was called *Ilium*. But, to be yet more critical, the name *Iulius*, or *Iulæ* was given him, because of his hairiness about the cheeks sooner than his age required, according to the *Latin* *Virgil*.

*At puer Afcanius, cui nunc cognomen Iulo
Additur, ille erat dum res fieret illa regna.*

Upon which place *Servius* tells us, that that name was given after the battle that *Afcanius* gain'd against *Mecentius*, *ab herba laryginem*. (*quam iulio Græci dicunt*) *que ei tempore victorie nascebatur*. So that *iulus* signifies *the* *Edi-* *bury* *the* *young*, the soft hair which first appears upon the cheeks.

The name *Cæsar* seems to have some relation to the other, for that *Caesæ*, in *Hesychius* signifies *meagras*, that is to say, a certain thick and clotted hairiness, such as Women's, when they plait and twist their hair about their heads; and he that either naturally or artificially had such a one, had first the honour of that name, which likely was some one of the posterity of *Iulus*, the Son of *Æneas*; unless we would rather trust *Spatianus*, who would have the first of this family to be so called, *Quod cum magis criminibus sit utero parentis effusus*, because he was born with abundance of hair. In fine, however it came, it was so venerable during the long Reign of *Augustus*, that of *Tiberius*, and three more of the Family, that it alone design'd the Emperor, and became a name of invocation upon any accident of haste, surprise, or admiration.

We might here bring in what *Suetonius* delivers in the Life of *Augustus*, that the first Letter of the name *Cæsar*, which is *C*. being dash'd out by a Thunderbolt, it was predicted, that he should die within a hundred dayes, because that Letter stands for that number; and that after his decease he should be received into the number of the gods, because *ÆSAR* signified in the *Hebrew* *can* *Tongue* *GOD*. This gave occasion to all that have Commented on that Author, to criticize and puzzle themselves about the signification of the word *CÆSAR*: but all being trivial, and imaginary, we forbear further disquisition, and pass to our Observations upon his *MEDALS*.

OBSERVATIONS UPON CÆSAR'S MEDALS.

Upon the First Medall.

THe Effigies of *Venus Genitrix*, with a Globe or World before her, without any inscription; though *Orco* and *Urfinus* mention one inscrib'd with *L. BUCA*, the other side hath *Venus* giving *Anchises* a meeting near Mount *Ida*: this it should seem *Cæsar* caused to be done out of flattery to himself, in that it served, both to make his Original more illustrious, and as a Monument of that hap-

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pinets and good fortune which this goddess had procured him in all his enterprises. For it was his ambition, to have descended in a right line from *Anchises* and *Venus*, by whose indulgence he had conquered the Universe, as being his directrix in all his designs, as is represented by the Globe or World; whereof this goddess was thought to be in some sort the Protectress, as being esteem'd the Sovereign *Genius* of Generation, according to *Solinus*,

—Tu fetibus auges
Cuncta suis, totus pariter tibi parturit orbis.

And her worship was questionless very ancient: for it was the head of *Venus Genitrix* that the *Saracens* and *Ishmaelites* worshipped, alledging, that *Abraham* had, by the means of it, enjoy'd *Hagar*, from whom proceeded a great generation, as *Enthymius Zigabenus*, in his Table of the opinions of that Nation, and the anonymous *Greek* Author of the *Saracen* History, have observed. So have we here the same Goddess accosting that great Heros to have issue by him. The *Genius* destin'd to further the establishment of the *Roman* greatness, hath a Scepter in his hand, to signify the future Majesty of that Monarchy.

The Second Medall.

I SEPULIUS MACER. *Venus* standing with a Victory in her right hand, and a pike in the other, being the other side of that which bore the Effigies of *Cæsar*, and the star of this Goddess. *Servius* quoting an observation of *Varro*, says, upon the first of the *Æneids*, that when this Heros left *Troy*, looking up into the sky, he presently perceives *Venus* in the day-time, she shining then purposely to direct him to *Laurentum*, the place for which the *Destinies* had design'd him. The *Egyptians* represented this star by the figure of a most beautiful Woman, it being thought the brightest in the firmament, whence it was called *Καλλιστο* *pulcherrima*, being nam'd in the morning *Phosphorus*, or *Lucifer*, in the evening *Vesper*. This star therefore, that was *Æneas's* conductress, was no other then that midwife of the Light, *Venus*, being the same which the *Saracens* call *Cubar*, or *Kabar*, which word signifies, great; being also otherwise called *Astarte*, *Urania*, or *Celestis*: by all which names is meant no other but this *Genitrix*, under which Epithet the *Lacedemonians* ador'd and invok'd her as an advancer of Generation. The *Romans* in the *Circensian* games brought forth the statue of *Cæsar* in *Pompe*, having the Planet *Venus* on his head. Now this *Urania* (because of her procreative influence) was held in particular devotion by the Women, as divers Medalls of the *Empresses* discover, being commonly inscrib'd *Veneri celesti*, and having that Star. *Gualtherus* furnishes us with an inscription of a certain priestess of hers, out of the antient Monuments of *Sicily*.

ΔΙΟΔΩΤΟΣ ΤΙΤΙΕΛΟΥ ΑΠΗΕΙΡΑΙΟΣ
ΤΑΝ ΑΔΕΛΦΑΝ ΑΤΤΟΥ ΤΑΝ
ΜΙΝΤΡΑΝ ΑΡΤΕΜΟΝΟΣ ΙΕΡΑΤΕΥΟΥΣΑΝ
ΑΣΠΟΔΙΤΑΙ ΟΤΡΑΝΙΑΙ

Diodotus

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*Diodotus Titili filius Appeireus sororem suam Minyram Artemonis filiam
Sacerdotem Veneris Celestis.*

She was also inscribed *Venus Celestis Augusta*, (possibly in favor of some *Empress*) as also *Inuita Celestis*.

The third Medall.

CÆSAR DICT. PERP. *Cæsar* perpetual Dictator. A *Venus Victorix* naked, holding an Helmet and a Buckler. There is before her a Pillar, upon which is placed an Eagle, and behind a Military Ensign. The meaning is this. We have *Venus* here naked with a Helmet in her hand, to signify her victorious over *Mars* by her charming attractions, as if that God had quite lost all courage, delivering up his *Armes*, and rendring himself her Prisoner. Thus *Menelaus* cast away his pike, sword and buckler, having had but a glimpse of the delicate breast of the fair *Hellen*. But in this Medal *Venus* denotes, that she had so fortunately assisted *Cæsar*, (the minion of all her progeny) in all his warlike enterprises, that he had obtained absolute Victory over all his enemies; whereof the Helmet, Buckler and military Ensign being the Marks, *Cæsar* had consecrated them to her in acknowledgment of her favors. The Eagle pitched upon a pillar, signifies that his Victories have assured him the *Roman* Empire, which should be his eternally. The Eagle denotes Empire and Royalty, and prefigures and signifies absolute Victory. It signifies also that the Empire shall be assured to him, maugre all the force and opposition of the *Gallies* and *Germans*, or any other whatsoever, whom he should despise, as this bird doth thunder, for that of all creatures it can ascend above the clouds, where it can suffer no injury.

The fourth Medall.

GERMN. INDUTI III. A River lying by a Mountain side pours out his water, having a Boat or Bark near him. This Medal seems to have been stamp'd purposely to exercise our divination. We conceive it should be read *GERMANA INDUTIA*, and that the number three stands for nothing else but the year, taking the word *INDUTIA* to signify a Colony of *Germans* disposed into that place by *Cæsars* order. This name indeed is not found among the Geographers, only *Pliny* mentions a Town called *INDUSTRIA* situated along the *Apennine*, upon the famous River of *Po*. Now there is a great conformity between the situation of this Town and this Medal, and possibly it may be an *erratum* in *Pliny*, and that it should be read *INDUTIA* instead of *INDUSTRIA* which is not so likely to be the name of a City. For the three points III. they may signify the year of the establishment of that Colony, or of the foundation of the City. There is another Medal hath four III. denoting the fourth year; but it hath withall the devise of an Ox with his head stooping, and his knee bent, which posture implies the establishment and foundation of a City. In this posture doth

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doth Nonnus describe the Ox of Cadmus. Upon both these Medals there is a *Venus Victrix* on one side, and what is before recited on the other: whence it is inferred, that the planting of this Colony happened after *Cæsars* most remarkable Victories against the *Germani*.

The fifth and sixth Medals.

WE have these two Medals from *Goltzius*: whereof one in Greek, hath a Tripod and two stars, the inscription of the head and the other side is ΚΑΙΣΑΡ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ ΑΡΧΙΕΡ ΜΕΤ. ΟΙΟΝΙΣΤΗΣ. *Cæsar Imperator, Pontifex maximus, Augur*. This Tripod of *Apollo* hath something in it more particular. *Apollo, Augur*, or ☉, who is here designed by one of the stars which accompanies that of *Venus Genitrix* or *Celestis*, shews that *Cæsar* was assisted in his charge of *Augur*, and his study of Astrology, and presaging (whereof the *Litæus* and the Tripod were the marks) by these two Divinities. For *Phœbus* or ☉, hath two significations which relate much to his star and Tripod, that is to say, splendid and luminous, so that he is both foreteller and *Augur*. But to return to the star of *Venus*, or *Phosphorus*, or (as *Philo Judeus* calls it) *Eosphorus*, and to this Sun or star of *Phœbus Apollo*. It may be conjectured they are placed above this Tripod, to give us to understand, that these Gods should promise the *Roman* *Agur Cæsar*, by a continual success in all his enterprises, the absolute conquest of both East and West.

The seventh Medal.

CÆSAR. An Elephant with a Serpent between his legs. On the other side, the utensils and instruments that belonged to sacrificing, with the head ornament of the High-priest. Divers Antiquaries have so commented upon this Medal, as to make the word *Cæsar* signify an Elephant. But in my opinion, this devise signifies altogether as much as if it had this inscription about it, IMP. CÆSAR, or CÆSAR DICTATOR PERP. on one side, and PONTIF. MAX. on the other. For as the one shews forth the Royal quality, the other supposes the Pontifical to have been in those times joined with it in the person of *Cæsar*. An Elephant in *Italy* (according to *Artemidorus*) signifies a Royal, Imperial, or Supreme Power. But *Achmet* in his *Oncirocriticks* ch. 271. tells us, that this creature had the same signification in the *Indies* and *Ægypt*; therefore *Artemidorus* hath not done well to restrain it to *Italy*. But it may be the *Moors*, imitating other Nations herein, took an Elephant to signify a Monarch; and because *Cæsar* was the most famous Man that ever was, one that commanded Kings and Monarchs, would make his name stand for an Elephant, for this word is little less than *African*. The same *Artemidorus* says, that a Dragon seen in a dream signifies a King and a supreme Magistrate; which agreeing with what he says of the Elephant, and both these creatures being on the other side, I conceive my interpretation the more receivable.

The

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The Eighth Medal.

CÆSAR DICTATOR. *Cæsar* with the augural stick. In the reverse there is L. LIVINEIUS. REGULUS. a Bull furiously running with his head stooping. It is conceived this was stamped by *Regulus*, in *Cæsars* favor, when *Cæsar* was created Dictator, or shortly after. This Bull is brought in as an emblem of Principality, as *Dion Chrysostome* says, who hath made an excellent parallel between this Creature, and a King and his Kingdom. But before him *S. Denys* in the 15 ch. of his *Hierarchy*, said that the strength of a Bull represents the force necessary for a Prince, and that his horns signify *Servatricem atque invictam vim*. *Stephanus* observes upon the word ταύρος, that the Antients call'd ταύρους all things that were excessive for greatness or strength. The intention therefore of *Regulus*, was to let *Cæsar* understand, that having overthrown *Pompey*, and become perpetual Dictator, he was in effect the most powerful and most redoubted Monarch that ever was, and was in a condition to pursue and accomplish the utter ruine of his enemies, and protect his friends.

There is a reverse among the Medals of *Augustus*, where there is also a Bull in a different figure and posture from this, bending his knee, to represent (as is conceived) the *Taurus Cælestis*, which is under the dominion of *Venus*, which signified the invincibility of *Augustus*. It may be also considered, that this Bull may signify *Italy* subdued and subject to the Laws of *Augustus*, as being now the civil Wars were over, ready to receive the yoke. For that Province took its name from a Bull, which the *Tyrrhenians* called *ιγρως*; so that *Italy* submitted its neck to receive the yoke of the new Government, as the Bull ———— *Summittit aratris*.

Colla, jugumque suis poscit cervicibus ipse.

The ninth Medal.

DIVO. JULIO. the effigies of *Cæsar* deif'd, the Star of *Venus* before him or if you will, *Cæsars* own. On the other side *Mars* upon an Altar, or rather *Cæsar* representing *Mars*, before whom sits a figure, which hath a *Cornucopia* or horn of abundance under the left arm, in the right, holds a Victory, which presents a Crown to him. This Medal seems to have been made shortly after *Cæsars* death, to keep his memory in veneration, and nourish that belief of the people, that he was, while living, a God transformed into a Man. It was indeed an excellent artifice of *Augustus* and his party, to make the superstitious vulgar believe, that *Julius Cæsar* was become a fellow-Commoner among the Gods, to make his succession the more plausible. For being already persuaded that no other than a demy-God, could have arrived to that glory which *Cæsar* had, having baffled the Universe; it was not very hard to persuade them that the Comet, which appeared in the North after his death, was his deif'd soul. But the cheat was, that this soul must appear there to render *Augustus* more illustrious; who to retribute the glory, and make the business more authentick

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thenick, must erect *Cæsar* statue in the Capitol, representing upon the head of it that *Starr* in Gold, and giving it this bold inscription; ΚΑΙΣΑΡΙ ΗΜΙΘΕΩ, to *Cæsar* the Demi-god. To make any long discourse upon Comets from hence, were superfluous, since all that can be said is, that they signify changes and revolutions of States and Empires, and sometimes favorably. This signified in all likelihood, the War then kindling against *Augustus*: after which, a general peace ensuing, the Prince of Peace should be born, the Comet at whose birth denoted the universal change of Religion that afterward happened. To be short, all that the Poets, those fine Cooks of fictions and inventions, could dress that would be any way digestible with the credulous vulgar, was served up at this time to raise the memory of *Julius Cæsar* to the greatest reputation that might be: but it will be to no purpose to repeat their adulations in this place.

On the reverse of this Medal, we find *Mars*, who receives the Crown, which *Victory* presents him with, represented with a dart. The *Victory* is *Venus Victrix*, or the Victorious City of *Rome*, and the *Mars*, *Julius Cæsar* himself, in the posture of that God. The Statue is conceived to be the same with that of *Mars*, erected by the *Romans* in the Temple of *Quirinus*, with this magnificent title, ΘΕΟΑΝΙΚΗΤΩ, Deo invicto. This supposition is confirmed by the dart, for *Mars* was ordinarily represented with a spear, as divers Medals discover. But in this Statue he hath a dart, which is that piece of Arms which is capable of furthest casting, and that indeed which the *Romans* most used, and at the fight of *Pharsalia* was one main cause of the Victory, *Cæsar* having given his men order that they should aim at the faces of the raw *Roman* Nobility they had to deal with, as divers Historians have delivered. Yet this argues not but that *Cæsar* sometimes made use of a Javelin or Pike as well as *Mars*; but it is to be conceived this was more for the convenience of his travelling, which was afoot, (and that many times in the winter haply over the *Alpes*) according to the custome of most of the great Captains and Generals of *Rome*, as *Livy* and *Plutarch* abundantly attest.

The tenth Medal.

ΙΩΤΑΙΟΤ ΚΑΙΣΑΡΟΣ ΑΤΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ ΔΟΤΚΤΑ ΤΟΡΟΣ. *Cai Julii Cæsaris Imperatoris Dictatoris*. The effigies of *Cæsar* crowned with a thick Crown of Laurel, which closed before, the better to cover his baldness, the hair being thrust forward to help it. The reverse hath ΙΑΙΩΝΒΙΣ ΝΕΩΚΟΡΩΝ *Ilensum bis Neocororum*; *Æneas* carrying his Father and the *Palladium* at their quitting of *Troy*, the little *Julus* going before with his hat in his hand. That which in this falls under question is, first, to know the situation of this *Ilium*; wherein *Strabo* hath spent more sweat than all the Geographers; affirming that it was not the *Ilium* of his time, a Town well known, nor any thing built upon the ruins of the old one so ill-entreated by the *Greeks*, as being distant from this thirty *stadia*; that in that place there was only a small village bearing up the name; that it was built up by *Alexander*, from a small Town that it was before, having a little Temple of *Minerva* much ruined, and received from him divers privileges and immunities, with a promise after his

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his Victory over *Darius*, of a magnificent Temple, and the Toleration and setting up of Games and Exercises. This was partly executed after his death by *Lysimachus*, who enlarged the City by a Wall of forty *stadia*; disposing thither many out of the Neighbouring Cities that were ruin'd. After which it was ruin'd, and restor'd divers times; but lastly, it received great Favours from *Sylla*, which is conceived to be the reason that it declared against *Cæsar* in the Civil Wars: whence it may be inferred, that those of that City knew not at that time that *Cæsar* pretended to be of the race of *Venus* and *Anchises*, which was only found out after his Victory. But at length *Cæsar* receives them into Favour, restores and confirms their ancient privileges and immunities, and imitating *Alexander*, did them many courties.

In the second place, the understanding of these words, ΙΑΙΩΝΒΙΣ ΝΕΩΚΟΡΩΝ, *Ilensum bis Neocororum*. The word *Neocor*, is Translated commonly *Ædificiorum*; which we cannot render properly in English, but by *Overseers*, *Superiors*, and those that are entrusted with the charge of the Temples, and dispose of all things Sacred, or in some sort, they were such as we call *Church-wardens* in our Churches. But they are not those *Neocori* of the Temples that this Medal and divers others represent unto us, but the word was analogically apply'd to whole Nations, as also to Cities and Bodies Corporate, to whom the Kings, and afterwards the Emperors gave Commissions, to make Panegyrics, and Encomiastick Orations upon their Statues, Poms, religious worships, publick recreations and exercises, to the honour of their gods and Princes; which was done out of the publick stock, or by the contribution of the Corporations. As therefore the *Neocori* that belonged to the Temples, were disposers and guardians of the things Sacred, that were in their Sanctuaries, nay haply entertained the People or strangers, with the rarities and antiquities of their worships and mysteries; to these National *Neocori* had the superintendency over the Poms and Solemnities, panegyricall celebrations, exercises, sacrifices, and Ceremonies, which were to be observ'd upon the more Festival dayes, whereof they had the absolute disposal. This I build upon the conjecture of the Great and Learned *SELDEN*, who was the first cut this Gordian knot, upon a passage of the *Acts of the Apostles*, Chap. 19. There we have *Demetrius*, and those of his Profession, raising a Tumult, and accusing *S. Paul* and others, for Preaching that the Statues made with the hands of Men, were not Gods. The Town-clerk, or the Church-warden having appeased the Tumult, tells them that it was well known, that the City of *Ephesus* was then *Neocore* (in the English Translation *worshipper*) of the great Goddess *Diana*, and of the Image fallen from *Jupiter*, and that therefore there being no contradiction in that, they ought not to do any thing rashly. For these men, saith he, are neither sacrilegious, nor blasphemous persons, and therefore have done nothing against the Majesty of *Diana*. But if they had any matter against any man, the Law was open: but in case it were something else relating to their Goddess, whether by Blasphemy, Impiety, or Sacrilege (the cognizance whereof did of right belong to the *Ephesians* in body, as being then *Neocori*) they should have satisfaction in a full Assembly convoked for things of that nature. Now those silver shrines which *Demetrius* is said to make, are conceived to have been Models of that magnificent Temple, which the *Ephesians* being *Neocori*, caused out of magnificence to be made of that rich Metal. Had this controversy between the Apostles and the Goldsmiths come to

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a decision, they had proceeded thus; They would have had some to make publick panegyricks of their goddess in the first place; then, if *Paul* and his companions should not rest satisfied, this *Neocorean* people would have punished them according to their manner. Now, that the *Neocori* of the Temples were used to commend to all comers (especially Travellers) the greatness and power of their gods, and that the *Neocori* of Cities imitated them, but did it with great Pomp, employing persons, eminent for Learning and Eloquence, as Poets and Orators, for the honor of their gods, as also their Kings, Monarchs, Emperors, Founders, and that upon dayes instituted and ordain'd for that purpose, may be learn'd from *Horace*, who, *lib. 2. Ep. 1.* writing to *Augustus*, call's those Poets *Æditors*, who should immortalize the Vertue of that Emperor, or rather those who were charg'd to choose such as should do it, in these Verses:

*Sed tamen est operæ pretium cognoscere quales
Æditors habet, bellis spectata domique
Virtus, indigno non committenda Poetæ.*

But besides *Selden* hath well observed, that there were none of these Medals in the time of the Common-wealth, for that the Cities of Greece were not yet arrived to that esteem of the *Roman* greatness by the Fabrick of their monies and other signs of veneration, which they have come to since it became a Monarchy. This is the opinion of that great judicious Man, which yet is not absolutely true; for there were found the marks of this magnificence, under the Title of *Neocori*, abundantly among the Medals of *Alexander* the Great, whereof *Goltzius* reckons above 20. with this inscription, ΚΟΙΝΟΝ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΩΝ ΝΕΚΟΡΩΝ. Whence may be observ'd, that the People of *Macedonia* being generally *Neocori*, had caus'd these Coins to be stamp'd, in the honour of *Alexander*, having, upon the reverse, the figures of statues, chariots, temples, columns, &c. Nay, the *Maronians* in *Philip's* time, though but the People of a particular City, were honour'd with the charge of *Neocori*, there being a Medal, which hath on the one side, the effigies of *Bacchus*, crown'd with Vine-branches, inscrib'd, ΔΙΟΝΤΣΙΟΣ ΣΑΤΡΑΠ; on the reverse, that of *Philip*, thus, ΜΑΡΩΝΕΙΤΩΝ ΝΕΚΟΡΩΝ. In fine, the inhabitants of *Ilium* obtain'd leave of *Cæsar*, to make some magnificence, under the Title of *Neocori*, to honour him and the *Julian* Family, having erected, in memory of his extraction from *Anchises*, *Aeneas* and *Julus*, some *Colossus* representing the posture of *Aeneas* when he left *Troy*, doing a signal act of Piety both towards the gods and men, having the *Palladium* in his hand, and carrying the old man his Father in his right arme, as Women carry children, the little *Julus* marching before, having his hat in one hand, and asking his Father the way with the other. The word ΝΕΚΟΡΩΝ signifies that this was the second time they had been honour'd with the quality and commendation of being *Neocori*, and that they had celebrated the solemn dayes with Panegyricks, Poms, Exercises, and other magnificences befitting the grandeur of *Cæsar*.

The

The WIVES of CÆSAR.

The Wives of Cæsar.

His first Wife was *COSSUTIA*, whom he married in his youth, but divorc'd her at the seventeenth year of his Age, before he had lived with her, though she was Rich, and descended of a Family of the *Roman* Knights.

The second was *CORNELIA*, the daughter of *Cornelius Cinna*, one who had been four times Consul; by whom he had only one daughter, named *Julia*, afterwards first Wife to *Pompey*. He took her death very heavily, and publicly commended her, in a most elegant Funeral Oration.

The third was *POMPEIA*, the daughter of *Q. Pompeius*, who had gotten that evil report, as if *Publius Claudius* had been somewhat too familiar with her, which was the reason that *Cæsar* divorc'd her.

The fourth and last was *CALPURNIA*, who out-lived him, and was the daughter of *Lucius Piso*: a woman of a generous spirit, and well spoken, and had that honour and affection for *Cæsar*, that after his death she herself made a most elegant funeral Oration to his honour, and afterward retir'd to *Mark Antony*.

THE MEDALL OF THE TRIUMVIRI.

The Medal is of Copper, small, of the *Greek* fashion; It represents the three effigies of *Cæsar*, *Antoninus*, and *Lepidus*, done side-ways, one upon another on the same side, without Inscription. On the reverse it represents an *Hermathena*; before which Image there is an Altar, out of which issues a Serpent that lifts it self above it; behind there is a Legionary Eagle: time hath worn out the inscription to this half word APXIEP. This figure represents *Mercury* and *Minerva* joyn'd in one statue; that is to say, the upper part is of that Goddess, arm'd with a Helmet, Buckler and Javeline; the Lower part is a *Terminus* or *Hermes*. For the interpretation of this device; This *Hermathena*, comprehending in it the god *Terminus*, with *Minerva* and *Mercury*, denotes an excellent union, as to affection, interest and good understanding, among the *Triumviri*, as well for the management and conduct of civil affairs, as military. Which being so, the invention must needs be ingenious, denoting, that though their employments were several, yet there was such a concurrence between their Counsels and intentions, as that they jump'd into the same resolution for to carry on the interest of the Common-wealth. As for the Altar and Serpent, they signify certain Sacrifices performed by that People, for the welfare, union and concord

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cord of those three powers; as also either to obtain some Victory, or to give thanks to the gods for one received. For a Serpent issuing from under a Table, was taken by *Sylla* to preface Victory, as the Historian *Sisenna* observes upon *Cicero*, lib. 1. de *Divinatione*. See also *Val. Maximus*, lib. 1. ch. 6. and *Plutarch* in his *Life*. 'Tis therefore the Symbole of Health, Victory and Felicity. Of which opinion is also *Theophrastus*, who, giving the marks of a Superstitious man, says, 'that if he surprize a Serpent' in any place, he presently raises a Chappel, or an Altar in that place, as it were to thank the gods for so good an adventure. There may this further reason be given of this juncture in the *Hermathena*, that as *Minerva* hath a dominion over wrastling, as well as *Mercury*, so were they also both equally patrons of *Traffick* and *Merchandise*.

We shall divert a little to speak of another kind of Statues, called *Hermæ*, consisting the lower part of *Hermes*, the upper of *Hercules*. Both these and the *Hermathenas*, were placed in the places of publick exercises, *Mercury* and *Hercules*, implying strength and sleight. The reason why *Mercury* was so often joynd with other gods, was, that he could conform to any, and was one with all; as *Iamblicus* affirms, *Isque* (says he) *de Diis vera scientie præsidium ac tutelam tenens, unus extat idem in universis*: for which reason, the Ancients dedicated all their Works under his onely name. *Hercules* was held in such veneration for the god and Genius of all Gymnick engagements, that they came to be called (*angustiori vocabulo*) *Herculea certamina*. He was the institutor of the *Olympick Games*, wherein, having had the honour to wrastle with *Jupiter*, he was thought fit to be the patron of them: whence *Lycophron* call's him *παλαιστής*, the *Wraistler*.

The Second Medal.

M ANTONIUS IMP. AUG. IIIVIR. R.P.C. *Marcus Antonius Imperator Augur Triumvir Reipublicæ constituenda*. A sacrificing vessel called *præfericulum*, and the augural stick called *Litnus*. On the reverse there is *L. PLANCUS IMP. COS.* An Urne between a Thunderbolt and a *Caduceus*. It is to be noted first, that there is a Vessel on either side of this Medall, and therefore it is not enough to say, that that on one side with the *Litnus*, is the mark of an augural dignity, which *Antonius* obtained from his Favourite *L. Plancus* being Consul; but something must be said of this Urne, so honourably plac'd between a Thunderbolt and a *Caduceus*, on the other. *Appianus Alexandrinus* in his book of the Wars against the *Parthians*, speaking of the design which *Mark Antony* had, being at *Athens*, to undertake the War against them, and to partake of the glory might follow the ruining of so great and powerful a Nation, says, that, to satisfy the admonition of a certain Oracle, he carried with him a Vessel full of Water, taken out of the sacred Fountain which was in that City, called *Clepsydra*. Et ut oraculo cui-dam satisfaceret, etiam *Clepsydra* fonte vas repletum aqua secum aportavit. This Fountain *Hesychius* says was within the Cittadel of *Athens*. Now this is the representation of that Vessel, and a monument of the transportation of that water by *Mark Antony*, which must needs be of great concernment to him, since he was advised to do it by the Oracle, and specified the Fountain. As for the Thunderbolt and *Caduceus*, they signify that *Mark Antony* should in that expedition

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expedition make a thundring and dismal War against the *Parthians*, with a great number of old experienced Legions, who should tread under foot the *Parthian* greatness, elevated against the *Romans* by the miscarriage of *Crassus* and his flourishing Legions, or those Barbarians should buy their peace very dear, which the Heralds of *Mark Antony* should offer them with the *Caduceus* in their hands, that being the emblem of an assured reconciliation.

ATILIUS CIMBER.

WE should have no more to say of this *Cimber*, then we have of *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and the other Mafacrers of *Cæsar*, were it not that his Medal serves to correct divers passages in History (which it hath been the main design of these our Observations to clear up) wherein his name is corrupted.

All who have mentioned this Man, have been mistaken in his name, except *Appianus Alexandrinus*, and that in one place only, for in some others he calls him *Ταλλίος*. Others call him *Tillius*, others *Tullius*, or *Annius*. *Seneca* Epist. 8. 3. *Cai Cæsaris cede* (illius dico qui, superato Pompeio, Rempublicam tenuit) tam creditum est Tillio Cimbro quam Cassio: *Cassius tota vita aquam bibit*, *Tillius Cimber & nimis erat in vino & scordalus*. In hanc rem jocosus est ipse; *Ego*, inquit, *quenquam feram, qui vinum ferre non possum*? Upon which passage (which gives a strange intimation of the vicious qualities of this man) *Pintianus* says it ought to be read *Tullius Cimber*, as the same *Seneca* elsewhere calls him, and as he is called in *Plutarch* and *Suetonius*. But it is doubtless he should be called *Atilius Cimber*, and that *Suetonius*, *Quintillian*, and the other later Authors should be corrected, as having trusted the corrupt Manuscripts, and not seen this Medal.

But to come to the Devise on the reverse first. The Cap signifies (as is obvious to any one) the liberty obtained by the means of the ponyard wherewith *Cæsar*, who oppressed the Common-wealth, was dispatched. The wings, or Taries of *Mercury*, with the serpents, and the rod, which was ceremonies at the manumission of slaves, or rather the wand which *Mercury* made use of to conduct the Souls delivered out of the miseries of this life to their expected rest, signify that the diligence, dexterity, and prudence which *Atilius Cimber* had used in this execution, had restor'd the Universe to its Liberty, the *Romans* from the Tyranny of *Cæsar*, and had established peace and tranquillity in all families. The conduct and assistance of *Mercury* to the departed souls, with this wand, is expressed by *Statius* in these Verses.

*Summa pedum prope plantaribus illigat alas,
Obnubique comas, & temperat astra galero;
Tum dextra virgam infervit qua pellere dulces,
Aut suadere iterum somnos, qua nigra subire
Tartara, & ex sanguine animare adjuverat umbras.*

There is yet another thing whence it may be inferred that *Mercury* was a God very antiently esteemed well affected to Liberty, which is, that in the Isle of *Crete*, (now *Candia*) they celebrated an anniversary, which they called *Equeusio*

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to the honor of this God, wherein, after the manner of the *Saturnals* at Rome, Slaves and servants had all manner of Liberty, and were magnificently waited on at table by their Masters, as *Athenians* affirm, l. 14.

On the other side we have this inscription *ATILIUS CIMBER*, a man beyond middle-aged, with a great beard, and a rustick countenance, with a long poniard before him. That which may be more particularly deduced hence is, that he was more than ordinarily desirous that the conspiracy should prosper, though before he had been a great creature of *Cæsar*'s (as *Seneca* affirms in his Book *de Ira*.) Nay, under pretence of presenting a Petition to him, he was so importunate with him, and held him in discourse with such eagerness till he came into the Senate, that he had not the time to read a note which was presented to him, wherein the whole conspiracy was discovered. This poniard therefore stands to signify the great zeal he had to this execution, wherein he thought the liberty of his Countrey was concerned, to vindicate which, as it was his ambition to appear the most eager and the most resolute of all the gang, so he thought it his glory to give *Cæsar* the first wound. Which consideration leads us by the hand to what we had designed for the last part of this discourse, namely the tragical Catastrophe of this miraculous person.

For motives to the conspiracy, we may lay down partly the irreconcilable hatred that some bare, in others the aversion they had from tyranny, in others a kind of zeal to publick liberty: the encouragements, *Cæsar*'s own carelessness of himself, according to that *Apophthegm* of his, when advised to take a guard about his person, *That it was better to dye once, then live in continual fear*; his not humouring that people, who if courted with Majesty (as they had been wont in the time of the Commonwealth,) had suffered any thing; his derisory expressions of the Commonwealth, saying that it was a shadow, and an imaginary notion; *Antonius* his proffering him a Crown, which though (seeing the acclamations of the people backward) he accepted not, yet was his design easily discovered, the report that he was to be declared King, and would translate the Seat of the Empire to *Troy*, whence he pretended to descend or to *Alexandria*, to spend his days with *Cleopatra*; the Tribunes shewing a certain law to a friend of his in writing, whereby it was lawful to take as many Wives as one would, the better to people the Commonwealth. These and such like passages gave occasion to Libels and Placards, which were set up at every corner, whereof divers particularly addressed to *Brutus*, who by his influence over the chiefest Citizens, got together above 60. who under the conduct of *Brutus* (whose very name they thought to be fatal to Tyrants) would prefer the liberty of their Countrey before Lives, Fortunes, or Relations. Some time before his death, so many signs and prodigies happened, that it was become the general belief that *Cæsar*'s death was near at hand. Among other things, his soothsayer *Spurina* bid him beware of the Ides of *March*. All which put together somewhat startled him, inso much that he was once resolved to defer the Senate for that day, had not *Brutus* advised him in no case to betray so much fear, whereupon he went.

Going therefore in his Litter towards the Senate the fifteenth day of *March*, it could not be but divers would be presenting petitions, and discoursing with him; but the Conspirators kept some of them so close to him, that he had not the leisure to peruse any thing he had taken, which if he had, he had in an Epistle given him by *Artemidorus*, or some other, discovered the whole plot. Meeting by the way with *Spurina*, he told him

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him the Ides of *March* were come, to which he answered, I trust; but they are not past. Being come to the Temple, where the Senate was to sit that day, and sacrifice done according to the custom; he took his chair in the Senate. The first came up to him was one *Caler*, one while he was intreating him to release a Brother of his that was in captivity, the next came up to him; whereat he suspecting some violence, cried out, What force is this? To which the abovementioned *Atilius Cimber* answered him with a wound in the throat, which the rest of the Conspirators seconded with others. But that which amazed him above all, was to see *Brutus* among them; one whose authority was great, and one whom he had obliged beyond all expression of gratitude; when a conquer'd enemy; upon which he could not but break forth into these words, *And thou, son Brutus, art thou one?* Whereupon seeing there was no possibility of escaping, he remembered to keep the honor of his person, covering his head with part of his robe, and with his left hand setting his cloaths about him; and so having received 23 wounds, he fell to the ground a sacrifice to the publick Liberty, near the base of *Pompey*'s Statue, which was noted as a judgment of the Gods.

Cæsar having neither Son nor Daughter legitimate, at his Death, had by his Will before, adopted his Nephew *Octavius Cæsar*, who was afterwards called *Octavianus Augustus*, who studied in *Apollonia* at the time of this misfortune of *Cæsar*, and expected to go with him to the War against the *Parthians*; being then about 17 years of age.

This death (as all extraordinary accidents) must needs beget tumult and confusion in the City; All Offices ceased, the Temples and Courts of Justice were shut up; *Cæsar*'s friends were afraid of the Conspirators, and they reciprocally of them. This Tumult somewhat startled the Conspirators, who seeing the design took not with the people as they expected, to secure themselves, seized the Capitol; crying as they went, *Liberty, Liberty, Liberty*. Whereupon *Antonius* and *Lepidus* being all this while in Arms, divers Treaties of Accommodation passed between them, whereby it was at last agreed the Senate should sit, whither *Brutus* and *Cassius* came, *Antonius*'s Sons being Hostages for their return. The Senate approves the fact, the People dissemble their satisfaction; for, as the Authority of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, with the name of *Liberty*, was very charming on one side; so the horror of the fact, and the love some bare *Cæsar*, exasperated them against the Murderers. But *Mark Antony*, endeavouring to trouble the waters as much as he could, among other things got *Cæsar*'s testament to be opened, wherein he had bequeath'd to the people of Rome certain gardens and heritages near the River *Tiber*, and to every Citizen of Rome a certain Sum of Money: which being known, it re-enflamed their old affection to *Cæsar*, and raised a compassion and a regret for his death. The day appointed for his Funeral (the Ceremony whereof was to burn his Body in the field of *Mars*) *Antonius* being to make the Oration, brought with him the Robe wherein *Cæsar* was assassinated, which being all bloody, he shewed to the people, using some expressions which raised in them both indignation and pity; inso much as before the Solemnity of the Funeral was ended, they all departed in great fury with the brands of the same fire, to set afire the houses of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, and the rest of the Conspirators, whom they sought running up and down the streets. In which fury they killed *Ælius Cinna*, mistaking him for *Cornelius Cinna*, who indeed was one of them. This Tumult forced *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and all who conceived themselves guilty of *Cæsar*'s death, to depart from Rome: whereupon *Antonius* took oc-

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casion to dispense with the decree of the Senate, and assuming *Cæsar's* power and authority, persecuted them all he could. *Brutus* and *Caſſius* went into Greece, to govern those Provinces which *Cæsar* (whom they had murdered) had conferred on them, which were *Macedonia* and *Syria*; and in like manner were all the rest dispersed, and that so unfortunately, that within the space of three years they all came to violent deaths.

He was slain in the 56 year of his age, somewhat above 4 years after the death of *Pompey*, 700 years after the foundation of *Rome*, 3010 years after the Creation, but according to the 70 Interp. 5157. in the 184 *Olympiad*, and 42 years before the Birth of *Christ*. Having made himself perpetual Dictator, he enjoyed it three years, four months, and six days.

Thus have we traced this transcendent Personage through all his great and incomparable actions and achievements, we have viewed him in his distresses and extremities, and we have also seen him in his victories and triumphs, expressing the same greatness, that is, the same equality of mind in both; we have surveyed him in all his excellencies and abilities both of mind and body; we have considered the invincibility of his spirit, his incomparable courage, his clemency and magnanimity, his policy, vigilance, prudence, conduct; we have, as near as we can, enumerated the many battels he fought, the many victories obtain'd, the many people and provinces reduc'd, the many Kings and Countries subdu'd, so to figure a person imitable in all things, that may be called great or virtuous, not exceedable in any; we have described and dilucidated his *Medals*, wherein if we have committed any offence, it hath been in studying brevity, purposely omitting many things that might have been said, and forbearing the multitude and particularity of Citations, lest it might be thought a vanity: lastly, we have accompanied him to his funeral pile, the fire whereof consumed his murderers and enemies, while he himself is carried up by the same element, to shine eternally a star of the first magnitude, in the firmament of famous and heroick spirits. And there we leave him, recommending the Reader to see and find him haply far greater than our commendations, in his own everlasting COMMENTARIES.

Reading

Reading and Discourse are requisite to make a Soldier perfect in the Art Military, how great soever his knowledge may be, which long experience and much practice of Arms hath gained.



When I consider the weakness of mans judgment in censuring things best known unto it self, and the disability of his discourse in discovering the nature of unacquainted objects, chusing rather to hold any sensible impression; which custom hath by long practice inured, than to hearken to some other more reasonable persuasion: I do not marvel that such Soldiers, whose knowledge groweth only from experience, and consisteth in the rules of their own practice, are hardly persuaded that History and Speculative Learning are of any use in perfecting of their Art, being so different in nature from the principles of their cunning, and of so small affinity with the life of action; wherein the use of Arms and achievements of War seem to have their chief being. But those pure spirits embellish'd with learning, and enriched with the knowledge of other mens actions, whose variety of accidents affords variety of instructions, and the mutual conference of things happen'd, begeth both similitudes and differences, contrary natures, but yet jointly concurring to lesson our judgment with discretion, and to implant wisdom in the government of the mind: These men, I say, mounting aloft with the wings of contemplation, do easily discover the ignorance of such Martialists, as are only trained up in the School of Practice, and taught their Rules under a few years experience, which serveth to interpret no other Author: but it self, nor can approve his Maxims, but by his own Authority; and are rather moved to pity their hard fortune, having learned only to be ignorant, than to envy their skill in matter of War, when they oppose themselves against so manifesta Truth as this, that a meer practical knowledge cannot make a perfect Soldier. Which Proposition that I may the better confirm, give me leave to reason a little of the grounds of Learning, and dispute from the habitude of Arts and Sciences, which are then said to be perfectly attained, when their particular parts are in such sort apprehended, that from the variety of that individuality, the intellectual power frameth general Notions and Maxims of Rule, uniting terms of the same nature in one head, and distinguishing diversities by differences of properties, aptly dividing the whole body into his greatest and smallest branches, and fitting each part with his Descriptions, Duties, Cautions and Exceptions. For unless the understanding be in this sort qualified, and able by Logical discourse, to ascend by way of composition, from singularity to ac-

tholick conceptions, and return again the same way to the lowest order of his partitions, the mind cannot be said to have the perfection of that Art, nor induc'd to the true use of that knowledge; but guiding her self by some broken Precepts, fetcheth more vanity by that the best, than benefit by that the truth, whereby it followeth, that a science divided into many branches, and consisting in the multiplicity of divers members, being all so interroll'd in the bulk, that a main of the smallest part, causeth either debility or deformity in the body, cannot be said to be thoroughly attained, nor conceived with such a pleasing apprehension, as respecteth the mind with true judgement, and matcheth the Scholar Master in his Art, unless the nature of their particularities be well had and obtained.

And forasmuch as no one Science or Faculty whatsoever, in multitude and plurality of parts, may any way be comparable to the Art Military, wherein every small and unexpected circumstance quite alters the nature of the Action, and breedeth such variety and difference, that the resemblance of their equal participating properties is blemish'd with the dissimilitude of their differing parts; it cannot be denied, but he that is acquainted with most of these particular occurrences, and best knoweth the variety of chances in the course of War, must needs be thought a more perfect Soldier, and deserve that title of greatest dignity in the profession of Arms, than he who contenteth himself with a few common Precepts and overgrown Rules; without which as they cannot be said at all to be Soldiers; so with them and no more, they no way deserve the name of skilful and perfect men of War. Now whether meer experience, or experience joined with reading and discourse, doth best the mind with most variety and choice of matter, or impartain knowledge with greater plenty of Novelties, incident to Expeditions and use of Arms, I will not on other reason to determine of this question, than that which *Socrates* hath shew'd in his Examples, where he handleth this argument, which I repeat of.

He that followeth a War (saith he) doth see either the course of the whole, or but a part only: If his knowledge extend no farther than a part, he hath learned less than he that saw the whole: but admit he hath seen and learned the instructions of one whole War, he hath notwithstanding learned less than he that hath seen the proceedings of two such Wars: and he again hath not seen so much as another that hath served in three

Reading and Discourse are requisite

several Wars: and so by degrees, a Soldier that hath served ten years, must needs know more than one that hath not served so long. And to conclude, he that hath received twenty two years stipend (which was the just time of service amongst the Romans before a Soldier, could be dismissed) hath greater means of experience than another, that hath not so long a time followed the Camp, and cannot challenge a discharge by order and custom. And hence it consequently followeth, that if in one War, or in all these Wars, there have happened few or no additions of service, which might teach a Soldier the practice of Arms; that then his Learning doth not countervail his Labor. And if the War throughout negligence, or ignorance of the chief Commanders have been ill carried, he can boast of no knowledge, but that which acquainted him with the Corruptions of Military Discipline; if the War which he followed were defeated and overthrow, he knoweth by experience how to lose, but not how to gain. And therefore it is not only Experience and Practice which maketh a Soldier worthy of his Name. But the knowledge of the manifold accidents which rise from the variety of humane actions; wherein reason and error; like Merchants in traffic, interchange contrary events of Fortune, giving sometime copper for silver, and balm for poison, and repaying again the like commodity as time and circumstances do answer their directions. And this knowledge is only to be learned in the Registers of Antiquity, and in Histories recording the motions of former Ages.

Julius Caesar (whose Actions are the Subject of these Discourses) after his famous Victories in France; and that he had gotten the Privileges of a King; broken the strength of the Roman Empire. *Pharolite*, was held a Soldier surmounting every, and all her exceptions; and yet notwithstanding all this, the Battle he had with *Pharaces* King of Pontus, was like to have buried the glory of his former Conquests, in the dishonorable memory of a wilful overthrow. For having posted himself of a hill of great advantage, he began to encamp himself in the top thereof: which *Pharaces* perceiving, (being lodged likewise with his Camp upon a Mountain confronting the Romans) imbatelled his men, marched down from his Camp into the Valley, and mounted his Forces up the hill, where the Romans were buffed about their Intrenchments, to give them Battle. All which *Caesar* took but for a bravado: and measuring the Enemy by himself, could not be persuaded that any such fool-hardiness could carry man-heads into so dangerous an Adventure, until they were come so near; that he had scarce any time to call the Legions from their work, and to give order for the Battle: which so amazed the Romans; that unless as *Caesar* himself saith, the advantage of the place, and the benignity of the gods had greatly favoured them; *Pharaces* had at that time revenged the overthrow of Pompey and the Senate, and restored the Roman Empire to liberty. Which may learn us how necessary it is (besides experience, which in *Caesar* was infinite) to perfect our knowledge with variety of chances: and to meditate upon the effects of other mens adventures, that their harms may be our warnings, and their happy proceedings our fortunate directions.

And albeit amongst so many Decades of History, which pregnant Wits have presented to these later Ages, we seldom or never meet with any one accident which jumpeth in all points with another of the like nature, that shall happen to fall out in managing a War, or setting forth of an Army; and so do seem so rare little benefit by that we read, and make small use of our great travel; yet we must understand that in the Audit of Reason, there are many offices, which through the sovereign power, of the discursive faculty, receive great commodities by whatsoever falsehood upon which justification, and suffer no action to pass without due trial of the nature, and examination of his state: that for the judgment may not be defrauded of her Revenues; nor the mind of her Learning: For many differing disagreeing circumstances, and a difference of forms, which seem to cut off the knowledge of imitation, and frustrate the knowledge we have obtained by reading; the intellectual faculty hath authority to examine these, and look into the inconveniences of these wants and diversities, and by the help of reason to turn it to her advantage; or do to counterpoise the defect, that is fatal and execution it shall not appear any disadvantage. For as in all other Sciences, and namely in Geometry, of certain base elements, and common sentences, which sense admitteth to the apprehension, the powers of the Soul frame admirable Theorems, and Problems of infinite use, proceeding with certainty of demonstration, from Proposition to Proposition, and from Conclusion to Conclusion, and still make new Wonders as they go, besides the strangeness of their Architecture, that upon such plain and easy foundations, they should erect such curious and beautiful Buildings: so in the Art Military, these examples which are taken from Histories, are but plain kind of principles, on which the mind worketh to her best advantage, and useth reason with such dexterity, that of inequalities she concludeth an equality, and of dissimilitudes most sweet resemblances; and so the worketh out her own perfection by discourse, and in time groweth to absolute knowledge, that her sufficiency needeth no further directions. But as *Lomax* to the *Militer*, in that excellent work which he writ of Picturing, faith of a skilful Painter, that being to draw a Portraiture of graceful Limaments, he will never stand to take the symmetry by scale, nor mark it out according to rule; but having his judgment habituated by knowledge, and perfected with the variety of shapes and proportions, his knowledge guideth his eye, and his eye directeth his hand, and his hand followeth both with such facility of cunning, that each of them serves for a rule whereby the true measures of nature are exactly expressed: The like may I say of a skilful Soldier, or any Artizan in his faculty; when knowledge hath once purified his judgment, and turned it to the key of true apprehension.

And although there are many that easily admit a reconciliation of this disagreement, in the resemblance of accidents being referred to the arbitrement of a well-tempered spirit; yet they will by no means acknowledge, that those monstrous and unimitable examples of Valor and Magnanimity (whereof Antiquity is prodigal,

Lib. 24

to make a perfect Soldier

gal, and spendeth as though time should never want such treasure) can any way avail the manners of these days, which if they were as they ought to be, would appear but counterfeit to the lustre of a golden Age, nor yet comparable to silver or brass, by the strength of Iron, but deserving better title than earth or clay, whereof the frame of this Age consisteth. For what resemblance (say they) is between the cautious of our times, and the actions of those ancient Heroes? They observed equity as well in War as in Peace; for virtue rather ruled by the natural disposition of Men, than by Law and Authority; the great end of Arms which they esteemed, were the duty of Arms which they had attached for their Country, adorning the temples of their gods with piety, and their private houses with glory, pardoning rather than persecuting a wrong; and taking nothing from the vanquished but ability of doing injury. But the course of our times hath another bias, for covetousness hath subverted both faith and equity, and our valor affecteth nothing but ambition, pride and cruelty tyrannize in our thoughts, and subtilty teacheth us to carry rather a fair countenance, than a good nature; our means of getting are by fraud and extortion, and our manner of spending is by waste and prodigality, not esteeming what we have of our own, but coveting that which is not ours; men esteemed, and women impudent, using riches as servants to wickedness, and preventing Natures Appetite with wanton Luxury; supplanting Virtue with Treachery, and using Victory with such impety, as though injuries faced, were imperio sui; and therefore the exemplary patterns of former times, wherein true honour is expressed, may serve to be gazed upon, but no way to be imitated by this Age, being too subtil to deal with honestly, and wanting courage to encounter valor. I must needs confess, that he that compareth the History of *Livie* with that of *Guichardine*, shall find great difference in the Subjects which they handle; for *Livie* triumpheth in the Conquests of Virtue, and in every Page erecteth trophies unto valor, making his discourse like *Cleantes* Table, wherein Virtue is described in her entire Majesty, and so sweetened with the presence and service of the graces, that all they which behold her are rapt with admiration of her excellency, and charmed with the love of her perfection: but *Guichardine* hath more than *Thyestes* task to perform, being to wind through the labyrinth of subtilty, and discover the quaint practices of Politicians; wherein publick and open designs are oftentimes but shadows of more secret projects, and these again serve as foiles to more eminent intentions: being also discoloured with dissimulation, and so infused in the sleights of subtilty, that when you look for War, you shall find Peace; and expecting Peace, you shall fall into troubles, dissensions and Wars: So crabb'd and crooked is his Argument in respect of *Livies* fortune, and such Art is required to unfold the truth of those mysteries.

But to answer this Objection in a word, and so to proceed to that which followeth, I say those immortal memories of Virtue which former time recordeth, are more necessary to be known, than any stratagems of subtler Ages: for Equity and Valor being truly apprehended, so season the

motions of the Soul, that albeit in so corrupt a course, they cannot peradventure stir up imitation; as yet they oftentimes hinder many malicious practices, and devilish devices, when evil is reproved by the knowledge of good, and condemned by the Authority of better Ages. And if we will needs follow those steps which the present course of the World hath traced, and play the *Grenus* with the *Grenus*; this Objection hindereth nothing, but that History, especially these later times, affordeth sufficient instructions to make a Soldier perfect in that point.

Let not therefore any man despise the found instructions which Learning affordeth, nor refuse the helps that History doth offer to perfect the weakness of a short experience, especially when no worth can contravert the weight of so great a business: for I take the office of a chief Commander, to be a Subject capable of the greatest wisdom that may be apprehended by natural means; being to manage a multitude of disagreeing parties, as a fit instrument to execute a design of much consequence, and great expectation, and so to qualify both their affections, and apprehensions, according to the accidents which rise in the course of his directions; besides the true judgment which he ought to have of such circumstances as are most important to a fortunate end, wherein our Providence cannot give enough either from learning or experience, to prevent disadvantages, or to take hold of opportunities. Neither can it be denied, but as this knowledge addeth perfection to our judgment, so it serveth also as a spur to glory, and increaseth the desire of honor in such as behold the achievements of virtue, commended to a perpetual posterity, having themselves the like means to consecrate their memory to succeeding Ages, wherein they may serve for examples of valor, and reap the reward of true honor. Or to conclude, if we thirst after the knowledge of our own fortune, and long to foresee the end of that race which we have taken, which is the chiefest matter of consequence in the use of Arms; what better conjecture can be made, than to look into the course of former times, which have proceeded from like beginnings, and were continued with like means, and therefore not unlikely to fort unto like ends?

And now if it be demanded whether Reading or Practice have the first place in this art, and serveth as a foundation to the rest of the buildings; let *Marius* answer this question, who enquiring at the Nobility of Rome, faith thus, *Qui populum Consulibus fassi sunt, alia Majorum et Gracorum militaria praecepta legere cepissent: homines praepositi, nam legere quam fieri, tempore polle-rius, re & via prius est*: Whereas (faith he). Reading ought to go before Practice (although it follow it in course of time, for there is no Reading, but of something practised before) these preposterous men, after they are made Consuls, and placed at the Helm of Government, begin to read, when they should practise that which they had read; and so bewray their insufficiency of knowledge, by using out of time that, which in time is most necessary. This testimony giveth *Marius* of Reading and Book-learning, being himself an Enemy to the same, forasmuch as all his knowledge came by mere experience, but howsoever his judgment was good in this point: for

Salust. de bello Jugurth.

since

Reading and Discourse are requisite to make, &c.

Since that all motion and action proceedeth from the Soul, and cannot well be produced, until the Idea thereof be first inspired in the mind, according to which pattern the outward being and sensible resemblance is duly fashioned; how is it possible that any action can be well expressed, when the mind is not directed by knowledge to dispose it to that sort, as shall best agree with the occurrence of such natures, as are necessarily interceded both in the means and in the end thereof? And therefore speculative knowledge as the Tramontane, to direct the course of all practice is first to be respected.

But that I may not seem partial in this Controversie, but carry an equal hand between two so necessary yoke-fellows, give me leave to conclude in a word the benefit of practice, and define the good which cometh from experience: that so nothing that hath been spoken, may seem to come from affection, or proceed from the surge of unjust partiality. And first it cannot be denied, but that practice giveth boldness and assurance in action, and maketh men expert in such things as they take in hand: for no man can rest upon such certainty, through the Theorick of knowledge, as he that hath seen his Learning verified by practice, and acknowledged by the testimony of assured proof. Besides, there are many other accomplishments gotten only by practice, which grace the presence of knowledge, and give

credit to that which we have seen as first to learn the use and advantage of the Arms which we best favourably, by frequent use, and familiarizing of dangers, and accidents of error, colours to fear nothing but dishonour, to make no difference between heat and cold, Summer and Winter, to keep in all places as on a Bed, and at the same time, to take pains, and suffer penury, with many other difficulties which custom maketh easy, and cannot be gotten but by use and practice.

And thus at length, I have brought a shallow Discourse to an abrupt end, wishing with greater zeal of Attention, than I am, able with manifest proof of Reason, to demonstrate the necessity, that both these parts were by our Soldiers so regarded, that neither practice might march in oblique blindfold without learned knowledge; nor this again be entertained with an idle apprehension without practice: but that both of them may be respected as necessary parts to make a complete nature, wherein knowledge as the intellectual part giveth life and spirit to the action, and practice as the material substance maketh it of a sensible being, and like a skillful workman expresseth the excellency, which knowledge hath fore-conceived, withal as man to despair of effecting that by Practice, which the Theorick of knowledge commendeth. For *Cur desuper animi possit fieri, quod ianctus fides est.*

THE

(1)

The Sum of the FIRST BOOK of Cæsars Commentaries;

With OBSERVATIONS upon the same, discovering the Excellency of *CÆSARS* Militia.

The ARGUMENT.

IN this *First Book* are contained the Specialties of Two great Wars, begun, and ended both in a Summer: the first, between *Cæsar* and the *Helvetii*: the second, between *Him* and *Ariovistus*, King of the *Germans*. The History of the *Helvetians* may be reduced to three principal heads: under the first, are the reasons that moved the *Helvetians* to entertain so desperate an Expedition, and the preparation which they made for the same. The second containeth their defeat by *Cæsar*: and the third their return into their Country. That of *Ariovistus* divideth it self into two parts: the first giveth the causes that induced *Cæsar* to undertake that War: the second treateth of the War it self, and particularly describeth *Ariovistus's* overthrow.

CHAP. I.

Gallia described: the *Helvetians* dislike their Native Seat, and propound to themselves larger Territories in the Continent of *Gallia*. *Orgetorix* feedeth this Humour, for his own advantage.



*G*allia is all divided into three parts; whereof the *Belges* do inhabit one, the *Aquitans* another, and those which they call *Celtes*, and the *Galles*, a third: all these do differ each from others

in Manners, Language, and in Laws. The River *Garun* doth separate the *Galles* from the *Aquitans*, and *Marne* and *Seine* do bound them from the *Belges*. Of these, the *Belges* are most Warlike; as furthest off the Civility and Politeness of the Province, and less frequented with Merchants, or acquainted with such things as are by them imported to effeminate mens minds; as likewise being situate next to the *Germans* beyond the *Rhene*, with

whom they have continual wars. For which cause also, the *Helvetians* do excell the rest of the *Galles* in deeds of Arms, being in daily conflicts with the *Germans*, for defence of their own Territories, or by invading theirs. The part inhabited by the *Galles*, beginneth at the River *Rhone*, and is bounded with *Garun*, the Ocean, and the confines of the *Belges*; and reaching also to the *Rhene*, as a Limit from the *Sequans* and *Helvetians*, is stretched Northward. The *Belges* take their beginning at the extreme confines of *Gallia*, and inhabit the Country which lieth along the lower part of the *Rhene*, trindling to the North, and to the East. *Aquitania* spreadeth it self between the River *Garun* and the *Pyrenean Hills*, and butteth upon the *Spanish Ocean*, between the West and the North.

Amongst the *Helvetians*, *Orgetorix* did far exceed all others, both for noble descent and store of Treasure: and when *M. Messala*, and *M. Piso* were Consuls, being stirred up with the desire of a Kingdom, he moved the Nobility to a commotion; persuading the

B State

Marne
Sequana,

State to go out of their confines with their whole power: as an easie matter for them, that excelled all other in valor and prowess; to seize upon the Empire of all Gallia. To which he did the rather persuade them, for that the Helvetians were on every side shut up, by the strength and nature of the place wherein they dwelt; on the one side, with the depth and breadth of the River Rhene, which divideth their Country from the Germans on the other side, with the high ridge of the hill Jura, which runneth between them and the Sequans; and on the third part they were flanked with the Lake Lemanus, and the River Rhone, parting their Territories from our Province.

Hence it hapned, that being thus straitened, they could not easily enlarge themselves, or make war upon the bordering Countries: and thereupon, being men wholly bent to Arms and War, were much grieved, as having two little elbow-room for their multitude of people, and the renown they had got of their Valor; their whole Country containing but 240 miles in length, and 180 in breadth. Spurred on with these inducements, and moved specially with the authority of Orgetorix, they resolved to make provision of such things as were requisite for their expedition, bought great numbers of Cars, and Horses, for Carriages; sowed much Tillage, that they might have plenty of Corn in their journey; made peace and amity with the confining Countries. For the perfecting and supply of which things, they took two years to be sufficient; and in the third, enacted their setting forward by a solemn Law, assigning Orgetorix to give order for that which remained.

The first OBSERVATION.

HE that will examine this Expedition of the Helvetians, by the Transmigrations and Flittings of other Nations, shall find some unexampled particularities in the course of their proceeding: for, first it hath never been heard, that any people utterly abandoned that Country, which Nature or Providence had allotted them, unless they were driven thereunto by a General Calamity, as the Infection of the Air, the Cruelty and Oppression of a Neighbour-Nation, as were the Swedians, who thought it great Honor to suffer no man to border upon their Confines; or some other Universal, which made the place inhabitable, and the People willing to undertake a voluntary Exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the Inhabitants of a Country were so multiplied, that the place was over-charged with multitudes of off-spring, and like a poor Father, had more Children then it was able to sustain, the abounding surplus was sent out to seek new Fortunes in forrain Countries, and to possess themselves of a Resting Seat; which might recompense the wants

of their Native Country, with a plentiful revenue of necessary supplements. And, in this sort we read, that Rome sent out many Colonies into divers parts of her Empire. And, in this manner the ancient Gauls disburdened themselves of their superfluity, and sent them into Asia. The Goths came from the Islands of the Baltic Sea, and in Silesia his time swarmed over Germany: besides, many other Nations, whose Transmigrations are particularly described by Tacitus. But amongst all these, we find none that so forsook their Country, but there remained some behind to inhabit the same; from whence, as from a Fountain, succeeding ages might derive the stream of that over-flowing multitude, and by them take notice of the causes, which moved them unto it. For, their manner was, in all such Expeditions, and sending out of Colonies, to divide themselves into two or three parts, equal both in equality and number: for, after they had parted these common people into even Companies, they divided their Nobility with as great equality as they could, among the former partitions: and then calling lots, that part which went out to seek new Adventures, left their Lands and Possessions to the rest that remained at home: and so the industry they supplied that defect which continuance of time had drawn upon them. And this was the means, which the first inhabitants of the earth found out, after the flood, to people the uninhabited places, and to keep off the inconveniences of scarcity and famine.

The second OBSERVATION.

HE that would prognosticate by the course of these several proceedings, whether of the two betokened better success, hath greater reason to foretell happiness to these which I last spake of, than to the Helvetians; unless their valor were the greater, and quitted all difficulties which hatred and envy would cast upon them: for an action which favourerth of necessity (which was always understood in sending out a Colony) hath a more plausible passport amongst men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntary motion. For, as men can be content to tolerate the one, if it concern not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gain to punish pride with shame, and to oppose themselves against the other.

The third OBSERVATION.

Orgetorix, thirsting after Princely Dignity, discovereth the humour of vain glory. For, not contented with the substance of honour, being already of greatest power amongst the Helvetians, and ordering the Affairs of the State by his own direction, thought it nothing without the Marks and Title of Dignity, unto which the inconveniences of Majesty are annexed: not considering that the best honor fitteth not always in Imperial Thrones, nor wearerth the Diadems of Princes; but oftentimes reflects it self in meaner places, and shineth better with obscure Titles. For proof whereof, to omit Antiquity, take the family of the Medices in Florence, and particularly Cosmo, and Lorenzo, whose vertue raised them to that height of Honour, that they were nothing

thing inferiour to the greatest Potentates of their time; being themselves but private Gentlemen in that State, and bearing their proper names as their greatest titles. But howsoever, the opportunity of changing their soil, was well observed by Orgetorix, as the fittest means to attempt an innovation: but the success depended much upon the fortunate proceeding of their expedition.

For, as a multitude of that nature can be content to attribute a great part of their happiness, wherein every man thinketh himself particularly interested, to an eminent Leader; and in that universal extase of joy, will affily admit an alteration of their state: so if the ill be in any respect unfortunate, no Man will acknowledge himself faulty, but every one desiring to discharge his passion upon some object, a chief director is likeliest to be the mark, at which the darts of their discontent will be thrown, and then he will find it hard to effect what he intendeth.

CHAP. II.

Orgetorix's practices are discovered; his death.

The Helvetians continue the resolution of their expedition, and prepare themselves accordingly.

cafar.

Orgetorix thereupon undertook employment to the adjoining States; and first persuaded Catullus, the Son of Catamantidæ a Sequan, whose Father had for many years Reigned in that place, and was by the Senate and people of Rome, styled with the title of a Friend to possess himself of the Signiory of that State, which his Father formerly enjoyed: and in like manner dealt with Dumnorix the Heduan, Divitiacus brother, (who at that time was the only man of that Province, and very well beloved of the Commons) to endeavor the like there; and withall, gave him his daughter in Marriage. Shewing them by lively reasons, that it was an easie matter to effect their designs: for that he being sure of the Sovereignty of his State, there was no doubt but the Helvetians would do much throughout all Gallia, and so made no question to settle them in those Kingdoms, with his power and Forces. Drawn on with these inducements; they gave Faith and Oath each to other, hoping with the support of the Sovereignty of three mighty Nations, to possess themselves of all Gallia.

This thing being discovered, the Helvetians (according to their Customs) caused Orgetorix, to answer the matter in due order: whose punishment upon the Attaint, was to be burned alive. Against the day of trial, Orgetorix had got together all his Family, to the number of ten thousand Men, besides divers followers, and others far indebted, which were many; by whose means he escaped a judicial bearing. The people thereupon being much

incensed, agreed the Magistrate should execute their Laws with force of Arms, and to that end should raise the Country: but in the meantime Orgetorix was found dead, not without suspicion (as was conceived) that he himself was guilty thereof.

Notwithstanding his death, the Helvetians did pursue their former design of leaving their Country: and when they thought themselves ready prepared, they set fire on all their Towns, (which were in number twelve) together with four hundred Villages, besides private houses, and burnt likewise all the Corn, save that they carried with them, that all hope of return being taken away, they might be the readier to undergo all hazards: and commanded, that every Man should carry so much Meal with him, as would serve for three Months.

Moreover, also they persuaded the Rauraci, the Tulingi, and Latobrigi, their neighbour borderers, that putting on the same resolution, they would set fire on all their habitations, and go along with them. And likewise took unto them the Boii, which had dwelt beyond the Rhene, but were now seated in the Territories of the Norici, and had taken the Capital Town of that Country. There were only two ways which gave them passage out of their Country, the one through the Sequans, very narrow and difficult, between the Hill Jura, and the River Rhone, by which a single Cart could scarce pass; and had a high Hill hanging over, that a small force might easily hinder them. The other was through our Province, far easier and readier, as much as the River Rhone, running between the Helvetians and the Allobroges, (who were lately brought in obedience to the people of Rome) did give passage in divers places by Ford.

The utmost Town belonging to the Allobroges, that bordereth upon the Helvetians, is Geneva, wherewith adjoineth a Bridge leading to the Helvetians; who doubted not to persuade the Allobroges, (that seemed as yet to carry no great affection to the people of Rome) or at least to force them to give them passage. Things being now ready for their journey, they assigned a day when all should meet together upon the banks of Rhone: which day was the first of the Calends of April, in the Consulship of Lu. Pils, and A. Gabinius.

OBSERVATION.

The omission in the Helvetian expedition.

As these provisions were all requisite, so one thing was omitted, which might have furthered their good fortune more than any thing thought of; which was, to have concealed by all means the time of their departure. For all the beards of the woods, must needs stand and gaze, when such Lions roused themselves out of their dens, and be then very watchful of their safety, when they knew the instant of time, when some of their spoils must needs be offered to appease their fury. Or at the least it behoved them so to have dealt by Hostages and Treaty, that such as were likelyst and best able to cross their designs, might have been no hindrance of their proceedings: considering there were but two ways out of their Country, by which they might go; the one narrow and difficult, between the Hill Jura and the River Rhone, by the Country of the Sequani, the other through Provence, far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romans: But howsoever, their error was, that after two years provision, to go, and having made an exterminating decree, which enjoined them to go, when they came to the point, they knew not what way to go.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar denieth the Helvetians passage through the Remane Province: he fortifieth the passage between the Hill Jura, and the Lake of Geneva.

Cæsar.
* Rome.

As soon as Cæsar, was advertised that their purpose was to pass through our Province, he basted to leave the City, and posting by great Journeys into the further Gallia, he came to Geneva. And enrolling great Forces throughout all the Province, for that there was but one Legion in those parts, he broke down the Bridge at Geneva.

The Helvetians having intelligence of Cæsar's arrival, sent divers of the best of their Nobility, Embassadors unto him, whereof Numicius, and Veredocius, were the chief, to give him notice, that they had a purpose to pass peaceably through the Province, having no other way to go, and therein to pray his suffrance and permission.

Cæsar, well remembering how Lu. Cassius the Consul was slain, his Army beaten, and the Soldiers put under the yoke, did not hold it convenient to grant their request. Neither did he think that Men so ill-afflicted, could forbear to offer wrongs and insolencies, if leave were given them as was required. Howbeit, for the better gaining of time, and getting such Forces together, as were caused to be imolled, he answered the Commissioners, that he would take a time of deliberation; and so that end willed them to return again, by the

Ideas of April. And in the mean time, with that Legion he had ready, and the Soldiers that came out of the Province, he made a ditch, and a wall of sixteen foot in height, from the Lake Lemanus, which runneth into the Rhone, to the Hill Jura, that divideth the Sequans from the Helvetians, being in length nineteen miles; and disposed Garrisons and Fortresses along the work, the better to impeach them, if happily they went about to break out by force.

At the day appointed, when the Embassadors returned for a resolution, he utterly denied to give any leave to pass through the Province: having neither custom nor presidents from the people of Rome, to warrant him in that kind. And if they should endeavor it by force of Arms, he should oppugne them.

The first OBSERVATION.

This manner of prolonging of time to reinforce the Troops, or get some other advantage, as it was then of great use to Cæsar, and hath oftentimes been practised to good purpose, so doth it discover to a circumspect enemy, by the difficulties in the mean time, (which cannot easily be shadowed) the drift of that delay; and so inviteth him with greater courage to take the opportunity of that present advantage; especially if tract of time may strengthen the one, and not further the other, which is easily discerned by the circumstances of the Action.

The second OBSERVATION.

The request of the Helvetians seemed to deserve a facile answer, being in effect, no more than nature had given to the River Rhone; which was to pass through the Province, with as much speed and as little hurt as they could. But Cæsar looking farther into the matter, and comparing things already past with occurrences that were to follow after, found the Majesty of the Remane Empire, to be interested in the answer; being either to maintain her greatness, by resisting her Enemies, or to degenerate from antient Virtue, by gratifying such as sought her ruine: which in matter of State, are things of great consequence. And farther, he knew it to be an unsafe course, to suffer an Enemy to have means of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is always prone to load him with further wrongs whom he had once injured: nor but that he could peradventure be content to end the quarrel upon that advantage; but fearing the other whom he wronged, to expect but an opportunity of revenge, he gets what advantage he can beforehand, and so ceaseth not until he have added a bloody end to an injurious beginning.

The

The Third OBSERVATION.

Concerning this marvellous Fortification between the Hill and the Lake, how serviceable such works were unto him in all his wars, in what fort, and in how small time they were made; I will defer the treatise of them until I come to the height of Alesia, where he gave some ground of that hyperbolical speech, *An me delecto, non animadvertebatis decem habere letas quidem legiones populum Romanum, que nonsumus vobis obistere, sed etiam caelum diruere possent?*

CHAP. IIII.

The Helvetians failing to pass the Rhone, take the way through the Country of the Sequani, Cæsar beareth into Italy, and there inveth more Legions, and returning, overbroweth part of them at the River Arar.

Cæsar.

The Helvetians frustrated of their former hope, went about, some with Boats coupled together, others with Flats, (whereof they made great store) the rest by Fords and Places where the River was shallow, sometimes in the day, and oftentimes in the night to break out: but being beaten back by the help of the Fortification, and the concurrence of Soldiers, and multitude of weapons, they desisted from that attempt.

There was only another way left through the Sequans, which they could not take by reason of the narrowness thereof, but by the favor of the Country. And for as much as of themselves they were able to prevail little therein; they sent Messengers to Dumnorix the Heduan, that by his Mediation they might obtain so much of the Sequans. Dumnorix, what through favor and bounteous carriage, was of great power in his Country, much affecting the Helvetians, by reason of his Marriage with Orgetorix Daughter; and drawn on with a desire of a Kingdom, gave his mind to new projects; labouring to gratifie many States, to tie them the rather to favor his courses. And thereupon undertaking the business, got the Sequans to give the Helvetians leave to pass through their Confiners; giving each other pledges, that the Sequans should not interrupt the Helvetians in their journey, nor they offer any injury to the Country.

It was told Cæsar, that the Helvetians were determined to pass through the Territories of the Sequans and Heduans, on the confines of the Santons, who are not far from the borders of the Tholofans, a people of the Province: which if they did, he foresaw how dangerous it would be to have a warlike

Nation, and such as were Enemies to the people of Rome, to come so near them, and to have the advantage of an open and plentiful Country.

For which causes he left T. Labienus a Legate to command those works, and he himself made great journeys to get into Italy; where he imolled two Legions, and took three more out of their wintering Camps near about Aquileia: and with these five Legions, went the next way over the Alps into the further Gallia. Where by the way the Centrons, Carroceli, and Caturiges, taking advantage of the open ground, did seek to keep the Army from passage: but being beaten and put off by many skirmishes, they came in seven days from Ocellum, a Town in the furthest parts of the nearer Province, into the confines of the Vocontii, a people of the further Province, from whence he led them into the Territories of the Allobroges, and so unto the Sabutians, that are the first beyond the Rhone, bordering upon the Province.

By that time the Helvetians had carried their Forces through the freights and frontiers of the Sequans, into the Dominions of the Heduans, and began to forrage and pillage their Country. Who finding themselves unable to make resistance, sent Messengers to Cæsar, to require aid; shewing their desert to be such, from time to time of the people of Rome, that might challenge a greater respect than to have their Country spoiled, their Children led into captivity, their Towns assaulted and taken, as it were in the sight of the Roman Army. At the same instant likewise the Ambassadors, that had dependency and alliance with the Heduans, advised Cæsar that their Country was utterly wasted, and they scarce able to keep the Enemy from entering their Towns. In like manner also the Allobroges, that had farms and possessions beyond the Rhone, fled directly to Cæsar, complaining that there was nothing left them, but the soil of their Country.

With which advertisements, Cæsar was so moved, that he thought it not convenient to linger farther, or expect until the fortunes of their Allies were all wasted, and that the Helvetians were come unto the Santones. The River * Arar, that runneth through the confines of the Heduans and Sequans into the Rhone, passeth away with such a stillness, that by view of the eye it can hardly be discerned which way the water taketh. This River did the Helvetians pass over by Flotes and Bridges of Boats. When Cæsar was advised

* Soane.

tified by his Discoverers, that three parts of their Forces were already past the water, and that the fourth was left behind on this side the River; about the third watch of the night he went out of the Camp with three Legions, and surprising that part which was not as yet got over the River, slew a great part of them, the rest fled into the next woods.

Zurick.

This part was the Tigurine Canton: and the Helvetians being all parted into four divisions, this Canton alone in the memory of our Fathers, slew L. Cassius the Consul, and put his Army under the yoke. So whether it were by chance, or the providence of the Gods, that part of the Helvetian State, which gave so great a blow to the Roman people, was the first that did penance for the same. Wherein Cæsar took revenge, not only of the publick, but of his particular loss too; forasmuch as the Tigurines had in that Battell with Cassius slain L. Piso, the Grandfather of L. Piso, his father in law.

The First OBSERVATION.

THis defeat being chiefly a service of execution, upon such as were taken at a dangerous disadvantage, which M. n. call unware, containeth these two advices. First not to neglect that advantage which *tenoris*, by the hairs of his horse's tail, hath proved to be very important; that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficulty to overcome the whole. Secondly, it may serve for a caveat, so to transport an Army over a march, where the enemy is within a reasonable march, that no part may be so severed from the body of the Army, that advantage may thereby be taken to cut them off altogether, and separate them from themselves. The safest and most honourable way to transport an Army over a River, is by a Bridge, placing at each end sufficient Troops of horse and foot, to defend the Army from sudden assaults as they pass over the water. And thus went Cæsar over the Rhene into Germany, two several times.

The Second OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING the circumstance of time, when Cæsar went out of his Camp, which is noted to be in the third Watch, we must understand that the Romans divided the whole night into four Watches, every Watch containing three hours, and their Watches were distinguished by several notes and sounds of Cornets or Trumpets; that by the distinction and diversitie thereof, it might easily be known what Watch was sounded. The charge and office of founding the Watches belonged to the chiefest Centurion of a Legion, whom they called *Præmulus*, or *Primus Centurio*; at whose Pavilion the Trumpeters attended, to be directed by his hour-glasse.

The first Watch began always at sun-setting, and continued three hours (I understand such hours as

the night contained, being divided into twelve: for the Romans divided their night, as well as their day, into equal spaces, which they call hours,) the second watch continued until midnight, and then the third Watch began, and contained likewise three hours; the fourth was equal to the rest, and continued until sun-rising. So that by this phrase *de tertio vigilia*, we understand that Cæsar went out of his Camp in the third Watch, which was about midnight; and so we must conceive of the rest of the Watches, as often as we shall find them mentioned in History.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar passeth over the River Arar, his horsemen encounter with the Helvetians, and are put to the worke.

AFTER this overthrow, he caused a Bridge to be made over the River Arar, and carried over his Army to pursue the rest of the Helvetian Forces. The Helvetians much daunted at his sudden coming, that had got over the River in one day, which they could scarce do in twenty, sent Embassadors unto him, of whom Divico was chief, that commanded the Helvetians in the War against Cassius, who delt with Cæsar to this effect; That if the people of Rome would make Peace with the Helvetians, they would go into any part which Cæsar should appoint them: but if otherwise, he would prosecute War, that he should remember the overthrow which the people of Rome received by their valours and not to attribute it to their own worth that they had surprised at unawares, a part of their Army, when such as had passed the River, could not come to succor them. They had learned of their forefathers, to commend rather by valor than by craft and devices; and therefore let him beware that the place wherein they now were, did not get a Name, or carry the mark to all future ages of an eminent calamity to the people of Rome, and of the utter destruction of his Army.

To this Cæsar answered, That he made the less doubt of the success of these businesses, in that he well remembered and knew those things, which the Helvetian Commissioners had related; and was so much the rather grieved thereat, because it hapned without any cause or desert of the people of Rome; who if he were guilty of any wrong done unto them, it were a matter of no difficulty to beware of their practices; but therein was his error, that he could think of nothing which he had committed, that might cause him to fear; neither could he fear without occasion. And if he would let pass former infidelities, could he forget those late and fresh injuries? for that they had attempted to pass

pass through the Province by force of Armes, sacked and pillaged the Hedunans, Ambaras, and Allobrogiens, that did so incessantly vaunt of their Victory, admiring that these injuries were suffered so long time to rest unrevenge, came all in the end to one pass. For the immortal gods were wont sometimes to give happiness and long impunity to men, that by the greater alteration of things, the punishment should be the more grievous for their offences. Howbeit, if they would give Hostages for the performance of those things which were to be agreed upon, and satisfy the Hedunans, and Allobrogiens, together with their Allies, for the injuries they had done unto them, he would be content to make peace with them.

Divico replied, that they were taught by their Ancestors to take Hostages, rather than to give them, whereof the People of Rome were witnesses; and thereupon departed. The next day they removed the Camp, and the like did Cæsar, sending all his horse before, in number of Four thousand (which he had raised in the Province, and drawn from the Hedunans and their Associates) to understand which way the Enemy took; who prosecuting the Reward overbore, were forced to undertake the Helvetian Cavalry in a place of disadvantage; and thereby lost some few of their Company.

The Enemy made proud with that encounter, having with Five hundred Horse beaten so great a multitude, did afterwards make head with more assurance; and sometimes stuck not to fall out of the Reward and assault our Partie. Cæsar kept back his men from fighting; and held it enough for the present, to keep the Enemy from spoiling and harrying the Country: and went on for fifteen dayes together in such manner, as there were but five or six miles between the first Troopes of our Armie, and the Reward of theirs.

OBSERVATION.

THis example of the *Ætherians* may lesson a Commander, not to wax insolent upon every overthrow which the enemy taketh, but duly to weigh the true causes of a Victory gotten, or any overthrow taken; that apprehending the right currency of the action, he may neither vaunt of a blind Victory, nor be dismayed at a casual mishap.

And herein let a heedful wariness so moderate the sequels of Victory in a triumphing spirit, that the care and jealousie to keep still that sweet-founding flame on foot, may as far surpass the industry which he first used to obtain it, as the con-

tinuance of happiness doth exceed the beginning of good fortunes. For such is the nature of our Soul, that although from her infancy, even to the manhood of her age, the never found want of that which she lusteth after; yet when the meeteth with a counterbalance to check her appetite, and restrain her affections from their satisfaction, she is as much troubled in that want, as if she had never received any contentment at all: for our will to every object it seeketh after, begeth always a new appetite, which is not satisfied with a former quittance, but either seeketh present payment, or returneth discontentment unto the mind.

And as our soul is of an everlasting being, and cannot think of an end to her beginning; so she seeketh a perpetual continuance of such things as the lusteth after: which he that meaneth to hold Fortune his friend, will endeavour to maintain.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar sendeth to get the advantage of a Hill, and so to give the Helvetians Battle: but it was off by false intelligence. The opportunity being lost, he intendeth provision of Corn.

IN the mean time Cæsar pressed the Hedunans from day to day to bring in Corn, according to their promise; for by reason of the cold temperature of Gallia, which lieth to the Northward, it happened not only that the Corn was far from being ripe, but also that there was scarce forrage for the Horses. And the Provisions which were brought along the River Arar stood him in small stead at that time, for as much as the Helvetians had taken their Journey clean from the River, and be would by no means forsake them.

The Hedunans putting it off from one day to another, gave out still it was upon coming. But when Cæsar found the matter so long delayed, and that the day of Meeting out Corn to the Soldiers was at hand, calling before him the chiefest Princes of the Hedunans, of whom he had great numbers in his Camp, and amongst them Divitiacus and Lileus, who for that time were the Sovereign Magistrates (which they call *Vergobret*, being yearly created, and having power of life and death) he did greatly blame them, that he was not supplied with Corn from them, the Enemy being so near, and in so needful a time, that it could neither be bought for money, nor had out of the fields; especially when for their sake, and at their request he had undertaken that War. Whereat he was the rather grieved, because he found himself forsaken of them.

At length Lileus, moved with Cæsar's Speech, discovered (which before he had kept secret) that there were some of great Authority amongst the Commons, and could do more, being private persons, then they could do being Magistrates.

Magistrates. These, by seditious and bad speeches, did deter the People from bringing Corn: shewing it better for them, sith they could not attain to the Empire of Gallia, to undergo the Sovereignty of the Galles, than the Romans: for they were not to doubt, but if the Romans vanquished the Helvetians, they would bereave the Heduans of their Liberty, with the rest of all Gallia. By these men are our deliberations and counsels, or whatsoever else is done in the Camp, made known to the Enemy. That they were not able to keep them in obedience. That he knew well withall what danger he fell into by acquainting Cæsar with these things, which was the cause he had kept them from him so long.

Cæsar perceived that Dumnorix (Divitiacus's brother) was shot at by this Speech of Lifcus: but for as much as he would not have those things handled in the presence of so many, he speedily brake off the Conference, and retaining Lifcus, asked privately of him those things which he had delivered in the Assembly, whereunto he spake more freely and boldly than before. And inquiring secretly of others, he found it to be true, that Dumnorix was of great courage, and singularly favoured for his liberality of the Common people, desirous of novelties and changer, and for many years had kept at a low rate the Taxes and Impositions of the Heduans, for as much as no man durst contradict what he would have done. By which courses he had increased his private Estate, and got great means to be liberal: for a great number of horsemen did onely live upon his entertainment, and were continually about him, being not onely powerful at home, but abroad also amongst divers of the neighbor States; and for this cause had married his Mother to a great Rich man, and of a Noble house, in the Country of the Bituriges, himself had took a Wife of the Helvetians, had married his Sister by his Mother, and others of his Kin, into other States. For that affinity he favoured and wished well to the Helvetians: and on the other side hated the Romans, and specially Cæsar of all others; for that by their coming into Gallia his power was weakened, and Divitiacus his brother restored to his antient honor and dignity. If any mischance happened to the Romans, his hope was to obtain the Principality by the favour of the Helvetians: whereas the sovereignty of the Romans made him not onely despair of the Kingdom, but also of the favour, or what other thing soever he

now enjoyed. And Cæsar had found out by inquiry, that the beginning of the fight, when the Cavalry was routed, came from Dumnorix and his Horsemen; for he commanded those Troops which the Heduans had sent to aid Cæsar, and out of that disorder the rest of the Cavalry took a fright.

Which things being discovered, for as much as these suspicions were seconded with matters of certainty, in that he had brought the Helvetians through the confines of the Sequans, had caused Hostages to be given on either side, and done all those things, not onely without warrant from the State, but without acquainting them therewith; and lastly, in that he was accused by the Magistrate of the Heduans, he thought it cause sufficient for him to punish him, or to command the State to do Justice upon him. One thing there was which might seem to oppugn all this; the singular affection of Divitiacus his brother to the People of Rome; the great love he bore particularly to Cæsar, his Loyalty, Justice, and Temperance; and therefore he feared least his punishment might any way alienate or offend Divitiacus's sincere affection. And therefore before he did any thing, he called Divitiacus, and putting aside the ordinary Interpreters, he spake to him by M. Valerius Proculus, one of the principal men of the Province of Gallia, his familiar friend, & whom he specially trusted in matters of importance, and took notice what Dumnorix had uttered in his presence, at a Council of the Galles, shewing also what informations he had privately received concerning him: and therefore by way of advice desired, that without any offence to him, either he himself might call him in question, or the State take some course in the same.

Divitiacus embracing Cæsar with many tears, besought him not to take any severe course with his brother; he knew well that all those things were true, neither was there any man more grieved thereat than himself. For whereas he had credit and reputation, both at home, and amongst other States of Gallia, and his brother being of small power by reason of his youth, was, by his aid and assistance, grown into favour and authority, he used those means as an advantage, not onely to weaken his authority, but to bring him to ruin: And yet nevertheless he found himself overruled through Brotherly affection, and the opinion of the common people. And if Cæsar should take any strict account of these offences, there was no man but would think it was done with his privacy, considering the place he held in

in his Favour; whereupon would consequently follow on his behalf, a general alienation and dislike of all Gallia.

As he uttered these things, with many other words accompanied with tears, Cæsar taking his right hand, comforted him, and desired him to intreat no further: for such was the respect he had unto him, that for his sake, and at his request, he forgave both the injury done to the Common-wealth, and the displeasure which he had justly conceived for the same. And thereupon called Dumnorix before him, and in the presence of his brother shewed him wherein he had deserved much blame and reproof; told him what he had understood, and what the State complained on; advised him to avoid all occasions of mistake for the future; that which past he had forgiven him, at Divitiacus his brother's intreaty. Howbeit he set espials upon him, to observe his courses, that he might be informed what he did, and with whom he conversed.

The same day, understanding by the Discoverers, that the Enemy was lodged under a Hill, about eight miles from his Camp, he sent some to take a view of the Hill, and of the ascent from about the same. Which was found, and accordingly reported unto him to be very easie. In the third watch of the night he sent away T. Labienus the Legat with two Legions, and those Guides that knew the way; commanding him to possess himself of the top of that Hill. Himself, about the fourth watch, marched on after the Enemy, the same way they had gone, sending all his Horsemen before.

P. Causidius, that was held for a great Soldier, first in the Army of L. Sylla, and afterwards with M. Crassus, was sent before with the Discoverers. At the breaking of the day, when Labienus had got the top of the Hill, and himself was come within a mile, and a half of the Helvetian Camp, without any notice to the Enemy either of his or Labienus approach (as was afterwards found by the Captives) Causidius came running, as fast as his Horse could drive, and told him, that the Hill which Labienus should have taken, was held by the Galles; which he perceived plainly by the Armes and Ensigns of the Helvetians. Whereupon Cæsar drew his forces to the next Hill, and imbatelled the Army.

Labienus (according to the directions he had from Cæsar, not to fight, unless he saw his Forces near the Enemies Camp, that they might both at the same time assault them from divers parts at once) when he had took the

Hill, kept his men from battel, expecting our Army.

At length, when it was farr in the day, Cæsar understood by the discoverers, that the Hill was possessed by his Party; as also that the Enemy was dislodged, and that Causidius was so astonished with fear, that he reported to have seen that which he saw not. The same day he followed the Enemy at the distance he had formerly used, and incamped himself three miles from them. The day following for as much as the Army was to be paid in Corn within two dayes next after, and that he was but eighteen miles distant from Bibract, a great and opulent City of the Heduans, he turned aside from the Helvetians, and made towards Bibract.

The first OBSERVATION.

The getting of this Hill, as a place of advantage, was marvellous important to the happy success of the Battel: for the advantage of the place is not onely noted as an especial cause of ease victory throughout this History, but in all their Wars, from the very cradle of their Empire, it cleared their Armies from all difficulties, to what extremities soever they were put. The first reason may be in regard of their Darts and Slings, and especially their Piles; which being a heavy deadly weapon, could not any way be so available being cast countermount, or in a plain level, as when the declivity and downfall of a swelling bank did naturally second their violent impulsion. Neither can the shock at handy-blows be any thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their Battels) when the soldiers spent their strength in fraining the injury of a rising Mountain, as when the place by a natural inclination did further their course.

And, to conclude, if the Battel succeeded not according to their desire, the favour of the place afforded them means of a strong retreat, in the highest part whereof they had commonly their Camps well fenced, and fortified against all chances. If it be demanded, whether the upper ground be of like use, in regard of our weapons; I answer, that in a Skirmish of shot, I take the advantage to lie in the lower ground, rather then on the Hill; for the Peeces being hastily charged, as commonly they are after the first Volley, if the bullet chance to lie loose, when the noise of the Peeces is lower then the breech, it must needs lie at Random, and be altogether uneffectual: but when the noise shall be raised up to the side of a Hill, the Bullet being rammed in with his own weight, shall fly with greater certainty and fury; considering the nature of the Powder to be such, that the more it is shot and shut in, the more it seeketh to enlarge his flame, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury.

Concerning other weapons, I take the upper ground in the shock and encounter to be advantageous, as well for the Sword, as the Pike, and would desire as great respect, if the contrivance were

Places of advantage in the Roman Wars.

were decided by these weapons, as seldom times it is.

The second OBSERVATION.

BY *Causidius* his demeanour, we see that verified, which Physicians affirm, That nothing will sooner carry our judgement out of her proper seat, then the passion of fear; and that amongst soldiers themselves, whom custom hath made familiarly acquainted with horror and death, it is able to turn a flock of sheep into a squadron of Corselets, and a few Canes or Officers into Pikes and Lancers. Which may serve to advise a direct General not easily to credit a relation of that nature, when a man of reputation in so perfect a discipline, and so experienced in the service of three famous Chiefs, was so surprised with fear, that he could not discern his friends from his enemies. But I will speak more of this passion in the War with *Drivissus*.

The third OBSERVATION.

IN every relation throughout the whole course of this History, the first words are commonly these, *Re frumentaria comparata*, as the foundation and strength of every expedition, without which no man can manage a War according to true Maxims and Rules of the Art Military; but must be forced to relieve that inconvenience with the loss of many other advantages of great consequence. Which was the occasion to *Cæsar* de *Coligence*, that famous Admiral of France, amongst other Oracles of truth, wherewith his mind was marvelously enriched, often to use this saying, That he that will shape that beast (meaning War) must begin with the Belly. And this rule was diligently observed by *Cæsar*, who best knew how to express the true portraiture of that beast, in due proportion and lively resemblance.

The order of the *Romans* was, at the day of measuring, to give Corn to every particular soldier for a certain time, which was commonly defined by circumstances: and by the measure which was given them, they knew the day of the next payment; for every Footman received after the rate of a Bushel a week, which was thought sufficient for him and his servant. For if they had paid them their whole stipend in Money, it might have been waited in unnecessary expenses: but by this means they were free of provision for the time determined; and the sequel of the War was providently cared for by the General.

The Corn being delivered out, was husbanded, ground with Hand-mills, which they carried always with them, and made into hasty Cakes, dainty enough for a Soldiers mouth, by no other but themselves and their servants. Neither could they sell it, or exchange it for Bread; for *Salust* reckoneth this up, amongst other dishonors of the Discipline corrupted, that the Soldiers sold away their Corn, which was given them by the Treasurer, and bought their bread by the day. And this manner of provision had many special commodities, which are not incident to our custom of Victualling: for it is impossible that Victuallers should follow an Army, upon a Service, in the Enemies Country, twenty or thirty days together, with sufficient

provision for any Army: And, by that means, the General cannot attend advantages and strict opportunities, which, in tract of time, are often offered, but is forced either to hazard the whole upon unequal terms, or to found an unwilling retreat.

And, whereas the Victuallers are for the most part voluntary, respecting nothing but their gain, and the Soldiers on the other side careless of the morrow, and prodigal of the present; in that turbulent Marr-market, where the seller hath an eye only to his particular, and the buyer respecteth neither the publick good, nor his private Commodity, there is nothing to be looked for but Famine and Confusion. Whereas the *Romans*, by their manner of provision, imposed the General care of the Publick good upon the Chief Commander, whose duty it was to provide store of Corn for his Army; and the particular care upon every private Soldier, whom it especially concerned to see that the allowance which the Common-weal had in plentiful manner given him for his maintenance, might not be wasted through negligence, or prodigality: which excellent order the nature of our Victualls will now admit. Their Provinces, and the next Confederate States furnished their Armies continually with Corn; as it appeareth by this place, that for provision of grain, he depended altogether upon the *Helvii*: and when they were in the Enemies Country, in the time of Harvest, the Soldiers went out to Reap and gather Corn, and delivered it threshed and cleaned to the Treasurer, that it might be kept until the day of payment.

But, to leave this frugal and provident manner of Provision, as impossible to be imitated by this Age, let us return to our History, and see how the *Helvetians* were led, by a probable error, to their last overthrow.

CHAP. VII.

The Helvetians follow after Cæsar, and overtake the Reverend. He imbatleth his Legions upon the side of a Hill; and giveth order for the Battle.

WHEREOF the Enemy being advertised, by certain fugitives of the Troop of Horse, commanded by *L. Emilius*, presently, whether it were, that they thought the Romans did turn away for fear, (and the rather, for that the day before, having the advantage of the upper ground, they refused to fight) or whether they thought to cut them off from provision of corn, they altered their purpose, and, turning back again, began to attack our men in the Rere. Which *Cæsar* perceiving, drew his Forces to the next Hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the charge of the Enemy: and, in the mean time, in the midst of the Hill, made a Triple Battel, of four Legions of old Soldiers; and upon the highest ridge thereof he placed the two Legions which he had lately involved in the bitter Gallia, together with the associate Forces, filling the

whole front of the Hill with Men, and flowing the carriages in one place, which he commanded to be fenced and guarded, by those that were in the uppermost Battalions.

The Helvetians on the other side conveyed their carriages and impediments into one place; and having beaten back *Cæsar's* horsemen with a thick-thronged Squadron, they put themselves into a Phalanx, and so pressed under the first Battel of the Roman Legions.

The first OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING the true sense of this triple Battel which *Cæsar* made upon the side of the Hill, I understand it according to the ancient customs of the Romans, who, in the infancy of their Military Discipline, divided their Army into three sorts of Soldiers, *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*; for I omit the *Pelites*, as no part of their standing Battels, and of these they made three several Battels, from Front to Back. In the first Battel were the *Hastati*, and they possessed the whole Front of the Army, and were called *Acies prima*. Behind these, in a convenient distance, stood the *Principes* in like fort and order disposed, and were called *Acies secunda*. And lastly, in a like correspondent distance were the *Triarii* imbatelled, and made *Acies tertiâ*.

Their Legion consisted of Ten Companies, which they called Cohorts, and every Cohort consisted of three small Companies, which they named *Manipuli*: a Manipule of the *Hastati*, a Manipule of the *Principes*, and another of the *Triarii*; as I will more particularly set down in the second Book. And, as these three kinds of Soldiers were separated by distance of place, from Front to Back: so was every Battel divided into his Maniples; and these were divided by little allies and wayes one from another, which were used to this purpose: The *Hastati* being in Front, did ever begin the Battel: and if they found themselves too weak to repel the Enemy, or were happily forced to a retreat, they drew themselves through these allies or distances, which were in the second Battel, between the Maniples of the *Principes*, into the space which was between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*; and there they rested themselves, whilst the *Principes* took their place and charged the Enemy. Or otherwise, if the Commanders found it needful, they filled up those distances of the *Principes*; and so united with them into one Body, they charged the Enemy all in groûs; and then if they prevailed not, they retired into the spaces between the *Triarii*, and so they gave the last assault, all the three bodies being joyned into one.

Now if we examine by the current of the History, whether *Cæsar* observed the same order and division in his Wars, we shall find little or no alteration at all: for first, this *Triplex Acies* here mentioned, was no other thing but the division of the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, according to the manner of the first institution. And least any man should dream of that ordinary division, which is likewise threefold, the two cornets and the Battel, and in that sense he might say to have made

triplicem Aciem, let him understand, that the circumstances of the Division, have no coherence with that Division; for in that he faith of the *Helvetians*, *successerunt sub Acie primâ*, they pressed near the first Battel or Vanguard, he maketh it clear, that the Army was divided into a Triple Battel from Front to Back: for otherwise he would have said, *successerunt sub dextrâ aut sinistrâ cornu, aut mediâ Acie*; for so were the parts of that Division termed. Again, in the retreat which the *Helvetians* made to the Hill, when he faith, that the first and second Battel followed close upon the Enemy, and the third opposed it self against the *Boii* and *Tulingi*, and stood ready at the foot of the Hill to charge the Legions in the flank, and on the back; it is manifest, that no other division can so fitly be applied to this circumstance, as that from front to back.

But that place, in the first of the Civil Wars, taken away all scruple of controverſie, where he useth the very same termes of *prima*, *secunda*, and *tertia Acies*: for, being to encompass himself near unto *Africanus*, and fearing least his Soldiers should be interrupted in their work, he caused the first and second Battel to stand in Armes, and keep their distance, to the end they might thrust and cover the third Battel (which was employed in making a Ditch behind them) from the view of the Enemy; and this kind of imbatelling *Cæsar* observed in most of his Fights: by which it appeareth, that he used the very same order and discipline for imbatelling, as was instituted by the old Romans.

Concerning the ancient names of *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, which *Romus* in his *Quintus Silius Cæsar* is urged to be omitted throughout the whole History, I grant they are seldom used in these Commentaries, in the sense of their first institution: for the *Hastati*, when the Discipline was first created, were the youngest and poorest of the Legionary Soldiers; and the *Principes* were the lusty and able-bodied men; and the *Triarii* the eldest and best experienced. But in *Cæsar's* Camp there was little or no difference, either of valor or years, between the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*; which he nameth *Primâ*, *Secundâ*, and *Tertiâ Acies*; and therefore they were never termed by those names, in respect of that difference.

Notwithstanding, in regard of order and degrees of Discipline, that virtue might be rewarded with honor, and that time might challenge the privilege of a more worthy place, the late distinctions and termes were religiously observed. For, in the Battel with *Petavius* at *Ilerda* in Spain, he mentioneth the death of *L. Bulginius*, *ex primâ Hastatâ legionis quatuordecimæ*; and, in the overthrow at *Dyrachina*, he faith, that the Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded, commended the safety of his Battalion to the Horsetmen, all the Centurions of the first Cohort being slain, *præter Principem prætorum*. And for the *Triarii*, there is no term more frequent in *Cæsar* than *Primipilus*; which name, by the Rules of the ancient Discipline, was given to none but to the chieftest Centurion of the first manipule of the *Triarii*: whereby it appeareth, that the maniples kept the same names, in regard of a necessary distinction, although peradventure the *Hastati* were as good Soldiers as either the *Principes*, or the *Triarii*.

As touching the spaces between the maniples, wherein the first Battel did retire it self if occa-

sion urged them, I never found any mention of them in *Cæsar*: excepting once here in *England*, where, in a skirmish, the *Brians* urged the Count of Guard, which kept watch before the *Roman Camp*, that *Cæsar* sent out two other Cohorts to succor them; who making distance between them as they stood, the Count of Guard retired it self in safety through that space into the Camp. Otherwise we never find, that the first Battel made any retreat into the allies, between the maniples of the second Battel; but when it failed in any part, the second and third went presently to second them: as appeareth in the Battel following with *Arivivus*, and in divers others.

Lib. 5. de
Militia Ro-
mana.

Concerning the use of this triple Battel, What can be said more than *Lipius* hath done? where he layeth open the particular commodities thereof, as far forth as a speculative judgement can discern of things so far remote from the use of this age, which never imitate this triple Battel, but only in a March: for then commonly they make three Companies, a Vanguard, a Battel, and a Rereward: but in imbatelling, they draw these three Companies all in Front, making two Cornets and the Battel, without any other Troops to second them.

But let this suffice concerning *Cæsar* his manner of Imbatelling, and his *triplex Acies*, until I come to the second Book: where I will handle more particularly the parts of a Legion, and the commodity of their small Battalions.

The second OBSERVATION.

A Phalanx
described.

The Macedonian *Phalanx* is described by *Polybius*, to be a square Battel of Pikemen, consisting of Sixteen in flank, and Five hundred in Front; the Soldiers standing so close together, that the Pikes of the fifth rank were extended three foot beyond the Front of the Battel: the rest, whose Pikes were not servicable, by reason of their distance from the Front, couched them upon the shoulders of those that stood before them: and so locking them in together in file, pressed forward, to hold up the way, or giving back of the former ranks, and so to make the assault more violent and unresistable.

The *Grecians* were very skilful in this part of the Art Military, which containeth order and disposition in imbatelling: for they maintained publick Professors, whom they called *Tactici*, to teach and instruct their youth, the practice and Art of all formes convenient for that purpose. And these *Tactici* found by experience, that sixteen in flank, so ordered as they were in a *Phalanx*, were able to bear any shock, how violent soever it charged upon them. Which number of sixteen they made to consist of four doubles; as first, unity maketh no order, for order consisteth in number and plurality; but unity doubled maketh two, the least of all orders, and this is the double: which doubled again maketh the second order, of four Soldiers in a file; which doubled the third time, maketh eight; and this doubled maketh sixteen, which is the fourth doubling from a unity; and in it they stayed, as in an absolute number and square, whose root is four, the Qua-

druple in regard of both the extremes. For every one of these places the *Tactici* had several names, by which they were distinctly known. But the particular description requireth a larger Discourse; then can be comprehended in these short observations. He that desireth further knowledge of them, may read *Ælianus*; that lived in the time of *Adrian* the Emperor; and *Arianus*, in his History of *Alexander* the Great, with *Maurinus*, and *Leo Imperator*; where he shall have the divisions of *Tetraphalanga*, *Diphalangia*, *Phalangia* unto a unite, with all the Discipline of the *Grecians*. The chiefest thing to be observed is, That the *Grecians* having such skill in imbatelling, preferred a *Phalanx* before all other formes whatsoever; either because the Figure in it self was very strong; or otherwise, in regard that it fitted best their Weapons, which were Long Pikes and Targets. But, whether *Cæsar* termed the Battel of the *Helvetians* a *Phalanx*, in regard of their thick manner of imbatelling only, or otherwise, for as much as besides the form, they used the Natural Weapon of a *Phalanx*, which was the Pike, it remaineth doubtful. *Brasensis*, in his Discourses upon this place, maketh it no controverfie, but that every Soldier carried a Pike and a Target. The Target is particularly named in this History: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the fame, that their offensive Weapons were Pikes. In the fight at the Baggage, it is said, that many of the Legionary Soldiers were wounded through the Cart-wheels, with *tragulae* and *matere*, which are commonly interpreted Spears and Javelins: and I take them to be Weapons longer than common Darts; but, whether they were so long as the *Sarissae* of the *Macedonians*, I cannot tell. Howsoever, this is certain, that the *Helvetians* have ever been reputed for the true *Phalangite*, next unto the *Macedonians*; and that in their thick and close imbatelling, they failed not at this time of the form of a *Phalanx*: for they rooted it so thick with Targets, that *Cæsar* faith, they were sore troubled, because many of their Targets were felled, and tied together with Piles darted at them. Which argueth, that their *Phalanx* was very thick through, whatsoever their Weapon was.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar sendeth away all the Horses of ease; exhorteth his Men, and beginneth the Battle.

Cæsar, to take away all hope of safety by flight, first caused his own, and then all the private Horses of ease, to be carried out of sight; and so using some motives of courage, began the Battle. The Soldiers casting their Piles, with the advantage of the Hill, did easily break the *Helvetians Phalanx*, and then with their Swords beset themselves to a furious close.

Cæsar.

The

The First OBSERVATION.

Speeches of
encourage-
ment before
they gave
Battle.

The ancient Sages found it necessary to a faithful and serious execution of such an action, to prepare the minds of their Men with words of encouragement, and to take away all scruple out of their conceits, either of the unlikelihood of the cause, or disadvantage against the Enemy: for if at any time that laying be true, that *Oratio postquam pœnit*, it is here more powerful and of greater effect. For a donative or liberanza, can but procure a mercenary endeavor, ever yielding to a better offer; and do oftentimes breed a suspicion of wrong, even amongst those that are willingly enriched with their service without. But in as much as Friends to become Enemies, the Soul, and discomforth the intent and drift of every action, a few good words laying open the injury, which is offered to innocency, how equity is controlled with wrong, and justice controlled by iniquity (for it is necessary that a Commander approve his cause, and settle an opinion of right, in the mind of his Soldiers, as it is ease to make that seem probable which so many offer to defend with their blood, when indeed every Man relieth upon anothers knowledge, and respecteth nothing less the right) a few words I say, will so stir up their minds, in the serventness of the cause, that every Man will take himself particularly engaged in the action, by the Title of Equity, and the rather, for that it jumpeth with the necessity of their condition. For Men are willing to do well, when well doing argueth that they would do: otherwise the Act may happily be effected, but the mind never approveth it by assent.

Lib. 7. de
bello Gallico.

And this manner of exhortation or speech of encouragement was never omitted by *Cæsar* in any conflict mentioned in this History: but he still used it as a necessary instrument to set Vertue on foot, and the only means to stir up alacrity. Or if it happened that his Men were at any time discouraged by disaster or cross accident, as they were at *Gergobia*, and at the two overthrowes he had at *Dyrackium*, he never would adventure to give Battle, until he had encouraged them again, and confirmed their minds in valor and resolution. But these age hath put on so scornful a humor, that it cannot bear a speech in this key, found it never so gravely, without scoffing and derision; and on the other side discontinuance of so necessary a part, hath bred at length such an *insultum pudorem* in our chief Commanders, that they had rather lose the gain of a great advantage, then buy it in words, to be delivered in publick.

The Second OBSERVATION.

In this Chapter we may farther observe the violence of the *Roman* Pile, which being a heavy deadly Weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectual against a *Phalanx*, or any other thick and close Battle, or whereforever else the broke was certain, or could hardly deceive the aim of the caller: for in such Encounters, it so galled the Enemy, that they were neither able to keep their or-

der; nor answer the assault with a resisting counterbuffe. By which it appeareth, that the only remedy against the Pile, was to make the ranks thin; allowing to every Souldier a large Podium, or place to stand in, that so the broke might of it self fall without hurt, or by force might be prevented; as it shall plainly appear by the sequel of this History, which I will not omit to note, as the places shall offer themselves to the examination of this discourse.

But as touching the Pile, which is so often mentioned in the *Roman* History; *Polybius* describeth it in this manner; A Pile faith he, is a casting weapon, the staff whereof, is almost three Cubits long, and it hath *pa mærem diametrum*, a hand-breadth in thickness. The staves were armed with a head of iron, equal in length to the staff it self: But in that sort, that half the head was fastned up to the middle of the staff, with plates of Iron, like the head of a Halbert; and the other half stuck out at the end of the staff, like a Pike, containing a fingers breadth in thickness, and so decreasing less and less unto the point, which was barbed. This head was so slender toward the point, that the weight of the staff would bend it as it stuck, as appeareth in this Battle of the *Helvetians*. This Weapon was peculiar to the *Romans* and was called *Pilum*, as *Varro* noteth, of *Pilum* a Pistle, quod *Hofes feriret ut pilum*. *Lipius* findeth that *Palmærem diametrum* was too great a thickness to be managed by any Mans hand, interpreteth it to be four inches in circuit, if the staff were either round or square, for they had of both sorts, and so he maketh it very imaginable; but nothing answerable to the description given by *Polybius*, either in form or weight.

Parvicius in his *Parallelis* maketh the staff to have *palmærem diametrum* in the butt end, but the rest of the staff he maketh to decrease taperwise, unto the head of Iron, where it hath the thickness of a Mans finger; and so it answereth both in form and weight to a Pistle, as may be seen by the figure, and I take it to be the meaning of *Polybius*. *Parvicius* in that place setteth down four difcommodities of the Pile. First, a furious and hot-spirited Enemy, will easily prevent the darting of the Pile, with a nimble and speedy close. And so we read, that in the Battle which *Cæsar* had with *Arivivus*, the *Germans* came so violently upon them, that the Souldiers cast away their Piles, and brook them to their Swords. And likewise in that worthy Battle between *Cætiline*, and *Marcus Petreus*, they cast away their Piles on either part. The second difcommodity was, that the Piles being so heavy, could not be cast any distance; but were only servicable at hand. Thirdly, they could not be cast with any aim, or as they lay, point-blank. And lastly, the Souldiers were to take advantage of ground backward when they threw them: which might easily disorder their Troops, if they were not very well experienced.

The Third OBSERVATION.

The last thing which I observe in this speciality is, that the legionary Souldiers had no other offensive weapon but one Pile or two at the most, and their Swords. By which it may be gathered, that all their Victories came by buckling at handy blows, for they came always too near before

The Roman
Pile described.

Lib. 3. de
Militia Ro-
mana.

Lib. 5.

Salust.

before they cast their Pile, that they left themselves no more time then might conveniently serve them to draw their Swords: neither would their Arms of defence, which was compleat, besides a large Target which they carried on their left Arm, suffer them to make any long pursuit, or continued chafe, whensoever a light-armed Enemy did make any speedy retreat; as will more plainly appear by that which followeth.

CHAP. IX.

The Helvetians fainting in the Battle, retire to a Hill, the Romans follow after, and the Battle is continued.

Cæsar.

IT was a great hinderance to the Gallies in their fight, that many of their Targets were struck through, and tied together with one fall of a Pile: for so it happened that it could neither be pulled out, by reason of the bowing of the Iron, nor could they use their left hand for the defence of themselves. Whereby it fell out, that many of them (after a wearisome toil) did cast away their Targets, and fought naked and unarmed. At length fainting with wounds, they began to give place, and retreated to a Hill a mile off.

The Hill being taken, and the Legions following on to drive them from thence, the Boii and Tulingi, to the number of fifteen thousand, being in the Rear of the Enemy, to guard the lag of their Army, setting on our Men as they were in pursuit of the rest, did charge them upon the open side, and began to inclose them about; which the Helvetians that had got the Hill perceiving, began again to fall upon our Men, and renewed the Battle. The Romans dividing themselves, turned their Ensigns two ways; the first and second Army fought against the Helvetians, that returned from the Hill, and the third Battle took charge of them that stood ready to inclose them about. And here the fight was doubtful and furious for a long time; until at length they were no longer able to endure the violence of the legionary Soldiers; and so one part betook themselves as at the first to the Hill; and the other to the place where their Carts and Baggage were lodged.

And hitherto, there was not one Man seen to have turned his back, in all this conflict; although the fight continued from the seventh hour, until the evening.

The first OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING the Ensigns of the Romans, we are to understand that the chiefest Ensign of every Legion was an Eagle, which always attended upon the Principal chief Centurion of the

said Legion, The Ensign of a Manipule, was either a Hand or a Dragon, a Wolf or a Sphinx; as it appeareth (besides the testimony of History) by the Column of Trajan in Rome, wherein the Ensigns are figured with such pourtraitures: so that these Ensigns resembling the proportions of living Creatures, had their foreparts always carried that way, which the Legions were to march, or where they were to fight. And therefore in this History, by the aspect and carrying of the Ensigns, the front of the Army was commonly noted; as in this place it is said, that the Ensigns of the first and second Battle were carried towards the Hill, which the Helvetians had made their Retreat; and the Ensigns of the third Battle looked another way, towards the Boii and Tulingi, which stood on the foot of the Hill. By which is signified how the Legions were divided to resist the brunt of the double encounter.

The second OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING the time of the day, we are to understand that the Romans used not the same division of the day as we commonly do: for they divided their artificial (which is the space between sun-rising, and setting) into twelve equal parts, which the Astronomers called unequal or planetary hours. The first hour of the day began always at sun-rising; the sixth hour was always high-noon; and the twelfth hour was sun-setting. And as the day waxed longer or shorter, so the hours were either greater or less: neither did they agree with equal or equinoctial hours, such as are now used; but only as the *Æquinoctium*; so that by this manner of reckoning, *Ab hora septima ad vespertum*, is meant, the Battle began about one of the clock, according to our computation, and continued until the evening. The like we must understand throughout this whole History, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.

CHAP. X.

The Helvetians continue their fight at the carriages: but at length they leave the field, and march towards Langres.

IN like manner the fight was kept on foot, at the carriages, until it was far in the night; the place being fortified with Carts instead of a Rampier: and the enemy casting their weapons from the upper ground, and with Darts and Javelins, under the Waggon, and from between the Wheels, did wound and kill many of our Men. After a long conflict, our Soldiers took their Carriages and their Camp; wherein Orgetorix's Daughter, and one of his Sons were taken. There were saved out of that Battle about one hundred and thirty thousand persons; who marching continually all that night, and making no stay in any place, came the fourth day into the confines of the Lingones: for by reason of the Soldiers' hurry, and the burial of the slain, Langres.

wherein there was spent three days, there was no pursuit made after them.

OBSERVATION.

IF we consider the nature of the action, and look into the true cause of their overthrow, as far as the right fence of the History shall direct our judgement, we shall find valor not to be wanting in the Helvetians, but rather superlatively abounding in the Romans. For that vehement opinion of their Valiancy and Manhood, which carried them out of the straits of the Countrey, to seek larger fortunes in other Kingdoms, was not abated with the loss of the fourth part of their Host at the River Arar, nor with the terrible fury of those veteran Legions; but it yielded this effect, which Cæsar in his estimate of valor, thought memorable, that for five hours space or more, there was not one Man seen to have turned his back. Their manner of imbatelling, had not the Romans been the Enemy, was unresistible. For being cast into a *Phalanx*, which in the plains of Asia, had made Alexander the great, and the Macedonian famous, they did as far surpass any other form of imbatelling (supposing that the conveniency of the place did fit that disposition) wherein the strength of the whole, is divided into many particulars, as the violence of a great body exceedeth the force and motion of his parts, when it is divided into small Cantons. For as in a *Phalanx*, many particular Soldiers, are by a close and compact order incorporated into one entire body; so their several Vertues are gathered into one head, and are as parts united into one general force; which easily fawalloweth up the ability of many other lesser quantities, into which a greater strength is equally divided.

The advantage of the place which they got by retreat, and the double charge wherewith they engaged the Romans, both in front and flank, was able in an indifferent conflict to have made Fortune fugitive, and bear Arms on their side, or at the least to have stemmed the swelling Tide of Victory, which carried the Romans so violently in the chafe, that they might have been equal tharers in the honour of the day; had it not followed from an Ocean of valor, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, until it came to that height; which true valor and unexampled resolution affected. And yet the height of this courage, could not so allay the heat of the Helvetians fury, but it brake forth into dangerous flames, when it came to the place where their carriages were laid, and cost much blood, and many Mens lives before they quitted the place, for they fought with that spirit and industry, as though they meant to make Trial, whether their fortune would prove no better in the night, then it had done in the day.

The overthrow of the *Tigurine* Canton, at the River Arar, proceeded rather from want of good directions, (which is the least to be marvelled at, considering they had no chief Commander, as we read of) than from any defect of valor: for the rules of Military Government, requires especial care in passing over a water; for then especially an Army is in greatest danger, when it is disorderly divided. And therefore the Romans achieved this Victory, by the horrible vigilancy, (as Tully cal-

lenth it) of their Commander, who always watched opportunities *rei bene gerendæ*, as necessary and speedy means to overcome in all his wars.

CHAP. XI.

Cæsar, after three days respite, followeth after the Helvetians: he taketh them to mercy, and sendeth them back again to the Countrey.

CÆsar sent Letters and Messengers to the Lingones, forbidding to supply them either with Corn or any other thing; which if they did, he would esteem of them as of the Helvetians. Himself, after three days respite, followed after with all his Forces. The Helvetians, pressed with the want of all necessary provisions, sent Commissioners unto him, to treat of their rendition. Who meeting him on the way, cast themselves at his feet, and with humble words and tears desired Peace. Being commanded to attend in the place they then were, they accordingly obeyed. Cæsar being come up unto them, required hostages, together with their Arms and Servants; as also the fugitives that were fled unto them.

While those things were sought out and brought, in the night time, six thousand men, or thereabouts, of the Canton called Verbi-gene, whether moved through fear of being executed, after their Arms were given up, or induced with hope of escaping, (as thinking that amongst such a multitude of people, that were there to be rendered, their flight should not be missed, or at least would be concealed) did in the beginning of the night leave the Helvetian Camp, and made towards the Rhene, and into the confines of the Germans.

Cæsar understanding through whose Territories they passed, commanded them to seek them out, and bring them back again, if they would be blameless in that behalf: And being brought back, dealt with them as Enemies. All the rest, after Hostages, Arms, and Fugitives were given in, he received to mercy; and commanded the Helvetians, Tulinges, and Latobriges to return into their Countrey from whence they came. And forasmuch, as having lost all their provision of Corn, there remained nothing at home to satisfy hunger, he gave order to the Allobroges, to supply them with Corn, and willed the Helvetians to reedifie their Towns and Cities, that they had before destroyed and forsaken. Which he did specially for this cause, that the Germans inhabited beyond the Rhene might not be invited with the richness of that soil, to fear themselves so near neighbours to the Province of Gallia, and the Allobroges. The Boii, at the mediati-

The Ensigns of the Romans.

Periculum
Rempus ab
bellis
gravissimum
sustine-
re divisus
et inordinatus
exercitus.

on of the Heduians, as knowing them to be Men of great valor, were permitted to dwell in their Country; to whom they gave Lands and Possessions, and received into the same Liberties and Immunities, as they themselves enjoyed.

In the Helvetian Camp was found a List, or Register, writ in Greek, and brought to Cæsar, containing by pole the whole number that left their Country, how many of them were able to bear Arms: and in like manner the Boys, old Men and Women, were involuted apart by themselves. The summary whereof, was, that the whole number of the Helvetians amounted to two hundred sixty three thousand, Tulinges to thirty six thousand, the Latobriges to fourteen, the Rauracks to twenty three, the Boii to thirty two. Of these there were that bare Arms, one hundred ninety two thousand. The total of all were three hundred sixty eight thousand. A view being taken by Cæsar's appointment, of those that returned home, there were found one hundred and ten thousand.

OBSERVATION.

The directions concerning their rendry and return were very found, and of good consequence. For first, in that he commanded them to attend his coming in the place where they were, he took away all motions of rest, trouble, which often removes might have caused, by the opportunity of some accident which might have happened: assuring himself that their abode in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace, which they made themselves of; considering that the *Evagones*, in whose Territories they were, durst not, for fear of Cæsar's displeasure, furnish them with any necessaries in that extremity. Touching the security which the *Romans* required of the loyalty of such people as they conquered; their manner was to take as Hostages, a sufficient number of the Men Children, of the chiefest Men of that Nation; whose Lives depended upon their Parents fidelity, and ended with the first suspicion of their Rebellion. Which custom, besides the present good, promised the like or better security to the next age; when as those Children by conversation and acquaintance should be so affected to the *Roman* Empire, that returning to their own Country, their actions might rather tend to the advancement thereof, than any way be prejudicial to the same. And least the love of liberty and freedom should prevail more with them, than that affection which Nature had injoyed them to bear to their Children; he did what he could to take away the means and instruments of their Rebellion, by causing them to deliver up such Arms and weapons, as were there present: and so to become fitable to that petition of peace, which they had made.

The summe of all is this; he corrected the infolency of a furious people, and reduced them to a feeling of their own madness. He kept them

from facking the possessions of many thousands in the Continent of Gallia, and sent them back again to continue their Name and Nation, in the place where they first inhabited; which continueth unto this day. And thus we see, that there is no humor so head-strong, nor so backt with strength of circumstances, but it may meet with a remedy to qualify the infolency thereof, and make it subject to correction and controulment.

C H A P. XII.

The States of Gallia congratulate Cæsar's Victory: they call a Council, and discover their inward grief, concerning *Arivivitus* and his Forces.

The Helvetian war being thus ended, the Princes and chief Men of all the States of Gallia came to Cæsar, to congratulate the happiness of this Victory, in so much, as they well understood, that albeit the people of Rome had by the course of this war, revenged the injuries, which heretofore they had done unto them: yet nevertheless, the issue thereof, did redound no less profitable to the peace of Gallia, than to the Roman Empire; forasmuch as the Helvetians left their Houses and Country, abounding with all plenty and prosperity, for no other purpose but to invade the whole Countrey of Gallia, and to bring it in subjection to themselves; and choosing one of that Large Continent some fit and fruitful place of habitation, to make the rest of the States their Tributaries. They required farther, that with his good leave they might call a general assembly at a day prefixed, of all the States of Gallia, forasmuch as they had matters of great importance to be handled, which they desired, (with a common consent) to prefer to his consideration. Which being granted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselves by Oath not to reveal the causes of their assembly, but to such as should be designed by common counsel.

The Parliament being broken up, the same Princes returned to Cæsar, and desired that they might in secret Treat with him of the safety of themselves, and all the rest: which being granted, they cast themselves in lamentable manner at his feet, contending with a great earnestness, that those things which they delivered, might not be revealed, as they did to have their Petition granted: forasmuch as they saw that the discovery of such declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull upon them most grievous afflictions.

Divitiacus the Heduan, in the name of the rest delivered, That Gallia was divided into two factions: the Hedui were the head of the one, and the Arverni of the other. These two States contending many years for the principality,

city, the Arverni, with the Sequans their Clients, hired the Germans to take their part; of whom, at first, there passed over the Rhene, some Fifteen thousand: but afterwards, these barbarous people having tasted the plenty and civility of the Gallies, drew over many more, that now there were no less than One hundred and twenty thousand. With these, the Hedui and their Clients had once or often fought; but, the Successes turned to their own calamity, and the utter overthrow of their Nobility and Senate: with which losses they were so broken and decayed, that whereas heretofore, as well by their own credit, as by the favour of the people of Rome, they struck a great stroke throughout all Gallia; they were now driven to deliver the Chiefest of their State as Pledges to the Sequans, and to bind themselves by Oath, never to seek their release, or freedom, nor to implore the aid of the People of Rome, nor to seek means to free themselves from their Sovereignty; only himself of all the Heduians could not be brought to take that Oath, or to give his children as Hostages: for which cause he fled to Rome, and besought help of the Senate, being now way obliged to the contrary, either by Oath or Hostages.

But it so fell out, that the Victory became more grievous to the Sequans, than to the Heduians: for that *Arivivitus* King of the Germans, was planted in their Territories; and being already possessor of a third part of their Country, which was the best part of all Gallia, did now require the Sequans to surrender another third part, for that a few months before, there were come unto him Twenty four thousand *Harudes*, to whom Lands and Possessions were to be allotted. Whereby it would come to pass, within a few years, that all the Gallies would be driven out of their dwellings, and all the Germans would come over the Rhene; for there was no comparison between Gallia and Germany, either in richness of soil, or fashion of life.

Concerning *Arivivitus*, after he had once defeated the Gallies in a Battel, near *Amagecobrig*, he carried himself very cruelly and insolently, requiring the children of all the Nobility for Hostages, and shewing strange examples of torture upon them. If any thing were done not according to his command or desire, he would easily shew himself to be a barbarous, fierce and bloody man, whose Tyranny they could no longer endure: and, unless there were help to be found in Cæsar and the People of Rome, all the Gallies must, as the

Helvetians did, forsake their Country, and seek new houses and states of habitation, far remote from the Germans, and try their fortunes, whatever befall them. If these things should haply be discovered to *Arivivitus*, he would doubtless take a severe revenge of all the Pledges of his custody. Cæsar might by his own authority, or the presence of his Army, by the renown of his late Victory, or by the countenance of the People of Rome, keep the Germans from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia, and defend it from the injuries of *Arivivitus*. This Speech being delivered by *Divitiacus*, all that were present, with much weeping, besought Cæsar to give them relief.

Cæsar observed, that only the Sequans of all the rest did no such matter, or were so affected as the others were; but with their heads hanging down, looked mournfully upon the ground: and wondering at it, asked them the cause thereof. To which they made no reply, but stood silent, with the same countenance of sorrow. And having oftentimes iterated his demand, without gaining any word of answer, *Divitiacus* the Heduan replied, That the State of the Sequans was herein more miserable and grievous than the rest; that they of all others durst not complain, or implore aid, although it were in secret, as having before their eyes the cruelty of *Arivivitus*, being absent, no less then if he were present. And the rather, for that other men had safe means of flying away; but the Sequans, having received *Arivivitus* into their Country, and made him Master of their Townes, were necessarily to undergo all miseries.

These things being known, Cæsar encouraged the Gallies with good words, and promised them, to have a care of that matter, as having great hope, that by his means and power, *Arivivitus* should be forced to offer no further injuries. And thereupon dismissed the Council.

OBSERVATIONS.

In this relation there are divers points worthily recommended to the discretion of such as are willing to be directed by other mens misadventures. As first, into what extremities ambition doth drive her thirsty favourites, by suppressing the better faculties of the Soul, and setting such unbridled motions on foot, as carry men headlong into most desperate attempts. For as it had deserved commendation in either fashion, to do have carried their emulation, that by their own means and strength applied to the rule of good Government, their authority might wholly have

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swayed the inclination of the weaker states: so was it most odious in the *Sequani*, to call in Foreign Forces, to satisfy the appetite of their untimpered humour; and, in the end, they were accordingly rewarded.

Secondly, it appeareth, how dangerous a thing it is, to make a stranger a stickler in a quarrel, which civil dissension hath broached, when the party that called him in, shall not be as able to refuse his assistance upon occasion, as he was willing to entertain it for advantage.

Lastly, the often discontents of these States, shew the force of a present evil, which possesseth so vehemently the powers of the Soul, that any other calamity, either already past, or yet to come, how great soever, seemeth tolerable and easie, in regard of that smart which the present grief inflicteth.

So the *Sequani* chose rather to captivate their liberty to the Barbarism of a Savage Nation, than to endure the *Hedui* to take the hand of them. And again, to make themselves vassals to the *Romans*, rather than endure the usurping cruelty of the *Germani*. And finally (as the sequel of the History will discover) to hazard the loss of life and Country, than to suffer the Taxes and Impositions of the *Romans*. So predominant is the present evil in mens affections, and so it prevailleth at the seat of our Judgment.

CHAP. XIII.

The Reasons that moved Cæsar to undertake this War.

Cæsar.

Many were the inducements which moved him to take that business to heart. At first, that the *Heduians*, who were oftentimes stiled by the Senate, with the title of Brethren, Cousins, and Allies, were in the servitude and thraldome of the *Germani*; and that their Hostages were with *Ariovistus* and the *Sequans*: which in so great a Sovereignty of the People of Rome, he took to be very dishonourable, both to himself and the Common-weal. At also for that he saw it very dangerous for the Roman Empire, that the *Germani* should accustom to little and little to flock in such multitudes into Gallia: Neither did he think he could moderate or restrain such fierce and barbarous people; but that having possessed all the Continent of Gallia; they would, as the *Cimbri* and *Teutons* had done before, break out into the Province, and so into Italy: especially the *Sequans*, being divided from the Province but with the River Rhone.

These things he thought fit with all speed to prevent: and the rather, for that *Ariovistus* was grown to that pride and arrogance, as was not to be suffered. For which respect, he thought it expedient, to send Embassadors unto him, to appoint some indifferent place for parlee; for

that he had to treat with him concerning publick Affairs, and some matters that did much import both of them.

OBSERVATION.

I May here take an occasion to speak somewhat concerning the authority of the *Roman* Generals, which we see to be very large; considering that *Cæsar* of himself, without any further leave of the Senate and People of Rome (for what may be gathered by this History) did undertake a War of that consequence, and put in jeopardy the Legions, the Province, or what other interest the *Romans* had in Gallia.

Wherein we are to understand, that when the State of Rome did allow the Government of any Province to a Proconsul, they did likewise recommend unto him the careful managing of such accidents, as might in any way concern the good of that Regiment. For, considering, that such cases, as may trouble a well-ordered Government, are as well external and foreign, as internal, and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had been to small purpose, to have given him only Authority to maintain a course of wholesome Government at home, and no means to take away such oppositions, which Foreign accident might set up against him. And so we see, that *Cæsar* undertook the *Helvetia* War, in regard of the safety of the Province, and this again with *Ariovistus*, lest the *Germani* should so multiply in Gallia, that the Province it self might at length be endangered. Neither had their Generals Authority only to undertake these Wars, but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to Treat, Capitulate, Compound, or what else they thought convenient for the advancement of the Common-weal, did wholly rest upon their direction; *republica bene gesta* being the stile of the Warrant for all their actions.

Neither may we think, that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerful in the course of business, as that which absolutely commandeth without controulment, and proceedeth according to the opportunity of time, and occasion, further than either Prescription or Limitation can direct it. And therefore whensoever the Roman Affairs were distressed, and driven to an exigent, they created a Dictator, that had *regiam potestatem*, such an absolute command, that whatsoever power rested, either in the Consul, or in the Tribunes, in the Senate, or in the People, it gave way to the greatness of that Magistrate: that there might be no lett or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute command could establish for the good of the Common-weal. And yet notwithstanding this absolute Government, they attributed such power to the course of Humane actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted upon dissolute and unfortunate Leaders, they seemed to acknowledge, that no man, how circumspet soever, could promise more then likelihoods, or probabilities of good fortune, as far forth as his means and industry could achieve it. For old *M. Fabius*, pleading for the life of his gallant son, and opposing the rigour of *Papirius* the Dictator, with examples of Antiquity, saith, *Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omnium*

The Authority of the Roman Generals.

omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem unquam atrociter fuisse in eos qui ceciderat atque infestis exercitiis amississent, quam in pecunia eos multaret: capite autem diem esse. The People, saith he, in whom the sovereign power of things consisteth, never shew greater displeasure against such as had lost an Army, either by rashness, or unskillfulness, than imposing a Fine upon them: but, to bring the life of a General in question, for failing in his Endeavours, was never heard of to that day.

The condition of the inferior Officers of their Camp was far otherwise, in regard of Military Discipline: for Prescription guided them in all their services, and the chieft part of their duty was obedience; although they saw evident reason to the contrary, and found their directions imperfect in that behalf: and therefore *Cæsar* saith upon that occasion, *Alia sunt legati partes ac imperatoris: alter omnia agere ad prescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet.* The office of a Legate, or Lieutenant, differeth from that of a General: the one doing all things by Prescription; and the other freely deliberating of whatsoever may concern the cause. And this course the *Romans* held concerning the Authority of their Generals.

CHAP. XIV.

Ariovistus his Answer. A second Embassy, with the success thereof.

Cæsar.

To that Embassy, *Ariovistus* answered; That if his occasions had required *Cæsar*'s assistance, he would have furthered them with his own presence: and he thought it as reasonable, that if it were in his hand to pleasure the *Romans*, *Cæsar* ought not to think much of the like labour. For his own part, he durst not come into those parts of Gallia, which *Cæsar* possessed, without an Army; nor could he draw an Army to a head without great trouble and expence. The thing that he most wondered at, was, that the *Romans*, or *Cæsar*, had to do in that part of Gallia, which the Law of Armes had made his Inheritance.

Upon the return of this Answer, *Cæsar* framed a second Embassy, the purport whereof was; For as much as he thus required the *Rome* wherewith the People of Rome had beautified his best Dignity (for, in *Cæsar*'s Consulship, the Authority of their Empire had vouchsafed to esteem of him as a King in his Dominions, and as a Friend unto their State) and that he disdained to admit of a Parlee concerning the Common good; let him know, that these were the things that he required to be performed by them: First, that he should not suffer any more Troops of *Germani* to be transported over the Rhene into Gallia. Secondly, That he should deliver up those Hostages which he had of the *Heduians*

and *Sequans*; And should cease to molest them further with War, or other Injuries. These things if he did perform, *Cæsar* would assure him of a grateful acceptance on the behalf of the People of Rome: otherwise, for as much as in the Consulships of *M. Messala*, and *L. Piso*, the Senate had decreed, That he that should obtain the Government of the Province, should, as near as it would stand with the good of the Common-weal, endeavour the defence of their Associates and Friends, he would not neglect the injuries done unto the *Heduians*.

To these Mandates *Ariovistus* replied: The Law of Armes kept this tenure amongst all Nations, That a Conqueror might govern a subdued People, according as he thought best for his own safety. The People of Rome did not direct the course of their Government by another mans Prescription, but by their own Arbitrament: and as he had not directed the *Romans*, so ought not they to meddle with his proceedings.

The *Heduians* having tried the fortune of War, were, by right, become his Stipendiaries, wherein *Cæsar* offered great wrong, for that his coming thither had made their Tribute much less unto him than before. Touching their Hostages, his purpose was still to retain them. Neither would he make any unjust War upon any of their Associates, if they observed the Articles of Agreement, and paid their yearly Tribute: but, if they failed in that, the fraternity of the *Romans* would come too late to their succor. If *Cæsar* would needs undertake their quarrell, he was to let him know, that no man ever contended with *Ariovistus*, but to his own destruction. Try when he would, he should find what valour consisted in the *Germani*, that for fourteen years space never were covered with other roof than the Heavens.

OBSERVATION.

And thus far proceeded *Cæsar* with *Ariovistus*, in debating the wrongs and grievances of the *Hedui*. Wherein appeareth the difference between a matter handled according to Moral Civility, in terms of mildness and pleasing accent, and that which is rudely delivered, and dependeth rather upon the plainness of the project, than fitted with words fit for persuasion. For that which *Ariovistus* alleged, to make good his interest in Gallia, was as consonant to reason, as any thing to the contrary urged by *Cæsar*.

But, as the *Lacedemonian* said of one, That he spake the truth otherwise than it should be spoken: so it may be said of *Ariovistus* his Answer, that it wanted that sweetening Humanity, which giveth credit to Verity it self; for as much as it pro-

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ceedeth from a well-tempered spirit, wherein no turbulent passion seemeth to controul the force of Reason, nor hinder the sentence of true judgment; but rather reasonings her conceptions with humility, doth covertly complain of open wrong, and strengthen her Affections with a pleading delivery. And therefore how great soever the contrivance be, that party which exceedeth not the bounds of Modesty, but maketh mildness his chiefest Advocate, will prevail in any Auditory, that albeit Equity doth disallow her title, yet the manner of his carriage will clear him from offering wrong, in that he useth the sequels of innocency to prove his interest in that which he demandeth. But, to leave this circumstance, as only to be noted, let us proceed to the War it self, which I made the second part of this History.

CHAP. XV.

The Treviri bring news of One hundred Townships of the Suevi that were come to the Rhene. Cæsar taketh in Befanson: his Soldiers are surpris'd with an extreme fear of the Germans.

Cæsar.

AT the same time that this Answer was returned to Cæsar, there came likewise Embassadors from the Heduans and Trevires. The Heduans complained, That the Harudes lately transported into Gallia, did depopulate and waste their borders, and that they could not buy their peace of Ariovistus, with giving of Hostages for their Allegiance. The Trevires brought news of One hundred Townships of the Suevi, that were come to the River Rhene, to seek a passage into Gallia, conducted by Nasua and Cimberius, two brethren. Whereat Cæsar being exceedingly moved, thought his best means of prevention to consist in celerity, lest the difficulty of resisting should grow greater, when those new Forces of the Suevi were joyned with the power which was already with Ariovistus. And therefore having provided Corn, he made haste to seek the Germans. And, having gone three dayes journey on his way, he had intelligence, that Ariovistus, with all his Forces, was gone to take in Befanson, the greatest Town of the Sequans; and that he was three dayes journey on his way already.

Cæsar knowing how much it importeth him to prevent that disadvantage (for as much as the Town abounded with all necessary provisions for War, and was so sited, that he that commanded it might prolong the War at his own pleasure) being incircled with the River Albius, excepting a small space of Six hundred foot, which was fortified with an exceeding high Hill, the foot whereof did at each end joyn unto the River, and the Hill strengthened with a wall, and so joyned to the Town) made

all the haste he could to take the Town, and here left a Garrison. And as he rested there a few dayes, to make provision of Corn and other necessities, the Romans enquiring of the Gallies and Merchants concerning the quality of the Germans, understood that they were men of a huge stature, of courage invincible, and of great practice and experience in feates of Armes; whereof the Gallies had oftentimes made trial: For when they encountered them, they were not able to endure so much as the sternness of their countenance, or the fierceness of their looks. The whole Army conceived such a fear thereof, that all mens minds were wonderfully appalled. This fear began first among the Tribunes and Commanders of Hosts, and such others as for friendship sake followed Cæsar from Rome, and had small or no skill in matter of War. These men fainting, some one excuseth, and some another, of very earnest business which called them home, desired leave to depart. Some others, whom shame would not suffer to forsake the Camp, bewrayed the like passion in their countenances and behaviour: for hiding themselves in their Tents, they either bewailed their destiny secretly to themselves, or otherwise with their acquaintance and familiar friends. They lamented the danger they were all like to fall into, so that throughout the whole Camp, there was noising but making and signing of Testaments. And through the talk and fearfulness of these men, the old Soldiers and Centurions, and such as had great experience in the Camp, began by little and little to apprehend the terror wherewith the rest were amazed: and those that would seem to be least fearful, said, they feared not the Enemy, but the narrowness of the wayes, and the greatness of the Woods that were between them and Ariovistus; or otherwise they cast doubts where they might have provision of Corn. And many stuck not to tell Cæsar, that whenever he should give Commandments to March forward, or advance the Standards, the Soldiers would refuse to do it.

OBSERVATION.

WHerein, for that we find a strange alteration, no way answerable to that courage which a late-gotten Victory doth usually breed in noble spirits; it shall not be amiss a little to insist upon the quality of the accident, and to gather such brief instructions from their weakness, as may best serve to qualifie the amazement of horror, and mitigate the frenzy of so violent a passion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of Nature, cannot promise any such Learning; as may discover the true means and secret motions, whereby

whereby a fore-conceived fear doth trouble the senses, and astonish the mind; yet fith the History offereth it to our scanning, give me leave only to note the strangeness of the circumstance, and rudely to delineate the pourtraiture of a Beast-offener (even then well known, using the unwieldy pile for my pencil, and sifting my speech to a warlike Auditory. I know not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the senses receive intelligence of an eminent evil, which may either displease the Soul of this earthly Mansion, or trouble the quiet wherein she resteth, the spirits (as it seemeth) by the direction of their Sovereign Mistress, retire themselves into the inner Cabinets, and severer Pavilions of the body, where the chiefest part of the Soul is most resident: and so they leave the frontier quarters of her Kingdom, naked and ungarrisoned, the better to strengthen that capital City of the heart, out of which the life cannot fly, but to the utter ruin and destruction of the whole Body. For fear is not only a perturbation of the Soul, proceeding from the opinion it hath of some evil to come; but it is also a contraction and closing up of the heart, when the blood and the spirits are recalled from the outward parts, to assist that place which giveth life and motion to all the rest. In this Chaos and confusion of humors and spirits, when the multiplicity of faculties, (which otherwise require an ordinate distinction in their service, and by the order of nature should be disposed into several instruments, and be dilated throughout the body) are thus blended confusedly together, the conceptions of the mind, which presently rise from these advertisements, are suddenly checked with the disordered mixture of so many several properties, and are stifled as it were in the throng, before they can be transported to our judgment, or examined by reason, for want of that ordinate uniformity of place, which nature requireth in the powers of the mind. And hence proceedeth that amazement and astonishment, which so daunteth the hearts of Men, when they are taken with this passion, that because the Soul giveth no counsel, the body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen to the extremity of the perturbation, benumbed in sense, and forsaken of the spirits. So we read, that Theophilus the Emperor, in an overthrow which he had given him by the Hagarans, was stricken with such an excessive fear, that he could not bethake himself to flight, (*Adæ pavor etiam auxilium formidat*) until one of his chief Commanders, shaking him by the shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deep sleep, threatened him with present death, if he would not prevent the ruine of the Empire, by using that means which was only left for his safety.

Again, if in that turbulent confusory the spirits chance difficultly to receive any apprehension proceeding from the forging faculty of the Soul, they carry presently to execution before it be examined by reason, and follow the action with such vehemency, that they leave no place for better advice and reknowledgment. And this is the cause, that oftentimes through extremity of fear, to avoid one evil, we run headlong into a worse, and find a greater danger in the means we use to avoid a less; because reason did not first try the apprehension, before it was delivered to external Agitations. And so we find in the Battle between Germanicus

and the Armenians, that two gross Troops of Soldiers, were driven into such an excess of fear, that taking contrary courses to avoid one and the same danger, they either of them fled to that place, which the other had quitted; neither could they be advised by each others flight, that the places which they sought after, afforded them no remedy.

And albeit reason be called to counsel, when a parlee is summoned of composition, yet it beareth so final a sway in the consultation, that the will of it self concludeth to betray Verue to dishonour, and so to purchase peace, with the loss of the Souls chiefest Treasure: which ought ever to be estimated at a higher rate than any other happiness which can betide the mind. For among all the scissible things of this World, there is no Creature that hath such a confused fear, or is more amazed therewith, then Man: in neither is there any misery greater, or any bondage more shameful, servile or vile, then this, which maketh Men very abjects of all other Creatures, to redeem the evil which the danger threateneth; and then doth flame follow after to base a part, and aggravate the burthen of the Sin, with loathsome dilgrace, and penitent discontentment; adding oftentimes, Aloes to Wormwood, and making the end grievous for then the beginning. And thus doth danger breed fear, and fear yieldeth to dishonour, and dishonour bringeth shame, and shame, being always mingled with wrath and anger, revengeth it self upon it self; and wrath more perill then the first danger could threaten.

Whereby it appeareth, that as the affections of the mind are bred one of another; so on the contrary part, some are bridled and restrained by others, for as envy, hatred and anger rise oftentimes of love; so is joy lessened with grief, envy with mercy, and fear with shame.

But forasmuch as all such perturbations proceed of ignorance and inconsiderateness, whereby we think that the evil is greater then indeed it is; let us consider what disposition of our judgment, best moderateth the violent heat of these affections. And first, touching the passages whereby the Soul receiveth her advertisements, as they are of divers natures, the chiefest whereof, are the Eye and the Ear; so are their avisors different in quality, and require a several consideration to be rightly discerned. The intelligence by the eye is more certain, then that which cometh by the way of hearing; forasmuch as the Eye is a witness it self of every action whereof it taketh notice, neither is it deceived in its proper object: and therefore the judgment is not much troubled to determine definitively how great or how final the danger is, when the relations carry always that certainty. And albeit the Ear in like manner be not deceived in the proper object, for it faithfully giveth up that sense which found hath delivered unto it; yet forasmuch as the fantasy hath greater scope to coin her vain conceptions, in regard of the absence of the action, it is necessary that the discerning faculty be called for an assistant, before the judgment can truly determine: and then it will appear, that the truth doth not always answer the report which is made thereof; inasmuch as diseased Spirits will not stick to dilate or qualifie relations, according to the key wherein they themselves are tuned. And therefore this first cometh to be considered of, in all

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all such violent commotions, by which of these two fenses, the first intelligence was received. But concerning the judgment it self, this is most certain, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the flesh, the more violent are the affections of the Soul. And again, the purer the judgment is, and the higher it is lifted up from earthly natures, being no further interceded therein, then to hold a resolution of well doing, the fewer and lighter are the affections which trouble and molest it: for then it better discerneth the Truth and Fallhood, good or evil that is in things.

To redress this inconvenience, Cæsar betook himself to the fittest and most proper remedy, which was by the authority of his speech, to restore Reason to her former dignity, and by discourse, which fear had interrupted in them, to put down a usurping passion, which had so troubled the Government of the Soul, recalling it to the mean of true resolution, which was to moderate audacity with wariness, but not to choke valor with beastly cowardice: for these Oratory inducing persuasions, were not the least point of their discipline considering how they framed the inward habit of the mind (being the fountain and beginning of all motion) to give life and force to those actions, which the severity of outward discipline commanded. For as Laws and Constitutions of Men, enforce obedience of the body: so reason and persuasions mult win the Souls consent, according to that saying, *Hominis duci volunt, non cogi.*

CHAP. XVI.

Cæsar his Speech to the Army concerning this Feat.

Cæsar.

Cæsar being informed of these things, called a Council of War, admitting all the Centurions, of what degrees or orders soever, unto the same. And being thus assembled, he greatly blamed them, first, that any should be so inquisitive, as to imagine to themselves whither, and upon what service they were carried. Concerning Ariovistus, he had, in the time of Cæsar's Consulship, most earnestly sued for the friendship of the people of Rome: and why then should any Man misdemerit that he should so unadvisedly go back from his duty? For his own part he was verily persuaded, that if Ariovistus once knew his demands, and understood the reasonable offers that he would make him, he would not easily reject his Friendship, or the favor of the people of Rome. But if he were so mad as to make War upon them, why should they fear him? or why should they despair either of their own Promise, or of Cæsar's diligence? For if it came to that point, the Enemy that they were to encounter, had been tried what he could do, twice before; first in the memory of their Fathers, when the Cimbræ and Teutoni were vanquished by Marius, at what time the Army merited no less honor than the General: and

now of late again in Italy, at the insurrection of the Bondmen; who were not a little furthered through the Practice and Discipline they had learned of the Romans. Whereby it might be discerned, how good a thing it is to be constant and resolute; inasmuch, as whom for a time they feared without cause, being naked and unarmed, the same Men afterwards (although well armed and Conquerors withal) they nobly overcame. And to be short, these were no other Germans, then those whom the Helvetians had vanquished in divers Conflicts; and not only in their own Country, where the Helvetians dwell themselves, but also even at home at their own doors; and yet the same Helvetians were not able to make their Party good against our Armies.

If any Man were moved at the sight and overthrow of the Galles, upon inquiry he should find, that being wearied with continual Wars, (after that Ariovistus had for many Months together, kept himself within his Camp, in a boggy and fenny Country) and despairing of any occasion of Battle, he suddenly set upon them as they were dispersed, and so overcame them, rather by policy then by force. Which although it took place against savage and unskilful people, yet was not Ariovistus so simple as to think that he could insure our Armies with the like facilities. As for those that feared the cause of their fear to be the difficulty of provision of Corn, and the dangerousness of the way, they seemed very arrogant in their conceits, in presuming to direct their General, as if he had not known what pertained to his duty. The Sequans and Lingons had undertook that charge; besides that Corn was almost ripe every where in the fields: and what the ways were, should shortly be seen.

Whereas it was given out that the Soldiers would not obey his Mandates, nor advance their Standards, he little valued it; for he was well assured; that if an Army refused to be obedient to their General, it was either because he was thought to be unfortunate in his enterprises, or else, for that he was notoriously convicted of Avarice; but the whole course of his life, should witness his innocency, and the overthrow of the Helvetians his happiness. And therefore that which he was minded to have put off for a longer time, he would now put in execution out of hand: for the night following at the fourth watch, he would dislodge from thence; that without further delay he might understand, whether shame and respect of their duty would prevail more with them

them, then fear or cowardise. And though be mist that no Man else would follow him, yet notwithstanding he would go with the tenth Legion alone, of whom he had no doubt or suspicion, and would take them as a guard to his person.

Cæsar had chiefly favoured this Legion, and put most trust in them for their valor.

Upon the making of this speech, the minds of all Men were wonderfully changed; for it bred in every one a great alacrity and desire to fight: neither did the tenth Legion forget to give him thanks by their Tribunes, for the good opinion he had of them, assuring him of their readiness to set forward to the War. And then likewise the rest of the Legions made means by the Tribunes of the Soldiers and Centurions of the first Orders, to give Cæsar satisfaction; protesting they neither doubted nor feared, nor gave any censure of the issue of that War, but always left it to the wisdom of the General.

Their satisfaction being taken, and a view being made of the ways by Divitiacus (whom of all the Galles he best trusted) and report being by him made, that in fetching a compass of fifty miles, he might carry his Army in open and champaign Countries; in the fourth watch of the night, according to his former saying, he set forward.

The First OBSERVATION.

In the speech it self, are presented many specialities, both concerning their Discipline, and Military Instructions, which deserve examination: amongst which I note first, the extraordinary number admitted to the Council; *Omnium ordinum ad id concilium adhibitis Centurionibus*: whereas there were usually no more admitted to their Council of War, but the Legates, Questor, Tribunes, and Centurions of the first Orders; which I understand to be the first *Hastati*, the first *Principes*, and the first *Pilum* of every Legion. And this is manifestly proved out of the fifth Commentary, where Cicerō was besieged by *Ambiorix*: in which amongst other, there were two valient Centurions, *Pulsio* and *Varenus*, between whom there was every year, great emulation for place of preferment: *Et jam primis ordinibus appropinquabam*, saith Cæsar, that is, they had passed by degrees through the lower orders of the Legion, and were very near the dignity of the first cohort; wherein as in all the rest, there were three maniples, and in every maniple two orders.

The Second OBSERVATION.

The first motive which he useth to recal their exiled judgment, discovered their breach of discipline: for contrary to the course of Military government, they had presumed not only to make inquiry, but to give out whither, and upon

what service they were carried: which in the rigour of Camp-Policy, could not pass without due punishment. For what can more contradict the fortunate success of an expedition, then to suffer it to be measured with the vulgar conceits, or weighed in the balance of such false judgments; especially when those weak Censors are to be actors and executors of the design for then every Man will lute the nature of the action, according to his own humor, although his humor be led with blindness, and have no other direction then an uncertain apprehension of profit or disadvantage.

And in this case, there cannot be a better President then Nature hath prescribed: for as natural Agents, whilst they concur to produce a work of absolute perfection, neither know what they do, nor can discern the things they look upon, but yield themselves to be guided by a Moderator of infinite knowledge: so ought a multitude to submit their ability to the direction of some wise and prudent Captain, that beholdeth the addition in true honour, and balanceth the loss of many particulars with the health and safety of the publick good. For if every man should prescribe, who should obey? *Tam vixit quadam milites, quamque oportet*, saith Orto in Tacitus, upon the like disorder, and again, *Parando potius quam imperia ducum sciscitando, res militares continentur*. Which proveth that the greatest virtue which is required in a Soldier is obedience; as a thing wherein the force of all discipline consisteth.

The Third OBSERVATION.

In the reason which he useth to prove their disparity of valor, in regard of the Romans, who were superior to the Helvetians that had often-times overthrown the Germans, he strengtentheth the argument with the advantage of the place, and faith, that the Helvetians had put them to the world, not only when the Helvetians dwelt themselves, but even in their own Country, and at home at their own doors: as though an Enemy were charged with greater fury in the presence of a Mans own Country, and dearest friends, then in a strange and unknown land.

The question was handled in the Roman Senate, by *Fabius Maximus*, and *Scipio*; surnamed *Africinus*, when they sate in council how to rid their Country of that subtle *Carthaginian*, that, for sixteen years space had fretted like a canker the beauty of Italy, wasted the Land, and brought it to desolation, sacked their confederates, or alienated them from their duty, overthrown their Armies, slain their Consuls, and threatened their Imperial City with ruine and destruction. *Fabius*, upon the motion to make war in Africa, thought it agreeable to nature, first to defend that which was their own, before they attempted other Mens possessions: when Peace was established in Italy, then let War be set on foot in Africa, and first let them be without fear themselves, before they went about to terrify others: for those forces afforded little hope of victory in another Kingdom, that were not able to free their own Country, from so dangerous an Enemy. *Alcibiades* overthrew the Athenian Commonwealth, with the like counsel: and concerning *Hannibal*, let them be sure of this; that they should find him a fierer enemy in his own Country than in another Kingdom.

Scipio

Whether Men have greater courage in their own or in a Strangers Country.

Scipio on the other side, carried on with the honour of so glorious an enterprise; wanted neither reasons nor example to impinge Fabius his authority: For he shewed that *Agathides* the Syracusan King, being a long time afflicted with the Punic War, averting the Carthaginians from Sicily, by transporting his Forces into Africa: But how powerful it was to take away fear, by retorting danger upon the Oppressor, could there be a pretenser example then *Hamilcar*? There was great difference in the nature of the action, between the spoil and want of a Strangers Country; and to see their own native Country walled with Sword and destruction: *Plus animi est inferendi periculum, quam prosequendi*. For he that invadeth anothers Kingdom, easily discoveth both the advantage which may be taken against the Enemy, and the strength whereupon he relyeth. And amongst the variable events of War, many unexpected occasions arise, which present Victory to him that is ready to take it; and many strange chances to alter the course of things, that no foresight can discern what may happen.

With these and the like remonstrances, this question of no less doubt than importance, was handled by two famous and worthy Captains, whose minds (as it seemed) were intangled with such particular affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their own humor, then to determine in sincerity of judgment upon what specialists the truth was grounded, in the contrariety of their positions. But to leave other commodities or disadvantages, which were annexed unto either part, I will only set down some reasons, to prove how valor and courage may either grow, or be abated by the accidents, which rise in a War of that nature. And first this cannot be denied, the testimony of an infallible truth being grounded upon the property of Mans nature, that as advantage bringeth hope of victory; and hope conceiveth such spirits as usually follow, when the thing which is hoped for is effected, and thereby the courage becomes barely and resolute in Victory; so on the other side, disadvantage and danger breed fear, and fear doth check valor, and concoluteh the spirits, that virtue and honor give place to distrust, and yield up their interest to such directions as can afford nothing but diffidence and irresolution.

Neither can it be denied, but he that setteth up on an enemy in a strange Country, and so preventeth such attempts as might be made upon his own Territories, hath that advantage, which gives life unto action, and stealth his enterprise with resolution. For besides the commodity of leaving when he list, and proceeding as far forth as he shall find his means able to fortunate his attempts, he knoweth that the strife and controversy is not for his native Country, which he quietly enjoyeth, and is referred at all times to entertain him; howsoever Fortune shall favor his designs: but for a Strangers Kingdom, which his ambition thirsteth after, wherein, forasmuch as the riches and wealth of that State, are laid before them as the recompence of their labour, besides the honour which is achieved thereby, every Mans valor flourisheth at a high pitch, and their courage is increased, without any trouble or disturbance of the other faculties of the mind. But when a Prince shall be assaulted in his own Kingdom, and in the sight of his

Subjects, have his Land consumed with ruine, and destruction, the danger will so disturb the powers of the Soul, that through the turbulent disorder of the weaker parts, the better faculties will lose their prerogative of advising how the Enemy may be best resisted, when as every Man shall apprehend the terror of the danger, and few or none conceive the true means to avoid it.

And albeit the presence of such things as are dearest to his Soul, as the piety and respect of aged Parents, the tender affection towards Wife and Children, are sufficient to raise valor to the highest point of resolution; yet the motives are of little weight, as will rather make them diffident of their own worth, as insufficient to maintain so great a cause, then hold them in that key which true honor affecteth: forasmuch as the terror and fear of so great a danger, will present a greater measure of woes to their mind, then the hope of victory can afford them joy.

Hence therefore groweth the difference between him that seeketh to maintain that estate which he hath in possession by force of Arms, and another that seeketh to increase his means by valor. For the former is presented with the danger of losing all his Estate, which affrighteth and troubleth, having no other reward propounded unto him: and the other looketh upon the advantage which he gaineth by overcoming, which much increaseth his valor, without any loss or disadvantage, if he chanceth to be put to the worst. And therefore there is always great odds between him that hath already lost his goods, and is by that means become desperate, having nothing further to lose; and another that yet keepeth his substance, but is in danger to lose it; for fear will so dismay his mind, that he will rather distrust his own ability, then entertain a resolution of valor.

To prove this, we need not seek other examples, than those Imperial Cities in whose cause this controversy was first moved. For when *Hamilcar* was come into Italy, and had defeated *Sempronius* the Consul at *Trebia*, the Romans were driven into such an extacy of terror, that they believed verily that the Enemy was then coming to assault the City; neither had they any hope or aid in themselves, to keep or defend the same. On the other side, *Scipio* was no sooner landed in Africa, but there was such a tumult in Carthage, as though the City had been already taken: neither could the opinion of Victory, which *Hamilcar*, by a conquering Army in Italy, had confirmed for sixteen years together, prevail in the apprehension of so imminent danger. And then that which *Fabius* borrowed of Nature to teach the Romans, (that first Men ought to defend their own, before they seek other Mens possessions) was carefully followed by the Carthaginians: for with all speed they sent for *Hamilcar*, out of Italy, to be their Champion against young *Scipio*. If therefore other things be corresponded (as there are many other particularities concerning the power and strength of either Nation to invade an Enemy in his own Country, then to attend him at home in his own Kingdom,

The

The fourth OBSERVATION.

The last circumstance which I note in this Speech, was the truth which he reported in the Tenth Legion, being in it self peradventure as faulty as any other; wherein he shewed great Art, and singular Wisdom, For he that hath once offended, and is both burdened with the guilt of Confidence, and upbraided with the reproach of Men, can hardly be persuaded that his fault can be purged with any satisfaction. And although the punishment be remitted, yet the memory of the fact will never be blotted out with any virtuous action, but still remaineth, to cast dishonour upon the offender, and to accuse him of dilloyalty.

And therefore it oftentimes happeneth, that an error being once rashly committed, through despair of remission, admitteth no true penitency, but either draweth on more grievous crimes, confirming that of the Poet, *Sceler sceleris undum est*; or maintaineth his error by wilfull obduracy: as it is said of the Lion, that, being found by Hunters in a Cave, he will rather die in the place than quit it, for shame that he was found in so base a place of refuge; and therefore his property is thus expressed, *ingrediendo cæcus, exendo protervus*. This did *Cæsar* wisely present, by clearing the Tenth Legion of that of which he accused the rest of the Army; which made them the more earnest to answer his expectation, in as much as they were witness to themselves of a common error: and the other Legions envying at their fortune, resolved to shew as great alacrity in the sequel of the War, and to deserve more then the judgment of the Emperor had imputed to their fellows.

CHAP. XVII.

The Treaty between Cæsar and Ariovistus.

Cæsar.

The seventh day, as he continued on his March, his Espials brought him word, That Ariovistus, with all his Forces, was within Twenty four miles of that place: who, as soon as he understood of Cæsar's coming, sent Embassadors unto him, declaring, that for as much as he was come somewhat nearer, and that he might do it without danger, he was content to admit of a Parlee. Cæsar refused not the offer, thinking now to find him reasonable, in that he offered of his own accord, what he had formerly denied at Cæsar's request: and thereby was in good hope, that understanding what was required, he would in the end consider, of the many Favours he had received from the People of Rome, and desist from such wilful courses.

The fifth day following was appointed for the Treaty. In the mean time there passed often Messages reciprocally between them. Ariovistus required, That Cæsar would not

bring any Footmen to the Parlee, for that he feared to be circumvented by Treachery; and therefore thought fit, that either party should come only with their Cavalry: otherwise he would not give meeting.

Cæsar, not willing to put off the Treaty for any such cause, nor yet daring to put himself in trust to the French horse, thought it most convenient to leave the French Riders behind him, and to set the Soldiers of the Tenth Legion (whom he best trusted) upon their horses; that if he stood in need, he might have a faithful Guard of his Friends about him. Whereupon, one of the Soldiers said prettily, that Cæsar had done more for them then he had promised; for he had said before, he would make the Tenth Legion as a Guard to his person, and now he had involed them all for horsemen.

There was a great and open Plain, and in the midst thereof a rising Mount, which was almost in the mid-way between both the Camps: and thither, according to the agreement, they came to Parlee. The Legion which Cæsar had brought with him on horseback, he placed two hundred paces from the said Mount: and likewise the horsemen of Ariovistus stood in the same distance. Ariovistus requested, they might talk on horseback, and bring each of them ten persons to the Conference. At their meeting, Cæsar began his Speech with a Commemoration of the favours and benefits the Senate had done unto him, in that he was, by their Authority, intitled by the name of a King and a Friend, and thereupon had received great Gifts: Which favour fell but unto a few, and was by the Romans given only to men of great desert: whereas he, without any occasion of access unto them, or other just cause on his behalf, had obtained those honours through his Courtesy, and the bounty of the Senate.

He shewed him further, what ancient and reasonable causes of amity tied them so firm to the Heduvians: what Decrees and Orders of Senate had oftentimes been made in their favour and behoof: That from all Antiquity, the Heduvians had held the Principality of Gallia, and that long before they were in amity with the Romans. The People of Rome had always this Custome, not only to endeavour that their Allies and Confederates should not lose any thing of their proper, but also that they might increase in dignity and reputation: and therefore, Who could endure to see that forced from them, which they quietly possessed when they entered the league with the Romans?

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In like manner, he required the performance of such things which he had formerly given in charge to his Embassadors; that he should not make War either upon the Heduanes, or their Associates: that he should restore their Hostages: and, if he could not return any part of the Germans back again over the Rhene, yet he should forbear to bring any more into that Country.

Ariovillus made little answer to Cæsar's demands, but spake much of his own virtues and valor; That he was come over the Rhene, not out of his own desire, but at the mediation and intreaty of the Galles; that he had not left his Horse and Kindred but with great hope of high rewards; the possessions he had in Gallia were given him by themselves; their Hostages were voluntarily delivered unto him; he took Tribute by the Law of Arms, which was such, as Conquerors might lay upon the vanquished; he made no War upon the Galles, but the Galles made War upon him: All the States of Gallia came to fight against him, and had put themselves into the Field, whose Forces were in one Battel all dispersed and overthrown. If they were desirous to make another trial, he was ready to undertake them: but, if they would have Peace, it were an injury to retract that Tribute, which of their own accord they had paid until that time. He expected, that the Amity of the People of Rome should be rather an honor and a safety, than a loss unto him, and that he had sought it to that end: but, if by their means, the Tribute due unto him should be retracted, he would as willingly refuse their Friendship, as he had desired it. In that he had brought so many Germans into Gallia, it was rather for his own defence, than of any purpose to subdue the Country; as might appear, by that he had not come thither but upon intreaty, and set no War on foot but for his own defence. He was seated in Gallia before the Romans came thither; neither had the People of Rome, before that time, carried their Army beyond the bounds of their Province: and therefore he knew not what he meant to intrude himself into his possessions. This was his Province of Gallia, as that was ours: and, as it was not lawful for him to command in our quarters, so it was not fitting that they should disturb his Government.

In that he alleged, the Heduanes were by decree of Senate adopted into the Amity of the People of Rome; he was not so barbarous, or unacquainted with the course of things, as to be ignorant, that in the last War of the

Allobroges, they were aiding and assisting to the Romans: and, in the quarrel the Heduanes had with the Sequans, the Romans were in like manner assisting unto them. Whereupon he had good occasion to suspect, that Cæsar, under pretence of League and Amity, kept his Army in Gallia for his ruine and destruction: and, that if he did not depart, and withdraw his Army out of those Countries, he would no longer take him for a Friend, but for an Enemy. And, if his fortune were to slay him, he should perform a very acceptable service to many Noble and Chief Men of Rome (as he had well understood by Letters and Messengers he had received from them) whose favour and amity he should purchase, by taking away his Life. But, if he would depart, and leave him the free possession of Gallia, he would gratify him with great rewards: and what War sooner he desired to be undertaken, should be gone through withal, without his peril or charge.

Many things were spoken by Cæsar, to shew, why he could not desist from that contest; for neither was it his use, nor the custom of the People of Rome, to forsake their well-deserving Associates: neither could he think, that Gallia did rather belong to Ariovillus than the Romans. The Arverns and Rutenes, were, in due course of War, subdued by Q. Fabius Maximus: whom the People of Rome had pardoned, and not reduced to a Province, or made them stipendiaries. And if Antiquity were looked into, the People of Rome had good claim to that Country: but for as much as the intention and will of the Senate was, they should remain a free People, they were suffered to be governed by their own Lawes, and left unto themselves, notwithstanding any former Conquest by force of Arms.

Whilst these things were treated of in Parlee, it was told Cæsar, that Ariovillus's horsemen did approach nearer to the Mount, and that according our men, they assaulted them with stoner, and other weapons: whereupon he brake off, and betook himself to his Party, commanding them not to cast a weapon at the Enemy. For, albeit he well perceived he might without peril of that cited Legion, give Battel to his Cavalry; yet he thought fit to refrain, least it should be said, he had intrapped them with a Parlee; contrary to Faith made, and Agreement. After it was reported amongst the vulgar Soldiers, how arrogantly Ariovillus had carried himself in the Treaty, forbidding the Romans to frequent any part of Gallia, and that their Cavalry had assault-

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ed our Men, and that thereupon the Parlee brake off; the Army was possessed with a greater glory and desire to fight than before. Two dayes after Ariovillus sent Messengers to Cæsar, signifying, that he desired to Treat with him concerning those things which were left imperfect, and thereupon wished him to appoint another day of Meeting; or if he liked, not that, to send some man with Authority, to conclude of such things as should be found expedient. Cæsar was unwilling to give any further Meeting; and the rather, for that the day before the Germans could not be restrained from violence and force of Arms. Neither did he think he might safely expose the person of any of his followers to the inhumanity of such barbarous People; and therefore thought it fittest to send unto him M. Valerius Proculus, the son of C. Valerius Cæcilius, a Vertuous young man, and well bred; whose Father was made Free of Rome by C. Valer. Flaccus: which he did the rather, in regard of his singular integrity, and his perfectness in the French Tongue, which Ariovillus, through long continuance, had learned; and that the Germans had no cause of offence against him. And, with him, he sent M. Titius, that was familiarly acquainted with Ariovillus, with instructions, to hear what was said, and to make report thereof to Cæsar. Whom, as soon as Ariovillus saw come into his Camp, he cried out in the presence of his Army, demanding, Wherefore they came thither? and, Whether they were not sent as Spies? And, as they were about to make Answer, he cut them off, and commanded them to be put in Irons.

The same day he removed his Camp, and lodged himself under a Hill, six miles from Cæsar. The next day he brought his Forces along by Cæsar's Camp, and incamped himself two Miles beyond him, of purpose to cut off all such Corn and Convoies as should be sent to the Romans, by the Heduanes and Sequans. From that day forward, by the space of five dayes together, Cæsar imbatteled his Men before his Camp; to the intent, that if Ariovillus had a mind to give Battel, he might do it when he would. But Ariovillus all this while kept his Army within his camp, and daily sent out his Horsemen to skirmish with the Romans.

This was the manner of fighting which the Germans had practised: there were 6000 Horsemen, and as many strong and nimble Footmen, whom the Horsemen had selected

out of the whole host; every man one for his self; and these, they had always at hand with them in Battel, and unto these they retired for succour. If the Horsemen were overcharged, these ever stepped in to help them. If any one were wounded or unhorsed, they came about him and succoured him. If the matter required either to adventure forward, or to retire speedily back again, their swiftness was such (through continual exercise) that hanging on the Horse-mane, by the one hand, they would run as fast as the Horses.

OBSERVATION.

It may seem strange unto the Soldiers of our time, that the Footmen should be mingled pell-mell amongst the Horsemen, without hurt and disadvantage to themselves; so unlikely it is, that they should either succor the Horsemen in any danger, or annoy the Enemy: and therefore some have imagined, that these Footmen, in the encounter, cast themselves into one Body, and so charging the Enemy assisted the Horsemen. But, the circumstances of this place, and of others which I will alledge to this purpose, plainly evince, that these Footmen were mingled indifferently amongst the Horsemen, to assist every particular man, as his fortune and occasion required: and therefore the choice of these Footmen was permitted to the Horsemen, in whose service they were to be employed, that every man might take his friend, in whom he reposed greatest confidence. When they were overcharged, these stepped in to help them; if any man were wounded or unhorsed, he had his Footman ready to assist him; and when they were to go upon any speedy service, or suddenly to retire upon advantage, they having themselves upon the mane of the Horses with one hand, and so ran as fast as the Horsemen could go. Which services, they could not possibly have performed without confusion and disorder; if the Footmen had not severally attended upon them, according to the affection specified in their particular election.

The principal use of these Footmen of the Germans, consisted in the aid of their own Horsemen upon any necessity, not so much regarding their service upon the Enemy, as the assistance of their Horsemen. But the Romans had long before practised the same Art to a more effectual purpose; namely, as a principal remedy, not only to resist, but to defeat far greater Troops of Horse than the Enemy was able to oppose against them. Whereof the most ancient memory which History mentioneth, is recorded by Livie in the second Punic War, at the siege of Capua under the Regiment of Quintus Fulvius the Consul: where it is said, that in all their conflicts, as the Roman Legions returned with the better, so their Cavalry was always put to the worst; and therefore they invented this means, to make that good by Art, which was wanting in force.

Out of the whole Army were taken the choicest young men, both for strength and agility, and to them were given little round Bucklers, and seven Darts apiece in stead of their other weapons: these

Footmen intermingled amongst Horsemen.

Footmen

Ⓔ Ⓕ Soldiers

Soldiers preſtited to ride behind the Horſemen, and ſpeedily to light from the Horſes at a watch-word given, and ſo to charge the Enemy on foot. And when, by exerciſe, they were made to expect, that the novelty of the invention no whit affrighted them, the Roman Horſemen went forth to encounter with the Enemy, every man carrying his Foot-ſoldier behind him; who, at the encounter, ſuddenly alighting, charged upon the Enemy with ſuch a fury, that they followed them in laughter to the Gates of Capua. And hence, ſaith Livie, grew the firſt inſtitution of the *Pelites*: which ever after that time were inrolled with the Legions: The Author of this ſtratagem is ſaid to be one Q. *Navius* a Centurion, and was honourably rewarded by *Fulvius* the Conſul for the ſame.

Salsit, in the Hiſtory of *Jugurth*, ſaith, that *Marius* mingled the *Pelites* with the Cavalry of the Associates, *Ut quatuor invaderent equitatus hoſtium propulſores*. The like practice was uſed by *Cæſar*, as appeareth in the third Book of the Civil War, ſaying that in ſtead of the *Pelites*, he mingled with his Horſemen Four hundred of the luſteſt of his Legionary Soldiers, to reſiſt the Cavalry of *Pompey*, whilst the reſt of his Army paſſed over the River *Genusium*, after the overthrow he had at *Dyracchum*: *qui tantum profectere*, ſaith the Text, *us equitum praelio commiſſo, pellicerent omnes, complures interfectores, iſque incolumes ad agmen ſe reciperent*. Many other places might be recited; but, theſe are ſufficient to prove, that the greateſt Captains of antient times, ſtrengthened their Cavalry with Footmen diſperſed among them. The Roman Horſemen, ſaith *Polybius*, at the firſt, carried but a weak limber pole or ſtaff, and a little round Buckler; but afterwards they uſed the furniture of the *Græciæ*: Which *Polybius* affirmeth, to be a ſtrong Lance or Staff, and three or four Darts in a Quiver, with a Buckler, and a long Sword by their right ſide. The uſe of their Lance was moſt effectual, when they charged in Troop, Pouldron to Pouldron; and that manner of fight afforded no means to intermingle Footmen: but when they uſed their Darts, every man got what advantage of ground he could, as our Carabines for the moſt part do, and ſo the Footmen might have place among them: or otherwiſe, for ſo good an advantage, they would eaſily make place for the Footmen to ſerve among them. But, howſoever it was, it appeareth by this circumſtance, how little the Romans feared Troops of Horſe, conſidering, that the beſt means to defeat their Horſe, was, by their Foot Companies. But, to make it more plain, of many examples, I will only alledge two: the one out of *Livie*, to prove, that the Roman Horſemen were not comparable, for Service, to Footmen: the other out of *Hirtius*, to ſhew the ſame effect againſt Strangers, and *Numidians* Horſemen.

In the Conſulſhips of *L. Paterculus*, and *Marcus Horatius*, *Paterculus* having fortunately overthrowen the *Æqui* and the *Volſci*, *Horatius* proceeded with as great courage in the War againſt the *Sabines*; wherein it happened, that in the day of Battle the *Sabines* reſerved Two thouſand of their men to give a ſecond aſſault upon the left Corner of the Romans, as they were in conſiſt: which took ſuch effect, that the Legionary Footmen of that Corner were forced to retreat. Which, the Roman Horſemen (being in number Six hundred) perceiving, and not being able, with their Horſe, to

make head againſt the Enemy, they preſently forſok their horſes, and made haſte to make good the place on foot; wherein they carried themſelves ſo valiantly, that in a moment of time they gave the like advantage to their Footmen againſt the *Sabines*, and then betook themſelves again to their Horſes, to purſue the Enemy in chace as they fled. For the ſecond point; the *Numidians*, as *Cæſar* witneſſeth, were the beſt Horſemen that ever he met with, and uſed the ſame Art as the Germans did, mingling among them Light-armed Footmen. An Ambuſcado of theſe *Numidians* charging the Legions upon a ſuddain, the Hiſtory ſaith, that *primo impetu legiones Equitatus & levior armature, hoſtium nullo negotio, loco pulſe & deſpecte ſibi de colle*. And, as they ſometimes retired, and ſometimes charged upon the rearward of the Army, according to the manner of the *Numidians* fight; the Hiſtory ſaith, *Cæſariis interim non amplius tres aut quatuor miliaſque veterani ſe convertentiſſe, & pila viribus contra in Numidas injecit confeſſos, amplius duorum milium ad unum vergentes*. So that to free himſelf of this inconvenience, he took his Horſemen out of the Rearward, and placed his Legions there, *ita vim hoſtium per legionarium militem commodius juſtinebat*. And ever as he marched, he cauſed Three hundred Soldiers of every Legion to be free, and without burthen, that they might be ready upon all occaſions: *Quos in Equitatum Labienus inmiſit. Tum Labienus, converſis equis, ſignorum conſpectu perterritus ſurſumque cœnſis fugere, multis ejus occiſis, compluribus vulneratis: milites legionariis ad ſe ſe recipiens ſigna, atque iter incertum ire cœperunt*. I ſaith the Hiſtory, that the Hiſtory to take away all ſuſpicion of falſifying, or wreſting any thing to an affected opinion. If any man will look into the reaſon of this diſparity, he ſhall find it to be chiefly the work of the Roman Pile (an unreaſtable weapon) and the terror of Horſemen; eſpecially when they were caſt with the advantage of the place, and fell ſo thick, that there was no means to avoid them.

But, to make it plain, that any Light-armed Footmen could better make head againſt a Troop of Horſe, then the Cavalry of their own Party, although they bear but the ſame Weapons: let us conſider how nimble and ready they were that fought on foot, either to take an advantage, or to ſhun and avoid any danger: calling their Darts with far greater ſtrength, and more certainty, than the Horſemen could do. For, as the force of all the Engines of old time, as the *Balleſte*, *Cannuſe* and *Tormentum*, proceeded from that ſtability and reſting Centre, which Nature affordeth, as the only ſtrength and life of the Engine: ſo, what force ſoever a man maketh, muſt principally proceed from that firmneſs and ſtay, which Nature, by the Earth, or ſome other unmoveable reſt, giveth to the Body, from whence it taketh more or leſs ſtrength, according to the violence which it performeth; as he that liſteth up a weight from the ground, by ſo much treadeth heavier upon the earth, by how much the thing is heavier than his body. The Footmen therefore having a ſurer ſtay, to counterpoize their forced motion, than the Horſemen had, caſt their Darts with greater violence, and conſequently with more certainty.

CHAP.

C H A P. XVIII.

Cæſar preventeth Arioviſtus of his purſue, by making two Camps.

Cæſar.

When Cæſar perceived that Arioviſtus meant nothing leſs than to fight, but kept himſelf within his Camp; leaſt peradventure he ſhould intercept the Sequans, and others of his Associates, as they came with the convoys of Corn to the Romans, beyond that place wherein the Germans abroad about fix hundred paces from their Camp, he choſe a ground meet to incamp in: and marching thither in three battels, commanded two of them to ſtand ready in Arms, and the third to fortiſie the Camp. Arioviſtus ſent ſixteen thouſand ſoo, and all his horſe to interrupt the Souldiers, and hinder the intrenchment. Notwithſtanding Cæſar, as he had before determined, cauſed two Battels to withſtand the enemy, and the third to go through with the work: which being ended he left there two Legions, and part of the associate Forces, and led the other four Legions back again into the greater Camp.

The next day Cæſar, according to his cuſtome, brought his whole power out of both his Camps; and marching a little from the greater Camp, he put his Men in array, and proffered battle to the Enemy: but perceiving that Arioviſtus would not ſtir out of his Trenches, about noon he conveyed his Army into their ſecond Camp. Then at length Arioviſtus, ſtun at this Force to aſſault the leſſer Camp. The encounter continued very ſharp on both parts until the evening; and at ſun-ſetting, after many wounds given and taken, Arioviſtus conveyed his Army again into their Camp. And as Cæſar made inquiry of the Captives, what the reaſon was, that Arioviſtus reſuſed Battle, he found this to be the cauſe: The Germans had a cuſtom, that the Women ſhould by caſting of Lots and Soothſaying, declare whether it were for their behoof to fight or no: and that they ſhould by their Art, the Germans could not get the Victory, if they fought before the new Moon.

The firſt OBSERVATION.

Fiſt we may obſerve what ſpecial importance this manner of incamping carried in that abſolute diſcipline which the Romans obſerved, and by which they conquered ſo many Nations: for beſides the ſafety which it afforded their own Troops, it ſerved for a hold well-fenced and manned, or as it were a ſtrong fortified Town in any part of the field, where they ſaw advantage: and as

oft as they thought it expedient, either to fortiſie themſelves, or impeach the Enemy, by cutting off his paſſages, hindring his attempts, blocking up his Camp, beſides many other advantages, all averring the ſaying of *Domitius Corbulo*, *doletudine ſibi leſum*: a thing long time neglected, but of late happily renewed by the Commanders of ſuch Forces, as ſerve the States in the United Provinces of *Belgia*, whom time and practice of the War, hath taught to entertain the uſe of the Space, and to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatſoever, which may be thought worthy executioners of the deeds of Armes.

The ſecond OBSERVATION.

In the ſecond place we may obſerve that there was no Nation ſo barbarous (for I underſtand the Germans to be as barbarous, in regard of the motions of Religion, as any known Nation of that time, being in a Climate ſo near the North, that it afforded no contemplation at all) that could not make uſe in their greateſt affairs, of that ſuperſtition to which their mind was naturally intrahled, and forge prophecies and divinations, as well to ſtir up as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might beſt ſerve to advantage their proceedings. Neither did Cæſar let ſlip the occaſion of making uſe of this their Religion: for underſtanding by their prioreſs, that their divinations forbade them to fight; before the new Moon, he uſed all the means he could to provoke them to Battle; that their religious opinion of miſchieving might prejudice their reſolution to return Conquerors. Which may ſerve to prove, that a ſuperſtitious people are ſubject to many inconveniences, which induſtry or fortune may diſcover to their overthrow.

It is recorded, that *Columbus* being General of ſome Forces which *Ferdinando* King of *Caſtile*, ſent to diſcover the *weſt-Indies*, and ſuſtaining great penury for want of Victuals in the Iſle of *Jamaica*, after that he had obſerved how the Iſlanders worſhipped the Moon, and having knowledge of an Eclipse that was ſhortly after to happen, he told the Inhabitants, that unleſs they would furniſh him with ſuch neceſſaries as he wanted for the time, the wrath of their God ſhould quickly appear towards them, by changing his bright ſhining face into obſcurity and darkneſs: which was no longer hapned, but the poor *Indians*, ſtrucken with a ſuperſtitious fear of that which the courſe of nature required, kept nothing back that might aſſail their Enemies, to depopulate and over-run their own Country.

C H A P. XIX.

Cæſar, ſeeketh means to give them Battle, and the Germans diſpoſe themſelves thereunto.

He next day Cæſar left a ſufficient Garriſon in each of his Camps; and ſo much as the number of his Legionary Soldiers was ſmall, in reſpect of the multitude of Germans, he placed all the Auxiliaries Troops for a ſhew, before the leſſer Camp: and putting his Legions in a triple Battle,

Battle, he marched towards the Camp of Antiochus. And then although, were the Germans constrained to bring out their power, setting every Tribe and people by themselves, in like distance and order of Battle, (as the Etrurians, Marcomans, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusians, and Suevians) and surrounding their whole Army, with carts and carriages, that there might be no hope at all left to save any Man by flight. And in these they placed their Women, that they by their out-stretched hands and tears moving pity, might implore the Soldiers, as they defended by course to the Battle, not to deliver them into the bondage and thralldome of the Romans.

Cæsar assigned to every Legion a Legat and a Questor, that every Man might have an eye-witness of his valor: and he himself began the Battle with the right Corner, forasmuch as he perceived, that part of Antiochus Army to be the weakest.

The First OBSERVATION.

The Romans, even from the infancy of their state, were ever zealous admirers of true honor, and always desired to behold with the eye, to what measure of Virtue every Man had attained: that the Tongue with greater fervency of spirit, might sound out the celebration of *Macte virtute*, which imported more honour, than any wealth that could be heaped upon them. Neither was this the least part of their Wisdom: considering that the most pretious things that are, lose much of their worth, if they be not suited with other correspondent natures, whose sympathy addeth much more excellency then is discerned, when they appear by themselves without such assistance. For how small is the beauty which Nature hath given to the eye-pleasing Diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificial form? or what perfection can the form give, without a foil to strengthen it? or what good is in either of them, if the light do not illuminate it? or what avail all these, where there wanted an eye to admire it, a judgment to value it, and an heart to embrace it? Such a union hath Nature implanted in the diversity of Creatures concurring to perfection, and especially in moral actions, in whose carriage there is a far greater exactness of correspondency required to approve them honourable, then was requisite to make the jewel beautiful. And this did Cæsar in all his Battles; amongst the rest, that at *Alesia* is particularly noted in this manner, *Quod in epistola imperatoris res gerebatur, arguebat aut turpiter fallum celari poterat, utroque laudis cupiditas, et timor ignominie ad virtutem excitabatur.* And when Lucie would express how valiantly an action was carried, he saith no more but *id conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur*: which is as much as to say, that so far as the Romans were diligent observers of every Man's worth, rewarding Virtue with honour, and cowardice with reproach, every Man took his whole endeavor to deserve the good opinion of his General, by discharging that duty

which he owed to the Commonwealth, with all loyalty and faithfulness of spirit.


The Second OBSERVATION.

The Romans had four forms of the front of their Battle. The first was called *Ante Agens*, when neither the corners nor the battle, was advanced one before another, but were all carried in a right line, and made a straight front; and this was their most usual manner of embatteling.

The second forme of the front was called *Obliqua*, when as one of the Corners was advanced nearer unto the Enemy then the rest, to begin the Battle: and this was commonly as *Vegetius* noteth the right Corner, for the right Corner of an Army had great advantage against the left of the Enemies, in regard of their weapons and furniture. But Cæsar did it in this place, because he perceived that the Enemy was weakest in that part; following a Maximæ of great authority, That the weakest part of an Enemy is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an Army: for so favorable are Mens judgments to that which is already happened, that the sequel of every action dependeth for the most part upon the beginning. *Dimidium facti qui bene cepit habet*, saith a Poet: and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connected to the sequel by the nature of a precedent cause, that the end must needs err from the common course, when it doth not participate of that quality which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good end, without a good beginning: for although the beginning be oftentimes disastrous and unlucky, and the end fortunate and happy, yet before it came to that end, there was a fortunate beginning: for the bad beginning was not the beginning of a good, but of an evil end. And therefore that his Men might foresee a happy end, in a good beginning, it behoved him with the best of his Army to assault the weakest part of the Enemy.

The third form of the front is called *Simulata*, when both the Corners are advanced forward, and the Battle standeth backward off from the Enemy, after the fashion of a half Moon. *Scipio* used it in *Spain*, having observed some days before, that the Enemy continually so disposed of the Battle, that his best Soldiers were always in the midst; and therefore *Scipio* put all his old Soldiers in the Corners, and brought them out first to charge upon the weakest part of the Enemy, that those might decide the controversy, before the other that were in the midst could come to fight.

The last form is called *Gibbosa*, or *gibbera acies*, when the Battle is advanced, and the two Corners lag behind. This form did *Hamibal* use in the Battle of *Cannæ*, but with this Art, that he strengthened his two Corners with the best of his Soldiers, and placed his weakest in the midst, that the Romans following the retreat of the Battle, which was easily repeated, might be inclosed on each side with the two Corners.



CHAP. XX.

The Battel between Caesar and Ariovistus.

Caesar.

THe sign of the Battel being thereupon given, our Men charged upon the Enemy very fiercely, and they on the other side returned so speedily a counterbuffe, that the Legions had no time to cast their Piles, and in that regard, made haste to betake themselves to their Swords: But the Germans according to their manner, putting themselves into a Phalanx, received the force of their Swords. In the Battel, there were many Legionary Souldiers, sent to leap upon the Phalanx, and to pull up with their hands, the Targets that covered it, and so to wound and kill those that were underneath: and so the left Cornet of the Enemy was overbrowen and put to flight.

Now while the right Cornet was thus besied, the left Cornet was overcharged with an unequal multitude of the Germans: which young Crassus, the General of the Horse, no sooner perceived (having more scope and liberty than any of the Commanders that were in the Battel) but he sent tertium Aciem, the third Battel, to rescue and aid their fellows that were in danger; by means whereof, the fight was renewed, and all the Enemy was put to flight, and never looked back until they came to the Rhene, which was about fifty miles from the place where they fought. Where some few of them saved themselves by swimming: others found some Boats, and so escaped. Ariovistus, lighting upon a little Bark tied to the shore, recovered the other side, and so saved himself, the rest were all slain by the horsemen. Ariovistus had two Wives, one a Swevian, whom he brought with him from home; and the other of Norica, the Sister of King Voclon, sent unto him by her Brother into Gallia, and married there: both these perished in that fight. His two Daughters likewise being there, one was slain, and the other taken.

As Caesar pursued the German Horsemen, it was his chance to light upon Valerius Proculus, as he was drawn up and down by his Keepers, bound in three chains: which accident was as grateful to him, as the Victory itself; being so fortunate to recover his familiar friend, and a Man of sort in the Province, whom the barbarous enemy, (contrary to the law of Nations) had cast into prison. Neither would Fortune by the loss of him, abate any thing of great pleasure and contentment: for he reported that in his own presence they

had three several times cast lots, whether he should be burned alive; and that still he escaped by the fortune of the lots. And M. Titius was found in like manner, and brought unto him. The fumes of this Battel being carried beyond the Rhene, the Swevians that were come to the banks of the Rhene returned home again: whom the Inhabitants near upon that River pursued, finding them terrified and distracted, and slew a great number of them.

Caesar having thus ended two great Wars, in one Summer, brought his Army into their wintering Camps, somewhat sooner then the time of the year required; and leaving Labienus to command them, himself returned into the hither Gallia, to keep Courts and publick Diets.

The First OBSERVATION.

THis Phalanx here mentioned can hardly be proved to be the right Macedonian Phalanx; but we are rather to understand it to be so termed, by reason of the close and compact imbatelling, rather then in any other respect: and it resembled much a *testudo*, as I said of the Helvetian Phalanx. Secondly, I observe that Caesar kept the old rule, concerning their discipline in fight: for although the name of *Triaries* be not mentioned in his History yet he omitted not the substance, which was, to have *primam, secundam, tertiam Aciem*, and that *prima Acies*, should begin the Battel, and the second should come fresh and assist them: or peradventure, if the Enemy were many and strong, the first and second Battel were joined together, and so charged upon the Enemy with greater fury and violence; but at all adventures the third Battel was ever in *subsilio* as they termed it, to succor any part that should be overcharged; which was a thing of much consequence, and of great wisdom. For if we either respect the encouragement of the Souldiers, or the casualty of Fortune, what could be more added to their discipline in this behalf, than to have a second and a third succour, to give strength to the fainting weakness of their Men, and to repair the disadvantage which any accident should cast upon them? or if their valor were equally balanced, and victory stood doubtful, which of the two parties should honor, these always sleep in being fresh, against weary and over-laboured spirits, and so drew Victory in despite of casualty unto themselves.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Concerning use of lots, it shall not be amiss to look into the nature of them, being in former times so general, that there was no Nation, civil or barbarous, but was directed in their greatest affairs, by the sentence of Lots: As we may not refuse for an undoubted truth, that which Salomon saith in the sixteenth of Proverbs, *The lots are cast into the lap, but the direction thereof, belongeth to the Lord*, through the knowledge whereof

The use of Lots.

of *Fofua* was directed to take *Athen*, the Mariners *Jonus*, and the Apostles to consecrate *Martins*: so whether the heathen and barbarous people, whose blindness in the way of truth could direct them no farther, then to senseless superstition, and to put them in mind of a duty which they owed, but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed; whether these, I say, were persuaded that there was any supernatural power in their Lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of destiny, and as the Gods would have it, it remaineth doubtful.

Ariftole, the wisest of the Heathen, concerning things natural, nameth that event casual, or proceeding from Fortune, of which the reason of Man, could assign no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause. So that whatsoever happened in any action besides the intent of the Agent and Workmen, was termed an effect of Fortune, or chance of habit: for all other effects, which depended upon a certainty and definite cause, were necessarily produced: and therefore could not be casual, or subject to the inconstancy of chance. And because many and sundry such chances daily happened, which like *terre filii*, had no Father, and could not be warranted as lawful Children, either to nature or to reason, by the appearance of an efficient cause, they reduced them all to the power of Fortune, as the principal efficient and sovereign Motor of all such unexpected events: that is, they made nothing else the Governors and Directors of many things. Which afterward grew to such credit amongst Men, that it surpassed in dignity all natural causes, and was deified with celestial honour, as the Poet saith, *Te nos facimus Fortuna deam, colloque locamus*. By the providence of this blind Goddess, which held her Deity by the Tenure of Mens ignorance, were all casual actions directed, and especially lots, the event whereof depended only upon her pleasure and decree. Neither could their direction be assigned to any other power; for then their nature had been altered from chance to certainty, and the event could not have been called *Sors*, but must have been reputed in the order of necessary effects, whereof discourse of reason acknowledge a certain foregoing cause.

Whereby we see upon how weak an axletree, the greatest motions of the godless World were turned, having irregularity and uncertainty for the *Intelligencia* that governed their revolutions. And herein all sorts of Men (although in divers respects) rested as well contented, as if an Oracle had spoken unto them, and revealed the mystery of fatal destiny.

Rome directed the maincourse of her Government, by the fortune of this mock-destiny. For although their Consuls and Tribunes were elected by the people, who pleased their own fancy with the free choice of their Commanders, and suited their obedience with a well-liking authority: yet the public affairs which each Consul was severally to manage, was shared out by lots. For if an

Enemy were entered into their Confines, to depopulate and waste their Territories, the lots assigned this Consul, for the Government of the City and the other to command the Legions, and to manage the War.

If Forces were to be sent into divers Provinces, and against several Enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could give to either Consul his task: but their peculiar charges were authorized by lots. If any extraordinary actions were to be done in the City, as the dedication of a Temple, the sanctifying of the Capitol after a pollution; *Sors omnia versat*, that did all in all. And yet (notwithstanding the weak foundation of this practice in their Theology and deepest Divinity) we may not think but these skillful Architects of that absolute Government, wherein Vertue joined with true wisdom, to make an unexampled pattern, we may not think, I say, but they foresaw the manifold danger, which in the course of common actions, could no other way be prevented, but by the use of lots. For when things are equally levelled between divers objects, and run with indifferency to equal stations, there must be some controuling power, to draw the current towards one Coast, and to appropriate it unto one Channel, that the order of Nature be not inverted, nor a well established Government disturbed. So the State of Rome casting many things with equal charge upon her two Sovereign Magistrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better means could there be invented to interrel the one in that office, and to discharge the other, then to appoint an Arbiter, whose decree exceeded humane reason? Of which it could not be said why it was so, but that it was so. For if the wisdom of the Senate had been called to Counsel, or the voices of the people calculated to determine of the matter, it might easily have burst out into civil discord, considering the often contentions between the Senate and the People, the factions of Clients, and the constant mutability of every Mans private affections necessarily inclining unto one, although their worth were equal, and by true reason indiscernable which might have made the one proud of that which peradventure he had not, and cast the other lower then would have well befitted his Vertues: and therefore to cut off these with many other inconveniences, they invented lots, which without either reason or will, might decide such controversies.

By this it appeareth how little the ancient Law-makers respected the ground and reason of an ordinance, so the commodity were great, and the use important to the good of the State: for as they saw the thing itself to be casual, so they saw that casual things are sometimes more necessary than demonstrative conclusions: neither ought the nature, and speculative consideration of Laws and Statutes, to belong to the common people; but the execution and obedience thereof, maketh the commonwealth flourish. And thus endeth the first Commentary of Cæsar his War in Gallia.

The

THE Second Commentary OF THE WARS in GALLIA.

THE ARGUMENT.

Like as when a heavy Body lieth upon the skirt of a larger continued Quantity, although it cover but a small parcel of the whole surface, yet the other quarters are burthened, and kept under with a proportionable measure of that weight; and through the union and continuation, which bindeth all the parts into one Totality, feel the same suppression which hath really seized but upon their fellow part: In like manner, the *Belgæ*, inhabiting the furthest skirt of that triple Continent, seemed to repine at that heavy burthen which the Roman Empire had laid upon the Province, the *Hedui*, and other States of that Kingdom. And, left it might, in time, be further removed, and laid directly upon their shoulders, they thought it expedient, whilst they felt it but by participation, to gather their several Forces into one head, and try whether they could free their Neighbour-Nations from so grievous a yoke, or at the least keep it from coming any nearer unto themselves. And this is the Argument of this Second Book; which divideth it self into two Parts: the First containing the Wars between Cæsar and all the States of *Belgia* united together; the Second Recording the Battels which he made with some of the States thereof in particular, as time and occasion gave him means to effect it.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar hasteth to his Army, Marcheth towards the Confines of the Belgæ, and taketh in the *Men of Rheims*.



While Cæsar was in his Winter quarters in the hither Gallia, there came everyday fresh rumors to him (the same thing being also certified by Letters from Labienus) that all the Belgæ, being a third part of Gallia, had Leagued together against the Ro-

ple of Rome, and had given mutual Hossages one to another. The grounds of their confederacy were these: First, They were afraid that Cæsar having seized all the rest of Gallia in quiet, would bring his Armies upon them. Secondly, They were solicited to do it by some of the Galls; such namely, who, as they did not desire the company of the Germans longer in Gallia, so they were very much troubled, to think, that the Roman Army should winter and settle themselves there; and such again as levity and inconstancy prompted

prompted to seek new Governments; lastly, such as saw that it was an easy matter for those men that were powerful, and had the command of Monies, to seize upon Kingdoms in Gallia, which they could not so easily do in those parts where the Romans bare sway. Cæsar being moved with these Letters, and other intelligence to this purpose, levied two new Legions in the hither Gallia; and, as soon as Summer came on, sent them by Q. Pedius his Legate into the further Gallia: and, as soon as there was Forrage in the Fields, he himself came to the Army. He had before given charge to the Senones, and other of the Galles that bordered upon the Belge, to learn every day what they could of their doings, and to give him an account thereof. These presently informed him, That of a certainty there was nothing in Belgia but Mustering of Soldiers, and gathering their Forces into one head. He thought it not therefore safe to make any further delay; but, having made provision of Corn, he drew out his Army from their wintering Camps, and, within fifteen dayes he came to the borders of the Belge. As soon as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for, the men of Rhemes, being the uttermost of the Belge, next adjoining to the Celts, thought it best to entertain a peaceable resolution, and sent Iccius and Antebrogius, two of the Chief Men of their State, unto Cæsar, to submit themselves and all that they had, to the mercy of the Roman Empire; affirming, that they were innocent, both of the Counsel of the Belge, and of their conspiracy against the Romans. For proof whereof, they were ready to give Hostages, to receive them into their Towns, and to furnish them with Corn, or what other thing they stood in need of. That the rest of the Belge were all in Armes, and the Germans on the other side of the Rhene had promised to send them succor: yea, their madnes was so great, that they themselves were not able to hold back the Sueffones from that attempt, being their brethren, and Kinsmen in blood, and using the same Lawes and Customes as they did, having both one Magistrat, and one form of Government; but they would needs support the same Quarrel which the rest of the Belge had undertaken.

OBSERVATION.

I Might here take occasion to speak somewhat of a particular revolt in a general cause; and, how a confederate State may, in regard of their own safety, forsake a common quarrel, or whatsoever the universal society hath enacted prejudi-

cial to their Common-weal: but that I only intend to discover Warlike practices, leaving the questions of Law and Policy to men of greater judgment, and better experience. Only I observe, in the behalf of the Roman Government, that such Cities as yielded to the Empire, and became Tributary to their Treasury (howsoever they were otherwise combined by confederacy) seldom or never repented them of their fact, in regard of the noble Patronage which they found in that State, and of the due respect observed towards them.

CHAP. II.

The power of the Belge, and their preparation for this War.

Cæsar inquiring of the Embassadors which came from Rhemes, What the States were that had taken Arms, and what they were able to do in matter of War? found the Belge to be defended from the Germans; who, passing over the Rhene, time out of mind, and finding it to be a fertile Country, drove away the Galles, and seated themselves in their possessions; and that these only, of all the Galles, kept the Cimbrî and Teutoni from entering into their Country; and, in that regard, they challenged to themselves great Authority, and vaunted much in their Feats of Armes. Concerning their number, they had these Advertisements; The ^a Bellovaci exceeded all the Belge in prowess, authority, and number of men, being able to make 100000 fighting men; and, out of that number had promised 60000 towards this Undertaking; and, in that regard, they demanded the Administration of the whole War. Next to them lay the ^b Sueffones, who dwelt in a large and fruitful country, and had lately Divitiacus for their King, being the most powerful man in all Gallia, who had in possession a great part of these countreys, and also of Britain it self. Galba was their King now; to whom, for his singular Justice and Prudence, generally with one consent, they bestowed the management of the War. They had Twelve walled Towns, and promised to set forth 50000 Men. The ^c Nervii, who were the most barbarous amongst them all, and dwelt furthest off, promised as many; the ^d Atrebatii 15000, the ^e Ambiani 10000, the Vellocastii and ^f Veromandui as many; the ^g Morini 25000, the Menapii 9000, the Caletes 10000, the Aduatuci 29000, the ^h Eburones, Condrusi, and others, 40000. Cæsar encouraging the Men of Rhemes to persist in their faithfulness to the Roman Empire, propounded to them great offers, and liberal promises of recompence, and commanded all their Senate to come before him,

Cæsar.

^a The Country about Beauvois.

^b The Country about Soissons.

^c The People about Tournay.
^d Arvat.
^e Amiens.
^f Vermandois.
^g Terventum.
^h Liege.
30000, in all.

him, and bring with them their Noble-mens Sons to be given up for Hostages: which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And, having received two especial Advertisements from the Men of Rhemes, the one concerning the Multitude of the Enemy; and the other, touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their Manhood: he provided for the first, by perswading Divitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those businesses, to keep asunder the Power of the Enemy; and to withhold their Forces from making a head, that so he might avoid the danger of encountering so great a Power at one instant. Which might easily be brought to pass, if the Hedui would enter with a strong Power into the Marches of the Bellovaci, and sack their Territories with Sword and Confusion. Which Divitiacus promised to perform; and, to that purpose, he speedily returned into his Country. Upon the second Advertisment, which presented unto him the great valor and manhood of his Enemies, he resolved, not to be too hasty in giving them Battel, but first to prove by skirmishing with his Horsemen, what his Enemies, by their Prowess, could do, and what his own Men durst do.

OBSERVATION.

This rule of making trial of the worth of an Enemy, hath always been observed by prudent and grave Commanders, as the surest Principle whereon the true Judgment of the event may be grounded. For, if the Doctrine of the old Philosophers, which teacheth, that the words *non possumus*, I wist it not, was never heard out of a Wife man's mouth, hath any place in the course of Humane actions; it ought especially to be regarded in managing their main points, whereon the State of Kingdoms and Empires dependeth. For, unless we be perswaded, that blind Chance directeth the course of this World, with an uncertain confusion, and that no foresight can sway the balance of our hap into either part of our fortune; I see no reason why we should not, by all means, endeavour to ground our knowledge upon true causes, and level our proceedings to that certainty, which riseth from the things themselves. And this is the rather to be urged, in as much as our Leaders are oftentimes deceived, when they look no further, then to match an Enemy with equality of number, referring their valor to be tried in the Battel; not considering, that the eye of it self, cannot discern the difference between two Champions of like preference, and outward carriage, unless it see their strength compared together, and weighed as it were in the scale of trial: which Cæsar omitted not diligently to observe, before he would adventure the hazard of Battel. For, besides his own satisfaction, it gave great encouragement to his men, when they saw themselves able to countermatch an Enemy, and knew their task to be subject to their strength. Neither did

he observe it only at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for we find, that he never encountered any Enemy, but with sufficient power, either in number, or in valour, to make head against them: which equality of strength, being first laid as a sure foundation, he used his own industry and skill, and the Discipline wherewith his men were trained, as advantages to overway his Adversary; and to draw Victory, maugre fortune, unto himself, and seldom failed in any of his Battels.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar passeth his Army over the River * Axona, leaving Titurius Sabinus encamped, on the other side, with six Cohorts.

* La Dûne.

AS soon as Cæsar understood, as well by his discoverers, as from the Men of Rhemes, that all the Power of the Belge was assembled together into one place, and was now making towards him no great distance off; he made all the haste he could to pass his Army over the River Axona, which divided the men of Rhemes from the other Belge, and there encamped. Whereby he brought to pass, that no Enemy could come on the back of him to work any disadvantage; and that Corn might be brought unto him from Rhemes and other Cities without danger. And further, that he might command the passage back again, as occasion should serve, to his best advantage, he fortified a Bridge which he found on the River with a strong garrison of Men, and caused Titurius Sabinus, a Legate, to encamp himself on the other side of the River with six Cohorts, commanding him to fortifie his Camp with a Rampier of 12 Foot in Altitude, and a Trench of 18 foot in breadth.

OBSERVATION.

IF it be demanded, why Cæsar did pass his Army over the River, leaving it on his back, and did not rather attend the Enemy on the other side, and so take the advantage of hindring him, if he should attempt to pass over; I will fit down the reasons in the sequel of this War, as the occurrences shall fall out to make them more evident. In the mean time let us enter into the particularity of these six Cohorts, that we may the better judge of such Troops which were employed in the services of this War. But, that we may the better conjecture what number of Soldiers these six Cohorts did contain, it seemeth expedient a little to discourse of the Companies and Regiments which the Romans used in their Armies.

And first we are to understand, that the greatest and chiefest Regiment in a Roman Army, was termed by the name of *Legio*; as Parro saith, *Quod leguntur milites in delectu*; or as Plutarch speaketh, *Quod legi ex omnibus essent milites*; so that it taketh the name *Legio*, of the choice, and selecting of the Soldiers. *Romulus* is said to be the first author

F 2

and

A Legion, what it was.
Lib. 4. De vita Romuli.

Liv. lib. 22.

and founder of these Legions, making every Legion to contain 3000 Soldiers; but shortly after they were augmented, as *Festus* recordeth, unto they were augmented again from 4000, to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a Legion, until *Hamibal* came into Italy, and then it was augmented to 5000; but, that proportion continued only for that time. And again, when *Scipio* went into *Africa*, the Legions were increased to 6200 Footmen, and 300 Horse. And shortly after the *Macedonian* War, the Legions that continued in *Macedonie*, to keep the Province from Rebellion, consisted of 6000 Footmen, and 300 Horse. Out of *Cæsar* it cannot be gathered, that a Legion in his time did exceed the number of 5000 men, but oftentimes it was short of that number: for he himself saith, that in this War in *Gallia*, his Soldiers were so walled, that he had scarce 7000 men in two Legions. And, if we examine that place out of the Third of the Civil War, where he saith, that in *Pompey* his Army, were 110 Cohorts, which amounted to the number of 55000 men; and, it being manifest, as well by this number of Cohorts, as by the Testimony of divers Authors, that *Pompey* his Army consisted of 11 Legions; if we divide 55000 into eleven parts, we shall find a Legion to consist of 5000 men. Which number, or thereabout, being generally known to be the usual rate of a Legion, the *Romans* always expressed the strength of their Army by the number of Legions that were therein: as in this War it is said, that *Cæsar* had eight Legions; which, by this account, might arise to 40000 men, besides associates, and such as necessarily attended the Army. Further, we are to understand, that every Legion had his peculiar name, by which it was known, and distinguished from the rest: and that it took either from their order of Muster, or Enrollment; as that Legion which was first enrolled, was called the first Legion, and that which was second in the choice, the second Legion, and so consequently of the rest; and we read in this History, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleventh and twelfth Legion: or otherwise, from the place of their warfare, and so we read of *Legiones Germanicæ, Pannonicæ, Britannicæ*, and such others: and sometime of their General, as *Augusta, Claudia, Vespasiana* Legiones, and so forth: or to conclude, from some accident of quality, as *Rapax, Pilatrix, Fulminifera*; Plundering, Victorious, Lightning, and such like. And thus much of the Name and Number of a Legion; which I must necessarily distinguish into divers kinds of Soldiers, according to the first institution of the old *Romans*, and the continual observation thereof, unto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of these smaller parts, whereof a Legion was compounded.

Tacitus 3. hist.

Velites.

Hastati.

First therefore, we are to understand, that after the Consuls had made a general choice, and sworn the Soldiers, the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of *Velites*. Their place, in regard of the other Soldiers, was both base and dishonourable: not only because they fought afar off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the Enemy, as our Forlorn-hopes are. Having chosen out a competent number for this kind, they proceeded to the choice of them which they call *Hastati*, a degree above the *Velites*

both in age and wealth, and termed them by the name of *Hastati*, for as much, as at their first institution they fought with a kind of Javelin, which the *Romans* called *Hasta*: but, before *Polybius* his time they used Pikes: notwithstanding their antique name continued unto the latter time of the Empire. The third choice which they made, was of the strongest and lustiest-bodied men, who, for the prime of their age, were called *Principes*: the rest that remain'd were named *Triarii*, as *Varro* saith, *Quod tertio ordine extremis subsidio deputantur*: These were always the eldest and best experienced men, and were placed in the third division of the Battel, as the last help and refuge in all extremities. *Polybius* saith, that in his time, the *Velites*, *Hastati*, and *Principes*, did consist of 1200 men apiece, and the *Triarii* never exceeded the number of 600, although the general number of a Legion were augmented: whereof *Livy* allegeth these reasons. First, because the *Triarii* consisted of the best of the Soldiers, and so might countervail a greater number in good word and valour. Secondly, they seldom came to buckle with the Enemy, but when the controversy grew very doubtful. Lastly, we may well conjecture, that the Voluntaries, and extraordinary Followers, ranged themselves amongst these *Triaries*, and so made the third Battel equal to either of the former: but howsoever, they never exceeded the number of 600. And, by this it appeareth, that in *Polybius* his time, the common rate of a Legion was 4200.

In this division of their men, consisted the ground of that well-ordered Discipline; for, in that they distinguished them according to their years and ability, they reduced their whole strength into several classes; and so disposed of these different parts, that in the general composition of their whole body, every part might be fitted with place and office, according as his worth was answerable to the fame: and so they made not only a number in the grose, but a number differing by parts and properties; that from every accident which met with any part of the Army, the judgment might determine, how much, or how little it imported the whole body: besides the great use which they made of this distinction, in their degrees of honor and preferment, a matter of no small consequence, in the excellency of their Government.

The soldiers, at their Enrollment, being thus divided, according to their years and ability, they then reduced them into smaller Companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they divided the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, each of them into 10 Companies, making of those three sorts of Soldiers 30 small Regiments, which they called *Manipuli*: And again, they subdivided every Manipulus into two equal parts, and called them *Ordines*, which was the least Company in a Legion, and according to the rate set down by *Polybius*, contained 600 Soldiers. In every Order there was a Centurion or Captain, and a Lieutenant, whom they named *Opto*, or *Troglodytes*. The Maniples of the *Triarii* were much lesser than the Maniples of either the *Hastati* or the *Principes*; for as much as their whole Band consisted but of 600 Men. The *Velites* were put into no such Companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other Maniples; and therefore the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii* were called *subsignati milites*, to make a difference between them and the *Velites*, which

Principes, Triarii.

Lib. 6.

Lib. 1. de mil. Rom.

The age of this Division.

The distinction of their Companies.

Manipuli.

Ordines.

Cohors.

Lib. 3. de re mil.

A Legion ranged in Battel.

The first order.

3 De bello civil.

which were not divided into Bands, and so consequently had no Ensign of their own, but were distributed amongst the other Companies: so that every Manipulus had forty *Velites* attending upon it. And now I come to the description of a Cohort, which the History here mentioneth.

The word *Cohors* in Latine doth signifie, that part of ground which is commonly inclosed before the gate of a house, which from the same word we call a Court, and *Varro* giveth this reason of the Metaphor. As in a farm house, saith he, many out-buildings joined together, make one inclosure, so a Cohort consisteth of several Maniples joined together in one body. This Cohort consisted of three Maniples, for every Legion had ten Cohorts, which must necessarily comprehend those thirty Maniples: but these three Maniples were not all of one and the same kind of Soldiers, as three Maniples of the *Hastati*, three of the *Principes*, and three of the *Triarii*, as *Particium* in his *Parallel*, seemeth to affirm; for so there would have remained an odd Manipulus in every kind, that could not have been brought into any Cohort: but a Cohort contained a Manipulus of the *Hastati*, a Manipulus of the *Principes*, and a Manipulus of the *Triarii*; and so all the thirty Maniples were included into ten Cohorts, and every Cohort was a little Legion, so far as it consisted of all those sorts of Soldiers that were in a Legion. So that making a Legion to contain five thousand Men, a Cohort had five hundred; and so these six Cohorts which he encamped on the other side of the River, under the command of *Titus Sabinus*, contained three thousand Soldiers: but if you make a Legion to consist but of four thousand two hundred, which was the more usual rate, there were two thousand five hundred and twenty Soldiers in these six Cohorts.

By this therefore it may appear, that a Legion consisted of four sorts of Soldiers, which were reduced into ten Cohorts, and every Cohort contained three Maniples, and every Manipulus two Orders, and every Order had the Centurion marching in the head of the Troop, and every Centurion had his *Optimum*, or Lieutenant, that stood in the tail of the Troop.

When a Legion stood ranged in Battel, ready to confront the Enemy, the least Body or Squadron that it contained was a Manipulus: wherein the two Orders were joined together, making jointly ten in front, and twelve in file. and so every five files, had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rearward, to direct them in all adventures. In the time of the Emperors, their Battalions consisted of a Cohort, and never exceeded that number, how great soever the Army were.

Polybius distinguishing a Manipulus into two Centuries or Orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right Order, which was that Order which stood on the right hand, known by the name of *Primus ordo*; and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left Order; and in the absence of either of them, he that was present of them two, commanded the whole Manipulus. And so we find, that the Centurion of the first place was called *Primus Centurio*, in which sense *Cæsar* is to be understood, where he saith, that all the Centurions of the first Cohort were slain, *præter principem prærem*. From whence we gather two specialties: first

the priority between the Centurions of the same Manipulus; for a Cohort consisting of three Maniples, whereof the first Manipulus were *Triarii*, the second *Principes*, and the third *Hastati*, and every Manipulus containing two Orders, and every Order a Centurion; he saith that all the Centurions of this Cohort were slain, saving the first or upper Centurion of the *Principes*. The second thing which I observe, is the title of the first Cohort: for these ten Cohorts, whereof a Legion consisted, were distinguished by degrees of worthiness; and that which was held the worthiest in the censure of the Electors, took the priority both of place and name, and was called the first Cohort; the next, the second Cohort; and so consequently unto the tenth and last.

Neither did the Legions want their degrees of preeminence, both in embattelling and in encamping, according either to the seniority of their enrolment, or the favor of their General, or their own Virtue: And so we read that in these Wars in *Gallia*, the tenth Legion had the first place in *Cæsar*'s Army. And thus much concerning the divisions and several Companies of a Legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.

Upon this description it shall not be amiss, briefly to lay open the most apparent commodities depending upon this discipline; the excellency whereof, more plainly appeareth, being compared to that Order which Nature hath observed in the frame of her worthiest Creatures: for it is evident, that such Works of Nature, come nearer to perfect excellency, whose material substance is most particularly distinguished into parts, and hath every part indited with that property which best agreeth to his peculiar service. For being thus furnished with diversity of instruments, and these directed with fitting abilities, the Creature must needs express many admirable effects, and discover the worth of an excellent nature: whereas the other bodies that are but slenderly laboured, and find less favor in Nature's forge, being as abortives, or barbarously compoled, wanting the diversity, both of parts and faculties, are no way capable of such excellent uses, nor fit for such distinct services; as the former that are directed with so many properties, and enabled with the power of so well distinguished faculties. Which better works of Nature the *Romans* imitated in the Architecture of their Army, dividing it into such necessary and serviceable parts, as were best fitted all uses and employments, as first Legions, and Legions into Cohorts, and Cohorts into Maniples, and Maniples into Centuries or Orders, and these into Files; wherein every Man knew his place, and kept the same without exchange, or confusion; and thus the universal multitude, was by order disposed into parts, until it came unto a unit. For it cannot be denied, but that these Centuries were in themselves so sensibly distinguished, that every Soldier carried in his mind the particular Map of his whole Century: for in imbatelling, every Century was disposed into five Files, containing twelve in a File; whereof the Leaders were always certain, and never changed but by death, or some other special occasion; and every Leader knew his follower, and every second knew the third Man, and so consequently unto the last.

Upon these particularities it plainly appeareth, how cause a matter it was to reduce their Troops into

Prima Cohors.

The benefit of this discipline.

intooany order of a March or a Battle, to make the front the flank, or flank front, when they were broken and diffrankt to rally them into any form, when every Man knew both his own and his fellows station. If any Companies were to be employed upon sudden service, the general Idea of the Army being so deeply imprinted in the mind of the Commanders, would not suffer them to err, in taking out such convenient Troops, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safety of the Army, or nature of the action. At all occasions and opportunities, these principles of advantage offered themselves as ready means to put in execution any design or stratagem whatsoever; the project was no sooner resolved of, but every Man could readily point out the Companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important in regard of the life and spirit of every such part, their fidelity was sweetened, or rather strengthened with the mutual acquaintance and friendship of another; the Captain marching always in the head of the Troop, the Ensign in the midst, and the Lieutenant in the rearward, and every Man accompanied with his Neighbour and his friend, which bred a true and unfeigned courage, both in regard of themselves and of their followers. Besides these specialties, the places of title and dignity depending upon this Order, were no small means to cut off all matter of civil discord, and intestine dissension: for here every Man knew his place in the File, and every File knew his place in the Century, and every Century in the Maniple, and every Maniple in the Cohort, and every Cohort in the Legion, and every Legion in the Army; and so every Soldier had his place according to his Vertue, and every place gave honour to the Man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The want of this discipline hath dishonoured the martial Government of this age with bloodshed and murders; whereof France is too true a witness, as well in regard of the French themselves, as of our English Forces, that have been sent thither to appease their Tumults: for through defect of this order, which allotted to every Man his due place, the controversy grew between Sir William Drurie, and Sir John Burrowes, the issue whereof is too well known to the World: wherein, as our Commanders in France have been negligent, so I may not forget to give due commendation to the care which is had of this point amongst the English Troops in the Service of the States in the United Provinces, where they are very curious in appointing every Man his place in the File, and every File in the Troop, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reviving the Roman discipline.

To conclude this point, I will only touch in a word, the benefit which the Romans found in their small battalions, and the disadvantage we have in making great Squadrons. And first it cannot be denied, but that such Troops stand best appointed for disposition and array of Battel, which standing strong to receive a shock, bring most Men to fight with the Enemy: for the principal things which are required in setting of a Battel, are to order the Troops, that the depth in flank, may serve conveniently to withstand the assault, taking up no more than may well serve for that purpose, and giving means to the rest to fight with the

Enemy: and in these two points, were both their defensive and offensive considerations comprehended. But smaller Troops and Battalions afford this convenience better than great Squadrons, which drown up many able Men in the depth of their flanks, and never suffer them to appear, but when the breaking of the Squadron doth present them to the butchery of the Enemy. The Macedonian Phalanx, as I have noted in the first Book, never carried above sixteen in flank, and brought five hundred to fight in front. And these little Battalions (confiding them as they stood in battel ray) made as great a front or greater, than that of the Phalanx, keeping a depth answerable to the same; besides the second and third Battel, which always were to succor them, which the Phalanx wanted: neither would their thick and close imbatrelling, admit any such succor behind them. Now if we compare the advantages and disadvantages, which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great odds between them. These great Squadrons are not feasible, but in plain and open places, where they may either stand immovable, or make easy and slow motions, without shaking or disordering their body: but the lesser are a scantling for all places, champion or woody, level or uneven, or of what site or quality soever. And to conclude, if two or three ranks of these great battalions chance to be broken and disordered, the whole body is as much interred in the disorder, as the said ranks are, and hath less means to rally itself, than any other lesser company: but if by any violence chance to rout a Maniple, it proceedeth no farther in the Army, than that part which it taketh: neither can the disbanding of any one part, betray the safety of the Army to disorder and confusion, forasmuch as their discipline served to cut off such inconveniences, and yet no way hindered the general uniting of their strength into one body. More may be said concerning this matter; but I only point at it, and leave the due consideration thereof to the judgment of our Commanders, and return to our History.

CHAP. IV.

The Belge attempt the surprize of * Bibrax: Caesar sendeth succor unto it.

There was a Town called Bibrax, belonging to the State of Rhemes, about eight miles from Cæsars Camp, which the Belge thought to have surprized, as they came along to meet with Cæsar; and suddenly assaulted it with such fury, that the Townsmen could hardly hold out the first day. The Celts and Belge use one and the same manner in assaulting a Town: for having beset the whole compass of the wall, with ranks of Souldiers, they never cease flinging of stones, until they find the wall naked of defendants; and then casting themselves into a Testudo, they approach to the gate, and undermine the walls. Which thing was easily effected here for so great was the number of them that threw stones and darts, that it was impossi-

impossible for the defendants to abide upon the walls. As soon as the night had made an end of the assault, Ictius of Rhemes, a Man of great birth and authority in his Country, who at that time was Governor of the Town, and had been before with Cæsar, to treat and conclude a Peace, sent him word by Messengers, that if there came not present succor, he was not able to hold out any longer. The same night about midnight, (using the same Messengers for guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretian Archers, and Slingers of the Isles of Baleares to relieve the Towns by means whereof, the Townsmen, were put in good hope to make their party strong, and the Enemy made hopeless of winning the Town: and therefore after a small stay, having depopulated their fields, and burned their Villages and out-buildings, they marched with all their power towards Cæsars Camp, and within less than two miles of the Army, they incamped their whole Host; which as was gathered by the smoke and fire, took up more ground than eight miles in breadth.

The First OBSERVATION.

In the description of their assault, we are to observe two circumstances. The first is the manner they used in a sudden surprize: The second is the form and quality of a Testudo. Although Cæsar seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a Town, as peculiar to the Galles, yet we may not think but that the Romans used it as often as they had occasion to surprize any City: but because the Galles knew no other means to take a Town but this, therefore he fetcheth it down as peculiar unto them. The Romans called this manner of assault Corona; and so we read oftentimes this Pharse, Cingere urbem Corona, forasmuch as the Souldiers inclosed the Town with a Circle, and so resembled a Crown or Garland. Ammianus speaketh of a triple Crown of Souldiers, which incamped a Town: and Josephus telleth of Fortopata, which the Romans besieged, duplici peditum corona, with a double Circle of Footmen: and besides these, there was a third Circle of Horsemen, outmost of all. There is no further matter to be observed but this, that in surprizing a Town, they incircled it round about with thick continued ranks of Men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entered as they could.

The Second OBSERVATION.

The Testudo requireth a larger discourse, and is lively described in Livie after this manner. In the Amphitheatre, where the people did often assemble to see strange fights, and publick shews, were brought in (saith he) sixty lusty young Men, who after some motion, and seemly march, cast themselves into a square Troop, and roofing their heads, close with their Targets: the first rank, which made the front of the Testudo, stood

up right on their feet; the second rank bowed it self somewhat lower; the third and fourth ranks did more incline themselves, and so consequently unto the last rank, which kneeled on the ground: and so they made a body resembling half the side of an house, which they called Testudo. Unto this Squadron so strongly combined together, came two Souldiers running on their hands and fifty foot off, and threatening each other with their weapons, ran nimbly up the side of the roof, and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an Enemy that would have entered upon it, sometimes again encountering each other in the midst of it, leaped up and down as readily, as if they had been upon firm ground. And which is more strange, the front of a Testudo being applied to the side of a wall, there ascended many armed Men upon the said Testudo, and fought in an equal height, with other Souldiers, that stood upon the said wall to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the Souldiers that were in front, and in the sides of the square, carried not their Targets over their heads as the other did, but covered their bodies with them; and so no weapons, either cast from the wall, or otherwise thrown against it, could any way hurt them; and whatsoever weight fell upon the Testudo, it quickly glyded down by the declivity of the roof, without any hurt or annoyance at all.

Thus far Livie goeth; neither do I know what to say further of it: the chiefest use thereof was in a surprize or sudden attempt against a Town, before the Townsmen were thoroughly prepared to defend the same. This invention served them to approach the wall with safety, and so either to undermine it, or climb up: and to that end they oftentimes erected one Testudo upon another. Tacitus saith, that the Souldiers climbed upon the wall super iteratam testudinem, by one Testudo made upon another. And this was the ancient form and use of a Testudo, in a sudden assault or surprize.

Dio Cassius, in the acts of Antony saith, that being galled with the Parthian Archers, he commanded his whole Army to put it self into a Testudo, which was so strange a sight to the Parthians, that they thought the Romans had sunk down for weariness and faintness; and so for forsaking their horres, drew their swords to have made execution: and then the Romans, at a watch-word given, rose again with such a fury, that they put them all to sword and flight. Dio describeth the same Testudo after this manner: They placed, saith he, their baggage, their light-armed Men and their horsemen in the midst, and those heavy-armed footmen that carried long gutt-r-tiled Targets, were in the utmost circles next unto the enemy: the rest (which bare large oval Targets, were thronged together throughout the whole Troop, and so covered with their Targets, both themselves and their fellows, that there was nothing discerned by the Enemy, but a roof of Targets, which were so tiled together, that Men might safely go upon them.

Farther, we oftentimes read, that the Romans cast themselves into a Testudo, to break through an Enemy, or to rout and disbank a Troop. And this use the Romans had of a Testudo, in field services, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a Testudo in regard of the strength, for that it covered and sheltered, as a shell covereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a Testudo.

The benefit of small battalions, and the disadvantage of great squadrons.

To take a Town by surprize.

* Bray in the County of Reckell.

A Testudo described, Lib. 44.

The Third OBSERVATION.

The necessity of good discovery.

Thirdly, we may observe how carefully Cæsar provided for the safety of such succors as he sent into Bibrax: for he commanded the same Messengers that came from the Town to direct them as the best and surest guides in that journey; least peradventure through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconveniences or dangers. A matter of no small consequence in managing a War; but deserveth an extraordinary importunity, to periwade the necessity of this diligence: for a General that hath perfectly discovered the nature of the Country, through which he is to march, and knoweth the true distance of places, the quality of the ways, the compendiousness of turnings, the nature of the Hills, and the course of the Rivers, hath all these particularities, as main advantages, to give means of so many several attempts upon an Enemy. And in this point Hannibal had a singular dexterity, and excelled all the Commanders of his time, in making use of the way by which he was to pass. But he that leadeth an Army by an unknown and undiscovered way, and marcheth blindfold upon uncertain adventures, is subject to as many casualties and disadvantages, as the other hath opportunities of good fortune. Let every Man therefore periwade himself, that good Discoverers are as the eyes of an Army, and serve for lights in the darkness of ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good providence, and make the path of safety to manifest, that we need not stumble upon casualties. Cæsar in his journey to Aravissus, used the help of Divitiacus the Eburon, in whom amongst all the Galles, he reposed greatest confidence, to discover the way, and acquaint him with the passages: and before he would undertake his Voyage unto * Britanie, he well informed himself by Merchants and Travellers, of the quantity of the Island, the quality of the people, their use of War, and the opportunity of their Havens. Neither was he satisfied with their relations, but he sent Caius Volusenus, in a ship of War, to see what he could farther discover concerning the points. Suetonius addeth moreover, that he never carried his Army *per insidiola itinera*, through places where they were subject to be way-laid, unless he had first well discovered the places.

* New England.

Concerning the order which skillful Leaders have observed in discoveries, we are to know that this point consisteth of two parts; the one, in understanding the perfect description of the Country; the second, in observing the motions of the Enemy. Touching the first, we find as well by this, as other Histories, that the Romans used the Inhabitants of the Country for Guides, as best acquainted with their native places, that they might not err in so important a matter; provided always that their own scouts were ever abroad to understand what they could of themselves, that they might not altogether rely upon a strangers direction. The motions of the Enemy were observed by the horsemen: and these for the most part were Peterani, well experienced in the matter of War, and so the General received found advertisements: and yet they were not too forward upon any new motion, unless they found it confirmed by divers ways, for some Elipals may err either through passion or affection, as it hapned in the Helvetian War.

If therefore the use and benefit which prudent and wife Commanders made of this diligence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought upon the ignorant, have any authority to periwade a circumstance care herein, this little that hath been spoken may be sufficient for this point.

The Fourth OBSERVATION.

The Souldiers which Cæsar sent to relieve Bibrax, were Archers of Creta and Numidia, and Slingers of the Isles Baleares, which are now called Majorica, and Minorica: which kind of weapon, because it seemeth ridiculous to the Souldiers of these times, whose conceits are held up with the fury of these fiery engines, I will therefore in brief discover the nature and use thereof.

The Latines (saith *Isidorus*) call this weapon *funda*, quod ex ea fundatur lapides, because out of it stones are cast. *Plinius* attributeth the invention thereof to the Islanders called Baleares. *Florus* in his third Book, and eighth Chapter, saith that these Baleares used three sorts of slings, and no other weapon besides; and that a boy had never any meat given him, before he had first struck it with a sling. *Strabo* distinguisheth these three sorts of slings which the Baleares used, and saith, that they had one sling with long reins, which they used when they would cast afar off; and another with short Reins, which they used near at hand; and the third with reins of a mean size, to cast a reasonable distance. *Lipsius* saith, that in *Colonna Antonina* at Rome, he observed that the Baleares was made with one sling about his head, another about his belly, and the third in his hand; which might be their ordinary manner of carrying them. The matter whereof they made was threefold: the first was hemp or cotton, the second hair, and the third flax; for of either of these stuffs they commonly made them. The form and fashion of a sling resembled a platted rope, somewhat broad in the midst, and an Oval compass, and so by little and little decreasing into two thongs or reins. Their manner of slinging was to whirl it twice or thrice about their head, and so to cast out the bullet, *Virgil* speaking of *Mezentius*, saith,

Iste ter adducta circum caput egit balena.
He fetches the rein three times about his head.

But *Vegetius* preferreth that skill which cast the bullet with once turning it about the head. In *Suidas* we find, that these Baleares did commonly cast a stone of a pound weight: which agreeeth to these names in Cæsar, *fundas librales*. The leaden bullets are mentioned by *Salustius*, in the war with *Jugurth*, and by *Livie*, where he saith, that the Consul provided great store of arrows, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in request amongst divers Nations, as well in regard of the readiness and ease reiterating of the blow: as also for that the bullet fled very far, with great violence. The distance which they could easily reach with their sling, is expressed in this verse,

Fundum Varro vocat, quem possis mittere funda.

Fundum, according to Varro, is so much ground as a man may sling over. Which *Vegetius* interpreteth

Slingers with their art and use.

teeth to be Six hundred Foot. Their violence was such, as the same Author affirmeth in his First Book and sixteenth Chapter, that neither Helmet, Garbeline, nor Coriclet could bear out the blow; but he that was hit with a sling, was slain *fine laudis* *augustinus*, as he saith in the same place. *Lucius*, *Quintus*, and *Lucan*, three of the Latine Poets, say, That a Bullet skillfully cast out of a Sling, went with such violence, that it melted as it flew: whereof *Seneca* giveth this reason; *Motion*, saith he, doth extenuate the Ayre, and that extenuation or subtilty doth inflame; and so a Bullet, cast out of a Sling, melteth as it flyeth. But howsoever, *Diodorus Siculus* affirmeth, That these Baleares Slingers, brake both Target, Head-piece, or any other Armour whatsoever.

There are also two other sorts of Slings, the one mentioned by *Livie* and the other by *Vegetius*. That in *Livie* is called *Cyphophendo*, which cast a short Arrow with a long thick head; the other in *Vegetius* is called *Fustibulus*, which was a Sling made of a Cord and a Staffe. But, let this suffice for Slings and Slingers, which were reckoned amongst their Light-armed Soldiers, and used chiefly in assaulting, and defending Towers and Fortresses, where the heavy-armed Soldiers could not come to buckle; and present the place of our Harquebushers, which, in their proper nature, are levis armatura militis. Light-armed Soldiers, although more terrible than those of ancient times.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar confronted the Belge in form of Battell, but without any blow given: the Belge attended the passing of the River Axona; but in vain, and to their loss: they consult of breaking up the War.

Cæsar.

Cæsar at the first resolved not to give them Battell, as well in regard of their multitude, as the general fame and opinion conceived of their valour: notwithstanding he daily made trial by light skirmishes with his Horsemen, what the Enemy could do, and what his own men durst do. And when he found that his own Men were nothing inferior to the Belge, he chose a convenient place before his Camp, and put his Army in Battell: the Bank where he was encamped rising somewhat from a plain Level, was no larger than would suffice the Front of the Battell: the two sides were steep, and the Front rose alope by little and little, until it came again to a Plain, where the Legions were imbattelled. And, lest the Enemy, abounding in multitude, should circumvent his Men, and charge them in the flank as they were fighting, (which they might easily do with their number) he drew an overthwart Ditch behind his Army, from one side of the Hill to the other, Six hundred paces in length; the ends whereof he fortified with Bulwarks; and placed therein store of Engines. And leaving in his Camp the two Legions which he had

last enrolled in Lombardi, that they might be ready to be drawn forth when there should need any succour; he imbattelled his other six Legions in the Front of the Hill, before his Camp. The Belge also bringing forth their Power, confronted the Romans in order of Battell. There lay between both the Armies a small Marsh: over which the Enemy expected that Cæsar should have passed; and Cæsar on the other side attended to see if the Belge would come over, that his Men might have charged them in that troublesome passage. In the mean time the Cavalry on both sides encountered between the two Battells: and, after long expedition on either side, neither party adventuring to pass over. Cæsar having got the better in the Skirmish between the Horsemen, thought it sufficient for that time, both for the encouraging of his own men, and the contesting of so great an Army, and therefore he conveyed all his Men again into their Camp. From that place the Enemy immediately took his way to the River Axona, which lay behind the Romans Camp: and there finding Fords, they attempted to pass over part of their Forces, to the end they might either take the Fortress, which Q. Titurius kept, or break down the Bridge, or spoil the Territories of the State of Rhemes, and cut off the Romans from Provision of Corn. Cæsar having advertisement thereof from Titurius, transported over the River, by the Bridge, all his Horsemen, and Light armed Numidians; with his Slingers and Archers, and marched with them himself. The conflict was hot in that place: the Romans charging their Enemies as they were troubled in the water, slew a great number of them; the rest, like desperate persons, adventuring to pass over upon the dead carcases of their fellows, were beaten back by force of Weapons: and the Horsemen uncompacted such as had first got over the Water, and slew every man of them. When the Belge perceived themselves frustrated of their hopes of winning Bibrax, of passing the River, and of drawing the Romans into places of disadvantage, and that their own provisions began to fail them; they called a council of War, wherein they resolved, That it was best for the State in general, and for every man in particular, to break up their Camp, and to return home unto their own houses: and into whose Confines or Territories soever the Romans should first enter, to depopulate and waste them in hostile manner, that thither they should hasten from all parts, and there give them Battell; to the end they might rather

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rather try the matter in their own Country, then abroad in a strange and unknown place, and have their own Household Provision all-ways at hand to maintain them. And this the rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that Divitiacus, with a great Power of the Hedui, approached near to the borders of the Bellovaci; who, in that regard, made haste homeward to defend their Country.

The first OBSERVATION.

First we may observe the Art which he used to countervail the strength of so great a Multitude, by chusing out so convenient a place, which was no broader in Front than would suffice the Front of his Battel: and, having both the sides of the Hill so steep, that the Enemy could not ascend, nor climb up, but to their own overthrow; he made the back-part of the Hill strong by Art, and so placed his Soldiers, as it were in the Gate of a Fortrefs, where they might either issue out, or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred security and safety before the vain Opinion of Fool-hardy Resolution, which favourer of Barbarisme rather than of true Wisdom: for, he ever thought it great gain to lose nothing: and, the day brought always good fortune, that delivered up the Army safe unto the evening; attending until advantage had laid free principles of Victory: and yet Cæsar was never thought a Coward.

And now it appeareth what use he made by passing his Army over the River, and attending the Enemy on the further side, rather than on the side of the State of Rhemes; for, by that means, he brought to pass, that whatsoever the Enemy should attempt, in any part or quarter of the Land, his Forces were ready to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of *Bi-brax*: and yet notwithstanding he lost not the opportunity of making slaughter of them, as they passed over the River. For, by the benefit of the Bridge, which he had fortified, he transported what Forces he would, to make head against them as they passed over; and so he took what advantage either side of the River could afford him.

The second OBSERVATION.

And here the Reader may not marvel, if when the Hills are in labour, they bring forth but a Mouse; for, How soon is the courage of this huge Army abated? Or, What did it attempt worthy such a Multitude? Or, answerable to the report which was bruited of their Valour? but, being hastily carried together by the violence of Passion, were as quickly dispersed upon the sight of an Enemy: which is no strange effect of a sudden humour. For, as in Nature, all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durability, or lasting quality of all actions proceedeth from a slow and temperate progression; so, the resolutions of the mind, that are carried with an untemperate violence, and favour so much of heat and passion,

do vanish away even with the smoke thereof, and bring forth nothing but leifurable Repentance. And therefore it were no ill Counsel for men of such Natures, to qualify their hasty resolutions with a mistrustful lingering; that, when their judgment is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedy execution.

But, that which most bewrayeth their indifferet interpenance, in the hot pursuit of this enterprise, is, that before they had scarce seen the Enemy, or had opportunity to contest him in open Field, their Victuals began to fail them: for, their minds were so carried away with the conceit of War, that they had no leisure to provide such necessities as are the strength and sinew of the War. It was sufficient for every particular man to be known for a Soldier in so honorable an Action, referring other matters to the care of the State. The States, in like manner, thought it enough to furnish out Forty or Fifty thousand men apiece, to discharge their Oath, and save their Hostages, committing other requisites to the general care of the Confederacy; which being directed by as unskillful Governors, never looked further then the present Multitude, which seemed sufficient to overthrow the Roman Empire. And thus each man relied upon another's care, and satisfied himself with the present garbe. So many men of all sorts and qualities, so many Helms and Plumed Crests, such strife and emulation: what State should seem in greater forwardness, were motives sufficient to induce every man to go, without further inquiry how they should go. And herein the care of a General ought especially to be seen, considering the weakness of particular judgments, that having the lives of so many men depending altogether upon his providence, and engaged in the defence of their State and Country, he do not fail in these Main Points of Discipline, which are the Pillars of all Warlike designs. To conclude this point, let us learn by their error, so to carry a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handling it, then it was before we first took it to our charge; as it here happened to the Belge. For, their tumultuous Armes sorted to no other end, then to give Cæsar just occasion to make War upon them, with such assurance of Victory, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering, that he should not, in all likelihood, meet with the like strength again, in the continuance of that War. And this was not only *gravius bellum iustitiori trade*, to leave a more considerable War unto his Successor, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued War; but, to draw a dangerous War upon their head, that otherwise might have lived in Peace.

CHAP. VI.

The Belge break up their Camp, and, as they return home, are chased and slaughtered by the Romans.

His general resolution being entertained, by the consent of the whole Council of War, in the second Watch they departed out of their camp with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or Government, every man pressing

* Syofluna.

pressing to be foremost on his Journey, and to be first at home: in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away. Whereof Cæsar having notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practice, not as yet perceiving the reason of their departure, he kept his Army within his camp. In the dawning of the day, upon certain intelligence of their departure, he sent first his horsemen under Q. Pedius and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, two Legates to stay the Reteward, commanding Labienus to follow after with three Legions: these overtaking the Belge, and chasing them many miles, slew a great number of them. And, while the Reteward stayed, and valiantly received the charge of the Romans, the Vanguard being out of danger, and under no Government, as soon as they heard the alarm behind them, break out of their Ranks, and betook themselves to flight: and so the Romans slew them as long as the Sun gave them light to pursue them; and then sounding a Retreat, they returned to their camp.

OBSERVATION.

I have been an old Rule amongst Soldiers, That a great and negligent Error, committed by an Enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to Treachery. We read of Fulvius a Legate in the Roman Armie, lying in *Tuscanie*; the Consul being gone to Rome to perform some publick duty, the *Tuscanes* took occasion by his absence, to try whether they could draw the Romans into any inconvenience: and placing an Ambuscado near unto their Camp, sent certain Soldiers, attired like Shepherds, with droves of Cattel, to pals in view of the Roman Army: who handled the matter so, that they came even to the Rampier of the Camp. Whereat the Legate wondering, as a thing void of reason, kept himself quiet until he had discovered their Treachery, and so made frustrate their intent. In like manner, Cæsar, not persuaded that Men should be so heedless, to carry a Retreat in that disorderly and tumultuous manner, would not disclaim his men to take the opportunity of that advantage, until he had found that to be true, which in all reason was unlikely. And thus 308000 Belge were chased and slaughtered by three Legions of the Romans; for want of Government and Order in their departure.

CHAP. VII.

*Cæsar followeth after the Belge, into the Country of the Sueffones; and there besiegeth * Noviodunum.*

* Noyon.

Cæsar.

The next day after their departure, before they could recover themselves of their fear and flight, or had time to put themselves again in breath, Cæsar, as it were continuing still the chase and victory,

led his Army into the Country of the * Sueffones, the next borderers unto the men of Rhemes: and, after a long Journey, came unto Noviodunum, a Town of good importance, which he attempted to take by surprise, as he passed along by it. For he understood, that it was altogether unfurnished of defensive Provision, having no Forces within to defend it: but, in regard of the breadth of the Ditch, and height of the Wall, he was, for that time, disappointed of his purpose: and therefore having fortified his Camp, he began to make preparation for a Siege. The night following, the whole Multitude of the Sueffones, that had escaped by flight, were received into the Town: bombes, when the Vineæ were with great expedition brought unto the Wall, the Mount raised, and the Turrets built, the Gallies being amazed at the height of the Works, such as they had never seen, nor heard of before, and the speed which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent Embassadors to Cæsar, to Treat of giving up the Town; and by the Mediation of the men of Rhemes obtained their sate.

The first OBSERVATION.

In this Relation, we may observe, the industrious art which the Romans used, in assaulting, and taking Holds and Towns; wherein we find three sorts of Engines described, *Vineæ*, *Agger*, and *Turres*.

Vineæ is thus described by *Vegetius*: A little strong-built House or Hovel, made of light wood, that it might be removed with greatest ease; the roof was supported with divers pillars of a foot square, whereof the foremost were eight foot high; and the hindmost six, and between every one of these pillars, there was five foot distance. It was always made with a double roof, the first or lower roof was of thick planks, and the upper roof of hurdles, to break the force of a weight, without further shaking or disjoyning the building: the sides were likewise walled with Hurdles, the better to defend the Soldiers that were under it: the whole length was about sixteen foot, and the breadth seven, the upper roof was commonly covered with green or raw hides, to keep it from burning. Many of these hovels were joynted together in rank, when they went about to undermine a Wall: the higher end was put next unto the Wall, that all the weights which were thrown upon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the Engine: the four sides and groundills had in every corner a Wheel, and by them they were driven to any place as occasion served. The chiefest use of them was to cover and defend the Soldiers, as they undermined, or overthrew a Wall. This Engine was called *Vineæ*, which signifieth a Vine, for it sheltered such as were under the roof thereof, as a Vine covereth the place where it groweth.

Lib. 4.
A Vineæ, or
Vine descibed.

Agger, or
Murus.

H 2 divers

Observations upon CÆSARS

divers Histories to be a Hill, or elevation, made of earth and other substance, which by little and little was raised forward, until it approached near unto the place against which it was built; that upon this Mount they might erect Fortresses and Towers, and so fight with an advantage of height. The matter of this Mount was earth and stones, faggots and timber. Josephus saith, that at the Siege of Jerusalem, the Romans cut down all the Trees within Eleven miles compass, for matter and stuff to make a Mount. The sides of this *Agger* were of Timber, to keep in the loose matter: the forefront, which was towards the place of service, was open without any Timber-work; for on that part they still raised it, and brought it nearer the Walls. That which was built at *Asflia* was 80 foot high, and that at *Auricum* 80 foot high, and 30 foot broad. Josephus and Egeppus write, that there was a Fortress in *Judea* 300 cubits high: which *Silla* purposing to win by Assault, raised a Mount 200 cubits high; and upon it he built a Castle of stone 50 cubits high, and 50 cubits broad; and upon the said Castle he erected a Tower of 60 cubits in height, and so took the Fortresses. The Romans oftentimes raised these Mounts in the mouth of a Haven, and commonly to overtop a Town, that so they might fight with much advantage.

Towers or
Turrets de-
scribed.

Amongst other Engines in use amongst the Romans, their moveable Towers were very famous: for they were built in some safe place out of danger, and with wheels put under them, were driven to the Walls of the Town. These Towers were of two sorts, either the great or little: the lesser sort are described by *Virgilius* to be sixty cubits high, and the square side seventeen cubits; the breadth at the top was a fifth part of the breadth at the base, and so they stood sure without any danger of falling. The corner pillars were at the base nine inches square, and six inches at the top: there were commonly Ten stories in these little Towers, and windows in every story. The greater sort of Towers were 120 cubits high, and the square side was 24 cubits, the breadth at the top was a fifth part of the base; and in every one of these were commonly 200 stories. There was not one and the same distance kept between the stories; for the lowest commonly was 7 cubits and 12 inches high, the highest story 5 cubits, and the rest 4 cubits and a third. In every one of these stories were Soldiers and Engines, Ladders and casting Bridges, by which they got upon the Wall and entered the Town. The forefront of these turrets was covered with iron and wet coverings, to save them from fire. The Soldiers that removed the Tower to and fro, were always within the square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new water-work by Broken-wharfe in London, much resembleth one of these Towers.

The second OBSERVATION.

UPON the building of these mighty Engines, it was no marvel if the *Suefones* submitted themselves to such powerful industry. For whatsoever is strange and unusual, doth much affright the Spirits of an Enemy, and breed a motion of distrust and diffidence, when as they find themselves ignorant of such warlike practices: for novelty always breedeth wonder; in as much as the true reasons and causes being unknown, we apprehend it as diverse from the usual course of things,

and so stand gazing at the strangeness thereof: and wonder, as it addeth worth to the novelty, so it increaseth diffidence, and so consequently fear, the utter Enemy of Martial valour.


CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar carrieth his Army to the Territories of the Bellovaci, Ambiani and the Nervii.


Cæsar taking for Pledges the chiefest of their City, and amongst it the rest King Galba's own two sons, upon the delivery of all their Armes, received the *Suefones* to mercy: and from thence led his Army against the Bellovaci; who, having conveyed both themselves and their goods into the Town called *Bratupantium*, and understanding that Cæsar was come within five miles of the place, all the elder sort came forth to meet him, signifying, by the stretching forth of their hands, and by their suppliant words, that they yielded themselves up to Cæsar's disposal, and would no longer bear Armes against the People of Rome. And so again, when he was come near the Town, and had there set down his Army, the very boyes and women appearing upon the Walls with extended hands (as their custome is) besought Peace of the Romans. For these *Divitiacus* became a Mediator, who, after the Belgæ had broken up their Camp, had dismissed his *Heduan* Forces and was returned to Cæsar. The *Hedui*, saith he, have always found in the Bellovaci a faithful and friendly disposition to their State: and if they had not been betrayed by their Nobility (who made them believe, that the *Hedui* were brought in bondage by the Romans, and suffered all villany and despite at their hands) they had never withdrawn themselves from the *Hedui*, nor conspired to conspire against the Romans. The Ambors of this counsel perceiving into what great misery they had brought their country, were fled into Britanie: wherefore, not only the Bellovaci, but the *Hedui* also, in their behalf, besought him to use his clemency towards them. Which thing if he did, it would very much greaten the esteem and authority of the *Hedui* amongst the Belgæ, who formerly in their Wars had recourse to them for supplies and assistance. Cæsar, in regard of the *Hedui* and *Divitiacus*, promised to receive them to mercy; but for as much as the State was very great, and more populous and powerful than other Towns of the Belgæ, he demanded Six hundred Hostages. Which being delivered, and their Armour brought out of the Town, he Marched from thence into the coast of the Ambiani: who, without further lingering, gave both themselves

The Bel-
lova-
ci taken
to mercy.

The Amb-
iani
yield up
themselves.



CÆSARS march, where in every Legion had his Cariadges in front



CÆSARS march where the Enemy was nearer at hand

The Ner-
vii.

* Sambre
near Namur

selves, and all that they had into his power. Upon these bordered the Nervii, of whom Cæsar found thus much by inquiry, that there was no recourse of Merchants unto them, neither did they suffer any Wine, or what thing else might tend to riot, to be brought into their Country: for they were persuaded, that by such things, their courage was much abated, and their Vertue weakened. Further, he learned that these Nervii, were a savage people, and of great valor; often accusing the rest of the Belgæ, for yielding their necks to the Roman yoke, openly affirming, that they would neither send Embassadors, nor take Peace upon any condition.

Cæsar having marched three days journey in their Country, understood that the River * Sabis was not past ten miles from his Camp, and that on the farther side of this River, all the Nervii were assembled together, and there attending the coming of the Romans. With them were joined the Atrebrates and Veromandui, whom they had persuaded to abide the same fortune of war with them. Besides they expected a power from the Aduatici. The Women, and such as were unfit for the field, they bestowed in a place unaccessible for any Army, by reason of fens, and bogs, and marshes. Upon this intelligence, Cæsar sent his Discoverers and Centurions before, to choose out a fit place to incamp in.

Now whereas many of the surrendered Belgæ and other Gallies, were continually in the Roman Army, certain of these, (as it was afterwards known by the Captives) observing the order which the Romans used in marching, came by night to the Nervii, and told them, that between every Legion, went a great sort of Carriages, and that it was no matter of difficulty, as soon as the first Legion was come into the Camp, and the other Legions yet a great way off, to sit upon them upon a sudden, before they were disordered of their carriages, and so to overthrow them: which Legion being cut off, and their stuffe taken, the rest would have small courage to stand against them. It much furthered this advice, that forasmuch as the Nervii were not able to make any power of Horse, but what they did, they were wont to do with Foot, that they might the better resist the Cavalry of their borderers, whensoever they made any rode into their marches, their manner was to cut young trees half asunder, and bowing the tops down to the ground, played the boughs in breadth, and with thorns and briars planted between them, they made them so thick, that it was impos-

sible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or pass through them; so that when by this occasion the passage of the Roman Army must needs be hindered, the Nervii thought the foresaid counsel not to be neglected.

The place which the Romans chose to incamp in, was a hill of like level, from the top to the bottom, at the foot whereof, ran the River Sabis; and with the like level on the other side, rose another hill directly against this, to the quantity of two hundred paces; the bottom whereof was plain and open, and the upper part so thick with wood, that it could not easily be looked into. Within these woods the Nervians kept themselves close, and in the open ground, by the River side, were only seen a few Troops of Horse, and the River in that place, was about three foot deep.

Cæsar sending his Horsemen before, followed after with all his power. But the manner of his march differed from the report, which was brought to the Nervii; for inasmuch as the enemy was at hand, Cæsar, (as his custom was) led six Legions always in a readiness, without burthen or carriage of anything but their Arms: after them he placed the baggage of the whole Army. And the two Legions which were last involved, were rearward to the Army, and guarded the stuff.

OBSERVATION.

THIS treacherous practice of the surrendered Belgæ, hath fortunately discovered the manner of Cæsar's march, as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no small consequence in martial discipline, being subject to so many inconveniences, and capable of the greatest art that may be shewed in managing a War. Concerning the discreet carriage of a march, by this circumstance it may be gathered, that Cæsar principally respected safety, and secondly convenience: If the place afforded a secure passage, and gave no suspicion of hostility, he was content in regard of convenience, to suffer every Legion to have the oversight of their particular carriages, and to insert them among the Troops, that every Man might have at hand such necessaries as were requisite; either for their private use or publick discipline. But if he were in danger of any sudden attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an Enemy, he then omitted convenient disposition, in regard of particular use, as disadvantageous to their safety; and carried his Legions in that readiness, that if they had chanced to be engaged by an Enemy, they might without any alteration of their march or incumbrance of their carriages, receive the charge in that form of Battel, as was best approved by their Military rules, and the ancient practice of their fortunate Progenitors.

The manner
of the Ro-
mans march

The two re-
spect which
Cæsar had in
ordering a
march.
1 Safety.
2 Conveni-
ency.

The

Agmen quadratum.

* Lib. 8. de bel. Gall.

* 60. Epist.

Lib. 6.

Agmen longum.

Lib. 5. de bello Gal.

The use that may be made of this in our modern Wars.

The old *Romans* observed likewise the same respects: for in unsafe and suspected places they carried their Troops *agmine quadrato*, in a square march, which as *Livius* seemeth to note, was free from all carriage and impediments, which might hinder them in any sudden alarm. Neither doth that of * *Hirtius*, any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith, that *Cæsar* so disposed his Troops against the *Bellovaci*, that three Legions marched in front, and after them came all the carriages, to which the tenth legion served as a rearward; and so they marched *pene agmine quadrato*, almost in a square march. * *Seneca* in like manner noteth the safety of *agmen quadratum*, where he saith, that where an Enemy is expected, we ought to march *agmine quadrato* ready to fight. The most material consequence of these places alledged is, that as oft as they suspected any onset or charge, their order in a march, little or nothing differed from their usual manner of imbatrelling; and therefore it was called *agmen quadratum*, or a square march, inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts, as were observed in *quadrata Acie*, in a square body. For that triple form of imbatrelling, which the *Romans* generally observed in their fights, having respect to the distances between each Battel, contained almost an equal dimension of front and file, and so it made *Acie quadratum*, a square body, and when it marched, *Agmen quadratum*, a square march.

Polybius expresth the same in effect, as often as the place required circumspection; but altereth it somewhat, in regard of the carriages; for he saith, that in time of danger, especially where the Country was plain and champaign, and gave space and free scope to clear themselves, upon any accident, the *Romans* marched in a triple Battel, of equal distance one behind another, every Battel having his several carriages in front. And if they were by chance attacked by an Enemy, they turned themselves according to the opportunity of the place, either to the right or left hand; and so placing their carriages on the one side of their Army, they stood imbatelled ready to receive the charge.

The contrary form of marching, where the place afforded more security, and gave scope to convenience, they named *agmen longum*, a long march or train, when almost every Manipule or Order had their several carriages attending upon them, and strove to keep that way which they found most easy, both for themselves and their impediments. Which order of march, as it was more commodious than the former, in regard of particularity, so was it unsafe and dangerous, where the Enemy was expected; and therefore *Cæsar* much blamed *Sabinus* and *Costa* for marching, when they were deluded by *Ambrorix*, *longissimo agmine*, in a very long train; as though they had received their adversities from a friend, and not from an Enemy.

And albeit our modern Wars are far different in quality from them of ancient times, yet in this point of discipline, they cannot have a more perfect direction, than that which the *Romans* observed, as the two poles of their motions. Safety and Convenience, whereof the first dependeth chiefly upon the provident disposition of the Leaders; and the other will easily follow on, as the commodity of every particular shall give occasion.


Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can be taken, than that manner of imbatrelling, which shall be thought most convenient, if an Enemy were present to confront them? for a well-ordered march, must either carry the perfect form of a Battel, or contain the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receive that perfection of strength, which the fittest disposition can afford it. First, therefore a prudent and circumspect Leader, that desireth to frame a strong and orderly march, is diligently to observe the nature and use of each Weapon in his Army, how they may be placed for the greatest use and advantage, both in respect of their different and concurring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed; and this knowledge will consequently infer the best and exactest disposition of imbatrelling, as the said Forces are capable of; which if it may be observed in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactness of imbatrelling, will not admit convenient carriage of such necessary adjuncts, as pertain to an Army, the inconvenience is to be relieved with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary judgment should be found expedient; that albeit the form be somewhat changed, yet the principles and ground, wherein their strength and safety consisteth, may still be retained.

Neither can any Man well descend to more particular precepts in this point; he may exemplifie the practices of many great and experienced Commanders, what sort of Weapon marched in front, and what in the rearward, in what part of the Army, the Munition marched, and where the rest of the carriage was bestowed, according as their several judgments, though most expedient in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that observed this rule before prescribed, did seldom miscarry through an unsafe march. Let a good Martialist well know their proper use in that diversity of Weapons in his Army, how they are serviceable or disadvantageous in this or that place, against such or such an Enemy; and he will speedily order his Battel, dispose of his march, and bestow his carriages, as shall best fall out both for his safety and convenience.

Cæsar's custom was to send his Cavalry and light armed footmen, before the body of his Army, both to discover and impeach an Enemy; for these Troops were nimble in motion, and fit for such services: but if the danger were greater in the rearward than in the front, the horsemen marched in the tail of the Army, and gave security where there was most cause of fear. But if it happened that they were found unfit to make good the service in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in *Africa* against the *Numedians*, he then removed them as he best found it convenient, and brought his legionary Souldiers, which were the sinews and strength of his Forces, and marched continually in the bulk of the Army, to make good that which his horsemen could not perform. And thus he altered the antique prescription and uniformity of custome, according as he found himself best able to disadvantage an Enemy, or make way to victory.

Porta Praetoria

THE ROMAINE CAMPE



Principia.

Praetorium

Principia.

Quintana.

Quintana.

Porta Decumana

CHAP. IX.

The Romans begin to fortify their Camp, but are interrupted by the Nervii; Cæsar makes haste to prepare his Forces to battle.

Cæsar.

THe Roman Horsemen, with the Slingers and Archers, passed over the River, and encountered the Cavalry of the Enemy, who at first retired back to their Companies in the wood, and from thence sallied out again upon them; but the Romans durst not pursue them farther than the plain and open ground. In the mean time the six Legions that were in front, having their work measured out unto them, began to fortify their Camp. But as soon as the Nervii perceived their former carriages to be come in sight, which was the time appointed amongst them to give the charge, as they stood imballtled within the thicket, so they rushed out with all their Forces, and assaulted the Roman Horsemen: which being easily beaten back, the Nervii ran down to the River, with such an incredible swiftness, that they seemed at the same instant of time to be in the woods, at the River, and charging the Legions on the other side: for with the same violence, having passed the River, they ran up the hill to the Roman Camp, where the Souldiers were busied in their intrenchment. Cæsar had all parts to play at one instant: the flag to be hung out, by which they gave the Souldiers warning to take Arms, the Battel to be proclaimed by sound of Trumpet, the Souldiers to be recalled from their work, and such as were gone far off, to get turff and matter for the Rampier, to be sent for, the Battel to be ordered, his Men to be encouraged, and the sign of Battel to be given: the most of which were cut off by shortness of time, and the sudden assault of the Enemy.

The First OBSERVATION.

The description of the Roman camp with all the parts belonging unto it.

AS the Romans excelled all other Nations in many good customs, so especially in their Camp-discipline, they strove to be singular, for it seemed rather an Academy, or a City of civil Government, than a Camp of Souldiers; so careful were they both for the safety, and skilful experience of their men at Arms. For touching the first, they never suffered their Souldiers to lodge one night without a Camp, wherein they were inclosed with ditch and rampier, as in a walled Town; neither was it any new invention, or late found out cullome in their State, but in use amongst the Ancient Romans, and in the time of their Kings. Their manner of incamping was included within these circumstances.

The Centurions that went before, to choose out a convenient place, having found a fit situation for their Camp, first assigned the standing for the Emperors pavilion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the Camp; from whence he might easily overview all the other parts, or any alarme or *signum pæne* might from thence be discovered to all quarters. This pavilion was known by the name of *Prætorium*, for as much as amongst the ancient Romans, the General of their Army was called *Prætor*. In this place where the *Prætorium* was to be erected, they stuck up a white ensign, and from it they measured every way a hundred foot, and so they made a square, containing two hundred foot in every side; the *Area* or content whereof, was almost an Acre of ground: the form of the *Prætorium* was round and high, being as eminent among the other Tents, as a Temple is amongst the private buildings of a City; and therefore *Josephus* compareth it to a Church. In this *Prætorium* was their Tribunal or Chair of the Estate, and the place of divination, which they called *Augurale*, with other appendices of Majesty and authority.

The Generals Tent being thus placed, they considered which side of the Pavilion lay most commodious for forage and water, and on that side they lodged the Legions; every Legion divided one from another, by a Street or Lane of fifty foot in breadth, and according to the degree of honour, that every Legion had in the Army, so were they lodged in the Camp, either in the midst, which was counted most honorable, or towards the sides, which was of meaner reputation. And again, according to the place of every Cohort in his Legion, so was it lodged nearer the pavilion of the Emperor, towards the heart of the Camp, and so consequently every Maniple took place in the Cohort, distinguishing their preeminence by lodging them either toward the middle, or to the outwards; according as they distinguished the place of their Legions. There went a street of fifty in breadth, overthwart the midst of all the Legions, which was called *Quintana*, for that it divided the fifth Cohort of every Legion from the sixth.

Between the Tents of the first Maniples in every Legion and the *Prætorium*, there went a way of a hundred foot in breadth throughout the whole Camp, which was called *Principia*; in this place, the Tribunes sat to hear matters of Justice, the Souldiers exercised themselves at their Weapons, and the Leaders and chief Commanders frequented it as a publick place of meeting, and it was held for a reverent and sacred place; and so kept with a correspondent decency. On either side the Emperors Pavilion, in a direct line to make even and straight the upper side of the *Principia*, the Tribunes had their Tents pitched, every Tribune confronting the head of the Legion, whereof he was Tribune: above them, towards the head of the Camp, were the Legates and Treasurers: the upper part of the Camp was strengthened with some select Cohorts and Troops of Horse, according to the number of Legions that were in the Army.

Polybius describing the manner of encamping, which the Romans used in his time, whereas they commonly had but two Legions in their Army, with as many associates, placeth the *Ableti*, and *Extraordinarii*, which were select bands and companies,

The Centurions made choice of the place.

The *Prætorium*.

The lodging of the Legions.

Quintana.

Principia.

The tents of the Tribunes.

The space
between the
tents and the
rampier.

nies, in the upper part of the Camp, and the associates on the outside of the Legions.

The ditch and the rampier that compassed the whole Camp about, was two hundred foot distant from any Tent: whereof Polybius giveth these reasons; first, that the Soldiers marching into the Camp in battel array, might there dissolve themselves into Maniples, Centuries, and Decuries, without tumult or confusion, for order was the thing which they principally respected, as the life and strength of their martial body. And again, if occasion were offered to fall out upon an Enemy, they might very conveniently in that spacious room, put themselves into Companies and Troops: and if they were assaulted in the night, the darts and fire-works which the Enemy should cast into their Camp, would little indamage them, by reason of the distance between the rampier and the tents.

Contubernium.

The ditch
and the
rampier.

Their Tents were all of skins and hides, held up with props, and fastened with ropes: there were eleven Soldiers, as *Vegesius* saith, in every tent; and that society was called *Contubernium*, of whom the chiefest was named *Decanus*, or *Capit Contubernii*.

The ditch and the rampier were made by the Legions, every Maniple having his part measured out, and every Centurion overseeing his Century, the approbation of the whole work belonged to the Tribunes. Their manner of intrenching was this: the Soldiers being girt with their Swords and Daggers, digged the ditch about the Camp, which was always eight foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the Enemy were not far off, the ditch was always eleven or fifteen, or eighteen foot in latitude and altitude, according to the discretion of the General: but what scantling forever was kept, the ditch was made *directu lateribus*, that is, as broad in the bottom as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch, was three foot in height, and sometimes four, made after the manner of a Wall, with green turfs cut all to one measure, half a foot in thickness, a foot in breadth, and a foot and half in length. But if the place wherein they were incamped, would afford no such turfs, they then strengthened the loose earth, which was cast out of the ditch with boughs and faggots, that it might be strong and well fastened. The rampier they properly called *Agger*: the outside whereof, which hung over the ditch, they used to flick with thick and sharp flakes, fastned deep in the mound, that they might be firm; and the rest for the most part were forked flakes, which made the rampier very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great difficulty. *Parrus* saith, that the front of the rampier, thus lusk with flakes, was called *vallum a varicando*, for that no Man could stride or get over it.

Vallum.

Prætoria porta.

Porta Decumana.

The Camp had four gates: the first was called *prætoria Porta*, which was always behind the Emperors tent; and this gate did usually look, either toward the east, or to the Enemy, or that way that the Army was to march. The gate on the other side of the Camp, opposite to this, was called *Porta Decumana*, a *decimis cohortibus*; for the tenth or last Cohort of every Legion, was lodged to confront this gate: by this gate the Soldiers went out to fetch their wood, their water, and

their forrage, and this way their offenders were carried to execution. The other two gates were called *Portæ principales*, forasmuch as they stood opposite to either end, of that so much respected place, which they called *principi*, only distinguished by these titles, *leva principialis* and *dextra*, the left and the right hand principal gate. All these gates were shut with doors, and in flanking Camps fortified with Turrets, upon which were planted Engines of defence, as *Balistæ*, *Catapultæ*, *Tolones*, and such like.

Portæ principales.
Leva.
Dextra.

Castra et
va.

Hiberna.

The Romans had their summer Camps, which they termed *Æstiva*, and their winter Camps, which they called *Hiberna*, or *Hibernacula*. Their summer Camps were in like manner differenced, according to the time which they continued in them. For if they remained in a place but a night or two, they called them *Castra* or *Manones*; but if they continued in them any long time, they called them *Æstiva* or *Sedes*: and these were more absolute, as well in regard of their tents, as of their fortification, than the former, wherein they stayed but one night. The other, which they called *Hiberna*, had great labor and cost bestowed upon them, that they might the better defend them from the winter season. Of these we read, that the tents were either thatched with straw, or roofed with boards, and that they had their armory, hospital, and other publick houses. These Camps have been the beginning of many famous Towns, especially when they continued long in a place, as oftentimes they did, upon the banks of *Æphrates*, *Danubius*, and the *Rhene*. The order which they always observed in laying out their Camp, was so uniform, and well known to the Romans, that when the Centurions had limited out every part, and marked it with different engines and colours, the Soldiers entered into it, as into a known and familiar City; wherein every society or small contubernium, knew the place of his lodging: and which is more, every particular man could assign the proper station of every company throughout the whole Army.

The commodity
of this incamp-
ing.

The use and commodity of this incamping I briefly touched in my first Book: but if I were worthy any way to commend the excellency thereof to our modern Soldiers, or able by perswasion to re-establish the use of incamping in our Wars, I would spare no pains to activate to great a good, and want more in the conquest of negligence, than if my self had compassed a new found out means, and yet reason would deem it a matter of small difficulty, to gain a point of such worth, in the opinion of our Men, especially when my discourse shall present security to our forces, and honour to our Leaders, majesty to our Armies, and terror to our Enemies, wonderment to Strangers, and Victory to our Nation. But flout hath such interest in this age, that it commendeth vain-glory and foolhardiness, contempt of Virtue, and derision of good discipline, to repugne the designs of honor, and to go far to overmaster reason, that it suffereth not former harms to bear witness against error, nor correct the ill achievements of ill directions: and therefore ceasing to urge this point any farther, I will leave it to the careful respect of the wise.

The

The second OBSERVATION.

The Ceremonies
which they
used in their
preparation
to Battel.

The fury of the Enemy, and their sudden assault, so disturbed the Ceremonies which the Roman Discipline observed, to make the Soldiers truly apprehend the weight and importance of that Action, which might call upon their State either Sovereignty or bondage, that they were all for the most part omitted: notwithstanding they are here noted under these titles; the first was *exillum opotendum*, quod erat insigne cum ad Arma concurrere oporteret, the hanging out the Flag, which was the Sign for betaking themselves to their Arms: for when the General had determined to fight, he caused a Scarlet Coat, or Red Flag to be hung out upon the top of his Tent, that by it the Soldiers might be warned to prepare themselves for the Battel; and this was the first warning they had; which by a silent aspect presented blood and execution to their eyes, as the only means to work out their own safety, and purchase eternal honor. The second was *signum tuba dandum*, the Proclaiming the Battel by Sound of Trumpet: this warning was a Noise of many Trumpets, which they termed by the name of *Cicatrix* a *calando*, which signifies calling; for, after the eye was filled with species, suitable to the matter intended, they then halted to possess the Ear, and by the sense of hearing to stir up Warlike motions, and fill them with resolute thoughts, that no diffident or base conceits might take hold of their minds. The third was *milites cohortandi*, the encouraging of the Soldiers: for it was thought convenient to confirm this valour with Motives of Reason, which is the strength and perfection of all such motions. The use and benefit whereof I somewhat enlarged in the *Helvetian* War, and could afford much more labour to demonstrate the commodity of this part, if my speech might carry credit in the opinion of our Soldiers, or be thought worthy to regard men, so much addicted to their own fashions. The last was *signum dandum*, the Sign giving; which, as some think, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish, and know themselves from their Enemies. *Hirtius*, in the War of *Africa*, saith, that *Cæsar* gave the Word *Felicitas*; *Brutus* and *Cassius* gave *Liberty*; others have given *Virtus*, *Deus nobiscum*, *Triumphus Imperatoris*, and such like words, as might be ominous to a good success.

Besides these particularities, the manner of their delivery gave a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times & cues; whereof *Cæsar* now complaineth, that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for without all controversy, there is no matter of such consequence in it self, but may be much graced with Ceremonies, and Complements, which like Officers or Attendants add much respect and majesty to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth far meaner, and of less regard.

CHAP. X.

The Battel between Cæsar and the Nervii.

Cæsar.

IN these difficulties two things were a help to the Romans: the one war, the knowledge and experience of the Soldiers; for, by reason of their practice in former Bat-

tels, they could as well prescribe unto themselves what was to be done, as any other commander could teach them. The other was, that notwithstanding *Cæsar* had given commandment to every Legate, not to leave the work, or forsake the Legions, until the Fortifications were perfected; yet when they saw extremity of danger, they attended no countermand from *Cæsar*, but ordered all things as it seemed best to their own discretion. *Cæsar* having commanded such things as he thought necessary, ran hastily to encourage his soldiers, and, by fortune, came to the tenth Legion; where he used no further speech, than that they should remember their ancient valour, have courageous hearts, and valiantly withstand the brunt of their Enemies. And, for as much as the Enemy was no further off, then a weapon might be cast to encounter them, he gave them the sign of Battel: and, bawling from thence to another quarter, he found them already closed, and at the encounter. For the time was so short, and the Enemy so violent, that they wanted leisure to put on their head-pieces, or to uncase their Targets: so that what part they lighted into from their work, or what engage they first met withall, there they stayed; least in seeking out their own Companies, they should lose that time as was to be spent in fighting. The Army being imbatteled, rather according to the nature of the place, the declivity of the hill, and the brevity of time, than according to the rules of Art: as the Legions encountered the Enemy in divers places at once, the perfect view of the battel being hindered by those thick hedges before spoken of, there could no succors be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needful to be done: and therefore, in so great uncertainty of things, there happened divers casualties of fortune.

The Soldiers of the Ninth and Tenth Legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, calling their Piler with the advantage of the Hill, did drive the Atrebrates, breathless with running, and wounded in the encounter, down into the River; and as they passed over the water, slew many of them with their swords. Neither did they stick to follow after them over the River, and adventuring into a place of disadvantage, where the battel being renewed again by the Enemy, they put them to flight the second time. In like manner, two other Legions, the Eleventh and the Eighth, having put the Veromandui from the upper ground, fought with them upon the banks of the River; and so the front and the left part of the Camp

And therefore I rather take it to be something else than a word.

H

was

was well-near left naked. For in the right corner were the Twelfth and Seventh Legions, whereas all the Nervii, under the conduct of Boduognatus, were beset together; and some of them began to assault the Legions on the open side, and other some to possess themselves of the highest part of the Camp.

At the same time the Roman Horsemen, and the light-armed Footmen that were intermingled amongst them, and were at first all put to flight by the Enemy, as they were entering into the Camp, met with their Enemies in the face, and so were driven to fly out another way. In like manner, the Pagens, and Soldiers Boyes, that from the Decumane port and top of the hill had seen the Tenth Legion follow their Enemies in pursuit over the River, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the Enemy in their Camp, betook them to their heels as fast as they could. At the same time rose a great hubbub and outcry of those that came along with the Carriages, who being extremely troubled and dismayed at the business, ran some one way, and some another. Which accident so terrified the Horsemen of the Treviri (who for their prowess were reputed singular amongst the Galles, and were sent thither by their State to aid the Romans) first, when they perceived the Roman Camp to be possessed by a great multitude of the Enemy, the Legions to be overcharged, and almost inclosed about; the Horsemen, Slings, and Numidians to be dispersed and fled; that without any further expectation they took their way homeward, and reported to their State, that the Romans were utterly overthrown, and that the Enemy had taken their Carriages.

Cæsar departing from the Tenth Legion to the right Corner, finding his men exceedingly over-charged, the Ensignes crowded together into one place, and the Soldiers of the Twelfth Legion so thick thronged on a heap, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the fourth Cohort being slain, the Ensign-bearer killed, and the Ensign taken, and the Centurions of the other Cohorts either slain, or sore wounded; amongst whom Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that Legion, a valiant man, so grievously wounded, that he could scarce stand upon his feet; the rest not very forward, but many of the hindmost turning tail; and forsaking the field; the Enemy on the other side giving no respite in Front, although he fought against the Hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a

narrow issue, without any means or succour to relieve them: he took a Target from one of the hindmost Soldiers (for he himself was come thither without one) and pressing to the front of the Battel, called the Centurions by name, and encouraging the rest, commanded the Ensignes to be advanced toward the Enemy, and the Maniples to be enlarged, that they might, with greater facility and readiness, use their Swords.

The first OBSERVATION.

His Publius Sextus Baculus was the chieftest Centurion of the Twelfth Legion, being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Treviri that was of the first Cohort in that Legion: for that place was the greatest dignity that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of *Centurio primipili*, or simply *Primipilus*, and sometimes *Primipilus Centurio*. By him were commonly published the mandates and edicts of the Emperor and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centurions at all times had an eye unto him; and the rather, for that the Eagle, which was the peculiar Ensign of every Legion, was committed to his charge, and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this dignity without special commodity, as may be gathered out of divers Authors. We read farther, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribuneship was expired, to be a Primipile in a Legion; notwithstanding there was a Law made, I know not upon what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suffice concerning the office and Title of P. S. Baculus.

The second OBSERVATION.

And here I may not omit to give the Target any honor I may; and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Cæsar's hand, as in the place of greatest dignity, and much honouring the excellency thereof. Polybius maketh the Target to contain two foot and a half in breadth, overthwart the convex surface thereof, and the length four foot, of what form or fashion soever they were of: for the Romans had two sorts of Targets amongst their Legionaries; the first carried the proportion of that figure, which the Geometricians call Oval, a figure of an unequal latitude, broadest in the middle, and narrow at both the ends like unto an Egge, described in plane: the other sort was of an equal latitude, and resembled the fashion of a gutter-tile, and thereupon was called *Scutum imbricatum*. The matter whereof a Target was made was a double board, one fastened upon another with Lint and Buls glew, and covered with an Ox-hide, or some other stiffer leather; the upper and lower part of the Target were bound about with a plate of iron, to keep it from cleaving; and in the middle there was a bolle of iron or brass, which they called *Umbo*. Romans brought them in first amongst the Romans, taking the use of them from the Sabines. The wood whereof they were made, was, for the most part, either Sallow, Alder, or Fig-tree: whereof Pliny giveth

The place and office of a Primipile.

The Target described.

giveth this reason; for as much as these Trees are cold and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made upon the wood, was presently contracted and shut up again. But, for as much as the Target was of such reputation amongst the Romans, and challenged such interest in the greatness of their Empire, let us enter a little into the consideration of the use and commodity thereof; which cannot be better understood, then by that comparison which Polybius hath made between the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I have thought good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth,

Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian Weapons.

I Promised in my Sixth Book that I would make a comparison between the weapons of the Romans and Macedonians: and that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their Armies, how they do differ one from another; and in what regard the one or the other were either inferior or superior; which promise I will now with diligence endeavour to perform. And for as much as the Armies of the Macedonians have given to good testimonies of themselves by their actions, by overcoming the Armies, as well of Asia as of Greece, and that the Battels of the Romans have conquered as well those of Africa, as all the Eastern Countries of Europe; it shall not be amiss, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times have not once, but many times seen trial both of their Battels and Forces: that knowing the reason why the Romans do overcome, and in their Battel carry away the better, we do not, as vain men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteem them without reason happy Victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we give them their due praises, according to the direction of Reason and sound Judgment. Concerning the Battels between Hannibal and the Romans, and concerning the Romans their losses, there is no need that I speak much. For, their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Armies, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexterity and industry of Hannibal. But we have intreated thereof when we made mention of the Battels themselves; and, the end it self of that War doth especially confirm this our opinion: for, when they had gotten a Captain equal with Hannibal, even consequently he, with all his Victories, vanished. And he had no sooner overcome the Romans, but by and by rejecting his own weapons, he trained his Army to their weapons; and so taking them up in the beginning, he continued them on unto the end.

And Pyrrhus, in his War against the Romans, did use both their Weapons and Order, and made as it were a medley both of the Cohort and Phalanx; but notwithstanding it served him not to get the Victory, but always the event, by some means or other, made the same doubtful: concerning whom, it were not unfit that I should say something, least in being altogether silent, it might seem to pre-judice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will halt to my purposed comparison.

Now, touching the Phalanx, if it have the disposition and forces proper to it, nothing is able to oppose it self against it, or to sustain the violence

thereof; as may easily, by many documents, be approved. For, when an armed man doth stand firm in the space of three foot, in so thick an array of Battel, and the length of their Pikes being according to the first bulle or scantling, sixteen foot, but according to the true and right convenience of their fourteen cubits, out of which are taken four, allowed for the space between the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butt end thereof, whilst he stands in a readiness to attend the encounter; being thus ordered, I say, it is manifest, that the length of ten cubits doth extend it self before the body of every armed man, where, with both his hands, he doth advance it ready to charge the Enemy. By which means it followeth, that some of the Pikes do not only extend themselves before the second, third, and fourth rank, but some before the foremost, if the Phalanx have his proper and due thickness, according to his natural disposition, both on the sides and behind: as Homer maketh mention, when he saith, that one Target doth enclose and fortify another; one being piece is joyned to another, that they may stand united and close together.

Their circumstances being rightly and truly set down, it must follow, that the Pikes of every former rank in the Phalanx do extend themselves two cubits before each other, which proportion of difference they have between themselves; by which may evidently be seen, the assault and impression of the whole Phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of sixteen ranks in depth or thickness. The excess of which number of ranks above four, for as much as they cannot commodiously couch their Pikes without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long enough to enlarge themselves beyond the foremost ranks, they grow utterly unprofitable, and cannot man by man make any impression or assault: but serve only by laying their Pikes upon the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustain and hold up the swaves, and giving back of the former ranks which stand before them, to this end, that the Front may stand firm and sure; and with the thickness of their Pikes they do repel all those darts, which passing over the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those ranks which are more backward.

And farther, by moving forward with the force of their bodies, they do so press upon the former, that they do make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the foremost ranks should give back.

This therefore, being the general and particular disposition of the Phalanx, we must now speak on the contrary part touching the properties and differences, as well of the Armies, as of the whole disposition of the Roman Battel. For every Roman soldier, for himself, and in the encounter are moved three foot to stand in, and in the encounter are moved man by man, every one covering himself with his Target, and mutually moving whensoever there is occasion offered. But those which use their Swords, do fight in a more thin and distinct order; so that it is manifest, that they have three foot more allowed them to stand in, both from shoulder to shoulder, and from back to belly, that they may use their weapons with the better commodity. And hence it cometh to pass, that one Roman soldier taketh up as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the Macedonians.

domian Phalanx: so that one Roman is as it were to oppose himself against ten Pikes, which Pikes the said one soldier can neither by any agility come to offend, or else at handy blows otherwise annoy: And those which are behind him, are not only unable to repel their force, but also with conveyancy to use their own weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible that any battle being assaulted by the front of a Phalanx, should be able to sustain the violence thereof, if it have his due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the Romans do overcome, and that those that do use the Phalanx are void of the hope of Victory? Even from hence, that the Roman Armies have infinite commodities, both of places and of times to fight in. But the Phalanx hath only one time, one place, and one kind whereto it may profitably apply it self: so that if it were of necessity that their enemy should encounter them at that instant, especially with their whole Forces, it were questionable not only not without danger, but in all probability likely, that the Phalanx should ever carry away the better. But, if that may be avoided, which is easily done, shall not that disposition then be utterly unprofitable, and free from all terror? And, it is farther evident, that the Phalanx must necessarily have plain and champaign places, without any hindrances or impediments, as ditches, uneven places, valleys, little hills and rivers; for all these may hinder and disjoin it. And it is almost impossible that there be a Plain of the capacity of twenty *stadia*, much less more, where there shall be found none of these impediments. But suppose there be found such places as are proper for the Phalanx: if the Enemy refuse to come unto them, and in the mean time spoil and sack the Cities and Country round about, what commodity or profit shall arise by any Army so ordered? for if it remain in such places, as hath been before spoken of, it can neither relieve their friends, nor preserve themselves. For the Convoies which they expect from their friends are easily cut off by the Enemy, whilst they remain in those open places.

And, if it happen at any time, that they leave them upon any enterprise, they are then exposed to the Enemy. But suppose, that the Roman Army should find the Phalanx in such places, yet would it not adventure it self in gross at one instant, but would by little and little retire it self: as doth plainly appear by their usual practice. For, there must not be a conjecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that which they do. For they do not so equally frame their battle, that they do assault the Enemy altogether, making, as it were, but one front: but part make a stand, and part charge the Enemy, that if at any time the Phalanx do press them that come to assault them, and be repelled, the force of their order is dissolved. For, whether they pursue those that retire, or fly from those that do assault them, these do disjoin themselves from their Army; by which means there is a gap opened to their Enemies, standing and attending their opportunity: so that now they need not any more to charge them in the front, where the force of the Phalanx consisteth, but to assault where the breach is made, both behind and upon the sides. But if at any time the Roman Army may keep his due propriety and disposition, the

Phalanx, by the disadvantage of the place, being not able to do the like, doth it not then manifestly demonstrate the difference to be great between the goodness of their disposition, and the disposition of the Phalanx?

To this may be added the necessities imposed upon an Army: which is, to march through places of all natures, to encamp themselves, to possess places of advantage, to besiege, and to be besieged; and also, contrary to expectation, sometimes to come in view of the Enemy. For all these occasions necessarily accompany an Army, and oftentimes are the especial causes of Victory, to which the Macedonian Phalanx is no way fit or convenient; for as much as neither in their general order, nor in their particular disposition, without a convenient place, they are able to effect any thing of moment: but the Roman Army is apt for all these purposes. For every soldier amongst them, being once armed and ready to fight, refuseth no place, time nor occasion; keeping always the same order, whether he fight together with the whole body of the Army, or particularly by himself man to man.

And hence it happeneth, that as the commodity of their disposition is advantageous, so the end doth answer the expectation.

These things I thought to speak of at large, because many of the *Græcians* are of an opinion, that the Macedonians are not to be overcome. And again, many wondered how the Macedonian Phalanx should be put to the worse by the Roman Army, considering the nature of their weapons.

Thus far goeth *Polybius*, in comparing the weapons and embattelling of the Romans, with the use of Arms amongst the Macedonians: wherein we see the Pike truly and exactly ordered, according as the wise *Græcians* could best proportion it with that form of battle, which might give most advantage to the use thereof: so that if our squadrons of Pikes jump not with the perfect manner of a Phalanx (as we see they do not) they fall so much short of that strength, which the wisdom of the *Græcians*, and the experience of other Nations imputed unto it. But, suppose we could allow it that disposition in the course of our wars, which the nature of the weapon doth require: yet for as much as by the authority of *Polybius*, the said manner of imbattelling is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one time, one place, and one kind of fight, I hold it not so profitable a weapon as the practice of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woody Countries, such as *Ireland* is, where the use is cut off by such inconveniences as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtless, if our Commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike, and *Ireland*, they would not proportion to great a number of them in every Company as there is; for commonly half the Company are Pikes, which is as much as to lay in the practice of our Wars, that half the Army hath neither offensive nor defensive weapons, but only against a Troop of Horse. For they seldom or never come to the push of Pike with the Foot Companies, where they may charge and offend the Enemy: and for defence, if the Enemy think it not safe to buckle with them at hand, but maketh more advantage to play upon them afar off with shot, it affordeth small safety to shake a long Pike at them, and stand fair in the mean time to enter-

tain a volley of shot, with the body of their battalion. As I make no question, but the Pike in some services is profitable, as behind a rampier, or at a breach; so I assure my self there are weapons, if they were put to trial, that would countervail the Pike, even in those services wherein it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Target, we see it take the hand in the judgment of *Polybius*, of all other weapons whatsoever, as well in regard of the divers and sundry sorts of imbattelling, as the quality of the place wheresoever: for their use was as effectual in small bodies and centuries, as in grosse Troops, and great Companies; in thin and spacious imbattelling, as in thick-ordered *Tribunades*.

Neither could the nature of the place make them unserviceable; for whether it were plain or covert, level or unequal, narrow or large, if there were any commodity to fight, the Target was as necessary to defend, as the Sword to offend: besides the conveyancy which accompanieth the Target in any necessity imposed upon an Army, whether it be to march through places of all natures, to make a fall march, or a speedy retreat, to incamp themselves, to possess places of advantage, to besiege and to be besieged, as *Polybius* saith, with many other occasions, which necessarily accompany an Army. The use of this weapon hath been too much neglected in these later ages, but may be happily renewed again in our Nation, if the industry of such as have laboured to present it unto these times in the best fashion, shall find any favor in the opinion of our Commanders. Concerning which Target, I must needs say thus much, that the light Target will prove the Target of service, whensoever they shall happen to be put in execution: for those which are made proof, are so heavy and unwieldy, (although they be somewhat qualified with such helps as are annexed to the use thereof) that they overcharge a Man with an unsupportable burthen, and hinder his agility and execution in fight with a weight disproportionate to his strength. For our offensive weapons, as namely the Harquebussiers and Musketers, are stronger in the offensive part, than any Arms of defence, which may be made manageable and fit for service. Neither did the Romans regard the proof of their Targets, farther than was thought fit for the ready use of them in time of Battle, as it appeareth in many places, both in the Civil Wars, and in these Commentaries: for a Roman Pike hath oftentimes darted through the Target, and the body of the Man that bore it, and fastened them both to the ground; which is more than a Musket can well do, for a bullet commonly flieth in the body. And although it may be said that this was not common, but rather the effect of an extraordinary arm; yet it serveth to prove that their Targets were not proof to their offensive weapons, when they were well delivered, and with good direction. For I make no doubt but in their battels there were oftentimes some hindrances, which would not suffer so violent an effect as this which I speak of: for in a volley of shot, we must not think that all the bullets fly with the same force, and fall with the like hurt; but as Armour of good proof will hardly hold out some of them, so slender Arms, and of no proof, will make good resistance against others. And to conclude, in a Battle or encounter at hand, a Man shall meet with more occa-

sions suiting the nature and commodity of this light Target, than such as will advantage the heavy Target of proof, or countervail the surplus of weight which it carrieth with it.

Some Men will urge, that there is use of this Target of proof in some places, and in some services: which I deny not to those that desire to be secured from the extremity of peril. But this falseth out in some places, and in some particular services; and hindreth not but that the universal benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important occasions of a War.

Thus much I am farther to note, concerning the Sword of the Targetiers, that according to the practice of the Romans, it must always hang on the right side; for carrying the Target upon the left arm, it cannot be, that the Sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoyance. And if any Man say, that if it hang on the right side, it must be very short, otherwise it will never be readily drawn out: I say, that the Sword of the Targetiers, in regard of the use of that weapon, ought to be of a very short length, when as the Targetier is to command the point of his Sword within the compass of his Target, as such as look into the true use of this weapon will easily discover. But let this suffice concerning the use of the Pike and the Target.

CHAP. IV.

The Battle continued, and, in the end, Cæsar overcometh.

At the presence of their General, the Caesar, Soldiers conceived some better hopes, and gathering strength and courage again, when as every Man bestirred himself in the sight of the Emperor, the brunt of the Enemy was a little stayed. Cæsar perceiving likewise the seventh Legion, which stood next unto him, to be sore over-laid by the Enemy, commanded the Tribunes by little and little, to join the two Legions together, and so by joining back to back, to make two contrary fronts; and being thus secured one by another, from fear of being circumvented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the mean time the two Legions that were in the rearward to guard the carriages, bearing of the Target, doubled their pace, and were desirous by the Enemy upon the top of the hill. Titus Labienus, having won the Camp of the Nervii, and beholding from the higher ground what was done on the other side of the River, sent the tenth Legion to help their fellows: who understanding by the horsemen and lackies that fled, in what case the matter stood, and in what danger the Camp, the Legions, and the General was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose coming there hapned such an alteration and change of things, that even such as were sunk down through

through extreme grief of their wounds, or leaned upon their Targets, began again to fight afresh; and the Pages and the Boys perceiving the Enemy amazed, ran upon them unarmed, not fearing their weapons.

The Horsemen also striving with extraordinary valor to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselves in all places before the legionary Souldiers. Howbeit, the Enemy, in the utmost peril of their lives, shewed such Manhood, that as fast as the foremost of them were overthrown, the next in place beset their carcases, and fought upon their bodies: and these being likewise overthrown, and their bodies heaped one upon another, they that remained possist themselves of that Mount of dead carcases, as a place of advantage, and from thence threw their weapons, and intercepting the Piles, returned them again to the Romans.

By which it may be gathered, that there was great reason to deem them Men of haughty courage, that durst pass over so broad a River, climb up such high rocks, and adventure to fight, in a place of such inequality; all which, their magnanimity made easy to them. The Battle being thus ended, and the Nation and name of the Nervii being well near swallowed up with destruction, the elder sort with the Women and Children, that before the Battle were conveyed into Islands and Bogs, when they heard thereof, and saw now that there was nothing to hinder the Conqueror, nor any hope of safety to the conquered, by the consent of all that remained alive, sent Embassadors to Cæsar, and yielded themselves to his mercy; and in laying open the misery of their State affirmed, that of six hundred Senators, they had now left but three, and of sixty thousand fighting Men, there was scarce five hundred that were able to bear Arms. Cæsar, that his clemency might appear to a distressed people, preserved them with great care, granting unto them the free possession of their Towns and Country, and streightly commanding their borderers not to offer them any wrong or injury at all.

OBSERVATION.

And thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous Battel, which Roms complaineth of, as a confused Narration, much differing from the direct and methodical stile of his other Commentaries. But if that rule hold good, which learned Rhetoricians have observed in their Oratory, that an imperfect thing ought not to be told in a perfect manner; then by Roms leave, if any such confusion do appear, it both favoresh of

Eloquence, and well sheweth the turbulent carriage of the action, wherein order and skill gave place to fortune, and providence was swallowed up with peradventure. For to that which *Hippias* saith of the overthrow he gaveto *Pharaxes*, may as well be said of this, that he got the victory, plurimum adjuvante deorum benignitate, qui cum omnibus belli casibus interfuit, tum præcipue iis quibus nihil ratione posuit administrari, by the very great favor and assistance of the gods; who as they give aid in all cases of war, so especially in those where reason and good skill are at a loss. For so it fell out in this Battel, and the danger proceeded from the same cause that brought him to that push, in the Battel with *Pharaxes*, for he well understood that the *Nervii* attended his coming on the other side the River *Sabis*: Neither was he ignorant how to fortifie his Camp in the face of an Enemy without fear or danger, as we have seen in his War with *Arivovis*; when he marched to the place where he purposed to incamp himself with three Battels, and caused two of them to stand ready in Arms to receive any charge which the Enemy should offer to give, that the third Battel in the mean time might fortifie the Camp. Which course would easily have frustrated this stratagem of the *Nervii*, and made the hazard less dangerous; but he little expected any such resolution, so contrary to the rules of Military discipline, that an Enemy should not stick to pass over so broad a River, to climb up such steep and high rocks, to adventure Battel in a place so disadvantageous, and to hazard their fortune upon such inequalities. And therefore he little mistrusted any such unlikely attempt, wherein the Enemy had plotted his own overthrow, if the Legions had been ready to receive them.

Which may teach a General, that which *Cæsar* had not yet learned, that a Leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses, nor too careful in his best assured directions; considering that the greatest means may easily be prevented, and the safest course weakened with an unexpected circumstance: so powerful are weak occurrences in the main course of the weightiest actions, and so infinite are the ways whereby either wisdom or fortune may work. Neither did this warn him to provide for that which an Enemy might do, how unlikely soever it might seem unto him; as appeared by that accident in the Battel with *Pharaxes*. Which practice of attempting a thing against reason and the art of war, hath found good success in our modern Wars, as appeared by the French histories; notwithstanding it is to be handled sparingly, for as much as *Temeritas non semper felix*, rashness does not always speed well, as *Fabius* the great answered *Scipio*.

The chiefest helps which the Romans found, were first the advantage of the place; whereof I spake in the *Helvetian War*. Secondly, the experience which the Souldiers had got in the former Battels, which much directed them in this turbulent assault, wherein they carried themselves as Men acquainted with such casualties. Lastly, the valor and undaunted judgment of the General, which overruled the peril of the Battel, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherein we may observe, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the Battel

reft upon his directions, he wholly intended wariness and circumspection: so in the hazard and peril of good hap, he confronted extremity of danger with extremity of valor, and over-topt fury with a higher resolution.

CHAP. XII.

The Aduatici betake themselves to a strong hold, and are taken by Cæsar.

Cæsar.
* Either
Dowry or
Bodice in
Arabant.

THE Aduatici before mentioned, coming with all their power, to aid the *Nervii*, and understanding by the way of their overthrow, returned home again, and forsaking all the rest of their Towns and Castles, conveyed themselves and their wealth into one strong and well-fortified Town, which was compassed about with mighty Rocks, and steep downfalls, saving in one place of two hundred foot in breadth, where there was an entry, by a gentle and easy ascent: which passage they had fortified with a double wall of a large altitude, and had placed mighty great stones and sharp beams upon the walls, ready for an assault. This people descended from the *Cimbri* and *Teutoni*, who in their journey into Italy, left such carriages on this side of the Rhene, as they could not conveniently take along with them, and 6000 Men to look to them: who, after the death of their fellows, being many years disguised by their neighbors, sometimes invading other States, and sometimes defending themselves, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselves in.

At the first coming of the Roman Army, they sallied out of the Town, and made many light skirmishes with them: but after that Cæsar had drawn a rampier about the Town, of twelve foot in height, fifteen miles in compass, and had fortified it with Castles very thick about the Town, they kept themselves within the wall. And as they beheld the *Vines* framed, the Mount raised, and a Tower in building afar off; at first they began to laugh at it, and with scoffing speeches from the wall began to aske with what hands, and with what strength, especially by Men of that stature (for the Romans were but little Men in respect of the Gallies) a Tower of that huge massie weight, should be brought unto the Wall. But when they saw it removed, and approaching near unto the Town, (as Men astonished at the strange and unaccustomed sight thereof) they sent Embassadors to Cæsar to intreat a Peace, with this Message; they believed that the Romans did not make War without the special assistance of the Gods, that could with such facility transport Engines of that height,

and bring them to encounter at hand, against the strongest part of their Town: and therefore they submitted both themselves and all that they had to Cæsar's mercy, desiring one thing of him earnestly, which was, that if his goodness and clemency, (which they had heard so high praises of) had determined to save their lives, he would not take away their Arms from them; forasmuch as all their Neighbors were Enemies unto them, and envied at their valor; neither were they able to defend themselves, if they should deliver up their Armor: so that they had rather suffer any inconvenience by the people of Rome, than to be butcherly murdered by them, whom in former time they had held subject to their command.

To this Cæsar answered; that he would save the City rather of his own custom, than for any desert of theirs, so that they yielded before the Ram touched the wall; but no condition of remedy should be accepted, without present delivery of their Arms: for he would do by them as he had done by the *Nervii*, and give commandment to their neighbors; that they should offer no wrong to such as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answer being returned to the City, they seemed contented to do whatsoever he commanded them, and thereupon casting a great part of their Armor over the wall into the ditch, inasmuch as they filled it almost to the top of the rampier, and yet (as afterwards was known) concealing the third part, they set open the gates, and for that day carried themselves peaceably. Towards night, Cæsar commanded the gates to be shut, and the Souldiers to be drawn out of the Town, lest in the night the Townsmen should be any way injured by them. But the Aduatici, having consulted together before, (forasmuch as they believed that upon their submission, the Romans would either set no watch at all, or at the least keep it very carelessly) partly with such Armor as they had retained, and partly with Targets made of bark, or wrought of wicker, which upon the sudden they had covered over with Leather, about the third watch, where the ascent to our Fortifications was easiest, they issued suddenly out of the Town with all their power: but signification thereof being presently given by fire, as Cæsar had commanded, the Romans hastened speedily to that place. The Enemy fought very desperately, as Men in the last hope of their welfare, encountering the Romans in a place, of disadvantage, all their hopes now lying upon their valor: at length, with the slaughter

of

of four thousand, the rest were driven back into the Town. The next day, when Cæsar came to break open the gates, and found no Man at defence, he sent in the Souldiers, and sold all the people and spoil of the Town: the number of persons in the Town, amounted to fifty three thousand Bondslaves.

The First OBSERVATION.

IN the surprize attempted by the Belgæ upon Bibrax, I set down the manner which both the Gallies and the Romans, used in their sudden surprizing of a Town: whereof, if they failed the place importing any advantage in the course of War they then prepared for the Siege in that manner as Cæsar had described in this place. They environed the Town about with a ditch, and a rampier, and fortified the said rampier with many Castles and Fortresses, erected in a convenient distance one from another, and so they kept the Town from any foreign succor or relief and whilst, secured themselves from falls, or other stratagems, which the Townsmen might practice against them. And this manner of Siege was called *circumvallatio*, the particular description whereof, I refer unto the history of *Alesia*, where I will handle it according to the particulars there set down by Cæsar.

The Second OBSERVATION.

THE Ram which Cæsar here mentioneth, was of greatest note amongst all the Roman Engines, and heil that place which the Canon hath in our Wars. *Vitruvius* doth attribute the invention thereof to the *Carthaginians*, who at the taking of *Cadix*, wanting a fit instrument to raze and overthrow a Castle, they took a long beam or timber-tree, and bearing it upon their Arms and Shoulders, with the one end thereof they first brake down the uppermost rank of stones, and so descending by degrees, they overthrew the whole Tower. The Romans had two sorts of Rams; the one was rude and plain, the other artificial and compound: the first is that which the *Carthaginians* used at *Cadix*, and is portrayed in the column of *Trajan* at Rome.

The compound Ram is thus described by *Josephus*; a Ram, saith he, is a mighty great beam, like unto the mast of a ship, and is strengthened at one end, with a head of iron, fashioned like unto a Ram, and thereof it to-k the name. This Ram is hanged by the midle with ropes unto another beam, which lyeth cross a couple of pillars: and hanging thus equally balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward and recoiled backward, and so beatech upon the wall with his iron head: neither is there any Tower so strong, or wall so broad, that is able to stand before it.

The length of this Ram was of a large scantling, for *Plutarch* affirmeth, that *Antony* in the *Parthian* war, had a Ram fourscore foot long. And *Vitruvius* saith, that the length of a Ram was usually one hundred and six, and sometimes one hundred and twenty; and this length gave great strength and force to the Engine. It was managed at one

time with a whole Century or order of Souldiers, and their forces being fixt, they were seconded with another Century; and so the Ram continually played upon the wall, without intermission. *Josephus* saith, that *Titus* at the Siege of *Jerusalem*, had a Ram for every Legion. It was oftentimes covered with a Vine, that the Men that managed it, might be more in safety. It appeareth by this place, that if a Town had continued out until the Ram had touched the wall, they could not presume of any acceptance of rendry; forasmuch as by their obstinacy, they had brought in peril the lives of their Enemies, and were subdued by force of Arms, which affordeth such mercy as the Victor pleaseth.

The Third OBSERVATION.

THE *Aduatici* as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small security which one State can give unto another, that commendeth their safety to be protected by it: for as *Archias* the *Pythagorean* saith, A body, a Family, and an Army are then well governed, when they contain within themselves the causes of their safety; so we must not look for any security in a State, when their safety dependeth upon a foreign protection. For the old saying is, that *Neque murus, neque amicus ququam teget, quem propria arma non texere*. Neither walls nor friends will save him whom his own weapons do not defend. Although in this case the matter was well qualified by the Majesty of the Roman Empire, and the late victories in the Continent of *Gallia*, whereof the *Helvi*, with their affiliates, were very gainful witnesses: but amongst Kingdoms that are better suted with equality of strength and authority, there is small hope of safety to be looked for, unless the happy Government of both, do mutually depend upon the safety of either Nation. For that which *Polybius* observed in *Antigonus* King of *Macedonia*, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; that Kings by nature esteem no Man either as a friend or an enemy, but as the calculation of profit shall find them answerable to their projects. And contrariwise it cutteth off many occasions of practices and attempts, when it is known that a State is of it self, able and ready to resist the designs of foreign Enemies, according to that of *Mastius*; *Offendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videlicet vos paratos ad vim, jam ipse remittent*. Do but show them War, and you shall have peace: let them see you are provided to repell force, and they will do you nothing but right.

The Fourth OBSERVATION.

THE manner of signifying any motion or attempt by fire, was of great use in the night-season, where the fortification was of so large an extension: for fire in the night doth appear far greater than indeed it is; forasmuch as that part of the air which is next unto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance, cannot be discerned from the fire it self, and so it seemeth much greater than it is in substance. And contrariwise in the day time, it sheweth less than it is; for the clear brightness of the air, doth much obscure that light which pro-

ceedeth from a more gross and material Body: and therefore their custom was, to use fire in the night, and smook in the day, suting the transparent middle with a contrary quality, that so it might more manifestly appear to the beholder.

The fifth OBSERVATION.

AND albeit after the Victory, the Romans inflicted diverse degrees of punishment, according to the malice which they found in an Enemy; yet as *Flavius Lucanus* saith in *Lucie* there was no Nation more exorable, nor readier to shew mercy than the Romans were. The punishments which we find them to have used towards a Conquered Nation, were these; either they punished them by death, or sold them for bondslaves *sub corona*, or dismissed them *sub jugum*, or merced them in taking away their Territories, or made them tributary States.

Of the first we find a manifest example, in the third of these Commentaries, where Cæsar having overthrow the *Veneti* by Sea, in as much as they had retained his Embassadors by force, contrary to the Law of Nations, he put all the Senate to the Sword, and sold the rest *sub corona*.

Festus saith, that an Enemy was said to be sold *sub corona*, in as much as the captives stood crowned in the Market-place where they were set out to sale: as *Cato* saith in his Book *De re militari*, *Ut populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam coronatus supplicatus est: quam re male gesta coronatus venisset*. That the people may rather for well performing, go to supplicate crowned, than for ill performance be sold crowned. And *Gellius* affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, for as much as the soldiers that kept them, while they were in selling, incircled them round about to keep them together; and this round-about-landing was called *corona*. *Festus* saith, that oftentimes they used a Spear, and therefore they were said to be sold *sub hasta*: for as much as amongst the Greeks, by the Spear or Pike, was signified the power of Arms, and majesty of Empires.

When they dismissed them *sub jugum*, their order was to erect three Trees like a pair of Gallows, under which they cauled all the Captives to pass, as a sign of bondage: for they had conquered them by force of Arms, that they laid upon their neck the yoke of servitude.

Lucie saith, that *Quintius* the Dictator dismissed the *Aquus* *sub jugum*; and this jugum was made of three Spears, whereof two were stuck upright in the ground, and the third was tied overhead them. The soldiers that passed *sub jugum* were un-

girt, and their weapons taken from them, as *Festus* saith.

Sometimes again they took away their Lands and Territories, and either sold it for money, and brought it into the Treasury, or divided the Land amongst the Roman people; or left it out to farm-rent: of all which *Lucie* hath many pregnant examples.

Of the second sort, the selling of the *Peii* in his fifth Book, and of 7000 *Samnites* in his ninth Book. Of the third, that remarkable example of passing the two Consuls, *T. Venturius Calpurnius*, and *Spartus Postumius*, with the Legates, Tribunes, and whole Roman Army *sub jugum*, by *Caius Pontius* leader of the *Samnites*, in his ninth Book. Of the fourth, in all kinds thereof frequently through his History.

CHAP. XIII.

Craffus taketh in all the Maritime Cities that lie to the Ocean: the Legions carried into their wintering Camps.

THE same time Pub. Craffus, whom he had sent with one Legion to the Veneti, Unelli, Osiismi, Curiosolite, Selsuvii, Aulerici, and Rhedones, being the maritime Cities that lay to the Ocean, advertised him, that all those States had yielded themselves to the People of Rome: The wars being thus ended, and all Gallia being sealed in peace, there went such a fame of this war among other barbarians people, that from Nations beyond the Rhene there came Embassadors to Cæsar, offering both Hostages and Obedience to whatsoever he commanded them. But Cæsar, for as much as he then basted in to Lombardie, after he had placed his Legions in their wintering Camps, willed them to repair unto him again, in the beginning of the next Summer. He himself therefore, after he had first disposed his Army into winter-quarters amongst the Carnutes, Andes, and Turones, Cities next to those places where his War had been, took his Journey forthwith for Italy. For these things, upon the sight of Cæsar's Letters, a general Supplication was Proclaimed in Rome for Fifteen dayes together: which honor before that time had happened to no man.

Cæsar.

Of this Supplication I will speak in the latter end of the fourth Book.

THE Third Commentary OF THE WARS in GALLIA.

The ARGUMENT.

THis Commentary beginneth with an Accident which happened in the latter end of the former Summer, wherein the Belgæ had to lean a harvest: and then it proceedeth to the War between Caesar and the Veneti; Crassus and the Aquitani; Titurnus Sabinus and the Carisofolite; and Titus Labienus with the Treviri.

CHAP. I.

Sergius Galba being sent to clear the passage of the Alpes, is defeated by the Seduni and Veragri.

Caesar.



After taking his Journey into Italy, sent Sergius Galba with the Twelfth Legion, and part of the Horsemen, unto the Nantuates, Veragri and Seduni, whose Territories are extended from the River Rhone, and the Lake Lemanus, unto the tops of the highest Alpes. The end of this voyage was chiefly to clear the Alpes of Ibiteri and Robbers, that lived by the Spoil of Passengers, that travelled between Italy and Gallia. Galba, having order, if he found it expedient, to winter in those parts, after some fortunate encounters, and the taking of some Castles and Holds, Embassadors coming to him from round about, and giving hostages for their fidelity, he concluded a peace, and resolved to place two Cohorts of his Legion amongst the Nantuates, and himself to winter with the other Cohorts in a Town of the Veragri, named Octodurus. This Town being sited in a narrow Valley, and incircled about with mighty high Hills, was divided by a River into two parts; whereof he gave one part to the Galles, and the other he chose for

his wintering Camp, and fortified it about with a Ditch and a Rampier. After he had spent many dayes of wintering, and given order that Corn should be brought thither for provision: he had intelligence, upon a sudden, that the Galles in the night time had all left that part of the Town that was allotted unto them; and that the Hills which hung over the Valley, wherein the Town stood, were possessed with great multitudes of the Seduni and Veragri. The reasons of this sudden commotion, were chiefly the paucity of the Roman Forces, not making a compleat Legion, for as much as two Cohorts wintered amongst the Nantuates; besides many particular soldiers that were wanting, some being gone to fetch in Provisions, and others upon other necessary occasions. And besides their being thus contemptible in regard of themselves, the place afforded such advantage, that they were persuaded, by reason of the steep declivity of the Hill, that the Romans would not endure the brunt of the first assault. Besides this, it grieved them exceedingly, to have their children taken from them under the title of Hostages; and the Alpes, which Nature had exempted from habitation, and placed as bounds between two large Kingdomes, to be seized upon by the Roman Legions, not for their passage so much, as for their perpetual

possession, and so be united to their Province.

Upon these advertisements, Galba, not having as yet finished the Fortification of his Camp, nor sufficiently made provision of Corn and Forage for the winter season, in that he little feared any motion of War, being secured of their amity and obedience, both by hostages and rendry, presently called a Council of War, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which Council, the minds of many were so amazed with the terror of so unexpected a danger, when they beheld the hills pestered with Armed soldiers, the passages taken and intercepted by the Enemy, and no hope left of any succor or relief, that they could think of no other way for their safety, than leaving behind them their baggage and impediments, to sallie out of their Camp, and so to save themselves by the same way they came thither. Notwithstanding, the greater part concluded, to refer that resolution to the last pass, and in the mean time to attend the fortune of the event, and defend the Camp.

OBSERVATION.

WHilest Galba, although at this time it forced to small effect, yet it better suited the valour of the Romans, and lavoured more of tempered magnanimity than that former hazard, which argued the weakness of their minds, by their over-hasty and two forward resolution. For as it imported greater danger, and discovered a more desperate spirit, to break through the thickest Troops of their Enemies, and so by strong hand to save themselves by the help of some other fortune: so it manifested a greater apprehension of terror, and a stronger impression of fear, which can afford nothing but desperate remedies: for desperate and inconsiderate rashness riseth sooner of fear, then of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the danger with a less troubled eye, and qualified the terror of death with the life of their spirit, relieving extremity of help to extremity of peril, and in the mean time attended what chances of advantage might happen unto them, upon any enterprise the Enemy should attempt; they, I say, gave greater scope to Fortune, and enlarged the bounds of changing accidents.

CHAP. II.

The Enemy fetcheth upon the wintering Camp: Galba overthroweth them.

Caesar.

THe Council being dismissed, they had scarce time to put in execution such things as were agreed upon for their defence, but the Enemy, at a watch-word given, assaulted the Camp on all sides with stones and darts, and other casting weapons. The Romans, at first, when their

strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vain any weapon which they cast from the Rampier; but what part soever of their Camp seemed to be in greatest danger, and want of help, thither they came with succor and relief. But herein they were overmatched; for the Enemy, being spent and wearied with fight, whenever any of them gave place, and forsook the Battel, there were always fresh Combatants to supply it. But the Romans, by reason of their small number, had no such help: for their extremity in that point was such, that no man was permitted, neither for weariness nor wounds, to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And, having thus fought continually the space of six hours, when both strength and weapons wanted, the Enemy persisting with greater fury to fill the ditch, and break down the Rampier, and their hopes relying upon the last expectation, P. S. Bacu the Primipile of that Legion, whom we said to be so sore wounded in the Nervian battel, and Caius Volusenus Tribune of the soldiers, a man of singular courage and wisdom, ran speedily to Galba, and told him, that the only way of safety, was, to break out upon the Enemy, and to try the last refuge in that extremity. Whereupon, they called the Centurions, and, by them, admonished the soldiers, to surcease a while from fighting, and only to receive such weapons as were cast into the Camp; and so to rest themselves a little and recover their strength: and then at a watch-word to sallie out of their Camp, and lay their safety upon their valour. Which the soldiers executed with such alacrity and courage of spirit, that breaking out at all the Gates of the Camp, they gave no leisure to the Enemy to consider what was done, nor to satisfy his judgment touching so unexpected a novelty. And thus Fortune being suddenly changed, the Romans encompassing those who came with full expectation of spoiling their Camp, slew more than the third part of Thirsty thousand, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to stay upon the Hills near about them. Having thus overthrown the Enemies whole strength, and taken their Armes, they drew again into their quarters.

OBSERVATION.

WHich strange alteration lively describeth the force of novelty, and the effectual power of unexpected adventures: for, in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romans defended the Camp, and the Galles charged it by assault, the Victory held constant with the

The force of novelty turning the fortune of a Battel.

Galles, and threatened death and mortality to the Romans. Neither had they any means to recover hope of better success, but by trying another way; which so much the more amazed the *Galles*, in that they had vehemently apprehended an opinion of Victory, by a set fight continuing the space of six hours, without any likelihood of contrariety or alteration. Which practice of frustrating a design intended by an indirect and contrary answer, served the *Romans* oftentimes to great advantage; as besides this present example, in this Commentary we shall afterward read, how *Titus Sabinus* defeated the *Ucelli* with the same stratagem, and overthrew them by eruption and falling out, when they expected nothing but a defensive resistance from the *Rampier*. From whence a Commander may learn, to avoid two contrary inconveniences, according as the quality of the War shall offer occasion: (if other things be answerable, which a judicious eye will easily discover) that a Sally made out at divers ports of a Hold, will much mitigate the heat of a Charge, and controul the fury of an Enemy. And on the other side, he that besiegeth any place, what advantage soever he hath of the defendant, may, much better, assure himself of good fortune, if he appoint certain Troops in readiness to receive the charge of any eruption, that the rest that are busily employed in the assault, may provide to answer it, without disorder or confusion. Which order, if the *Galles* had taken, they had not in likelihood so often been deceived.

CHAP. III.

Galba returns into the Province: the Ucelli give occasion of a new War.

Cæsar.

After this Battel, Galba, unwilling to try fortune any further, and considering that he had met with business which he never dreamed of when first he came thither to quarter, especially finding himself in want both of Corn and Forage, having first burned the Town, the next day he returned towards the Province, and without let or resistance brought the Legion safe into the Nantuates, and from thence to the * *Allobroges*, and there he wintered.

* Savoyard.

After these things were dispatched, Cæsar supposing for many reasons, that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further fear of any new War, the Belgæ being overthrown, the Germans thrust out, and the Seduni amongst the Alpes subdued and vanquished, in the beginning of the winter was gone into Illyricum, having a great desire to see those Nations. But, there grew a sudden tumult and dissension in Gallia upon this occasion: Pub. Crassus wintering with the seventh Legion in Anjou near unto the Ocean, and finding scarcity of Corn in those parts, he sent out the Prefects of the Horsemen and Tribunes into the next Cities to demand Corn, and other provisions for his Legion: of whom

*Titus Terrasidus was sent unto the * Ucelli, Marcus Trebius to the * Curiofolite, Q. Velanuis, and Titus Silius to the Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest authority amongst all the maritime Nations in that coast, by reason of their great store of Shipping, with which they did traffick in Britannie, and exceeded all their neighbour States in skill and experience of Sea-faring matters; having command of as many Ports as lay to those Seas, and the most part of such as yfed those Seas Tributaries to their State. These Veneti first adventured to retain Silius and Velanuis, hoping thereby to recover their Hostages, which they had given to Crassus. The intimate Cities, induced by their authority and example (as indeed the resolutions of the Galles are sudden and hasty) for the same reason laid bold upon Trebius and Terrasidus, and sending speedy Ambassadors one unto another, conjured by their Princes and Chiefest Magistrates, to do nothing but by common consent, and to attend all the same event of fortune; soliciting also other Cities and States, rather to maintain that Liberty, which they had received of their Ancestors, than to endure the servile bondage of a stranger.*

The first OBSERVATION.

The circumstance in this History, which noteth the sudden breaking out of Wars, when the course of things made promise of Peace, sheweth what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse, in calculating the nativity of After-chances: which so seldom answer the Judgement we give upon their beginnings, that when we speak of happiness, we find nothing but misery; and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part, which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not marvel, if when almost all Nations are at odds, and in our best conceits threaten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace, or if peace be in speech, soothing the world with pleasing tranquility, and through the uncertainty of our weak probabilities, promise much rest after many troubles; there follow greater wars in the end than the former time can truly speak of. Which being well understood, may humble the spirits of our haughty Politicians, that think to comprehend the conclusions of future times, under the premises of their weak projects, and predestinate succeeding ages according to the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of shall break the main stream of our judgement, and falsify the Oracles which our understanding hath uttered. And it may learn them wital, how much it importeth a wise Commander, to prevent an evil that may cross his design (how unlikely soever it be to happen) by handling it in such manner, as though it were necessarily to confront the fate. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it self

* Le Perche
* Cornouaille
in Bretagne
* Vannes.

The Authority of example.

Cæsar.

* Ucelli.

The grounds of that reverent opinion which is held of Ambassadors.

self, both the causes of his being, and the direct means to resist the repugnancy of a contrary nature, and so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.

The Second OBSERVATION.

This practice of the *Veneti*, may instruct a circumspect Prince in cases of this nature, to have a more watchful eye over that Province or City, which shall be found most potent and mighty amongst the rest, than of any other inferior State of the same nature and condition: for as example of it self is of great authority, making improbabilities seem full of reason, especially when the intention shall sympathize with our wills; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerful means, and graced with the A& of superior personages, it must needs be very effectual to stir up Mens minds to approve that with a strong affection, which their own single judgment did no way allow of. And therefore equality bringeth this advantage to a Prince, which difference cannot afford, that albeit example do set on foot any rebellious motion, yet no supereminency shall authorize the same.

CHAP. IV.

Cæsar having advertisement of these new troubles, hasteth into Gallia, and prepareth for the War.

ALL the maritime States being by this means drawn into the same conspiracy, they sent an embassy unto Crassus, in the name of them all, that if he would have his Men again, he must deliver up the Hostages which he had taken from them. Whereof Cæsar being certified by Crassus, inasmuch as he was then a great way distant from his Army, he commanded Gallies and Ships of War to be built upon the River * *Loire*, which runneth into the Ocean, and that Gallies, Mariners, and ship-masters should be mustered in the Province: which being speedily dispatched, as soon as the time of the year would permit him he came into Gallia. The *Veneti* and the rest of the confederacy understanding of Cæsar's arrival, and considering how bairnour a fault they had committed, in detaining the Ambassadors, and casting them into irons, whose name is held sacred and inviolable amongst all Nations, prepared accordingly to answer so eminent a danger, and especially such necessities as pertained to shipping and sea-fights.

The OBSERVATION.

From hence I may take occasion briefly to touch the reverent opinion, which all Nations, how barbarous soever, have generally conceived of the quality and condition of Ambassadors: and what the grounds are of this universally received

custom, which in all ages and times hath held authenticall. And first we are to understand that all mankind, (indeed with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of humane society, that albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions, (which in themselves are unnatural, as proceeding from corruption and defect) drive them into extreme discord and diffusion of spirit, and break the bonds of civil conversation, which otherwise we do naturally affect; yet without a necessary entercourse and traffick of society, we are not able to keep on foot the very discord it self in terms of reason and orderly proceeding, but all parts will be blended with disorderd confusion and go to wrack, for want of these mutual offices performed by Messengers: (so straight are the bonds of Nature, and so powerful are the Laws which the enacteth. And therefore if it were for no other end which might sort to the benefit of either party, (as there are many good uses thereof) yet to hold up the quarrel, and keep it from falling, making War according to the grounds of reason, the entercourse of Messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of Nations hath made a law, ought as religiously to be observed as an Oracle of our own belief. Secondly, forasmuch as the end of War is, or at least should be, Peace which by Treaty of mutual Messengers, is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no people may seem so barbarous, as to maintain a War which only intendeth blood, and propoeth as the chiefest object, the death and mortality of Mankind, in so way respecting peace and civil Government; such as refuse the entercourse of Messengers, as the means of amity and concord, are justly condemned in the judgment of all Nations, as unworthy of humane society. Last of all, it is an injury of great dishonour, and deserveth the reward of extreme infamy, to revenge the Master his quarrel upon a servant, and punish Ambassadors for the faults of their States; considering that their chiefest duty consisteth in the faithful relation of such mandates as they have received, which may as well tend to the advancement and honor of that City to which they are sent, as to the dishonor and ruine of the same, whereof the Messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire War or Peace, the free liberty, and holy order of Ambassadors is reverently to be respected, and defended from brutish and unnatural violence.

CHAP. V.

The proceedings of either party in the entrance of this War.

The *Veneti* conceived great hope of their enterprise, by reason of the strength of their situation: forasmuch as all the passages by Land were broken and cut off with Arms and creeks of the sea, and on the other side Navigation and entrance by sea, was so troublesome and dangerous, in that the *Romans* were altogether unacquainted with the Channels and shelves of the coast, and there

Cæsar.

there were so few Ports. Neither did they think that the Roman Army could long continue there without Corn, which was not to be had in those quarters. And if it hapned that the course of things were carried contrary to this probable expectation, yet they themselves were strong in shipping, whereas the Romans had none at all: neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallows, Ports and Islands of that Coast where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should find the use of Navigation in that narrow Sea, to be far different from that which they were accustomed unto, in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution they fortified their Towns, stored them with provision, and brought all their shipping to Vannes, against whom Cæsar (as it was reported) would begin to make War, taking the Osmint, Lexovii, Nannctes, Ambialtes, Morini, Menapii, Diablintres, as confederates and partakers in this quarrel. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motives stirred up Cæsar to undertake this War: as namely the violent detaining of the Roman Knights in their Rebellion after they had yielded themselves by rendry, and given hostages of their Loyalty; the conspiracy of so many Cities, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other Nations and States to the like insolvency. And therefore understanding that almost all the Gallies were inclining to novelty and alteration, and of their own nature were quick and ready to undertake a War; and farther, considering that all Men by nature desired liberty, and hated the servile condition of bondage, he prevented all farther insurrections of the other States, with the presence of the Roman Forces in several places at once, and sent Titus Labienus with the Cavalry unto the * Treviri, that bordered upon the Rhene: to him he gave in charge to visit the Men of Rhemes, and the rest of the Belgæ, to keep them in obedience; and to hinder such Forces as might peradventure be transported over the River by the Germans, to further this rebellious humor of the Gallies. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus with twelve legionary Cohorts, and a great part of the Horse to go into Aquitane, lest there might come any aid from those Nations; and such considerable Forces join together. He sent also Q. Titurius Sabinus with three Legions unto the Lexovii Curiosolite, and Unelli, to disappoint any practice which rebellious minds might intend. And making D. Brutus, chief Admiral of the Navy, and of those French ships which he had got together from the Pictones, Sauto-

nes, and other Provinces which continued quiet and obedient, he gave him in charge to make towards Vannes, with what speed he could; and be himself marched thitherward with the foot forces.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN the first Book I observed the authority which the Roman Leaders had to undertake a War, without further acquainting the Senate with the consequence thereof: in this place let us observe the care and circumspection which the Generals had, who did not undertake a troublesome and dangerous War upon an humor, or any other slender motion; but diligently weighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the peril and hazard of the War, with the good and consequence of the effect, informed their judgments of the importance of that action, and so tried whether the benefit would answer their labor. And thus we find the reasons particularly delivered, that moved Cæsar first to undertake the Helvetian war; and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrel with Ariovistus; then followeth the necessity of that War with the Belgæ; and now the motives which induced him to this, with the maritime Cities of Bretagne; and so consequently of his passage into Germany, or what other enterprise he attempted: which he layeth down as the grounds and occasions of those Wars, and could not be avoided but with the loss and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further, let us observe the means he used to prevent the inclination of the Gallies, and to keep them in subjection and peaceable obedience, by sending his Men into divers quarters of that Continent, and so settling the wavering disposition of the farther skirts with the weight of his Army, and the presence of his Legionary souldiers, which he sent ready to stifle all motions of Rebellion in the beginning, that they might not break out to the prejudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good success of his proceedings: besides the advantage which he gained in the opinion of the Enemy; whom he so little feared concerning the upshot of that quarrel, that he had dispersed the greatest part of his Army upon other services, the rest being sufficient to end that War.

CHAP. VI.

The manner of their Shipping and their sea-fight.

THE situation of almost all these Cities was such, that being built in points and promontories, they could not at full sea, which hapned always twice in twelve hours, be approached by foot Forces, nor yet with shipping; for again in an ebbe the Vessels were laid on the ground, and so left as a prey to the Enemy. And if the Romans went about to hunt out the sea with Mounts, which they raised equal to the walls of the Town, and were at the point of entering and taking it; yet the Townsmen having such store

of shipping, would easily convey both themselves and their carriages into the next Towns, and there help themselves with the like advantage of place. And thus they deluded Cæsar, the greatest part of the Summer: for the Roman Fleet, by reason of continual winds and foul weather, durst not adventure to put out of the River Loire into so vast a sea, wherein the bays and roads were few, and far distant one from another, and the tides great. The shipping of the Gallies was thus built and rigged: the keel was somewhat flatter than the Romans shipping, the better to bear the ebbs and shallows of that coast, the fore-deck, was altogether erect and perpendicular; the pompe was made to bear the hugeness of the billows and the force of the tempest. And in a word, they were altogether built for strength, for the ribs and seats were made of beams of a foot square, fastned with iron pins of an inch thick, instead of Cables, they used chains of iron, and raw hides and skins for sails, either for want of linnen, or ignorant of the use thereof, or because Sails of linnen would hardly serve to carry Ships of that burthen, or endure the tempestuousness of those Seas, and the violence of the winds.

The meeting and conflict of the Roman Navy, with this kind of ships was such, that they only excelled them in celerity and speed, nimbleness with force of Oars; but in all other things, either concerning the nature of the place, or the danger of the foul weather, were far inferior unto them: for the strength of them was such, that they could neither hurt them with their beak beards, nor cast a weapon to any purpose into them, by reason of their altitude, and high built bulks. And if any gust chanced in the mean time to rise, that forced them to commit themselves to the mercy of the weather, their Shipping would better bear the rage of the sea, and with greater safety shelter in self amongst flats and shallows, without fear of rocks or any such hazard: of all which chances the Roman Navy stood continually in danger.

OBSERVATION.

AND here let it not seem impertinent to the Argument which we handle, considering the general use which we Islanders have of Navigation, briefly to set down the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the sea, as far forth as shall seem necessary to the knowledge of a Souleier: which albeit they may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret: yet so far as they stand for true principles of regularity, and well approved rules in our Art of Navigation,

let us take them for no less than they effect, and give them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those forged Circles in the Heavens: that albeit their chiefest efficacy consisteth in conceit and supposal; yet so far as they serve to direct our knowledge to a certainty in that variety and seeming inconstancy of motion, we esteem of them as they effect, and not as they are.

Considering then the globe of the World, as it maketh a right sphere, (for in that position the Naturalists chiefly understand celestial influence to have operation in this liquid element of the water) is divided by the Horizon and Meridian, into four quarters: the first quarter is that between the east Horizon and the noon Meridian, which they call a flowing quarter; the second from the noon Meridian to the west Horizon, which they make an ebbing quarter; the third, from the west Horizon, to the midnight Meridian, which they likewise call a flowing quarter; and again, from the midnight Meridian, to the east Horizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of Heaven. The instruments of these sensible qualities and contrary effects are the Sun and the Moon, as they are carried through these distinct parts of the Heaven. And although experience hath noted the Moon to be of greatest power in watry motions, yet we may not omit to acknowledge the force which the Sun yieldeth in this miracle of nature.

First therefore we are to understand, that when the Moon or the Sun begin to appear above the right Horizon, and enter into that part of the Heaven, which is termed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount up to their meridian altitude, so it increaseth until it come to a high flood. And again, as those lights passing the Meridian decline to the west, and run the circuit of the ebbing quarter, so the water decreaseth, and returneth again from whence it came. Again, as they for the west Horizon, and enter into the second flowing quarter, so the sea beginneth again to flow, and still increaseth until they come to the point of the night Meridian: and then again it refloweth, according as the Sun and Moon are carried in the other ebbing quarter, from the night Meridian to the west horizon.

And hence it happeneth, that in conjunction or new of the Moon, when the Sun and the Moon are carried both together in the same flowing and ebbing quarters, that then the tides and ebbs are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the Moon, when these lights are carried in opposite quarters, when they have described to be of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing, that then in like manner the Tides are great: so far as both these Planets, through the symbolizing quarters wherein they are carried, do join their Forces to make perfect this work of Nature, in the ebbing and flowing of the Sea. And contrariwise in a quadrates aspect (as the Astrologers call it) or quarter age of the Moon, when as the Moon is carried in a flowing quarter, and at the same instant the Sun doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of nature doth necessarily require, then are the Tides lessened, as daily experience doth witness.

And

Landriquet.
Ligues.
Nantes.
Aurancien.
Lezoudou.
Cites in
Little Bri-
tain.

* Treviri.

The causes
of the eb-
bing and
flowing of
the sea.

Spring-
tides.

And forasmuch as both the right Horizon and the Meridian also divide every diurnal Circle, which either the sun or the moon make in their revolutions, into equal parts; it followeth, that every Tide is continually measured with the quantity of six hours; and therefore that which *Cæsar* here saith must needs be true, that in the space of twelve hours, there are always two high Tides. And least any Man should imagine that every inland City, standing upon an ebbing and flowing River, may take the computation of the Tide, according to this rule; let him understand that this which I have delivered, is to be conceived principally of the Sea it self, and secondarily of such Ports and Havens, as stand either near or upon the Sea: but where a River shall run many miles from the Sea, and making many winding Meanders, before it come to the place of calculation, it must needs loose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought convenient to insert in these discourses, touching the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, as not impertinent to martial knowledge.

Concerning the Shipping of the Romans, whereof posterity hath only received the bare names, and some few circumstances touching the manner of their Equipage, the Critics of these times have laboured to set forth a Fleet answerable to that which the terms and title mentioned in history seem to report: but yet the gain of their voyage doth not answer their charge. For many Men reit untasked, first touching the names themselves, whereof we find these kinds;

Names	<i>Longas.</i>	{ <i>Triremes.</i> <i>Quadriremes.</i> <i>Quinqueremes.</i>
	<i>Oncarias.</i>	
	<i>Altiarias.</i>	

The first we may understand to be Gallies or ships of service; the second ships of burthen; the third ships that were driven forward with force of Oars; and the rest sounding according to their Names, for I dare not intitle them with a mere particular description. Now whether these Names *Longas* and *Altiarias*, were a several sort of shipping by themselves, or the general Names of the *Quadriremes*, *Triremes*, and *Quinqueremes*, so far as they are of any kind of these might be called both *Longas* and *Altiarias*; as it yet remaineth in controversy, so it is not much material to that which we seek after, but that which most troubleth our sea-Criticks is, in what sense they may understand these vocabularies, *Triremes*, *Quadriremes*, and *Quinqueremes*; whether they were so termed, in regard of the number of rowers or water-men, that haied continually at an oar, as the custom of the Gallies is at this day; or otherwise, because a *Trireme* had three orders of oars on either side, a *Quadrireme* four, and a *Quinquereme* five, whereof they took their distinction of Names.

Such as hold that a *Trireme* had on each side three ranks of oars, and so consequently of a *Quadrireme* and *Quinquereme*, alledge this place of *Livie* to make good their opinion. In the Wars between *Rome* and *Carthage*, *Lælius* meeting with *Asdrubal* in the Streets of *Gibraltar*, each of them had a *Quinquereme*, and seven or eight *Triremes* apiece: the current in that place was so great, that it gave no place to Art, but carried the vessels according to the fall of the Billow; in which uncertainty the *Triremes* of the *Carthaginians*, closed with the

Quinquereme of *Lælius*; which either because she was ponderous, or *Lælius* saith, or otherwise, for that *pluribus remorum ordinibus scindentibus verticibus, facilis regetur*, in regard of the plurality of banks of oars which resisted the billow, and stemmed the Current, the sunk two of the *Triremes*, and so got the victory. From hence they prove, that a *Quinquereme* had *plures remorum ordines* than a *Trireme* had; and therefore it took the name from the plurality of banks of oars, and not from the number of men that rowed at an oar.

But the contrary opinion doth interpret *Ordo remorum* to be a couple of oars, one answering another, on each side of the Vessel, which we call a pair of oars: so that a *Quinquereme* being far greater and longer than a *Trireme*, had more pairs of oars than a *Trireme* had, and those oars were handled with five men at one oar, according to the use of our Gallies at this day.

But to leave this, and come to their manner of sea-fighting; we must understand that the Romans wanting the use of Artillery, and managing their ships of War, with force of oars, failed not to make use of their Art in their conflicts and encounters by sea; for all their ships of service, which we term men of War, carried a strong beak-head of iron, which they called *rostrum*, with which they ran one against another, with as great violence and fury, as their oars could carry them. And herein Art gave great advantage; for he that could best skill to turn his ship with greatest celerity, and so frustrate an offer, or with speed and strong agitation follow an advantage, commonly got the victory.

In the battel which *D. Brutus* had with the *Mæssilians*, we read, that two *Triremes* charging the Admiral wherein *Brutus* was, one at the one side, and the other at the other, *Brutus* and his Mariners so cunningly handled the matter, that when they should come to the hurt, they speedily in a trice of time, wound themselves from between them, and the two *Triremes* met with such a career one against another, that one brake her beak-head, and the other spilt with the blow.

For this skill and fortune withal *Euphrator*, the *Rhodian*, was of great fame in *Cæsar*'s time, although his end found too true the saying of the Historian, that whom Fortune honoureth with many good haps, she oftentimes reserveth to a harder destiny, as other sea-men besides *Euphrator*, can truly witness.

This first brunt being ended, when they came to grapple and boarding one of another, then the art and practices of their land services came in use: for they erected turrets upon their decks, and from them they fought with engines and casting weapons, as slings, arrows, and pikes; and when they entered, they fought with sword and target. Neither did the legionary fouldier find any difference when he came to the point between their fight at sea and that at land; saving that they could not be martialed in Troops and Bands, in regard whereof, the sea-service was counted more base and dishonourable; and the rather, inasmuch as it decided the controversy by slings and casting weapons, which kind of fight was of less honor, then buckling at hand-blows.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

The Battel continueth: and Cæsar overcometh.

Cæsar.

THE Romans having taken one Town after another, the Enemies still conveyed themselves to the sea; so that *Cæsar* desiring it but lost labour, whilst he could neither hinder their escape, nor do them any mischief, refused to wait the coming of his Navy. Which was no sooner arrived, but the Enemy desirous to presently made out 220 sail of Ships well-appointed and furnished in all respects to oppose them. Neither did *Brutus* the Admiral, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his Navy know what to do, or what course of fight to take: for the shipping of the Gallies was so strong, that the beak-head of their *Quinqueremes* could perform no service upon them; and although they should raise turrets according to their use, yet these would not equal in height the poop of the Enemies shipping; so that therein also the Gallies had advantage. For, as the Romans could not much annoy them with their weapons, in regard they lay so low under them; so, on the contrary, their darts must needs fall with great advantage upon the Romans. Yet one thing there was amongst their provision, which stood them in great stead: for the Romans had provided great sharp hooks or sickles, which they put upon great and long poles; these they fastened to the tackling which held the Main-yard to the Mast; and then baling away their ship with force of Oars, they cut the said tackling, and the Main-yard fell down. Whereby the Gallies, whose only hope for their Navy consisted in the sails and tackling, lost at one instant both their sails and the use of their Shipping. And then the controversy fell within the compass of Valour, wherein the Romans exceeded the Gallies; and the rather, in as much as they fought in the sight of *Cæsar*, and the whole Army, no valiant act could be smothered in secret; for all the Hills and Cliffs which afforded near prospect into the Sea, were covered with the Roman Army.

Their Main-yards being cut down, and the Romans (though every ship of theirs had two or three of the Enemies about it) endeavouring, with great fury, to board them, failed not to take many of their ships: which the Gallies perceiving, and finding no remedy nor hope of resistance, began all to fly, and turning their ships to a fore-wind, were upon a sudden so decalmed, that they were able to make no way at all. Which fell out very fitly

for the Romans, who now fighting ship to ship easily took them in, so that of so great a Navy, very few (through the help of the evening) escaped to land, after they had fought the space of eight hours: with which Battel ended the War with the Veneti, and the rest of the maritime Nations. For all sorts of people, both young and old, in whom there was either courage, counsel, or dignity, were present at this Battel, and all the shipping they could possibly make was here engaged, taken and lost; so that such as remained knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their Towns any longer; and therefore yielded themselves to *Cæsar*: towards whom he used the greater severity, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous people not to violate the Law of Nations, by injuring Embassadors: for he slew all the Senate with the Sword, and sold the people for bond-slaves.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN this Battel I chiefly observe the good fortune which usually attendeth upon industry; for, amongst other provisions, which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the use of this war, they had made ready these hooks, not for this intent wherein they were employed, but at all occasions and chances that might happen, as serviceable complements, rather then principal instruments: and yet it so fell out, that they proved the only means to overthrow the Gallies. Which proveth true the saying of *Cæsar*, that industry commandeth fortune, and buyeth good success with extraordinary labour: for, industry in action, is as importunity in speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of reason, and striketh through continual pursuit, to make good the motives by often insinuations; and, at length, findeth that disposition, which will easily admit whatsoever is required. In like manner, diligence, and labour-some industry, by circumspect and heedful carriage, seldom fail, either by hap or cunning, to make good that part whereon the main point of the matter dependeth. For every action is entangled with many insinuating adherents, which are so interested in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried on by the nature of those adherents, some of them are by wisdom foreseen, and directed to that course, which way fortuneth the action; the rest being unknown, continue, without either direction or prevention, and are all under the Regiment of Fortune; for as much as they are beyond the compass of our wisest reach, and in the way either to assist or disadvantage. Of these, industry hath greatest authority, in as much as the armeth her self for all chances, whereby she is said to command fortune.

The force of industry.

K CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

* La Perche.

Cæsar.

Sabinus overbroweth the * Unelli, with the manner thereof.

WHile these things happened in the State of Vannes, L. Titurius Sabinus entreats with his Forces into the confines of the * Unelli. Over these Viridovix ruled, who was at present made Commander in Chief of all the revolted Cities, which furnished him with a great and potent Army. Besides this, the * Aulerci, * Eburo-nices, and Lexovii having slain their Senate, because they would not countenance the War, shut their Gates, and joyned with Viridovix. Also there came great multitudes to them out of Gallia, men of broken fortunes, Thieves and Robbers, whom the hope of prey and spoil had made to prefer the Wars before Husbandry and Day-labour. Sabinus incamping himself in a convenient place, kept his soldiers within the Rampier. But Viridovix being lodged within less than two miles of Sabinus his Camp, brought out his Forces daily, and putting them in Battel, gave him opportunity to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not only to be suspected by the Enemy of cowardice, but to be taunted with the reproachful speeches of his own soldiers. The opinion of his being fearful thus siled in the minds of the Enemy, he used all means to encrease it, and carried it so well, that the Enemy almost approach the very Rampier of the Camp. The colour that he pretended, was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the General, to fight with an Enemy of that strength, but upon some good opportunity, or in a place of advantage. In this general persuasion of fear, Sabinus chose out a subtile-witted Gall, an Auxiliary in his Army, whom he persuaded with great Rewards and further Promises, to fly to the Enemy, and there to carry himself according to the Instructions which he should give him. This Gall coming as a revoler to the Enemy, laid open unto them the fear of the Romans; the Extremity that Cæsar was driven into by the Veneti; and, that the night following, Sabinus was about to withdraw his Forces secretly out of his Camp, and to make all the haste he could to relieve Cæsar. Upon which advertisement, they all cried out with one consent, That this opportunity was not to be omitted; but, setting apart all other devices, they would go and assault the Roman Camp. Many circumstances persuaded the Gallies to this

Resolution: As first, the lingering and doubt which Sabinus had made, when he was offered Battel; Secondly, the Intelligence which this Fugitive had brought; Thirdly, the want of Victuals, wherein they had been negligent, and undauntedly careless; Fourthly, the hope they conceived of the War of Vannes; and Lastly, for that men willingly believe that which they would have come to pass. The force of these motives was so strong, that they would not suffer Viridovix, nor the rest of the Captains, to dismiss the Council, until they had yielded, that they should take Arms, and go to the Roman Camp. Which being granted, they gathered rubbish and Faggots to fill up the Ditch; and, with cheerful hearts, as though the Victory were already gotten, they Marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped; which was the top of a Hill, rising gently from a level, the quantity of one thousand paces. Hither the Gallies hasted with all expedition: and, to the intent the Romans might not have so much time as to put on their Armour, the Gallies, for haste, ran themselves out of breath.

Sabinus encouraging his soldiers, gave the Sign of Battel; and, falling out at two several Gates of his Camp upon the Enemy, who were hindered with their loads of rubbish, it fell out, that through the opportunity of the place, the weariness, and unexperience of the Enemy, the valor of the Roman Soldier, and their exercise in former Battels, that the Gallies could not endure the brunt of the first encounter, but presently betook themselves to flight. Ours being fresh and lusty, pursued after, and slew great numbers of them: then chasing their Horse, suffered very few of them to save themselves by flight. And so it happened, that at one time Sabinus had news of the overthrow at Sea, and Cæsar of Sabinus's Victory by Land. Upon these Victories, all the Cities and States yielded themselves to Titurius: for, as the Gallies are prompt to undertake a War; so are they weak in suffering, and impatient of the consequences and calamities thereof.

OBSERVATION.

This practice of a counterfeit fear was often put in use by the Roman Leaders, as well to disappoint the expectation of an Enemy, as to draw them into an inconvenience, and so to defeat them of their greatest helps in time of battel. Cæsar coming to succour the Camp of Cicero, made such use of this Art, that he put to rout a great Army of the Gallies with a handful of men: which I

The use which the Romans made of a counterfeit fear. Lib. 5.

CHAP. IX.

The proceedings of Crassus in Aquitania.

AT the same instant of time it happened also, that Pub. Crassus coming into Aquitania (which, both in regard of the large extension of the Country, as also for the multitude of the inhabitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and, considering, that he was to make war in those parts where L. Valerius Præconius the Legate was slain, and the Army overthrown, and where Lucius Manlius was fain to fly, with the loss of his Carriages, he thought that his affairs required no mean diligence: and therefore having made provision of Corn, and mustered many Auxiliary Forces, and sent for many valiant and prudent men, by name, from Tolouse, Carcassone, and Narbonne, Cities bordering upon the Province, he carried his Army into the confines of the Sontiates. Which was no sooner known, but they levied great Forces both of Horse and Foot, and with their Horse, in which their principal strength consisted, charged upon the Romans in their March: which being easily repelled, as ours followed the retreat, suddenly the Infantry of the Gallies shewed it self in a Valley, as it lay in ambush. These setting upon the Romans renewed the Battel, and there the fight continued but a long time. The Sontiates being animated with the former Victories, saw all the hope of Aquitania rely upon their virtue; and the Romans on the other side desired to shew what they were able to do of themselves, without their grand Captain, and under the conduct of a young soldier. At length, the Enemy, overwaged with promises, and wearied with wounds, betook themselves to flight; of whom, the Romans slew a great number, and then marched directly to the Town of the Sontiates, and laid siege unto it: the siege grew hot, the Romans approaching the Walls with Vines, Towers, and Mounts. The Townsmen defended themselves sometimes by falling out, sometimes by undermining the Mounts and Fortifications, wherein the Aquitani are very skilful. But, when they perceived the industry of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they intreated Crassus to accept their rendry. Which being granted, and all the Army intending the delivery of their Arms, Advantianus their chief Magistrate fled out in the mean time at another Port of the City, with Six hundred devoted Companions, whom they called Soldurii; whose manner is, to enjoy all good things in common, with those

Cæsar.

* Evocat.

whom they have chosen for their friends; and if any misfortune befall them, either to dye with them, or presently kill themselves: neither was it ever known in the memory of man, that any of them refused to dye when his Friend was slain. But, as they attempted to escape, the Soldiers that kept that part of the Fortification, as they signified his evasion by a clamour and shout, the rest betook themselves to Arms, and so, after a sharp conflict, repelled him again into the Town; where he desired to be taken in the number of the submissive multitude; which was granted. Crassus, having taken hostages of them, went into the confines of the Vocates and Tarulates.

The first OBSERVATION.

Evocati.

These skilful and experienced men which Crassus sent for out of all the Cities in *Ætoliæ*, were those, whom the Romans called *Evocati*, such as were free from warfare, and exempted by their Laws from giving their names in Muster, either by reason of their years, or the Magistracy which they had born, or for some other causes which gave them that privilege: and in that regard were sent for by Letters, intreating their assistance in the carriage of that War, as men well acquainted with the nature of such businesses. Their places were nothing inferior to the Centurions for advice and direction, although they had no part in command or authority.

The second OBSERVATION.

In this fight we may further observe their manner of defence against Mounts and Cavaleros; which we find chiefly to be Mines. *Josephus* in the Jewish War, saith, that the Romans having raised an exceeding high Mount, the Jews undermined the same with such Art, that as they digged underneath, they supported the Mount with huge props and planks that it might not shrink: and watching a time of the greatest advantage, they set all the Timber-work which under-propped the Mount on fire; which taking fire with the help of Brimstone and Pitch, the Mount fell upon a sudden, to the great terror and amazement of the Romans.

Lib. 7. de bello Gall.

At the siege of *Avaricum*, we find how the Gallies by undermining did take the earth from the Mount, as fast as it was carried unto it by the Romans; and so kept it from rising, and made it unequal. But, if it were for the most part made of wood, or other combustible matter, they fought then by all means to burn it; as it happened at the siege of *Mastilia*: and oftentimes when both burning and undermining failed, they confronted it with another Mount within the Wall, to dissipate the disadvantage by equal contesting of it, and so made it unprofitable.

Concerning Mines, thus much may I say without prejudice to that Art, that the chiefest points to be respected, are these: First, the true distance to a designed place; which is best got by instrument, and help of Geometry, where other marks

of certainty are wanting. Secondly, the direction of the Mine, that we may not erre in our course which the Compass affordeth. Thirdly, the strengthening of the Mine with Timber-work, if need require. Lastly, the countermineing and cross-meeting. All which parts have very many circumstances, and require a larger discourse than may be thought pertinent for this place.

The third OBSERVATION.

The strange contrast between these *Soldurii* and their Chieftain, may well deserve a place amongst these observations, especially considering the obligatory conditions which either party stood bound to observe: for the Captain was to make his *Soldurii* partakers of all his happiness in this life, in regard whereof they were to take part of whatsoever ill chance or disaster should happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensual misery, took hold of their head, these devoted were tied voluntarily to follow him the self-same way: neither in any memory was there (saith he) ever man found that refused to dy, if he to whom he was devoted chanced to be slain. Which bloody league of amity, as it was repugnant to the course of Nature, multiplying particular destiny to a general calamity; so was it dangerous in a well-ordered State, if the Ring-leader were either ambitious, or fought to practice any thing contrary to good Government: for he himself would presume much upon the assistance of his *Soldurii*; and they on the other side must needs with well to his attempts, that were so interred in his life and death.

CHAP. X.

The Gallies raise new Forces against Crassus.

The barbarous Gallies were much troubled, that a Town of that strength both by Nature and Art, should so soon be taken; and therefore they sent Embassadors into all quarters, conjured one with another, confirmed their Covenants with mutual hostages, and levied what power they were able to make, sending for aid out of Spain, and from other States that bordered upon *Aquitania*. At the coming of these Forces they began to make War with a great Power, and with many soldiers of great fame: for they appointed such Leaders as had seen the experience of *Sertorius* his Wars, and were great in the opinion of men for their skill and knowledge in the Art Military. These, according to the custom of the people of Rome, began to take places of advantage, to fortifie their Camp, and to intercept the Romans from free passage of Convoies, and necessary intercourses. Which, when Crassus perceived, and considering whatal that his own Forces were so few, that he could not well dismember them upon any service or advantage, and, that the Enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and

and left notwithstanding a sufficient Garrison in his Camp, by which means Corn and Provision would in time grow scarce with him, whilst the Enemy waxed every day stronger; he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to give them Battel.

The matter being referred to a Council of War, when he understood that all Men were of the same opinion, he appointed the next day to give them Battel: and in the dawning puting his Men in a double Battel, and placing the Auxiliary Forces in the midst, he attended to see what the Enemy would do. The Gallies, although they were persuaded that they might adventure Battel, both in regard of their multitude and ancient prowess of War, as also in respect of the paucity of the Romans, yet they thought it better to block up the passages, and so cut off all carriages and convoies of Corn, and so the victory would follow without bloodshed: and if the Romans for want of Corn should offer to make a retreat, they would then set upon them as they marched, wearied with travel, heavily laden with their burthens and dejected in their spirits. This resolution being approved by the whole council of the Gallies, when the Romans imbattelled their Forces, they kept their Men within their Camp.

The First OBSERVATION.

Sertorius.

This *Sertorius* had followed the faction of *Marcius* and *Cinna*, and when *Sylla* had overthrown both the elder and younger *Marcius*, he fled into Spain, and there maintained the quarrel on foot against *Pompey* and *Metellus*, and overthrew them in many Battels: but in the end was treacherously slain by *Perperna*, at a Banquet. He was a Man of a great spirit, and admirable dispatch, and under him were these Captains brought up, which *Cæsar* commendeth for their skill in Arms.

The second OBSERVATION.

In Historicks propounding to our consideration, the deeds and monuments of former ages, we may observe two especial means which the great Commanders of the World have entertained to achieve Victory, and over-maister their enemies: the first by cunning and wile carriage of a matter, before it come to trial by blows; the second by forceable means and waging of Battel; the one proceeding from wisdom, and the better faculties of the Soul, and the other depending upon the strength and ability of the body.

Concerning the first, it hath ever been held more honourable, as better fitting the worth of the spirit, and the divine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the adverse

part may be weakened by Wit, and prevented in the projects of their better fortunes, by anticipation of means and occasions, and so through advantages taken from their own proceedings, to be driven to that exigent, which may determine of the controversy, before they come to blows, and conclude the matter by terms of Art, taken from the directions of good providence. For to speak a truth, the action of Battel, as it is the last part in that faculty, so it is the worst in regard of Christian duty, and better fitted to the progeny of *Lamech*, his second wife (which the Divines do note to be born to the ruine and destruction of mankind) than the children of grace, whose joy consisteth in peace and love.

Cæsar in the first of the Civil Wars respected the same thing, but from other grounds: for having shut up *Afranius* and *Petelius*, in a place of disadvantage, so as he might have cut them off, without farther trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the victory coming towards him, without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captains that were earnest upon the enemy; *Cur, etiam secundo praelio, aliquis ex suis amiserit? cur vulnerari patetur optime de se meritis militis? cur denique forum militare?* Why should he loose any of his soldiers in battel, though he got the day? why should he suffer those to be wounded, who had deserved so highly at his hands? or why should he hazard his good fortune? And this course did these Gallies take which under *Sertorius* had learned the Roman way, and the *Roman* industry; and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romans at their own weapon.

This first means is principally to be embraced as the safest way in these uncertain and casual events, for that which resteth upon corporal strength, and maketh execution the means to a conclusion, is very terrible even to the better party, full of hazard, and of little certainty. For it were a miracle of fortune never heard of yet, so to carry a battel upon what advantage or means soever, that the victor Army should buy so great a fortune without bloudshed or loss of Men; and erect a Trophy to Honour, at the sole cost of the Enemy, without loss or expence of his own treasure.

And for the uncertainty in a battel, who knoweth not what in finite chances and changes may happen in every small moment of time, to turn the fortune of the day to this or that party, and make both sides unconflant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and fear, joy and sorrow? And therefore *Cæsar* thought it not best to tempt the waywardness of fortune, when by other means he might obtain his desires.

This I say, is chiefly to be embraced, if four means will afford us that happiness; but howsoever I hold it wisdom so to entertain this course of victory, that we omit not the chiefest helps of furtherance when it cometh to blows; but to think of this conquest by art and wit, as necessary if our means will serve us to compass it; and of the other as necessary whether we will or no: for the history maketh it plain, that when *Brutus* found himself facilitated by means to undertake that course of victory which proceedeth from providence and discreet carriage, he then betook himself necessarily to the later, and by the help of battel fought

Tubal, Cain
by war, and
Noah, by
the flood,

Two means
to achieve
victory and
to over-ma-
ster our
Enemies.

and

to free himself from those disadvantages into which the Gallies had brought him.

The Third OBSERVATION.

I Observe farther out of this place, that what course soever be taken, a discreet Leader will not easily force an advantage without great assurance of a better fortune, nor change the certainty of a benefit upon probabilities of other hopes, until it have paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to perform. For (so he might force his fortune, by presuming too much upon the favor of future chances, which are often seen to cross our purposes, rather than to further the way which is taken.

The Fourth OBSERVATION.

Further, I observe this double battle to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for their usual manner was to make a triple battle, that the first might have a second and third help, but where their number would not afford that commodity, they then made two battles, that there might be the succor of a second supply. But they never fought with one single battle, for ought that may be gathered by their histories.

The Fifth OBSERVATION.

The last thing which I observe is the place where Crassus bestowed the Auxiliary Forces, in the disposition of his Troops to battle, which is here said to be *in medium Aciem*, for as their Armies were divided into three battels; every battle was divided into three parts, the two cornets and the battel, wherein the Auxiliary Forces were in this service bestowed: of these he afterward saith, that inasmuch as he durst not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to serve the Romans in time of battel, with stones and weapons, and to carry earth and turf to the Mount. The reason why suspected Troops are placed in the battel, rather than in either of the cornets, is, for that the battel hath not such scope to fling out, or take advantage of place to do mischief, as the cornets have; for wheresoever there have been jet battels fought, the strength of their Army consisted always in the cornets, as the two principal instruments of the battel; and as long as these stood found, the victory went always certain on that part; for the Cornets both kept the enemy from compassing about the body of their Army, and had the advantage also of charging upon the open side of their adversary.

At the battel of Cannæ, Hannibal put the weakest of his forces in the battel, and advancing them towards the enemy, left the two Cornets behind, so that when the Enemy came to charge upon the battel, they easily beat them back, and as they followed the retreat, fell in between the two cornets, wherein the strength of the Army consisted; and being by them compassed on each side, were defeated and overthrown. And thus we see the advantage which a General hath when his two cornets stand firm, although the battel shrink in the encounter. Hannibal in the battel he had with Sci-

pio in Africk placed the Strangers in the front and in the rearward; according peradventure as he found their number, and the use of their Arms: which are circumstances to be considered in this case, and depend rather upon the judgment of a General, than of any prescription that can be given in this matter.

CHAP. XI.

Crassus taketh the Camp of the Gallies, and with their overthrow endeth that War.

Crassus understanding their drift, and finding his Men cheerful and willing to fight, the whole Army crying out they would stay no longer, but immediately set upon their Enemies in their Camp, encouraged his Souldiers, and to the contentment of all Men, went directly to the place where they were lodged: and as some began to fill up the ditch, and others with casting weapons to beat the Gallies from the rampier, he commanded the Auxiliary forces, of whom he had no great assurance, to bring stones and weapons to the Souldiers that fought, and to carry earth and turf to the Mount, that so they might make a shew of fighting. And on the other side, as the Enemy began valiantly to make resistance, and to cast their weapons from the higher ground, to the great hurt of the Roman Souldier; the Horsemen in the meantime riding about the Camp of the Gallies, brought word to Crassus, that the Rampier at the Decumane Port, was not fortified with such diligence as they found it in other places, but would admit an easy entrance. Crassus dealt earnestly with the Commanders of the Horse, to encourage their Men with great promises and rewards, and instructed them what he would have done. They according to their instructions, took four cohorts that were left in the Camp fresh and no way tired, and carrying them a farther way about, that they might not be discovered by the Enemy, while all Men's eyes and minds were intent upon the fight they speedily came to the place of the Fortifications, which the Horsemen had found to be weak; which being easily broken down, they had entered the Camp, before the Enemy either saw them, or could tell what was done. And then a great clamor and shout being heard about that place, the Roman Legion renewing their force, as it falleth out always in hope of Victory, began to charge them afresh with great fury. The Gallies being circumvented on each side, and despairing of their safety, casting themselves over the Rampier, sought by flight to escape the danger. But so far as the Country was open and champaign, the

the Horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of fifty thousand which came out of Aquitania and Spain, there scarce remained the fourth part.

Upon the news of this fight, the most part of the Aquitania yielded to Cæsar, and of their own accord gave him Hostages: amongst these were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Preciani, Vocates, Tarufates, Elufates, Garites, Aufci, Garumni, Sibutzates, and Cocafates. Only some few that lived farther off, trusting upon the coming on of winter, held off and did not submit themselves.

OBSERVATION.

From this place Brancatis taketh occasion to dispute, how an enemy that is strongly incamped, and for some advantage will not remove, may be dislodged whether he will or no. A point of great consequence in matter of War, and therefore deserveth due consideration. Concerning which, he layeth this down for a Maxime, that all forts and strong holds are taken by the foot, and that camps and lodgings are taken by the head. By which is meant, that he who purpoeth to win a fortress well manned and provided, must first get the foot, and take hold of the ditch; and then seize himself upon the Rampier, and so get the place: for he saith, that Mounts and eminent elevations are of little use against fortresses or sconces, unless they over-top them; which may be easily prevented, by raising the parapet of the fortress in front, and the curtain in flank, according as the Enemy shall carry his mounts aloft; and so they shall never come to over-top the holds. But all camps and lodgings are taken by the head, is, by Mounts and Elevations, which by the advantage of their height, command the champaign: for he holdeth it impossible to raise a Mount within the Camp, in so short a time, to contest that which the Enemy shall make without.

This foundation being laid, he proceedeth to discover a way how to raise a Mount, against the Enemy, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillery, or rather them all within their trenches. And this he taketh from Cæsar, at the Siege of Gergovia. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like unto the line which the Geometricians call *Helicæ*. By this double ditch he makes his approach to any place of most advantage, where he may in a night raise a Mount high enough, for the Ordnance to play upon any quarter of the Camp. The contrivance of this practice I refer to our judicious Souldiers, who may if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in Brancatis himself. Thus much I dare affirm in the behalf of these Works, that they were of high esteem amongst the Romans, whom daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to find out the readiest means, both for security and victory. And if our Souldiers could be brought to cast the commodity of these works, either by persuasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practices: but our men had rather fly upon desperate adventures, and seek

victory in the jaws of death, than to clear all hazard with pains and diligence.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar undertaketh the War with the Menapii, and Morini.

At the same time also, although the Summer was almost at an end, yet so far as all Gallia was in peace, and the * Morini only with the * Menapii stood out in Arms, and had never either sent an Ambassador, or otherwise treated of Peace, Cæsar thinking that War might quickly be ended, led his Army into their Country. At his coming he desired them to carry their wars far otherwise than the rest of the Gallies had done: for understanding that the greatest Nations of Gallia, which had waged battel with the Romans, were beaten and overthrown, and having whole continents of woods and bog in their Territories, they conveyed both themselves and their goods into those quarters. Cæsar coming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortify his Camp, not discovering any enemy near about him, but as his Men were dispersed in their charges, they suddenly sallied out of the woods, and assaulted the Romans; but being speedily driven in again, with the loss of many of them, as the Romans followed them far into the Woods, they had some of their Men slain.

The time that remained, Cæsar resolved to spend in cutting down the woods; and lest the Souldiers might be taken unawares, while they were busied in that work, he caused them to place all the trees which they cut down on either side of the Army, that they might serve for a defence against sudden assaults. A great quantity of ground was thus rid within a few days, so that their goods and cattle was taken by the Romans: but they themselves were fled into thicker woods. At which time there hapned such a continual rain, as forced them to leave off the work, and the Souldiers could no longer endure to lie in Tents of skins: and therefore Cæsar, after he had wasted and spoiled their Country, burned their Towns and their houses, carried back his Army, and placed them amongst the Auleri, Lexovii, and in other Cities to winter in, which were subdued in the late Wars.

OBSERVATION.

Not to forego an advantage.

The place where suspected forces are best bestowed in battel.

Lib. 3.
Averuntur
in castris.

Lib. de bello
Gallico.

Cæsar.
* Cleve and
Gueldres,
* Teroant.

OBSERVATION.

THe Irish Rebels having the like commodity of woods and bogs, do entertain the like course of War, as the *Marini* did with *Cæsar*. The means which he used to disappoint them of that practice was, to cut down the woods; which if it be thought monstrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of War, let them consider that the *Roman* discipline wrought greater effects of valor, then can be made credible by the use of these times. For besides their exquisite discipline, which of it self was able to frame patterns of unexampled magnanimity, their industry was admirable in the execution thereof, and carried it with such unceasing travel, that the Souldiers thought it great happiness when they came to wage battel with the Enemy; and could have means to quit their continual travel with the hazard of their lives.

Neither let it seem strange that the *Romans* undertook to cut down the woods, but rather let us admire their facility in so difficult a task: for as the history witnesseth, *magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate, a great quantity of ground was rid in a few days, with incredible speed.* And after the woods were cut down, they took more pains in placing it on each side of the Legions, to hinder any suddain assault, than they did in cutting it down; which deserveth as great admiration as the former part. There is another place in the sixth Book of the Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such wares, and may serve to acquaint us with that which *Cæsar* did in these difficulties.

The *Eburones*, or the men of *Elge*, had the like commodity of woods and bogs, and made use of them in the war they had with *Cæsar*. The matter which he, required great diligence, not so much

in regard of the peril of the whole Army (for there could no danger come from an Enemy that was frightened and dispersed,) as the safety of every particular souldier, which in part did pertain to the welfare of the whole Army. For the desire of a booty, carried many of the Souldiers far from the body of the Army; and the woods being full of unknown and secret passages, would not suffer them to go either thick together, or close imbeddled. If he desired to have the War ended, and the race of those wicked men to be rooted out, he must of force make many small Companies, and divide his men into many bodies: but if he would have the Maniples to keep at their Ensigns, as the discipline and custom of the *Roman* Army required, then the place was a shelter and defence to the Enemy. Neither did they want courage to lay Ambushments, and to circumvent such as they found alone straggling from their companies. In these difficulties there was as much done as diligence could do, providing rather to be wanting in the offensive part (although all Mens minds were set on fire with revenge) then to hurt the Enemy with the loss of the *Roman* Souldier. *Cæsar* sent messengers to the bordering States, to come out and sack the *Eburones*, and they should have all the prey for their labour; that the life of the *Gallies* rather than his legionary Souldiers might be hazarded in those woods; as also that with so great a multitude, both the name and race of that people might be quite extinguished.

There are many particularities in this relation, which concern the true motion of the Irish Wars, which may be better observed by such as know those Wars by experience, then by my self that understand them only by relation: and therefore to prevent such exceptions as my rule shall make of the parrallel in these two cases, I will leave it to be done by themselves. And thus endeth the third Commentary.

THE Fourth Commentary OF THE WARS in GALLIA.

THE ARGUMENT.

THe *Usipetes* and *Tenchtheri* are driven to seek new seats in *Gallia*; they drive the *Menapii* out of their Territories: but in the end are overthrown by *Cæsar*. That War being ended, he maketh a Bridge upon the *Rhene*, and carrieth his Army over into *Germany*. He taketh revenge upon the *Sicambri*; and giveth liberty to the *Ubii*: returneth into *Gallia*, and carrieth his Army over into *Britanie*; with the occurrences of that War.

CHAP. I.

The *Usipetes* and *Tenchtheri* bring great multitudes of People over the *Rhene* into *Gallia*. The nature of the *Suevi*.



He winter following, Pompey and Crassus being Consuls, the *Usipetes* and *Tenchtheri*, two German Nations, passed over the *Rhene* with great multitudes of People, not

far from the place where it falleth into the Sea. The reason of their sitting war, the ill intreaty which for many years together they had received of the *Suevi*, the greatest and warlike Nation amongst the Germans. For these *Suevi* had One hundred Cantons or Shires, which yearly furnished their Wars with a Thousand Men apiece, and kept as many at home to maintain both themselves and their Armies abroad: and these the year following were in Arms, and the other stayed at home and performed the like duty, and so by this means they all continued their experi-

ence both of Tillage and matter of War. No man had any ground proper to himself, neither might they abide longer then a year in one place. They lived chiefly upon Cattel and Milk, and used much hunting, which was the cause (what through the quality of their diet, their continual exercise, and liberty of life, being never brought up to any calling, or tyed to any discipline, nor urged to any thing against their disposition) that they were strong, and of a large stature: and they had used themselves so to it, that they never cared for any cloathing in the coldest place they came in, more then skins and hides, which covered but part of their body, the rest being naked: and they wash their bodies usually in the Rivers. They have Merchants that frequent their Ports, not so much to bring them any Commodities from abroad, as to buy the prey and spoil they take in War. And whereas the *Gallies* take much delight in Oxen, and other Beasts, and stick not to give any price for them, the Germans care not for the bringing of them amongst them, but rather use their own misshapen ugly cattel, which by daily inuring they bring to perform any service. Their Horsemen oftentimes, in time of Battel, forsake their Horse, and fight on.

* Those of
Zuphen.
* Of Hallia.

Cæsar.

THE

on foot; their Horses being taught to stand still in one place, that when they would they might return unto them. Neither was there any thing accounted more base, or sly, in the course of their life, then to use furniture for Horses: and therefore they would adventure to charge upon great Troops of Horses that used Equipage, with a few of their own quality. They admitted no Wine to be brought in unto them, lest it might effeminate their Warlike inclination, or make them snapt for labour. The greatest honor, in their opinion, was, to have their bordering Territories lye waste and desolate: for so it would be thought, that many States together could not resist their conquering valour: and, it was reported, that the Country lay waste from the Suevi one way, Six hundred miles together.

THE OBSERVATION.

BY this practice of the Suevi it appeareth, how little a naked resolution of valour availeth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral carriage and civil discretion, to make use of that greatness which Prowess hath obtained: for notwithstanding that they were a Nation both warlike, and of good ability, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of Manhood, that it forced to no other end then to maintain Barbarisme at home, and desolation abroad; whereas true valor is always subordinate to the preservation of Common-weals, and is as the defensive Armes of civil society. Which I have the rather noted, in as much as it resembleneth an humour that aboundeth in this age, especially in the particular behaviour of our young Gallants; whose naked valour revealing it self only in the lie and in the stab, for want of other assitant virtues to temper the heat of so brittle a metal, leadech them into such inconveniences and disorderd actions; that it changeth the nature thereof into giddy-headed rashness; and, in lieu of virtues gerdon, is repaired with irrision.

CHAP. II.

The Motives inducing the Ulpipetes to come over the Rhene into Gallia.

NEXT unto these Suevi inhabited the Ubii, a very ample and potent State: and through their intercourse and traffick with Merchants, being seasoned also with the manners of the Gallies their neighbours, somewhat more civil then the rest of the Germans. With these the Suevi had often waged Battel: and albeit they could not expell them out of their Country, for as much as their State was very great and populous; yet, by continual incursions they brought them under, and much weakened their Estate. In the same case were the Ulpipetes and Tench-

theri before mentioned: for, having made head against the Suevi, for many years together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions, and wandering the space of three years through the Continent of Germany, at last they arrived where the Menapii inhabited the Banks on either side the River Rhene; who, being distressed with the arrival of such a multitude, forsook all their dwellings beyond the River, and planted themselves on this side of the water, to hinder the Germans from further passage.

The Ulpipetes with their associates having tried all means, and not finding themselves able to pass over by force for want of boats, nor by stealth, by reason of the diligent watch of the Menapii, fained a retreat to their old habitation: and, after three dayes journey, their horsemen in one night speedily returned again, and slew the Menapii, both unprovided and unprovoked. For they, upon the departure of the Germans, feared not to return over the River into their Towns and Houses. These being slain, and their Shipping taken, they got over the River before the rest of the Menapii had any notice of their coming: by which means they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and lived that winter upon the provision they found there.

Cæsar understanding of these things, and fearing the weakness of the Gallies, in as much as they are sudden and quick in their resolutions, and without desirous of novelty, he durst not trust their constancy: for it was their practice and custome to stay travellers and passengers, and inquire of them, what they either heard or knew concerning any thing that had happened; and the common people would flock about Merchants in Faires and Markets, and learn of them whence they came, and what news they brought from thence: and, by these rumours and hear-sayes they directed the main course of their actions; whereof they could not but soon repent themselves, being grounded upon such weak intelligence as was usually coined to please the multitude. Which custome being known, Cæsar, to prevent a greater War, buisied to his Army sooner then he was wont to do.

OBSERVATION.

SUCH as have spent their time in the contemplation of Nature, and have made diligent search of the temperature and quality of climates and nations, have all with one consent made Choler the Regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the People with such attributes as the

* Golden and Clew.

the said humour usually breedeth. Neither have these conditions, which Cæsar so long ago observed in the ancient Gallies, any dissemblance from that, which the Learned of this age have delivered concerning the nature of the Inhabitants; but that Irridolute constitution, which breeds such novelties and contrarities of actions, continueth the same unto these times in the Inhabitants of that Country, notwithstanding the alteration of customs and people, or while so long a time hath changed; which argueth the unresistible power of celestial influence, establishing an uniformity of nature, according as, the site of the place lieth capable of their powerful afflic.

The reason of the diversity in the temperature of Nations, which are differenced by North and South, is not without apparent cause attributed to their propinquity or distance from the course of the Sun, which distinguisheth by heat and cold the Northern and Southern climates of the earth, and separateth the inhabitants thereof by the dominion of their active qualities. But, the reason why two Nations, which are both in the same climate, and under the same parallel, receiving the vertue of the celestial bodies, by the same downfall and rebound of their beams, being differenced only by East and West, are so much distanced in nature, and so unlike in disposition, is not so apparent: whether it be, as some have imagined, for as much as the all-inclosing sphere, which remaineth quiet and immovable above the circuit of the first motion, hath his parts diversly distinguished, with variety of properties, which, by continual reference and mutual aspect, are imprinted in the correspondent quarters of the earth, and so keep a perpetual residency of one and the same quality in one and the same place, and make also the variety of fashions in such parts, as otherwise are equal favourites of the Heavens Majesty, by receiving an equal measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the said quarters of the earth, are, in themselves, diversly noted with several qualities, which appropriate the self-same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other unknown cause, I will leave every man to satisfie himself with that which seemeth most probable unto him, and proceed to the discovery of this cholerick passion.

Wherein I will endeavour to shew, how impatience, sudden resolution, and desire of novelty, are natural adjuncts of this humour. And, if Cæsar made use of this Philosophy, in the managing of that War, let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a General, to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first I must lay for a Maxime, that, which long experience hath made authentical, That the motions of the Mind are either quick or slow, according as the complexion is tempered, either with heat or cold: for, as the Phlegmatical humour is of a moist, cold and heavy nature, begetting weak and gross spirits, and benumbing the instruments with a lifeless disability: so is the motion of the internal faculties, proceeding likewise after a slow manner, according to the quality of the instruments whereby it moveth: and therefore men of this watery constitution, are no way apt to receive an impression, nor to entertain any sensible apprehension, unless it be beaten into them with often and strong repetitions; and then also they proceed as slowly in dis-

cussing of the consequence, and linger in the choice of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this *flava bilis*, being of a hot piercing nature, and resembling the active vertue of the fire, doth so purifie the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the vivacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had been oftentimes presented unto them with many strong circumstances. And, thence it happeneth, that in as much as the *spiritus* is so readily received, and possesseth the apprehending faculty with such facility of entrance, that it moveth the other powers of the Soul with as great efficacy as the first conception, as if it had been brought in with troops of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of undoubted truth. It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtle and fine disposition of the instruments, which proceedeth from heat, the chiefest quality in Choler) that the object is at the first moment so strongly felt in the first receiving faculty, that the other powers of the mind with as great speed, manifest their offices concerning the apprehension, and deliver a sentence answerable to the strength of the first conception: which maketh them so impatient of delay, and so suddenly to alter their former resolutions, not suffering the discursive power to examine the substance thereof by conference of circumstances, nor to give judgment according to the course of our intellectual court. It becometh therefore every man, in that untastey disposition, especially in matter of moment, to be suspicious of his own credulity, and not to give place to resolution, before his judgment be informed, by discourse of the strength or weakness of the conceived opinion.

But, to leave these speculative meditations to Philosophers of learned conceit; for as much as the right use of passions, is either true wisdom, or cometh nearest to the same: I will only touch in a word, what degree of choler best becometh a soldier, or how it availeth or disadvantageeth in matter of War. And first, it cannot be denied, that there is almost no passion that doth more eclipse the light of reason, or sooner corrupteth the sincerity of a good judgement, then this of anger which we now speak of. Neither is there any motion that more pleasech it self in his own actions, or followeth them with greater heat in the execution. And, if the truth chance to shew it self, and convince a false pretended cause as the author of that passion, it oftentimes redoubleth the rage, even against truth and innocency. *Piso* condemned a Soldier for returning from foraging without his companion, being persuaded that he had slain him: But, at the instant of the execution, the other that was missing returned, and, with great joy of the whole Army, they were carried to the General, thinking to have much gratified him with the manifestation of the truth: but he, through shame and despite, being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a subtilty which his passion furnished him withal, he made three culpable, for that he found one innocent; the first, because the sentence of death was paid against him, and was not to be recalled without the breach of Law: the second, for that he was the cause of the death of his companion; and thirdly, the Executioner, for not obeying his Commandment.

Concerning matter of War, as it consisteth of differented

Salust.

different parts, so hath choler divers effects. In case of discourt and consultation, when as the powers of the mind ought to be clear of all violent affections, it greatly darkeneth the understanding, and troubleth the sincerity of a good judgment, as *Cæsar* noted in his speech to the Senate, concerning *Caïline*; and therefore a Commander must, by all means, endeavour to avoid even the least motions of so hurtful a passion, and reason his affections with that gravity and constancy of spirit, that no turbulent disposition may, either hinder his understanding, or withhold him will from following that course, which reason appointeth as the best means to a fortunate success: always remembering, that all his actions are projected upon a stage, and pass the censure of many curious beholders, which applaud grave and patient motions, as the greatest proof of true wisdom, and disallow of passionate and headstrong affection, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how just soever otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and fury of battel, I take anger to be a necessary instrument to set valour on foot, and to overawe the difficulties of terror with a furious resolution: for considering, that the noblest actions of the mind, stand in need of the impulsions of passions, I take anger to be the fittest means to advance the valiant carriage of a Battel; for, as fear is treacherous and unsafe, so anger is confident, and of an unquenchable heat. And therefore a Commander ought, by all means, to suggest matter of Anger against an Enemy, that his men may behold them with a wrathful regard, and thirst after the day of Battel, to satisfy their fury with the blood of their adversaries. If any urge, that it hath been heretofore observed of the *Gallies*, that in the beginning of a Battel they were more then Men; and, in the latter end they were less then Women; and therefore a cholerick disposition is not so fit for service, as we seem to make it: I answer, that there is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was observed in the *Gallies*, and the passion of anger well kindled in the mind: for the first is subject to alteration, and contrariety of actions; but the other is furious, invincible, never fatished but with revenge. And so that of *Aristotle* is proved true, that anger serveth oftentimes as a weapon to virtue: wherunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature; for we do handle it with guileth not it, but it guileth our hands; it possesseth us, and not we it, as it happened in the Reign of *Thierius*, amongst the mutinous Legions at *Petres*: and therefore a Commander ought to take great heed, whom he maketh the object of that anger which kindleth in his Army. For, as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to be wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regard of obedience, which was the only thing which *Cæsar* required in his Soldiers.

But, to leave this hasty matter, and fall nearer that which we seek after: I may not omit the Prognostication which *Cæsar* made of the consequence of this accident, by the natural disposition of the People: the event whereof proved the truth of his predictions: which sheweth, what advantage a learned General, that hath been some-

what instructed in the School of Nature, hath gained of him whom only experience hath taught the active rudiments of the War, and thinketh of no further lesson in that art, than that which the office of a Sergeant or Lancepredado containeth.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar cometh to his Army, marcheth towards the Germans, and, by the way, treateth of conditions of Peace.

Cæsar being come to his Army, found that to have happened which he before suspected: for, some of the States of Gallia had sent Messengers unto the Germans, to leave the banks of Rhene, and to come further into the Continent, where they should find ready whatsoever they desired. Whereupon, the Germans began to make further incursions, and to waste the Land as far as the confines of the * Eburones, and the Condruvi, who were under the protection of the Treviri. The Princes of the Gallies being called together, *Cæsar* thought it best to dissemble what he had discovered concerning their Revolt; and, confirming their minds with an approbation of their Loyalty, he commanded certain Troops of Horse to be levied, and refused to make war upon the Germans: and, having made provision of Corn, he directed his March towards them. From whom, as he was on the way, within a few dayes journey of their Camp, he received this Message: The Germans, as they were not willing to make war upon the Romans first, so they would not refuse to make trial of their Manhood if they were justly provoked; for, their ancient custom was, to answer an Enemy by force, and not by treaty: yet thus much they would confess, that they came thither very unwillingly, being driven by violence out of their possessions. If the Roman people would accept of their friendship, and either give them Territories to inhabit, or suffer them to keep that which they had got by the Law of Armes, they might prove profitable friends unto them. They only yielded to the Suevi, to whom the gods, in feats of Armes, were inferiour; any other Nation they would easily conquer.

* To this *Cæsar* answered what he thought fit; but, the purport of his speech was, That he could not make any League with them if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable, that they that could not keep their own, would get possessions out of other mens hands: Gallia had no vacant place to entertain so great a multitude: but, if they would, they might find a welcome amongst the * Ubii, whose

whose agents were at that instant in his Camp, complaining of the injury of the Suevi, and desiring aid against them; thus much he himself would intreat of the Ubii. The messengers went back with these Mandates, promising within three days to return again to *Cæsar* in the mean time they desired him not to bring his Army any nearer their quarters. Which request *Cæsar* denied. For understanding that a few days before, a great part of their Cavalry were passed over the Mos to the Ambivari, there to pillage and get provisions, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more than the return of their horsemen.

The River Mos bath its rise from the Mount Vogeus in the dominions of the Lingones, and having run far, it receives the River * Wals, which is a part of the Rhene, these two joining make the Island of the Batavi: fourscore miles below which, it falleth into the sea. The Rhene ariseth amongst the Lepontii, a people inhabiting the Alpes, and after a tedious course through the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrics, Triboci, and Treviri, drawing near the sea, it divides into several branches, and so makes many considerable Islands, most of which are inhabited by savage and barbarous people, some whereof live only upon fish and the eggs of birds, after this, the River empties it self at several mouthes into the Ocean.

When *Cæsar* was come within twelve miles of their Camp, their Ambassadors returned, and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towards them. But being denied of their suit, they besought him to send to those Troops of Horse which marched before the Army, that they should not fight nor make any hostile encounter; and that he would give them leave to send Messengers to the Ubii: of whose entertainment they would willingly accept, if the Princes and Senate would swear faith and safe continuance unto their people: neither would they require more than three days to negotiate this business. *Cæsar* conceived this intreaty to import nothing else, than the return of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within three days; notwithstanding he promised them to march but four miles farther that day, to a convenient waiting place, and bade that a considerable number of them should come thither to him next day, that he might know what they desired; in the mean time he sent to the Commanders of the horse that were before, not to provoke the Enemy to fight; and if they were set upon, to sustain

the charge until he came nearer with the Army.

The First OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe his dissembling of the practice of the *Gallies* with the Germans, and the encouragement which he gave them in a faithful and loyal affection to the people of Rome, when he himself knew they had started from that duty, which both their honour and a good respect of their friends required: for he well understood that his presence did take away all scruple of any farther motion in that kind; and therefore to have objected unto them their errors, had not been to heal but to discover their wound. Only he took the way to cut off their hopes of any practices which they might attempt against the Roman people; and held them in the mean time in the appearance of faithful friends, that they might not be discouraged by the detection of their revolt.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Secondly, upon this resolution that there was no League to be made with the Germans if they continued on this side the Rhene, we may observe how he entertained a treaty of Peace, with such contents and denials, as might manifest his readiness to farther what he made shew of, and not weaken the means of his best advantage. For as he was content they should take a quiet farewell of Gallia, and plant themselves in the possessions of the Ubii, so was he loth to yield to any condition which might disadvantage his forcible constraint, or weaken his command, if persuasion failed; for he well knew that powerful means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authority in a peace, than any other motive how reasonable soever.

Moreover we may observe how careful he was not to impose upon the Germans a necessity of fighting; but opened a passage (by propounding unto them the association of the Ubii) by which they might avoid the hazard of battel. Which thing was always observed by Commanders of ancient times, who diligently searching into the nature of things, found that neither of those noble instruments whereby Man worketh such wonders (I mean the hand and the tongue) had ever brought so many excellent works to that type of perfection, unless they had been forced therunto by necessity: and therefore we are wisely to handle the course of our actions, least while we stand too strict upon a violent guard, we give occasion to the Enemy, by the way of Antipræfatis, to redouble his strength, and to furnish him with that powerful Engine, which *Petius Mæcius* calleth ultimum and maximum telum, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appear by these examples.

Some few of the Samnites, contrary to the articles of peace, between them and the Romans, having made incursions into the Territories of the Roman Confederates, the Senate of that State sent to Rome, to excuse the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction. But being rejected, *Claudius Pontius* General of their Forces, in an excellent Oration which

Vinciter
hæd gratis
jugulo qui
provocat
hostem.

Liv. Lib. 9.

* Colonia Agrippina

Tacit.
l. Annal.

which he made, shewed how the Romans would not hearken to peace, but chose rather to be revenged by War; and therefore necessity constrained them to put on Arms: *Fulminest bellum* (saith he) *quibus necessarium; & pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in Armis spes est*. That war is just which is necessary; and it is piety in those Men to take up Arms, who have no hope but in taking up Arms. The issue thereof was, that the Samnites intrapped the Romans in a place of advantage, so that they were forced upon dishonourable terms to save their lives as it is large in the ninth Book of *Livie*.

Liv. Lib. 7.

Caius Manlius conducting the Roman Legions against the *Pell*, part of the *Petian Army* had entered the *Roman Camp*; which *Manlius* perceiving, he dispatched with a band of Men to keep the breach, and to shut in the *Pell*, which they no sooner perceived, but they fought with that rage and fury, that they slew *Manlius*; and had overthrown the whole Camp, had not a Tribune opened their passage, by which they fled away.

In like manner *Camillus*, the wisest of the Roman Captains, being entered into the City of the *Pell*, that he might take it with greater facility, and disarm the Enemy of that terrible weapon of necessity, he caused it to be proclaimed, that no *Pell* should be hurt that was found unarmed. Whereupon every Man cast away his weapon, and so the Town was taken without bloodshed.

Let a Soldier therefore take such hold of occasions and opportunities as are offered unto him, that in time of Battel he may seem to call necessity upon his own cause, and retain it in his pay; considering how the power thereof altereth the works of Nature, and changeth their effects into contrary operation, being never subject to any ordinance of law, and yet making that lawful which proceedeth from it.

CHAP. IV.

The Germans, contrary to their own request made to Cæsar, set upon the Roman Horsemen, and overthrew them.

Cæsar.

Notwithstanding the Germans request, concerning the truce, as soon as they saw the Roman Horsemen, which were in number five thousand, (whereas the Germans had not above eight hundred Horse, those that went over the Mosse to forage not being yet returned) they charged upon the Romans, not expecting any hostile encounter, inasmuch as their Embassadors were newly departed from Cæsar, and had obtained that day of truce: but being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their usual custom, forsook their Horse, and fighting on foot, ran our Horse into the bellies, and overthrew many of our Men, so that they easily put the Romans to flight; who never looked back, until they came into the sight of the Legions. In that battel were slain seventy four Roman horsemen, and amongst the rest *Piso* an Aquil-

tane, a valiant man, and born of noble parentage, whose grandfather was the chief ruler in his City, and called friend by the Roman Senate. This *Piso* seeing his Brother compassed about by the Enemy, brake in upon them and rescued him: but having his Horse wounded under him in the action, and being dismounted, he fought stoutly on foot, till such time as the Enemy becom'd him in, and gave him several wounds; then he fell down, which his Brother seeing afar off, (for he had left the Battel) he clapp'd spurs to his Horse, and rushing upon the throng to rescue him, was there slain.

After this Battel, Cæsar thought it not safe either to hearken to any conditions, or to receive any message from them that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, and meant nothing but war; and to attend any longer, until their Horsemen returned, was but to give them that advantage against him, especially considering the weakness of the Galles, amongst whom the Germans by this Battel, had gained great reputation; and therefore he durst not give them space to think upon it.

OBSERVATION.

The cunning of the Germans offered occasion to speak somewhat concerning that main controversy of policy, which is, whether the actions of Princes and great Commanders are always to be attended with integrity and faithful accomplishment thereof. Wherein I will only set down such arguments and grounds of reason, which virtue and moral honesty on the one part, (for we will make it no question to a Christian mind) and the daily practice of States-men on the other side, alledge to make good their contrary assertions.

The great Politicians of the world, that commend virtue in a shew, and not in *esse*, and being, and study to maintain their States only with humane reason, not retarding the authority of divine ordinance, set this down as a Maxime in their Art; That he that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an end, forcing to his contentment, must in all respects be like qualified, both in judgment and disposition, as the party is with whom he dealeth: otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared to hold himself strong in the matter, which he undertaketh. For a wrastler that cometh with meer strength to encounter another Man that hath both strength and cunning, may beliew his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skill, and be laught at as an unworthy Champion for serious sports: in like manner in this universal confusion of infidelity, wherein subtilty flyeth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicity of spirit to wind through the labyrinths of falsehood, and avoid the snares of deceit, shall find himself too weak for so difficult a task, and beliew his honesty, if he regard his commodity. For it is the course that every Man taketh, which must bring us to the place to which every Man goeth;

eth: and he that opposeth himself against the current of the World, may stand alone in his own conceit, and never attain that which the World seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore as craft and deceit are so general, it behoveth a Man of publick negotiations to carry a mind apt and disposed to their qualities. This was signified by that which ancient writers report of *Achilles*, who was sent to *Grius* the Centaur, half a Man and half a beast, to be instructed in the rudiments of Princely carriage, that of the brutish part he might learn to strengthen himself with force and courage, and of the humane shape so to manage reason, that it might be a fit instrument to answer or prevent whatsoever Mans Wit might forge to overthrow it: Neither ought a private Man to wonder at the strangeness of these positions, considering that the Government of Kingdoms and Empires is carried with another bias, than that which concerneth particular affairs in a well-ordered State: wherein truth-breakers and faithless dissemblers are worthily condemned, inasmuch as they necessarily enforce the ruine thereof. But these that sit at the helm of Government, and are to shape the course of a State, according to the variation of times and fortunes, derive their conclusions from other principles, whereof inferior subjects are no more capable, then Men are able to understand the works of the gods; and therefore they are called *arcano imperii*, secret of State, to be revered rather than lookt into.

To conclude, the affairs of particular persons are of so short extension, and incircled in so small a compass, that a mean capacity may easily apprehend the advantages or inconveniences which may ensue upon the contract; and therefore it is requisite they should stand to the adventure, and their judgment is worthily taxed with the loss: but the business of the Commonwealth are both subject to so many casualties of fortune, and rely upon such unexpected accidents, that it is impossible for any spirit, how provident soever, to foresee the issue in that variety of chances. Besides that every particular subject is much interested in the fortune of the event, and may justly challenge an alteration of the intended course, rather then suffer shipwreck through the error of their pilot: and so the safety of the State doth balance out the loss of credit in the Governor.

On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirm virtue to be the same both in Prince and people; neither doth condition of state or calling, or the quality of publick or private businesses, alter the nature and essence of goodness: so to deprive the tongue of truth and fidelity, were to break the bond of civil society, which is the basis and ground-plot of all States and Commonwealths. They do not deny but that a wise Prince may so carry a Treaty, that he may seem to affect that most, which he least intendeth; or answer doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that he may use with great honor the practices and stratagems of war, when the fortune of both parties consisteth upon their own industry: but to break any Covenants agreed upon, may well get a Kingdom, but never honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the means whereby a State is continued in happy Government: whereof thus much I dare say, by the warrant of this History, that he who falsifieth this word upon

advantage, howsoever he regardeth his honor, had need to pay them home, in regard of his own safety: for if they once recover the loss, and get any advantage against those truth-breakers, they will find as little favor as the Germans did with Cæsar.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar marcheth directly to the Camp of the Germans and crusheth them all in pieces, and so endeth that War.

Upon these considerations, Cæsar manifesting his resolution to the Legates and Legions, there hapned a very fortunate accident. For the next day very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chieft of the Germans came unto Cæsar into his Camp, to excuse their fraudulent practice, and to wish to continue their prison of truce. Whereof Cæsar was exceeding glad, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant brought his Army out of the Camp, commanding his Horsemen to follow the Legions, because they had been daunted with so late an overthrow: and making a tripple Battel, marched speedily eight miles, and so came upon the Germans before they had notice what had happened: who being terrified with our sudden arrival, and the departure of their own Leaders, knew not whether it were the best course to bring forth their Forces, or defend their Camp, or otherwise to seek their safety by flight. Which tumult and fear was no sooner perceived by the Roman Souldiers, but calling to mind their perfidious treachery, they brake into the Camp, and were at first a little resisted. In the mean time the women and children (for they had brought all they had over the Rhene) fled every one away: which Cæsar perceiving, sent his horsemen to pursue them. The Germans hearing the clamour and screechings behind their backs, and seeing their friends pursued and slain, did cast away their weapons, forsoke their ensigns, and fled out of the Camp, and coming to the confluence of the Maese and the Rhene, such as had escaped, cast themselves into the River, where what through fear, weariness, and the force of the water, they were all drowned. In this conflict the Romans lost not a Man. The number of the Enemy was 430000, with Women and Children. To them whom he had retained in his Camp, he gave leave to depart: but they fearing the cruelty of the Galles, for the mischief they had done them, desired that they might continue with the Romans, which Cæsar agreed unto.

OBSERVATION.

OBSERVATION.

THIS relation affordeth little matter of war, but only a severe revenge of hateful treachery: notwithstanding will hence take occasion to discover the offices of the *Questor* and the *Legatus*; and shew what place they had in the Army. And first concerning the *Questor*, we are to understand that he was elected by the common voice of the people, in the same Court which was called to create the General. His office was to take charge of the publick treasure, whether it came out of their *Avarian*, for the pay of the Army, or otherwise was taken from the enemy.

Of him the Souldiers received their stipend, both in corn and money: and what other booties were taken from the Enemy, he either kept them or sold them for the use of the Commonweal.

The *Legatus* were not chosen by the people, but appointed by the Senate, as Assistants and Conductors to the Emperor for the publick service, and were altogether directed by the General, in whose absence they had the absolute command: and their number was for the most part uncertain, but proportioned according to the number of Legions in the Army.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar maketh a Bridge upon the Rhene, and carrieth his Army over into Germany.

Cæsar.

THE German War being thus ended, Cæsar thought it necessary to transport his Army over the Rhene into the Continent of Germany for many causes: whereof this was not the least, that seeing the Germans were so easily perswaded to bring their Colonies and their vagrant multitude into Gallia, he thought good to make known unto them, that the Roman people could at their pleasure carry their Forces over the Rhene into Germany. Moreover, those Troops of Horse which were absent at the late overthrow of the Germans, being gone as I said before for spoil and provision over the Mosæ, after they saw their friends overthrown, were fled into the confines of the Sicambri, and joined with them. To whom when Cæsar sent Messengers, to demand them to be sent unto him, they answered, that the Roman Empire was limited by the Rhene; and if the Germans were interdicted Gallia, why should Cæsar challenge any authority in their quarters? Lastly the Ubii, who amongst all the rest of the Germans, had only accepted of Cæsars friendship, and given pledges of their fidelity, had made earnest suite unto him to send them aid against the Suevi; or at the least to transport his Army over the Rhene; that would serve their turns,

that would be help and encouragement enough to them; for the name and opinion of the Roman Army was so great, and of such fame, that with Ariovistus overthrown, and this last service, that is sounded honourable amongst the farthest Nations of Germany, so that it was the greatest safety to have them their friends. For these reasons Cæsar resolved to pass the Rhene: but to carry his Army over by Boat, was neither safe, nor for his own honour, nor the Majesty of the people of Rome. And albeit it seemed a matter of great difficulty, by reason of the breadth, swiftness and depth of the River, to make a Bridge: yet he resolved to try what he could do, otherwise he determined not to pass over at all. And so he built a bridge after this manner.

At two foot distance, he placed two trees of a foot and half square, sharpened at the lower end, and cut answerable to the depth of the River: these he let down into the water with Engines, and drove them in with Commanders, not perpendicularly after the fashion of a pile, but gablenwise, and bending with the course of the water opposite unto these he placed two other trees, joined together after the same fashion, being forty foot distant from the former, by the dimension between their lower parts in the bottom of the water, and reclining against the course of the River. These two pair of complex trees placed he joined together with a beam of two foot square, equal to the distance between the said complex, and fastened them at each end on either side of the complex with braces and pins: whereby the strength of the work and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the stream was, and the faster it fell upon the timber-work, the stronger the bridge was united in the couplings and joints. In like manner he proceeded with complex and beams, until the work was brought unto the other side of the river, and then he laid straight planks from beam to beam, and covered them with burlards; and so he made a floor to the bridge. Moreover on the lower side of the bridge, he drove down supporters, which being fastened to the timber work, did strengthen the bridge against the force of the water; and on the upper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boats, or what else the Enemy might cast down to trouble the work, or hurt the bridge. Within ten days that the timber began to be cut down and carried, the work was ended, and the Army transported. Cæsar leaving a strong garrison at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri. In the mean time his ambassadors came to him from many cities desiring peace,

peace, and the friendship of the Romans: upon which Cæsar answered courteously, and required hostages of their fidelity.

OBSERVATION.

IT shall not be amiss to enter a little into the consideration of this Bridge, as well in regard of the ingenious Architecture thereof, as also, that we may somewhat imitate Cæsar; whom we may observe, to infit with as great plenty of wit and eloquence; in presenting unto us the subtilty of his invention, in such manner of handy-works, as upon any other part of his actions: as this particular description of the bridge may sufficiently witness: besides the fortifications at *Alesia*, and the intrenchments in *Britany*, for the safety of his Shipping, with many other works, which he might well record, as the greatest effects of magnanimous industry, that succeeding ages might not blush either of Art or Prowess, which his virtue had not exprest; or otherwise might wonder at that worth which they themselves could not attain unto. And, to that purpose, he entertained *Viranius*, the Father of Architecture, and as worthily to be imitated in that faculty, as his Master Cæsar is in feats of Armes. By whose example, a great Commander may learn, how much it importeth the eternity of his fame to beautifie his greatest designs with Art, and to esteem of such as are able to intreat the Mathematical Mules, to shew themselves under the shape of a sensible form; which albeit, through the rudeness of the matter, fall far short of the truth of their intellectual nature, yet their beauty expresth such a majesty of Art, that no time will suffer the memory thereof to perish.

The workmanship of this Bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double puffs, whereof the first order bending with the stream, and the lower rank against the stream, when they came to be coupled together with overthwart beams; which were fastened in the couplings with braces, which he nameth *Fibulas*; the more violent the stream fell upon the work, the faster the joints of the building were united, as may better appear by a model of that making, than can be exprest by any circumstance of words.

I might hence take occasion to speak of the diversity of bridges, and of the practices which antiquity hath devised to transport Armies over Rivers: but, in as much as it is a common subject, for all that undertake this Military task, and hath been handled by *Lipsius* upon the occasion of this Bridge, I will refer the Reader to that place; and only note the singular disposition of this action, in as much as Cæsar made the means correspondent to that end which he intended. For, considering, that the chiefest end of his passage was, to let the Germans understand, that the power of the Roman Empire was not bounded with the Rhene, and that River could not so separate their territories, but that they were able to joyn both the Continents together, and make a common Road-way, where it seemed most unpassable: he thought it best to pass over his Army by a Bridge, that so the Germans might know the power of his Forces, and

also conceit their Territories as united unto *Gallia*, or to be united to the pleasure of the Romans, with a firm *Shoote*, and plain passage by foot, which, in times past, had always been separated by a mighty River. Neither would a transportation by boat have wrought that effect, for as much as the daily use thereof was so familiar to the Germans, that it nothing altered their imagination of an unactable passage: but, when they saw so strange a thing attempted, and so suddenly performed, they would easily understand, that they were not so far off, but that they might be overtaken, and so direct their demeanour accordingly.

Let this suffice therefore, to prove, that a passage over a River, by a Bridge, is more honorable, safe, and of greater terror to the Enemy, then any other way that can be devised; especially if the River carry any depth, such as the Rhene is; otherwise, if it have choller Shallows or Bords, whereby men may wade over without any great inconvenience, it were but lost labour to stand about a Bridge, but rather to think of it as of a place incumbered with fish hindrances, as men often meet with in a March.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar taketh revenge upon the Sicambri: giveth liberty to the Ubii; and returneth again into Gallia.

Cæsar.

THE Sicambri understanding that Cæsar was making a Bridge over the Rhene, prepared themselves to fly; and, at the perswasion of the *Uipettes* and *Tenchtheri*, forsook their Country, and conveyed themselves and their possessions into woods and solitary Deserts. Cæsar continuing a few dayes in their quarters, having set on fire their Villages and Houses, and burned up their Corn and Provision, came to the Ubii, promising them aid against the Suevi: by whom he understood, that as soon as the Suevi had intelligence, that he went about to make a Bridge, calling a Council, according to their manner, they sent unto all quarters of their State, that they should forsake their Towns, and carry their Wives and children, and all that they had into the Woods; and, that all that were able to bear Armes should make head in one place, which they appointed to be the midst of their Country; and there they attended the coming of the Romans, and were resolved in that place to give them Battel. Which when Cæsar understood, having ended all those things, in regard whereof he came into Germany, which was chiefly to terrifie the Germans, to be revenged upon the Sicambri, to set the Ubii at liberty; having spent in all eighteen dayes beyond the Rhene, and done enough, as well in regard of his own honor, as the good of the Commonweal, he returned into Gallia, and brake up the Bridge.

M CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar thinketh of a Voyage into Britannie: he enquires of Merchants concerning the nature of that People.

Cæsar.

Although the Summer was almost spent, and that in those parts the winter battered on apace in as much as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithstanding he resolved to go over into Britannie, for as much as he understood, that in all the former wars of Gallia, the Enemy had received most of their supply from thence. And, although the time of the year would not suffer him to finish that war; yet he thought it would be to good purpose, if he went only to view the Island, to understand the quality of the Inhabitants, and to know their Coast, their Ports, and their Landing-places, whereof the Gallies were altogether ignorant; for seldom any man but Merchants did travel unto them. Neither had they discovered any thing but the Sea-coast, and those Regions which were opposite unto Gallia. And therefore calling Merchants together from all quarters, he neither could understand of what quantity the Island was; what Nations, or of what power they were that inhabited it; what use or experience of War they had; what Laws or Customs they used; nor what Havens they had to receive a Navy of great Shipping.

OBSERVATION.

AS the Germans had oftentimes stirred up motions of Rebellion amongst the Gallies, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their Kingdoms: so the Britains had upheld most of their Wars, by furnishing them with such supplies as from time to time they stood in need of. So that if Cæsar, or the Roman People would rest secure of their quiet and peaceable Government in Gallia, as they had chafed the infolency of the Germans, and sent them back again with greater loss than gain; so was it necessary to make the Britains know, that their assistance in the War of Gallia, would draw more buifness upon them, than they were well able to manage. For, as I have noted in my former discourses, the causes of an unpeaceable Government are as well external and foreign, as internal, and bred in the body; which need the help of a Physician to continue the Body in a perfect state of health, and require as great a diligence to qualify their malicious operations, as any internal sickness whatsoever.

In the second Commentary I briefly touched the commodity of good discovery: but because it is a matter of great consequence in the fortunate carriage of a War, I will once again, by this example of Cæsar, remember a General, not to be negligent in this duty. Suetonius, in the life of our Cæsar, reporteth, That he never undertook any ex-

pedition, but he first received true intelligence of the particular life and nature of the Country, as also of the manners, and quality of the People; and that he would not undertake the Voyage into Britannie, until he had made perfect discovery by himself of the magnitude and situation of the Island. Which Suetonius might understand by this first voyage, which Cæsar would needs undertake in the latter end of a Summer, although it were, as he himself saith, but to discover.

It is recorded by ancient Writers, that those demi-gods that governed the World in their time, gave great honor to the exercise of hunting, as the perfect image of War in the resemblance of all parts, and namely in the discovery and knowledge of a Country; without which, all enterprises, either of sport in hunting, or earnest in Wars, were frivolous, and of no effect. And therefore Xenophon, in the life of Cyrus, heweth, that his expedition against the King of Armenia, was nothing but a repetition of such sports as he had used in hunting. Howsoever, if the infinite examples registered in History, how by the dexterity of some Leaders, it hath gained great Victories, and through the negligence of others irrevocable overthrow, are not sufficient motives to persuade them to this duty; let their own experience in matters of small moment, manifest the weakness of their proceedings, when they are ignorant of the chiefest circumstances of the matter they have in hand. But, let this suffice, in the second place, to prove the necessity of good discovery, and let us learn of Cæsar, what is principally to be inquired after, in the discovery of an unknown Country: as first, the quantity of the Land; secondly, what Nations inhabit it; thirdly, their use of War; fourthly, their civil government; and lastly, what Havens they have to receive a Navy of great Shipping. All which circumstances are such principal Arteries in the body of a State, that the discovery of any one of these demands, would have given great light concerning the motion of the whole body.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar sendeth C. Volufenus to discover the Coast of Britannie; and prepareth himself for that Voyage.

Cæsar sent out Caius Volufenus with a Galley, to discover what he could concerning these things, with charge, that having made perfect discovery, he should return again unto him as speedily as might be: he himself marching in the mean time with all his Forces unto the * Morini; for as much as from thence lay the shortest cut into Britannie. Thither he commanded that Ships should be brought from all the Maritime Cities of that quarter, and namely, that Fleet which he had built the year before for the War at Vannes. In the mean time, his resolution being known, and carried into Britannie by Merchants and others, many private States of that Island sent Embassadors unto him, promising him hostages of their Loyalty, and

Cæsar.

* Terouan
or Mon-
fieur.

CHAP. X.

Cæsar saileth into Britannie, and landeth his men.

Cæsar.

and signifying their readiness to submit themselves to the Roman Empire. To these he made liberal promises, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and so sent them back again. And with them he sent Comius, whom he had made King of Arras, whose wisdom and virtue he held in good account, and whom he took to be faithful to him, and of great authority in those Regions. To him he gave in charge to go to as many of the States as he could, and persuade them to accept of the friendship of the Roman Empire, and acquaint them, that Cæsar himself would presently follow after.

Volufenus having taken what view of the Country he could (for he durst not go on shore to commit himself to the barbarism of the Enemy) after five dayes returned to Cæsar, and related to him all that he had discovered. Whilst Cæsar stayed in those parts for the furnishing of his Fleet, the Morini sent messengers unto him, excusing themselves for their former fault, that being a rude and barbarous people, and altogether unacquainted with our customs, they had made War against the People of Rome; and whilst manifesting their readiness to obey his commands.

Cæsar not willing to leave any Enemy behind him, or to engage in a new War at this time of the year, or to neglect his Voyage into Britannie, for such small matters, willingly accepted of their submission, having first received many hostages of them: and having made ready Eighty Ships of burthen, which he thought sufficient to transport two Legions, he divided the Gallies to the Quæstor, the Legates, and the Commanders of the Horse. There were also Eighteen ships of burthen more, which lay wind-bound at a Port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the Horsemen. The rest of the Army he committed to Q. Titurius Sabinus and Luc. Aurunculeius Cotta, commanding them to go to the coast of the Menapii, and into those parts of the Morini, who had sent no Embassadors to him; and appointed P. Sulp. Rufus a Legate to keep the Port with a sufficient garrison.

These things being thus dispatched, having a good wind, in the third watch he put out to Sea, commanding his Horsemen to imbarke themselves at the further Port, and follow him; which was but slowly performed. He himself arrived upon the Coast about the fourth hour of the day, where he found all the Cliffs posset with the Forces of the Enemy. The nature of the place was such, that the hills lay so steep over the Sea, that a weapon might easily be cast from the higher ground upon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit Landing-place; notwithstanding he cast anchor until the rest of the Navy were come up unto him.

In the mean time calling a Council of the Legates and Tribunes, he declared unto them what advertisements he had received by Volufenus, and told them what he would have done; and withal admonished them, that, the course of Military Affairs, and especially Sea-matters, that had so sudden and unconformable a motion, required all things to be done at a beck, and in due time. The Council being dismissed, having both wind and tide with him, he weighed anchor, and sailed eight miles from that place, unto a plain and open shore.

The Britains perceiving the Romans determination, sent their horse and chariots (which they commonly use in war) before, and the rest of their Forces followed after to the place where the Romans intended to land. Cæsar found it exceeding difficult to land his men, for these respects: the ships were so great, that they could not be brought near unto the shore; the Soldiers, in strange, and unknown places; having their hands laden with great and heavy weapons, were, at one instant, to go out of the Ship, to withstand the force of the billow, and to fight with the Enemy; whereas the Britains, either standing upon the shore, or making short sallies into the water, did boldly cast their weapons in known and frequented places, and managed their Horses accustomed to such service.

The Romans being terrified with these things, and altogether unskilful of this kind of fight, did not use the same courage as they were wont to do in Land-services. Which, when Cæsar perceived, he caused the Gallies, that were both strange to the Britains, and reader for use, to be removed from the Ships

of burthen, and to be rowed up and down, and laid against the open side of the Enemy; that from thence, with slings, engines, and arrows, the Enemy might be beaten up from the water side: which stood the Romans in good stead. For, the Britains being troubled with the strangeness of the Gallies, the motion of their Oars, and the unusual kind of Engines, were somewhat dismayed, and began to retire back, and give way to the Romans. But, the Soldiers still lingering, and especially for fear of the depth of the Sea, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth Legion, desiring the gods, that it might fall out happily to the Legion; If you will, saith he, forsake your Eagle, O ye soldiers, and betray it to the Enemy; for my own part, I will do my duty, both to the Common-weal, and to my Imperator. And, having spoken this with a loud voice, he cast himself into the Sea, and carried the Eagle towards the Enemy. The Romans exhorting one another not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed, they all leaped out of the Ship: which, when others that were near at hand perceived, they followed them with as great alacrity, and pressed towards the Enemy to encounter with them.

The fight on both parts was very eager: the Romans (not being able to keep any order of Battle, nor to get any firm footing, nor to follow their Enginiers, for as much as every man kept with those Enginiers which he first met withal) were wonderfully troubled. But the Enemy, acquainted with the flats and shallows, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their ships, putting spurs to their horse, would set upon them unincumbered, and unprepared, and many of them would over-lay a few: others would get the advantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thickest Troops of them. Which, when Cæsar perceived, he caused the Ship-boats, and smaller vessels to be manned with Soldiers; and, where he saw need of help, he sent them to rescue such as were over-charged.

As soon as the Romans got footing on the firm Land, they made head together and charged the Enemy, and so put them to flight: but they were not able to follow them, nor take the Island at that time, for want of Horse-men, which thing was only wanting to Cæsar's wished fortune.

The fifth OBSERVATION.

Upon this circumstance of Landing, I must justly take occasion to handle that controversy, which hath been often debated by our English Captains; which is, whether it be better in question of an invasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an Enemy at his landing upon our Coast, or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our Forces into some inland place, and there attend to give him Battle. It seemeth, that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion, that we ought not, by any means, to encounter an Enemy at his landing, for so we might much endanger our selves and our Countrey, did ground themselves upon the authority of *Monsieur de Langey*, not observing the difference between an Island and a Continent. For, where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes as border one upon another in the same Continent: but, where their Territories are disjoined by so great a bar as the Ocean, and they have not such means to surprise one another, it were more folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appear by the sequel of this discourse. Wherein I will first lay down the reasons that may be urged, to prove it unsafe, to oppose an Enemy at his landing, nor as being urged by that party (for I never heard any probable motive from them, which might induce any such opinion) but set down by such as have looked into the controversies, both with experience and good judgement.

And first it may be objected, that it is a hard matter to resist an Enemy at his Landing, as well in regard of the uncertainty of place, as of time: for, being ignorant in what place he will attempt a Landing, we must either defend all places of access, or our intentions will prove mere frivolous; and, to perform that, it is requisite that our defensive forces be sufficient, according to the particular quality of every place subject to danger: which, considering the large extension of our Maritime parts, and the many Landing-places on our Coast, will require a greater number of men than this Island can afford. And, although it could furnish such a competent number, as might seem in some sort sufficient, yet the uncertainty of the time of the Enemies arrival, would require, that they should be lodged either upon, or near the places of danger many days, at least, if not many weeks, before the instant of their attempt; which would exhaust a greater mass of Treasure, than could be well afforded by the State.

Secondly, It may be objected, that all our landing-places are of such disadvantage for the defendants, that it were no safety at all to make head against him at the Landing: for, in as much as such places are open and plain, they yield no commodity to shelter the defendants from the fury of the Artillery, wherewith the Enemy will plentifully furnish their Long-boats and Landing Vessels; which beating upon the beach (for most of our Landing-places are of that quality) will so scatter them, that no man shall be able to endure the inconvenience thereof.

The third objection may arise from the disparity, both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either party. For the first, it must needs

be granted that the defendants, being to guard so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to every particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence.

Concerning the quality of the Forces, it is without question that a great and potent Prince (for such an one it must be that undertaketh to invade the Territories of so absolute and well-obeyed a Princess as her Majesty is) would draw out the flower of his soldiery wheresoever; besides the gallant Troops of Voluntaries which do commonly attend such services. Now these being thus qualified, and drawn into one head, and being to make as it were but one body, how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being uncertain) that the defendants should equal them with forces of like virtue and experience.

These are the reasons which may be drawn from the disadvantage which they have that go about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that have been urged by such as maintain this opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds: But before I proceed to the answer of these reasons, I will lay this down for a principle, That it is impossible for any foreign Prince, how puissant soever, to make such a preparation, as shall be fitting to invade a State so populous, and respective of their Sovereign, (notwithstanding the pretences devised to dissimble the same) but it must of necessity be discovered, before it can be made able to put any thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing infinite equipage which is required for so great a Fleet: But I will rest my self in the example of the year eighty eight, which proved the discovery of the pretended invasion, before it could come to execution.

Concerning therefore the first objection, it cannot indeed be denied, but the place of the Enemies landing will be doubtful, and therefore our care must generally extend it self to all places of access: but that our defensive forces are not sufficient in a competent manner to guard all such places, according as the necessity of them shall require, that is the point in question.

To prove that our Forces are sufficient; we must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take *Kent* for a precedent, as not altogether unacquainted with the state thereof, which if I deceive not my self, is a shore of as large extension, upon the maritime parts, as any other within this Kingdom. For the breadth thereof enlarging it self from the point of *Nesse* by *Lyde*, which is thickest most skirt upon the Coast of *Sussex*, unto *Margate* upon the Coast of *Essex*, is by computation about twenty four miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixth part thereof is not subject to the landing of such an Enemy as we speak of; partly in regard of the hugeness of the cliffs, which do inclose a great part of that skirt, and partly in regard that much of that quantity which may be landed upon, hath such eminent and difficult places near adjoining, as an Army that should put it self there on shore, should find it self, being opposed but by a small force, so frightened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparent ruin of their whole forces.

Farther, it cannot be denied but that generally along the Coast of *Kent* there are so many rocks, shelves, flats, and other impediments, that a Na-

vy of great ships can have no commodity to anchor near the shore; and for the most part the Coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchor: all which particularities duly considered, it will appear that this large skirt of *Kent* will afford a far less part fit for the landing of an Army, than was thought of at the first. And were it that so publick a treatise as this, would admit with good discretion, such an exact relation as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would undertake to make it so evident, by the particular description both of the number, quantity, and quality of the places themselves, as no Man of an indifferent judgment would imagine our Forces to be insufficient to afford every of them such a safe and sure guard, as shall be thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is sufficient to give such particular satisfaction in this publick discourse, give me leave, submitting my self always to better judgments, to give a general title of that number of Men, as would secure all places with a competent number of Men.

Having showed you before the circuit of the maritime parts of *Kent*, I would observe this order; first, to make a tripple division of all such forces as shall be appointed for this service; as for example, I will suppose the number to be twelve thousand; of which I would lodge three thousand about the point of *Nesse*, and three thousand about *Margate*, and six thousand about *Foulston*, which I take to be as it were the centre; for my greatest care should be so to dispose of them, as they might not only situate one another in the same line, but as every three bordereth one upon another, so they should mutually give help unto another, as occasion should be offered: as if the Enemy should attempt the landing about *Nesse*, not only the six thousand lodged as before, should march to their succours, but such also of the *Sussex* Forces, as were near unto that part, and so likewise of the rest. By which you may see, how great a force would in few hours be assembled for the reinforcing of any of these out-skirts, and the rather, forasmuch as the one half of the whole Forces are thus lodged in the centre of the Shire, which is nearer to all parts than any other place whatsoever. There would also in the quartering of them an especial care be had to the places of danger, as might be answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the Coast by Regiments and Companies, as the Country might afford best opportunity to entertain them.

Now concerning the latter part of this objection, which urgeth the uncertainty of time, when the enemy shall make his approaches; I hold it most requisite that our defensive Forces should be drawn into a head, before the Enemy should be discovered near our Coast: ready to put himself on shore, for it were a gross absurdity to imagine that Companies could upon such a sudden be assembled without confusion; and make so good a march, with such expedition, as the necessity of the occasion would require. Now, for that busbanding respect of her Majesties Coſſers, which is urged to such extremity, as it would be unsupportable for this State to bear; as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualify that supposed immoderate expence; so I assure my self, that Men of sound judgment will deem it much out of reason, to dispute about

Answer to the first objection.

about unnecessary thrift, when the whole Kingdom is brought in question of being made subject to a stranger.

Non iugulent homines furgans de nocte latrones!
Nos expetis/seris, ut te ipsum ferat?
Thieves rise by night to cut the throats of Men.
Will not thou then arise to save thy self?

The Enemy (peradventure) hath kept thirty thousand Men in pay two Months before, to make havoc of our Country, and to bring us into perpetual thraldom; shall we think it much to maintain sufficient Forces upon our Coast; to assure our selves that no such Enemy shall enter into our Country? The extremity of this charge would be qualified by our good capital, which would proportion our attendance with the necessity which is imposed upon us, to be careful in business of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to prove that our Forces are sufficient to keep the Sea-coast, and that the uncertainty of time, when the Enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder us from performing that duty which the care and respect of our Prince and Country imposeth upon every good subject; which is the substance of the first reason, which I set down in the beginning of this discourse.

The answer
to the
second reason.

Now concerning the second reason, which touches the disadvantage of the place, in regard of the fury of the Enemies Artillery; true it is, that such places as the Enemy commodiously of landing, are for the most part plain and open, and afford naturally no cover at all. What then? shall a foolish state every place as be fittest it, and use no Art to qualify the disadvantages thereof? or shall a Man forego the benefit of a place of advantage, rather than he will relieve with industry the disadvantage of some particular circumstance? I make no question but an ingenious Commander, being in seasonable time lodged with convenient Forces upon any of those places, yea upon the beach it self, which is as unapt to make defensible, as any place whatsoever, would use such industry, as might give sufficient security to his Forces, and overweigh the Enemy with advantage of place; especially considering that this age hath afforded such plentiful examples of admirable inventions in that behalf. But this cannot be done, if our Forces do not make head before the instant of the Enemies attempt; for our Commanders may have time time to make ready store of Gabions, and handbaskets, with such movable matter as shall be thought fit for that service.

Neither is this trouble any Man for I dare avouch that if our Forces are not drawn into a head before the Enemy be discovered upon the Coast, although we never meant to oppose their landing, but to cut them in their inland place to give them battle, our Commanders will be far to seek of many important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let us have but a reasonable time to be at our leisure of these necessities, and we will certainly overcome all these difficulties, and use the benefit of the first land to repel an Enemy, weakened with the sea, tossed with the yellow, troubled with his weapons, with many other hindrances and discouragements, which are presented unto him both from the Land and the Sea. He that saw

the landing of our Forces in the Island of Fial, in the year 97, can form what judge of the difficulty of that matter; for with the working of the Sea, the fitness of the Cliffs, and the troublemomeness of their Arms, the soldiers were so incumbered, that had not the Enemy been more than a coward, he might well with two hundred Men have kept us from entering any part of that Island.

Concerning the third Objection, this briefly shall be sufficient, that we are not so much to regard that our Forces do equal them in number, as to see that they be sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the Enemies landing; for we know that in places of advantage and difficult access, a small number is able to oppose a great, and we doubt not but all circumstances duly considered, we shall proportionally equal the Enemy both in number and quality of their Forces: always pre-supposed, that our state shall never be destitute of sufficient Forces trained and exercised in a competent manner, to defend their Country from foreign Enemies. For the neglect thereof, were to draw on such as for themselves are but too forward to make a prey of us, and to make us unapt not only to oppose an Enemies landing, but to defend our selves from being overrun, as other Nations living in security, without due regard thereof have been.

And thus much concerning the answer to those three reasons, which seem to prove that an Enemy is not to be resisted at his landing. Now if we do but look a little into the commodities, which follow upon the landing of an Enemy, we shall easily discover the dangerousness of this opinion: as first we give him leave to live upon the spoil of our Country; which cannot be prevented by any waiting, spoiling, or retiring of our provisions; in so plentiful a Country as this is, especially considering that we have no foreign Towns at all to repose our selves upon. Whereof we need no farther testimony than is delivered unto us out of the seventh Book of these Commentaries, in that War which Cæsar had with *Peregrinætaris*.

Secondly obedience, which at other times is willingly given to Princes, is greatly weakened at such times; whereby all necessary means to maintain a War is hardly drawn from the subject. Thirdly, opportunity is given to malecontents and ill-disposed persons, either to make head themselves, or to fly to the Enemy. Fourthly, his madness to adventure a Kingdom upon one stroke having it in our disposition to do otherwise: with many other disadvantages which the opportunity of any such occasion would discover.

The second OBSERVATION.

The word *Imperator*, which the Eagle-bearer attributeth to Cæsar, was the greatest title that could be given to a Roman Leader: and as *Zonaras* in his second Tome saith, was never given but upon some great exploit, and after a just victory obtained; and then in the place where the battle was fought, and the Enemy overthrown, the General was saluted by the name of *Imperator*, with the triumphant shout of the whole Army: by which acclamation, the soldiers gave testimony of his worth and made it equivalent with the most fortunate Commanders:

The answer
to the third
reason.

3. Anna.

This Ceremony was of great antiquity in the Roman Empire, as appeareth by many Histories, and namely by *Tacitus*, where he saith, that *Tiberius* gave that honour to *Blasius*, that he should be saluted *Imperator* by the Legions; which he thenceforth to be an ancient dignity belonging to great Captains, after they had foiled the Enemy with an eminent overthrow. But every Victory was not sufficient whereby they might challenge so great an honour, but there was required, (as it seemeth) a certain number of the Enemies to be slain. *Dionysius* in his second Book saith, that in old time the name of *Imperator* was never taken but upon great and admirable exploits: but in his time, ten thousand of the Enemy being slain in one battle, was a sufficient ground of that honour. *Cicero* saith, that two thousand slain in the place, especially of *Thracians*, *Spaniards*, or *Gallies*, did worthily merit the name of *Imperator*. Howsoever, it seemeth by the same Author, that there was a certain number of the Enemy required to be slain, where he saith, *Je iusta victoria Imperatorem appellatum*, that he was called *Imperator*, upon a due and full victory.

Phil. 14.

Lib. 3. epist. 9.

CHAP. XI.

The Britains make peace with Cæsar, but break it again upon the loss of the Roman shipping.

Cæsar,

THE Britains being overthrown in this battle, as soon as they had recovered their safety by flight, they presently dispatched Messengers to Cæsar, to intreat for peace, promising hostages, and obedience in whatsoever he commanded. And with these Ambassadors returned *Comius* of *Arras*, whom Cæsar had sent before into Britany, and whom the Britains at his first landing with Cæsar's mandates, had seized upon and thrown into prison; but after the battle they released him, and becoming now suitors for peace, threw all the blame there of upon the multitude, excusing themselves as ignorant of it, and so desiring to be pardoned. Cæsar complained, that whereas they sent unto him into Gallia to desire peace, notwithstanding as his coming they made War against him without any cause or reason at all, but excusing it by their ignorance, he commanded Hostages to be delivered unto him: which they presently performed in part, and the rest being to be fetch farther off, they promised should likewise be rendered within a short time. In the mean while they commanded their people to return to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters, to commend themselves and their States to Cæsar. The Peace being thus concluded, four days after that Cæsar came into Britany, the eighteen ships which were appointed for the Horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle wind: and approaching so near the Coast of

Britany, that they were within view of the Roman Camp, there arose such a sudden tempest, that none of them were able to hold their course; but some of them returned to the Port from whence they came, other some were cast upon the lower part of the Island, which lieth to the Westward, and there casting anchor, took in so much water, that they were forced to commit themselves again to the sea, and direct their course to the Coast of Gallia. The same night it hapned that the Moon being in the full, the Tides were very high in those Seas; whereof the Romans being altogether ignorant, both the Gallies that transported the Army, which were drawn up upon the shore, were filled with the Tide, and the ships of burthen that lay at Anchor, were shaken with the tempest. Neither was there any help to be given unto them; so that many of them were rent and split in pieces, and the rest left both their Anchors, Cables and other tackling, and by that means became altogether unserviceable. Whereat the whole Army was exceedingly troubled; for there was no other shipping to recarry them back again, neither had they any necessities to new furnish the old; and every Man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia, forasmuch as there was no provision of Corn in those places where they were. Which thing being known to the Princes of Britany, that were assembled to confer of such things as Cæsar had commanded them to perform, when they understood that the Romans wanted both their Horsemen, shipping and provision of Corn, and conjecturing of the paucity of their Forces, by the small circuit of their Camp, (that which made it of less compass then usual being, that Cæsar had transported his Soldiers without such necessary carriages, as they used to take with them) they thought it their best course to rebel, and to keep the Romans from Corn and Convoys of Provision, and so prolong the matter until winter came on. For they thought that if these were once overthrown and cut off from returning into Gallie, never any Man would afterward adventure to bring an Army into Britany. Therefore they conspired again the second time, and conveyed themselves by stealth out of the Camp and got their Men privately out of the fields, to make head in some convenient place against the Romans.

The First OBSERVATION.

Concerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes thereof, it hath already been handled in the second Book: to which I will add thus much, as may serve to shew how the Romans became so ignorant of the Spring Tides, which happen in the full and new of the Moon. It is obvious by experience, that the motion of this watery Element, is altogether directed by the course of the Moon; wherein the exercise of her gravity, according as the fluidity of the matter quiesces, and her influence, and forasmuch as all the Mediterranean Seas, and such Gulfs as are inclosed in sinews and bosoms of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallness of their quantity, are not so capable of celestial power as the Ocean itself; it consequently followeth, that the Tulean seas, wherewith the Romans were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the Moon, as the main Sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit, and through the plentiful abundance of its parts, better answereth the virtue of the Moon. The Ocean therefore being thus obedient to the course of the celestial bodies, taking her course of flowing from the North, falleth with such a current between the Orcaades and the main of Norwedge, that the silthiest channel between England and France with swelling Tides, and maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters than in any other parts of the World. And hence it happeneth that our River of Thames, lying with her mouth so ready to receive the Tide as it cometh and having withal a plain levelled belly, and a very small fresh current, taketh the Tide as far into the Land, as any other known River of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ignorant of the Spring-Tides in the full of the Moon.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Such as either by their own experience, or otherwise by observation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the Government of Commonwealths, are not ignorant with what difficulty a Nation that either hath long lived in liberty, or been governed by Commanders of their own choosing, is made subject to the yoke of bondage, or reduced under the obedience of a stranger. For as we are apt by the same nature we desire to civil society, so by the same nature we desire a free disposition of our selves and possessions, as the chief end of the said society: and therefore in the Government of a subdued State, what loss or disadvantage happeneth to the Victor, or how indirectly soever it concerneth the bond of their thraldome, the captive people behold it as a part of their adversities overthrow, and conceive thereupon such spirits as answer the greatness of their hope, and fort with the strength of their will, which always maketh that seem easy to be effected which it deserveth. And this was the reason that the Britains altered their resolution of peace; upon the loss which the Romans had received in their shipping.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar new trimmeth his late shaken Navy; the Britains set upon the Romans, as they harveſted, but were put off by Cæſar.

Cæſar, although he had not discovered their determination, yet conjecturing of the event by the loss of his Shipping, and by their delay of giving up Hostages, provided against all chances; for he brought Corn daily out of the fields into his Camp; and took the bulk of such Ships as were most dismembered, and with the timber and brass thereof, he mended the rest that were beaten with the tempest, causing other necessities to be brought out of Gallia. Which being handled with the great industry and travel of the Soldiers, he lost only twelve Ships, and made the other able to abide the Sea.

While these things were in action, the seventh Legion being sent out by course to fetch in Corn, and little suspecting any motion of War, as part of the Soldiers continued in the field, and the rest went and came between them and the Camp, the station that watched before the gate of the Camp, gave advertisement to Cæſar, that the same way which the Legion went, there appeared a greater dust than was usually seen. Cæſar suspecting that which indeed was true, that the Britains were entered into some new resolution, he took those two Cohorts which were in station before the Port, commanding other two to take their place, and the rest to arm themselves, and presently to follow him; and went that way, where the dust was descried. And when he had marched some distance from the Camp, he saw his Men overcharged with the Enemy, and scarce able to sustain the assault, the Legion thronged together on a heap, and weapons cast from all parts amongst them. For when they had harveſted all other quarters, there remained one piece of corn, whither the Enemy suspected the Romans would at last come, and in the night time conveyed themselves secretly into the woods, where they continued until the Romans were come into the field: and as they saw them disarmed, dispersed, and occupied in reaping, they suddenly set upon them, and slaying some few of them, routed the rest, and incommoded them about with their Horsemen, and Chariots. Their manner of fight with Chariots was, first to ride up and down, and cast their weapons as they saw advantage, and with the terror of their horses, and rattling of their wheels to disorder the Companies; and when

when they had wound themselves between any troops of horse, they forsook their Chariots, and fought on foot: in the mean time the guiders of their Chariots would drive a little aside, and so place themselves, that if their Masters needed any help, they might have an easy passage unto them. And thus they performed in all their fights, both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firm stability of footmen; and were so ready with daily practice, that they could stay in the declivity of a steep hill, and turn short, or moderate their going, as it seemed best unto them, and run along the beam of the Coach, and rest upon the yoke, or harness of their horse, and return as speedily again at their pleasure. The Romans being thus troubled, Cæſar came to rescue them in very good time: for, at his coming, the Enemy stood still, and the soldiers gathered their spirits unto them, and began to renew their courage that was almost spent. Cæſar taking it an unfit time, either to provoke the Enemy, or to give him battle, continued a while in the same place, and then returned with the Legions into the Camp. While these things were a doing, and the Romans thus busied, the Britains that were in the field conveyed themselves all away.

The first OBSERVATION.

By this we plainly find, that there were usually two Cohorts (which, according to the rate of One hundred and twenty in a Manipule, amounted to the number of 240 men) which kept the day-watch before the Gate of the Camp, and were always in readiness upon any service. The commodious wherewithal by this accident: for, considering that the advertisement required haste, and speedy recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue, to have so many men ready to march forward at the first motion, that they might give what help they could until the rest of their followes came in.

The second OBSERVATION.

Their manner of fight with Chariots is very particularly described by Cæſar, and needeth not to be stood upon any longer; only I observe, that neither in Gallia, nor any other Country of Europe, the use of Chariots is ever mentioned; but, they have ever been attributed as a peculiar fight unto the Eastern Countries, as fittable to the plain and level situation of the place, whereof we find often mention in the Scripture. Which may serve for an argument to Geoffrey of Monmouth, to prove the Britains descent from Troy in Asia, where we likewise find mention of such Chariots.

The third OBSERVATION.

Thirdly, we may observe the discreet and moderate temper of his valour, and the means he used to make his Soldiers con-

dent in his directions; for, notwithstanding the Britains had exceedingly urged him to make hazard of a present revenge; yet, finding it an unfit time (in as much as his men had been somewhat troubled with the fury of the Britains), he thought it best to expect some other opportunity. And again, to avoid the inconveniences of a fearful retreat, he continued a while in the same place, to imbolden his men with the sight of the Enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full persuasion in his Soldiers, that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a careful respect of their safety: which gave his men resolution when they were carried upon service, being assured, that what service soever they were employed upon, was most diligently to be performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate issue of that War: whereas, if they had perceived that headstrong fury (which carrieth men on with a desire of victory, and never looketh into the means wherby it may be obtained) had directed the course of their proceedings, they might with reason have drawn back from such employments, and valued their safety above the ill of such an enterprise. And hence ariseth that confident opinion, which the Soldiers have of a good General; which is a matter of great importance in the course of War.

CHAP. XIII.

The Britains make head with their Forces; and are beaten by Cæſar: his return into Gallia.

After this, for many days together, there followed such tempests and foul weather, that both the Romans were constrained to keep their Camp, and the Britains were kept from attempting any thing against them. But, in the mean time they sent Messengers into all quarters, publishing the small number of the Roman Forces, and amplifying the greatness of the booty, and the easy means offered unto them of perpetual liberty, if they could take the Roman Camp. Shortly upon this, having gathered a great company both of Horse and Foot, they came to the place where the Romans were incamped. Cæſar (although he foresaw the event, by that which before had happened, that if the Enemy were beaten back, he would avoid the danger by flight) yet having some thirty Horse, which Comius of Arras had carried with him as he came into Britany, he imboldened his Legions before his Camp, and so gave them Battle. The Enemy, not being able to bear the assault of the Roman Soldiers, turned their backs and fled: the Romans followed them as far as they could by running on foot, and, after a great slaughter, with the burning of their Towns far and near, they returned to their Camp. The same day the Britains sent

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Messengers

Messengers to Cæsar, to intreat for Peace; whom he commanded to double their number of Hostages, which he commanded to be carried into Gallia. And, for as much as the Equinoctium was at hand, he thought it not safe to put himself to the Sea in winter, with such weak Shipping: and therefore, having got a convenient time, he busied sail a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe into the Continent. Two of these ships of warlike, not being able to reach the same Haven, put in somewhat lower into the Land: the Soldiers that were in them, which were about three hundred, being set on shore, and marching towards their Camp, the Morini, with whom Cæsar at his going into Britany had made peace, in hope of a booty, first with a few of their men stood about them, commanding them upon pain of death, to lay down their weapons: and, as the Romans, by casting themselves into an Orbe, began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them, there were suddenly gathered together about Six thousand of the Enemy. Which thing being known, Cæsar sent out all the Horsemen to relieve them. In the mean time the Romans sustained the force of the Enemy, and fought valiantly about the space of four hours; and receiving themselves only some few wounds, they slew many of the Enemy. As soon as the Roman Horsemen came in sight, the Enemy cast away their weapons and fled, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.

OBSERVATION.

Of all the figures which the *Talizi* have chosen to make use of in Military Affairs, the circle hath ever been taken for the fittest to be applied in the defensive part, as including with an equal circuit on all parts, whatsoever is contained within the circumference of that Area: and therefore Geometry termeth a circumference a simple line, for as much as if you alter the site of the parts, and transport one Arch into the place of another, the Figure notwithstanding will remain the same, because of the equal bending of the line throughout the whole circumference. Which property, as it proveth an uniformity of strength in the whole circuit, so that it cannot be said, that this is the beginning, or this is the end; this is front, or this is flank: so doth that which *Euclid* doth demonstrate in the third of his Elements, concerning the small affinity between a right line and a circle (which being drawn to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) shew the greatness of this strength, in regard of any other line, by which it may be broken. Which howsoever they seem as speculative qualities, conceived rather by intellectual discourse, then manifested to sensible apprehension: yet, for as much as experience hath proved the strength of this figure in a defensive part, above any other manner of im-

battelling, let us not neglect the knowledge of these natural properties, which discover the causes of this effect: neither let us neglect this part of Military knowledge, being so strong a means to maintain valour, and the firmness of all our ability: for order correspondent to circumstances is the whole strength and power of an Army. Neither ought there any action in a well-ordered discipline to be irregular, or void of order. And therefore the Romans did neither see, nor sleep without the direction of the Consul, or chief Commander; otherwise their valour might rather have been termed fury than virtue: but, when their courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time, it never failed, as long as the laid order continued perfect.

It appeareth therefore, how important it is for a Commander to look into the diversity of orders for imbatelling, and to weigh the nature thereof, that he may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The Romans termed this figure *Orbis*, which signifieth a round body, both with a concave and a convex surface: in resemblance whereof, I understand this Orbe of men imbatelled to be so named; which might peradventure consist of five, or more, or fewer ranks, including one another, after the nature of so many circles described about one Centre; so that either the middle thereof remained void, or otherwise contained such carriages and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This form of imbatelling was never used but in great extremity: for, as it was the safest of all other, so it gave suspicion to the Soldiers of exceeding danger, which abated much of their heat in battle; as will hereafter appear by the testimony of Cæsar himself in the Fifth Commentary, upon the occasion which happened unto *Sabinus* and *Cona*.

CHAP. XIV.

The next day Cæsar sent Titus Labienus a Legate, with those Legions which he had brought out of Britany, against the revolted Morini; who, having no place of refuge, because their bows and spears were dried up, where they had sheltered themselves the year before, they all fell under the power of his mercy. Q. Titurius and A. Cotta the Legates, who had led the Legions against the Menapii, after they had wasted their fields, cut up their Corn, burned their houses (for the Menapii were all hid in thick woods) returned to Cæsar. These things being thus ended, Cæsar placed the wintering Camps of all his Legions amongst the Belgæ; to which place two only of all the Cities in Britany sent hostages unto him, the rest neglecting it. These things being thus ended, Cæsar placed the wintering Camps of all his Legions amongst the Belgæ; to which place two only of all the Cities in Britany sent hostages unto him, the rest neglecting it. These wars being thus ended, upon the relation of Cæsar's letters, the Senate decreed a Supplication for the space of Twenty dayes.

OBSER-

OBSERVATION.

In the end of the second Commentary, we read of a Supplication granted by the Senate for fifteen dayes; which was never granted to any man before that time, since the first building of the City: but, for as much as in this fourth year of the Wars in Gallia, it was augmented from fifteen unto twenty dayes, I thought it fit to refer the handling thereof unto this place. We are therefore to understand, that whensoever a Roman General had carried himself well in the Wars, by gaining a Victory, or enlarging the bounds of their Empire, that then the Senate did decree a Supplication to the gods, in the name of that Captain. And, this dignity was much sought after: not only because it was a matter of great honor, that in their names the Temples of their gods should be opened, and their Victories acknowledged, with the concourse and gratulation of the Roman People; but also because a Supplication was commonly the great-runner of a Triumph, which was the greatest honor in the Roman Government: And therefore *Cato* nameth it the prerogative of a Triumph. And *Livie*, in his 26 Book, saith, that it was long disputed on in the Senate, how they could deny one that was there present to Triumph, whose absence they had honoured with Supplication and Thanksgiving to the gods, for things happily effected. The manner of the Ceremony was, that after the Magistrate had publicly Proclaim-

ed it, with this form or stile, *Quod bene & feliciter rempublicam administrasset*, that he had happily and successfully administrated the affairs of the Commonwealth, the Roman people, clothed in white garments, and crowned with Garlands, went to all the Temples of the gods, and there offered sacrifices, to gratulate the Victory in the name of the General. In which time they were forbidden all other businesses but that which pertained to this solemnity. It seemeth, that this time of Supplication was at first included within one or two dayes at the most, as appeareth by *Livie* in his third Book, where he saith, that the Victory gained by two several Battels was spitefully shut up by the Senate in one dayes Supplication; the People, of their own accord, keeping the next day holy, and celebrating it with greater devotion then the former.

Upon the Victory which *Camillus* had against the *Peii*, there were granted four dayes of supplication; to which there was afterward a day added, which was the usual time of Supplication, unto the time that *Pompey* ended the War, which they called *Mithridaticum*, when the usual time of five dayes was doubled and made ten, and, in the second of these Commentaries made fifteen, and now brought to twenty dayes. Which setteth forth the incitements and rewards of well doing, which the Romans propounded both at home and abroad, to such as endeavoured to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge to the benefit of their Commonwealths. And thus endeth the fourth Commentary;

Lib. 14.
P. Cicero.

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THE Fifth Commentary OF THE WARS in GALLIA.

The ARGUMENT.

Cæsar causeth a great Navy to be built in Gallia: he carrieth five Legions into Britany, where he maketh War with the Britans on both sides the River Thames. At his return into Gallia most of the Galles revolt; and first the Eburones, under the conduction of Ambiorix, set upon the Camp of Q. Titurius the Legate, whom they circumvent by subtilty, and then bessege the Camp of Cicero: but are put by, and their Army overthrown by Cæsar.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar returneth into Gallia: findeth there great store of Shipping made by the Soldiers, and commandeth it to be brought to the Haven Itius.

Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius being Consuls, Cæsar, at his going into Italy, from his Winter-quarters (which he yearly did) gave order to the Legates to build as many ships that winter, as possibly they could, and to repair the old; commanding them to be built of a lower pitch, then those which are used in the Mediterranean Sea, for the speedy lading and unlading of them, and because the Tides in these Seas were very great: and, for as much as he was to transport great store of Horse, he commanded them to be made flatter in the bottome, then such as were usual in other places, and all of them to be made for the use of Oares, to which purpose their low building served very convenient-

ly. Other necessities and furniture for rigging he gave order to have brought out of Spain. Cæsar, after an Assembly of the States in Lombardy, went presently into Illyricum, where he heard, that the Pirustæ infected the Province by their incursions. As soon as he came thither, he levied soldiers, and appointed them a rendezvous. Which the Pirustæ hearing of, they sent Embassadors presently to him, excusing the business as not done by publick consent, and expressing a readiness to make any satisfaction that should be demanded. Cæsar having heard their message, appointed them to give hostages, and to bring them by such a day, or else they must expect nothing but War and Ruine to their City. Hostages were brought by the appointed time; whereupon Cæsar deputed certain to arbitrate differences between the Cities, and to punish as they saw cause for it. These things being over, he returned forthwith into Lombardy, and thence to his Army in Gallia.

The

THE OBSERVATION.

This Itius, Porus Floide, thinketh to be Callis, others take it to be Saint Omer, partly in regard of the situation of the place, which being in it self very low, hath notwithstanding very high banks, which incloseth the Town about, and in times past, was a very large haven. To this may be added the distance from this Town to the next Continent of the Island of Britany, which Strabo maketh to contain three hundred and twenty stadia, which agreeth to the French computation of thirteen Leagues: Cæsar maketh it thirty mile. This is the Haven which Pliny calleth, Britannicum portum Morinorum.

CHAP. II.

Cæsar preventeth new motions amongst the Treviri, and goeth to his Navy. Dumnorix refuseth to accompany him into Britany; his flight and death.

Cæsar.

Cæsar leaving Soldiers enough to do that business, himself marched with four Legions and eight hundred horse into the Country of the Treviri, in regard they neither came to the assembly of States, nor were obedient to his commands, and were farther reported to sollicite the Germans beyond the Rhene to new commotions. This City was the most powerful of all Gallia, for matter of horse, having likewise a great force of foot, and lying so conveniently upon the Rhene for assistance: wherein there was at this time a contention betwixt Induciomarus and Cingetorix, who should be chief Ruler, Cingetorix as soon as he heard of the coming of Cæsar with his Army, came in to him, assuring him of the fidelity of his party, and their constancy to the friendship of the people of Rome; discovering withal unto him, the present proceedings amongst the Treviri. On the contrary, Induciomarus gathered together what horse and foot he could, resolving upon nothing else than War: securing all the old and young folk, not fit to bear Arms, in the wood Arduenna, which is a very large wood, beginning at the Rhene, and running through the middle of the Treviri, to the borders of the people of Rheims. While things were thus preparing, divers of the chief of the City, some through the favor they bore to Cingetorix, others affrighted at the coming of our Army, came forth to Cæsar; and since they could not do it for the whole City, they endeavored every man to make his own peace. Induciomarus seeing this, and fearing to be left at last alone, sent Embassadors to Cæsar, excusing what he had done in not coming to him, which he said was done only to keep the City the better in obedience; for if all the No-

bility should have left it, the common people would have been apt to have made new troubles; that the City was now at his command, and if Cæsar would give leave, he was ready to wait upon him in his Camp, and to lay the lives and fortunes of himself, and the whole City at his feet. Cæsar, albeit he well knew why all this was spoken, as also what had put him besides his former resolution, yet rather then spend the summer in those parts, having all things in readiness for his British War, he commanded Induciomarus to come to him, and bring two hundred hostages with him. Induciomarus did as Cæsar commanded, and withal, brought along with him his son, and all that had any near relation unto him, whom Cæsar bade be of good cheer, and exhorted to continue firm in his duty and fidelity. After this calling to him the chief of the Treviri, man by man, he reconciled them to Cingetorix, as well looking at the desert of the man himself, as at his own interest and advantage, to have such a man bear the chief sway in his City, who had expressed so notable affection and good will towards him in this business. It troubled Induciomarus not a little to find his respect and authority thus impaired; insomuch, that he who before was no friend to us, being vexed at this, became a bitter enemy.

Things thus settled here, Cæsar came with his Legions back to the Port called Itius, where he understood, that forty Ships which were built amongst the Meldæ, were hindered by Tempests, that they could not keep their course, but were forced back from whence they came; the rest were well provided and ready to set sail. Hither also were gathered all the Cavalry in France, to the number of four thousand, and the chief Men of every City, some few of which, whose fidelity Cæsar had had experience of, he intended to leave at home, and to take the rest along with him for hostages, left in his absence they should begin any new stir in Gallia.

Amongst the rest was Dumnorix the Heduan formerly mentioned. Him of all the rest Cæsar intended to take with him, knowing him to be a Man desirous of change, greedy of rule, a Man of courage and resolution, and one of greatest authority amongst the Galles. Besides this, Dumnorix had given out at a meeting of the Hedui, that Cæsar had conferred upon him the Government of the City, which much troubled the Hedui, yet they durst not send any man to Cæsar, to binder or revoke it. This Cæsar came to hear of, when he saw he must go with the

CHAP. III.

Cæsar saileth into Britain; landeth his Forces, and seeketh the Enemy.

Cæsar.

the rest, first he besought with all the intreaties he could, that he might stay in Gallia, alledging one while, that he was afraid of the sea, having as yet never been used to sailing; another while that he had some religious accounts that kept him here. When he perceived this would not serve his turn, but go he must, he began to deal with the rest of the chief men of the Galles, taking them man by man, and persuading them to continue in their own Country; telling them, that it was not without ground, Cæsar went about to despoil Gallia thus of its Nobility, his drift being to carry them over into Britain, and there murder them, whom he was afraid to put to death amongst their friends at home. He went farther to engage them to fidelity, and to tie them by oath to proceed upon joint consultations to the doing of what should be thought of most concernment and behoof for the good of Gallia. These things were by divers persons related to Cæsar, who as soon as he knew thereof, in regard of the great respect he bore to the Heduan State, he resolved by all means possible to curb and deter Dumnorix from those courses, and in regard that he saw him thus to increase in madness, he thought it seasonable to prevent his endamaging either the Commonwealth or himself. So staying in the place where he was, about twenty five days, the North-west wind, (a wind that usually blowes in those parts) all that while hindering his putting to sea; he made it much of his business to keep Dumnorix quiet, and yet at the same time to spy out the whole drift of his designs. At last the wind and weather serving, he commanded his Soldiers and horsemen on shipboard. And whilst every mans mind was taken up about this, Dumnorix, with the rest of the Heduan Horsemen, unknown to Cæsar, had left the Camp, and were marching homewards; which when Cæsar heard, he stopt his voyage, and letting every thing else alone, sent a great part of his Cavalry to attack him, and bring him back, with command that if he stood upon his defence and did not readily obey, they should dispatch him. For he could not believe that this Man could mean any good to him if he once got home, since he made so light of his commands when present with him. The Horse having overtaken him, he stood upon his guard and made resistance, imploring also the aid of those that were with him; still crying out, that he was a free-born Man, and of a free City. Whereupon they, as they were commanded, hemmed him in, and so killed him: the Heduan Horsemen returning every Man to Cæsar.

Cæsar having prepared all things in readiness, he left Labienus in the Continent with three Legions, and two thousand Horse, both to keep the Haven, and make provision of corn, and also to observe the motion of the Galles, and to do according as he saw time and occasion, and with five Legions, and the like number of horse as he left in the Continent, about sun-setting he put out to sea with a soft south wind, which continued until midnight; and then ceasing he was carried with the Tide until the morning when he perceived that the Island lay on his left hand; and again, as the Tide changed, he laboured by rowing, to reach that part of the Island, where he had found good landing the year before. Wherein the Soldiers deserved great commendation; for by strength and force of Oars, they made their great Ships of burthen to keep way with the Gallies. About high noon they arrived in Britany, with all their Ships; neither was there any Enemies seen in that place: but as afterward Cæsar understood by the Captives, the Britans had been there with a great power, but being terrified with the infinite number of shipping, which they discovered from the Shore, (for with the ships of provision, and private Vessels, which several persons had for their own convenience, there were in all above eight hundred) they forsook the Shore, and hid themselves in the upland Country. Cæsar having landed his Men, and chosen a convenient place to incamp, as soon as he understood by the Captives where the Enemy lay, in the third watch of the night, he marched towards them; leaving ten cohorts, and three hundred horse under Quintus Atrius for a Garrison to his Shipping, which he left feared, because it lay at anchor in a soft and open shore. He marched that night about twelve mile before he found the Enemy. The Britans finding out their horse and chariots to a River that ran between them and the Romans, and having the advantage of the upper ground, began to binder the Romans, and to give them battles; but being beaten back by our horsemen, they conveyed themselves into a wood. The place was strongly fortified both by Art and Nature, and made for a defence (as it seemeth) in their civil Wars, for all the entrances were shut up with great trees layd over athwart the passages

passages. And the Britans shewed themselves out of the wood both here and there, not suffering the Romans to enter the fortification. But the Soldiers of the seventh Legion with a Tesado which they made, and a Mount which they raised, took the place, and drove them all out of the woods, without any loss at all, saving some few wounds which they received. But Cæsar forbade his Men to follow after them with any long pursuit, because he was both ignorant of the place; and a great part of that day being spent, he would employ the rest thereof in the fortification of his Camp.

OBSERVATION.

Cæsar having taken what assurance of peace he could with the Galles, both by carrying the chiefest of their Princes with him, and by leaving three Legions in the Continent to keep the vulgar people in obedience; he embarked all his men at one place, that they might be all partakers of the same casualties, and take the benefit of the same adventures; which being neglected the year before, drew him into many inconveniences for want of horse, which being embarked at another Haven, met with other chances, and saw other fortunes, and never came to him into Britany. The place of landing in this second voyage, was the same where he landed the year before; and by the circumstances of this history, may agree with that which tradition hath delivered of Deale in Kent, where it is said that Cæsar landed. In the first year we find, that he never removed his Camp from the sea shore, where he first seated himself; although his Men went out to bring in corn, as far as they might well return again at night: but now he entered further into the Island, and within twelve miles march came unto a River, which must needs be that of Canterbury, which falleth into the Sea at Sandwich.

In that he saith, that the Garrison of his shipping consisted of ten Cohorts, which I have said to be a Legion: we must understand that Cæsar left not an entire Legion in that Garrison; but he took ten Cohorts out of his whole Forces, peradventure two out of every Legion, and appointed them to take the charge of his shipping.

CHAP. IV.

Cæsar returneth to his Navies, to take order for such losses as had happened by tempest the night before.

Cæsar.

The next day early in the morning he divided his forces into three companies, and sent them out to pursue the Enemy: but before they had marched any far distance, and came to have the reward of the Enemy in view, there came news from Q. Atrius, with whom he left the ten Cohorts, and the charge of the shipping, that the night

before there was such a tempest at sea, that the whole Navy was either sore beaten, or cast on shore; and that neither anchor nor cable could hold them, nor yet the Sailers, endure the force of the weather: and that there was great loss in the shipping, by running against one another in the violence of the tempest.

Upon this news Cæsar caused the Legions to be called back again, and to cease for that time from following the Enemy any farther. He himself returned to the Navy: where he found that to be true which he had heard, and that about forty ships were lost, and the rest not to be repaired: but with great industry and pains: first therefore he chose shipwrights and carpenters out of their Legions, and caused others to be sent for out of Gallia, and wrote to Labienus, to make ready what Shipping he could. And although it seemed a matter of great difficulty and much labour, yet he thought it best to hale up all the Ships on shore, and to inclose them within the fortification of his Camp. In this business he spent ten days, without intermission either of night or day, until he had drawn up the Ships, and strongly fortified the Camp, leaving the same Garrison which was there before, to defend it.

OBSERVATION.

Wherein we may behold the true Image of undaunted valor, and the horrible industry (as Tully termeth it) which he used to prevent Fortune of her stroke in his business, and comprehend casualties and future contingents within the compass of order, and the bounds of his own power; being able in ten days space to set almost eight hundred ships from the hazard of wind and weather, and to make his Camp the Road for his Navy, that so he might rest secure of a means to return at his pleasure.

CHAP. V.

The Britans make Cassivellaunus General in this War. The Island and the manner of the people described.

Cæsar returning to the place from whence he came, found far greater Forces of the Britans there assembled, then he left when he went to the Navy: and that by publick consent of the Britans, the whole government of that War was given to Cassivellaunus, whose Kingdom lay divided from the maritime States with the River Thames, beginning at the Sea, and extending it self fourscore miles into the Island. This Cassivellaunus made continual War with his neighbour States: but upon the coming of the

Cæsar.

the Romans; they all forgot their home-bred quarrels, and cast the whole Government upon his shoulders, as the fittest to direct in that War.

The inner part of Britany is inhabited by such as memory records to be born in the Island; and the maritime Coast by such as came out of Belgia, either to make incursions or invasions; and after the War was ended, they continued in the possessions they had gained, and were called by the name of the Cities from whence they came. The country is very populous, and well inhabited with bonser, much like unto them in Gallia. They have great store of cattel; and use brass for money, or iron rings weighed at a certain rate. In the Mediterranean parts there is found great quantity of Lym, and in the maritime parts, Iron; but they have but little of that: their brass is brought in by other Nations. They have all sorts of trees that they have in Gallia, excepting the Fig and the Beech. Their Religion will not suffer them to eat either Hare, Hen or Goose, notwithstanding they have of all sorts, as well for novelty as variety. The Country is more temperate, and not so cold as Gallia. The Island lyeth tri-angle-wise, whereof one side confronteth Gallia, of which side that angle wherein Kent is, the usual place of landing from Gallia, pointeth to the East, and the other angle to the South. This side containeth about 500 mile. Another side lyeth toward Spain and the West, that way where Ireland lyeth, being an Island half as big as England, and as far distant from it as Gallia. In the mid-way between England and Ireland lyeth an Island called Mona, besides many other smaller Islands; of which some write, that in winter time for thirty days together, they have continual night, whereof we learned nothing by inquiry; only we found by certain measures of water, that the nights in England were shorter than in the Continent. The length of this side, according to the opinion of the Inhabitants, containeth seven hundred miles. The third side lyeth to the North and the open sea, saving that this angle doth somewhat point towards Germany. This side is thought to contain eight hundred miles. And so the whole Island containeth in circuit 2000 miles. Of all the Inhabitants they of Kent are most courteous and civil; all their Country bordering upon the Sea, and little differing from the fashion of Gallia. Most of the in-land people live no Corn, but live with Milk and flesh, clothed with skins; and having their faces painted

with a blew colour, to the end they may seem more terrible in fight: they have the hair of their head long, having all other parts of their body shaven saving their upper lip. Their wives are common to ten or twelve, especially brethren with brethren, and parents with children; but the children that are born, are put unto them, unto whom the Mother was first given in marriage.

OBSERVATION.

IN the descriptions of the ancient Britans, we may first observe their pedigree, according to the Heraldry of that time; wherein we must understand, that in those ages the Nations of the World thought it no small honour to derive their descent from a certain beginning, and to make either some of their gods, or some Man of famous memory the Father of that progeny, and founder of their State; that so they might promise a perpetual continuance to their government, being first laid and established by so powerful a means. But if this failed, they then braged of antiquity, and cast all their glory upon the fertility of their soil: being so strong and fruitful: that it yielded of it self such a people as they were. And so weread how the Athenians, so far as they were ignorant from whence they came, were an oaken leaf, in token that they were bred of the earth where they dwelled. And hereupon also grew the controversy between the Egyptians and the Syrians; concerning antiquity, wherein the Egyptians seemed to have great advantage, because of the fertility and heat of their Country; whereas the Syrians inhabited a cold climate, unfruitful, and an Enemy to generation. Of this sort were the Britans that inhabited the mediterranean part of the Island: who not knowing from whence they came; nor who first brought them thither, satisfied themselves with that common received opinion, that they were born and bred of the earth. The sea-coast was possessed by such as came out of the Continent, and retained the names of the Cities from whence they came, as a memorial of their progenitors.

The form of the Island is very well described, and measured out according to the scale of our modern Geographers. For concerning the difference of longitude between the Eastern angle of Kent, and the farthest point of Cornwall, they make it eight degrees; which in a manner jumpeth with Cæsar's dimension. The other sides are somewhat longer; and therefore Tacitus in the life of Agricola, compareth it to a Carpenters Axe, making that side which bordereth upon France to resemble the edge, and the other two sides to incline by little and little one towards another, and so make the Island narrower at the top, according to the form of that instrument. He setteth down the whole compais of the Island, according to the manner of the ancient Geographers; who by the quantity of the circuit, did usually judge of the content, not considering that the Area of every figure, dependeth as well on the quantity of the angle, as the length of the side.

Concerning

Concerning the temperature of Britany in regard of the cold Winters in France, we must understand, that Britany hath ever been found of a more temperate constitution, in regard of sharp and cold Winters, than any other Country lying under the same parallel. Whether the cause thereof may be imputed to the continual motion of the Sea about the Island, which begetteth heat, as some have imagined; or to the site thereof, in regard of other Continents, from whence the wind always riseth, and carrieth with it the nature of the Country by which it passeth; and so the Island having no other Continent lying North to it, from whence the wind may rise, but all for the most part upon the South, hath no such cold Winds to distemper it, as other parts of Germany, which are under the same parallel: but, the Southern Wind, which is so frequent in Britany, tempereth the Air with a mild disposition, and so keepeth it warm; or whether it be some other unknown cause, our Philosophers rest unsatisfied. But, as touching Gallia, it may be said, that for as much as it beareth more to the South than this Island doth, the air thereof (by reason of the continual heat) is of a far purer disposition; and so pierceth more then this groffer Air of Britany, and carrieth the cold further into the pores; and so seemeth sharper, and of a far colder disposition. This Island which Cæsar nameth Mona, is known at this time by the name of Man, and lieth between Cumberland and Ireland. Ptolemy calleth it Mona-dia. Tacitus calleth Anglesey by the name of Mona, peradventure from the nomination of the Britans, who called it *Yr mon*, the Land of Mon.

Concerning those places where the night continueth in the midst of Winter for thirty days together, they must be sited six degrees beyond the Circle Arctick, and have a day in summer of like continuance, according to the rules of Astronomy. In that he found the nights in Britany shorter then in the Continent, we must understand it to be only in summer: for, the more oblique the horizon is, the more uneven are the portions of the diurnal circles which it cutteth; and, the nearer it cometh to a right Horizon, the nearer it cometh to an equality of day and night; and hence it happeneth, that in Summer time, the nights in France are longer then here in England; and in winter shorter. The like we must understand of all Southern and Northern Countries.

To conclude, I may not omit the civility of the Kentish men, and their courteous disposition above the rest of the Britans, which must be imputed to that ordinary course which brought civility unto all other Nations: of whom, such as were first seated in their possessions, and entertained society, were by little and little were purified, and so attained to the perfection of civil Government. So we find, that first the Assyrians and Babylonians (as nearest to the Mountains of Armenia, where the Ark rested, and people first inhabited) reduced their States into Common-weales, or Monarchies of exquisite Government, flourishing with all manner of learning and knowledge; when as yet, other Countries lay either waste, or overwhelmed with Barbarism. From thence it flowed into Egypt; out of Egypt into Greece; out of Greece into Italy; out of Italy into Gallia; and from thence into England: where our Kentish men first entertained it, as before

dering upon France, and frequented with Merchants of those Countries.

CHAP. VI.

Divers skirmishes between the Romans and the Britans.

THE Cavalry of the Enemy, and their Chariots gave a sharp conflict to the Roman Horsemen in their march: but so, that the Romans got the better every way, driving them with great slaughter to the woods and hills, and losing also some of their own men, being too venturesome in the pursuit. The Britans, after some intermission of time, when the Romans little thought of them, and were busied in fortifying their Camp, came suddenly out of the woods, and charged upon those that kept station before the Camp. Cæsar sent out two the chiefest Cohorts of two Legions, to second their fellows. These two cohorts standing with a small alley between them, the other that were first charged being terrified with that strange kind of sight, boldly brake through the thickest of the Enemy, and retreated in safety to their fellows. That day Quintus Laberius Durus, a Tribune of the Soldiers, was slain. The Britans were repelled with more cohorts, which Cæsar sent to second the former. And, for as much as the fight happened in the view of all the Camp, it was plainly perceived, that the legionary soldiers, being neither able for the weight of their Armour to follow the Enemy as he retired, nor yet daring to go far from their several Ensigns, was not a fit adversary to contest this kind of Enemy: and that the Horsemen likewise fought with no less danger, in as much as the Enemy would retire back of purpose; and, when they had drawn them a little from the Legions, they would then light from their chariots, and encounter them with that advantage, which is between a footman and a horseman. Furthermore, they never fought thick and close together, but thin, and at great distance, having stations of men to succor one another, to receive the weary, and to send out fresh supplies.

OBSERVATION.

UPON this occasion of their heavy Armour, I will describe a Legionary Soldier in his complete furniture, that we may better judge of their manner of warfare, and understand wherein their greatest strength consisted. And, first we are to learn, that their Legionary Soldiers were called *milites graves armature*, soldiers wearing heavy Armour, to distinguish them from the Velites, the Archers, Slingers, and other Light-armed men. Their offensive Armce were a couple of Pikes, or some

some will, but one Pile, and a Spanish Sword, short and strong, to strike rather with the point, than with the edge. Their defensive Arms were a Helmet, a Corset, and Boots of Brags, with a large Target; which in some sort was offensive, in regard of that *Umbo* which stuck out in the middle thereof. The Pile is described at large in the first Book, and the Target in the second. The Sword, as Polybius witnesseth, was short, two-edged, very sharp, and of a strong point. And therefore Livy in his 23 Book saith, that the *Gallæ* used very long swords without points; but, the *Romans* had short swords, readier for use. These they called *Spanish* swords, because they borrowed that fashion from the *Spaniards*. The old *Romans* were so girt with their swords, as appeareth by Polybius, and their Monuments in Marble, that from their left shoulder it hung upon their right thigh, contrary to the use of these times; which, as I have noted before, was in regard of their Target, which they carried on their left arm. This sword was hung with a belt of Leather, beset with studs, as *Varro* noteth. And, these were their offensive weapons.

Lib. 4.

Plin. lib. 10.

Their Helmet was of Brags, adorned with three Ostrich Feathers of a cubit in length: by which the Soldier appeared of a larger stature, and more terrible to the Enemy, as Polybius saith in his Sixth Book. Their breast-plate was either of Brags or Iron, jointed together after the manner of scales, or plated with little rings of Iron: their boots were made of bars of brags, from the foot up to the knee. And thus were the Legionary Soldiers armed, to stand firm, rather than to use any nimble motion, and to combine themselves into a body of that strength, which might not easily recoil at the opposition of any confrontation: for, agility standeth indifferent, to help either a retreat or a pursuit; and, nimble-footed soldiers are ready to flee back, as to march forward; but, a weighty body keepeth a more regular motion, and is not hindered with a common counterbuffe. So that whensoever they came to firm buckling, and felt the Enemy stand stiff before them, such was their practice and exercise in continual works, that they never fainting under any such task, but the Victory went always clear on their side. But, if the Enemy gave way to their violence, and came not in but for advantage, and then as speedily retired, before the counterbuffe were well discharged, then did their nimbleness much help their weakness, and frustrate the greatest part of the Roman discipline. This is also proved in the overthrow of *Sabinus* and *Cona*, where *Ambiorix* finding the inconvenience of buckling at handy-blows, commanding his men to fight a far off; and, if they were assaulted, to give back, and come on again as they saw occasion: which he executed out the *Romans*, that they all fell under the execution of the *Gallæ*. Let this suffice therefore to shew, how unapt the *Romans* were to flee upon any occasion, when their Armour was such, that it kept them from all flitting motions, and made them fitable to the staid and well assured rules of their discipline, which were as certain principles in the execution of a standing battle; and therefore not fit, either for a pursuit, or a flight.

Concerning the unequal combat between a horseman and a footman, it may be thought strange, that a footman should have such an ad-

vantage against a horseman, being overmatched at least with a Sextuple proportion both of strength and agility: but, we must understand, that as the horse is much swifter in a long career, so in speed and nimble turning at hand, wherein the subsistence of the combat consisteth, the footman far exceedeth the horseman in advantage, having a larger mark to hit by the horse, then the other hath besides, the horseman engageth both his valour and his fortune in the good speed of his horse, his wounds and his death do consequently pull the rider after; his fear or fury murther his Master either desperate or slow of performance; and, what selfe do ever ariseth from the horse, must be answered out of the honor of the Rider. And surely it seemeth reasonable, that what thing soever draweth us into the society of so great a hazard, should as much as is possible be contained in the compass of our own power.

The sword which we manage with our own hand affordeth greater assurance then the harquebuse, wherein there are many parts belonging to the action, as the powder, the stone, the spring, and such like; whereof, if the least fail of his part, we likewise fail of our fortune. But, how probable soever this seemeth, this is certain, that in the course of the *Roman* Wars, the Horse were ever defeated by the Foot, as is manifestly proved in the list of these Books.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar giveth the Britans two severall overthrowes.

The next day the Enemy made a stand upon the hills a far off from the Camp, and shewed themselves not so often; neither were they so busie with our horsemen as they were the day before. But about noon, when Cæsar had sent out three Legions, and all his Cavalry, to get forage under the conduction of Caius Trebonius a Legate, they made a sudden assault upon the foragers, and fell in close with the Ensignes and the Legions. The Romans charged very fiercely upon them, and beat them back: neither did they make an end of following them, until the Horsemen trusting to them, put them all to flight, with the slaughter of a great number of them; neither did they give them respite, either to make head, to make a stand, or to forsake their Chariots.

After this overthrow, all their Auxiliary Forces departed from them; neither did they afterward contend with the Romans with any great power. Cæsar notwithstanding their determination, carried his Army to the River Thames, and so to the confines of Cassivellaunus; which River was passable by foot but in one place only, and that very hardly. At his coming, he found a great power of the Enemy to be imbatteled on the other side, and the bank fortified with many sharp stakes, and many

many other also were planted covertly under the water. These things being discovered to the Romans, by the Captives and Fugitives, Cæsar putting his Horse before, caused the Legions to follow suddenly after: who, notwithstanding they had but their heads clear above the water, went with that violence, that the Enemy was not able to endure the charge, but left the bank, and betook themselves to flight.

OBSERVATION.

This attempt of Cæsar seemeth so strange to Bracatio, that he runneth into strange conclusions concerning this matter: as first, that he that imitater Cæsar may doubt of his good fortunes; for his proceeding in this point was not directed by any order of War: and, that a great Commander hath nothing common with other Leaders: but especially, he crieth out at the baseness of the Britans, that would suffer themselves cowardly to be beaten. But, if we look into the circumstances of the action, we shall find both Art and good direction therein: for, being assured by the Fugitives, that the River was passable in that place, and in that place only, he knew that he must either adventure over there, or leave Cassivellaunus for another Summer, which was a very strong inducement to urge him to that enterprise. The difficulty whereof was much relieved by good direction, which consisted of two points: First, by sending over the Horsemen in the front of the Legions, who might better endure the charge of the enemy then the Footmen could, that were up to the neck in water; and withall, to shelter the Footmen from the fury of the Enemy.

Secondly, he sent them over with much speed, that they were on the other side of the water before the Enemy could tell what they attempted; for, if he had lingered in the service, and given the Enemy leave to find the advantage, which he had by experience, his men had never been able to have endured the hazard of so dangerous a service. It is hard to conjecture at the place where this service was performed; for, since the building of London-Bridge, many Foords have been scoured with the current and fall of the water, which before that time carried not such a depth as now they do.

CHAP. VIII.

The conclusion of the British War. Cæsar returneth into Gallia.

Cæsar.

Cassivellaunus having no courage to contend any longer, dismissed his greatest Forces, and retaining only Four thousand Chariots, observed our Journeys, keeping the Wood-Countries, and driving men and cattel out of the fields into the woods, where he knew the Romans would come: and, as their Horse strayed out, either for forrage or booty, he sent his Chariots out of the woods by unknown wayes, and put their horsemen to

great peril: in regard whereof, the horsemen durst never adventure further then the Legions, neither was there any more spoil done in the Country, then that which the Legionary Soldiers did of themselves.

In the mean time, the Trinobantes, being almost the greatest State of all those Countries (from whom Mandubratius had fled to Cæsar into Gallia, for that his Father Imanuentius holding the Kingdom, was slain by Cassivellaunus) sent Embassadors to Cæsar, to offer their submission, and to intreat, that Mandubratius might be defended from the oppression of Cassivellaunus, and sent unto them to take the Kingdom. Cæsar having received from them forty Pledges, and Corn for his Army, sent Mandubratius unto them. The Trinobantes being thus kept from the violence of the Soldiers, the Cenimagni, Seguntiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci and Cassi yielded themselves to Cæsar. By these he understood, that Cassivellaunus his Town was not far off, fortified with Woods and Bogs, and well stored with Men and Cattell. The Britans call a Town, a thick wood, inclosed about with a Ditch and a Rampier, made for a place of retreat, when they stood in fear of incursions from the borders. Thither marched Cæsar with his Army, and found it well fortified both by Art and Nature: and, as he assaulted it in two several places; the Enemy, unable to keep it, cast himself out of the Town by a back way: and so he took it; where he found great store of Cattell, and slew many of the Britans.

While these things were a doing, Cassivellaunus sent messengers into Kent, which, as was said, lies upon the Sea, and wherein there were four several Kings, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus and Segonax: them he commanded, with all the power they could make, to sit upon the Camp where the Navy was kept. The Kings coming to the place, were overthrowen, by a sally which the Romans made out upon them, many of them being slain, and Lugotorix, a great Commander, taken prisoner. This Battle concerning with the former losse, and especially moved thereunto with the revolt of the forenamed Cities, Cassivellaunus intreated peace of Cæsar by Comius of Arras. Cæsar being determined to Winter in the Continent, for fear of sudden commotions in Gallia, and considering, that the Summer was now far spent, and might easily be lingered out, he commanded Pledges to be brought unto him, and set

down what yearly tribute the Britans should pay to the Romans; giving withal a strict charge to Cassivellaunus, to do no injury, either to Mandubratius, or the Tribonantes. The hostages being taken, he carried back his Army to the Sea, where he found his Shipping repaired: whith, as soon as he had caused to be set afloat, in regard partly of the great number of prisoners he had, and that some of his Ships were cast away, he determined to carry his Army over at twice. And so it happened, that of so great a Fleet, at so many Voyages, neither this year nor the year before, there was not any one ship missing which carried over our Soldiers: onely of those which were to be sent back to him, after they had landed the first half, and those which Labienus caused afterwards to be made, threefcore in number, few could make to the place, the rest were all kept back. Which Cæsar having for some time expected in vain, and fearing that the time of year would not long serve for sailing, for the Equinoctial was at hand; was forced to disperse his Soldiers closer, and in less room. So, taking the opportunity of a calm Sea, he set sail about the beginning of the second watch, and came to land by break of day, his whole Fleet arriving in safety.

The first OBSERVATION.

And thus ended the War in Britany: which affordeth little matter of discourse, being indeed but a scambling War, as well in regard of the Britans themselves, who, after they had felt the strength of the Roman Legions, would never adventure to buckle with them in any standing Battel; as also, in regard there were no such Towns in Britany, as are recorded to have been in Gallia, which might have given great honor to the War, if there had been any such to have been besieged, and taken in by Cæsar.

And, although Tacitus saith, that Britany was rather viewed then subdued by Cæsar, being desirous to draw that honor to his Father-in-Law Agricola; yet we find here, that the Tribonantes, which were more then either the skirt or the heart of Britany (for our Historians do understand them to have inhabited that part which lieth as far as Northshire and Lancashire) were brought under the Roman Empire by Cæsar: who was the first that ever laid Tribute upon Britany, in the behalf of the People of Rome: or cast upon them the heavy name of a subdued People.

The Second OBSERVATION.

But, least I may seem negligent in these occurrences of Britany, as not deeming the alteration happening in this Island by the power of Rome, worthy due memory; I will briefly set down the state thereof from this Area, during the lives of the twelve Emperors.

Julius Cæsar next successors, first Augustus, and then Tiberius, thought it policy to refrain the insatiable desire of enlarging the Roman Empire, and so left this entrance into Britany uninvaded. Caius is said to have had a meaning to invade it, but did nothing. Claudius transported Legions and Aides, and first sent Aulus Plautius Governor, and after him Ostorius, who overthrew King Caradocus in Battel, and shewed him at Rome to Claudius, to Agrippina, and the Lords of the Senate: who affirmed the flight to be no less honorable then when P. Scipio shewed Siphaser, or L. Paulus Perseus. Him Didius Gallus succeeded, who being old and full of honor, thought it sufficient to keep that which his Predecessors had gotten. Next unto Didius came Vespasian, onely memorable in dying the first year of his Proprietorship: but Suetonius Paulinus following, got a great name, first by invading Anglesie, strong with inhabitants, and a receptacle for fugitives; secondly, by overthrowing Boadicea Queen of the Iceni, in a Battel comparable to the Victories of old times; wherein fourscore thousand Britans were slain, with the loss of Four hundred Roman Soldiers. But, being thought to be over-severe, he left his charge to Petronius Tursilianus; who, composing former troubles with a milder carriage, was succeeded by Trebellianus Maximus; whose case course of Government taught the Britans good manners, and made the Soldiers first wanton with ease, and then mutinous: wvich, by his gentle intreaty, being ended without blood-shed, he left his place to Vedius Polianus, of like looseness of discipline, but, in stead of obedience, got much good will. The errors of these three lost Proprietors were holpen by Petilius Cerealis, a great Commander, and wvorthy his place; he subdued the Brigantes, and left the place to Julius Frontinus, wvho, with no less happines, vanquished the Silures. The last was Agricola, fortunate in divers Battels against the Britans, and as unhappy in his reward; for Domitian maligning his honor, first discharged him of his place, and then, as it is thought, poisoned him. And this was the state of Britany under the Twelve Emperors.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar disposeth his Legions into their wintering Camp, and quieteth the Carnutes.

After he had put his Ships in harbour, and held a Council of the Gallies at * Samarobrina; for as much as that year, by reason of the drought, there was some scarcity of Corn in Gallia, he was constrained to garrison his Army, and to disperse them into more Cities then he had done the years before. And first he gave one Legion to Caius Fabius, to be led among the Morini; another to Quintus Cicero, to be carried to the Nervii; another to L. Roscius, to be conducted to the Eslui; a fourth he commanded to winter amongst the men of Rhemes, in the Marches of the Treviri, under T. Labienus; three he placed in Belgium, with whom he sent Mar. Crassus his Quæstor L. Munatius Plancus and

Tacit. 13.
Annal.

and C. Trebonius, Legates; he sent one Legion, that which he had last invollod beyond the River Po in Italy, with five cohorts, unto the Eburones, the greatest part of whose Country lyeth between the Male and the Rhene, and was under the command of Ambiorix and Cativolcus; with them he sent Q. Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeus Cotta. By distributing his Legions in this manner, he thought to remedy the scarcity of Corn; and yet the garrisons of all these Legions, excepting that which Roscius carried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of one hundred miles. And until his Legions were settled, and their wintering Camps fortified, he determined to abide in Gallia.

There was amongst the Carnutes a man of great birth called Talsgetius, whose ancestors had born the chief rule in their State. This man, for his singular prowess and good will towards him, for he had done him very good service in all his Wars, Cæsar restored to the dignity of his forefathers. Before he had reigned three years, his Enemies with the comploment of divers of his Citizens, killed him in the open streets: which thing was complained of to Cæsar. Who fearing in regard so many men had a hand in it, left that the City should by their instigation revolt, commanded L. Plancus immediately to march with his Legion thither, from his quarters in Belgium, and there to winter: and whomsoever he could learn to be the ring-leaders in the death of Talsgetius, he should take hold of them, and send them to him. Mean while Cæsar had notice from all his Legates and Quæstors to whom he had delivered his Legions, that they were settled in winter Garrisons, and their Garrisons fortified.

The First OBSERVATION.

I Have heard it oftentimes contradicted by some that understand not the weight of a multitude, when it was said, that an Army keeping head continually in one part of a Kingdom, was more burthensome to the Commonwealth, in regard of the expence of victuals, then when it was dispersed into particular Cities and Families, before the time of the muster and inrolment: for say they, in the general account of the publick weal it differeth nothing, whether a multitude of thirty thousand Men be maintained with necessary provisions in one entire body together, or dispersed particularly throughout every part of the Country; forasmuch as every Man hath but a competent quantity allotted unto him, which he cannot want in what sort or condition of life soever he be ranged; neither doth the charge of a multitude grow in

regard they are united together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude wheresoever. But such as look into the difference with judgment, shall find a marvellous inequality, both in regard of the portion of Victuals which is spent, and the means whereby it is provided: for first we must understand, that an Army lying continually in one place, shalleth so heavy upon that part, that it quickly consumeth both the fat and the flesh (as they say) and leaveth nothing sufficient, which that part can afford them; and without farther supply of provisions, would in a small time come to utter destruction. This want then must be relieved by taking from the plenty of other greater quarters, to furnish the wants of so great a multitude: where in there cannot be observed, that proportion of moderate taking, to victual the Army with a sufficient competency, but the partial respect which the purveyours and victuallers will have to their private commodity, will quickly make an inconvenience, either in the Country from whence it is taken, or in the Army for which it is provided, according as the error may best advantage their particular, what discipline soever be established in that behalf. Whereas on the contrary part, when every particular Man of that multitude shall be billeted in a several family, throughout all parts of the Kingdom, the charge will be so inoffensive, in regard of the expence of the said Families, that the Country will never feel any inconvenience. And if every household that had received into his house, one of the said Army, should give a true account of that which riseth above his ordinary expence by the addition of one Man, it would fall far short of that treasure which is necessarily required to maintain the said number of Men, united together in one body.

Neither doth the difference consist in the quantity of victuals which every Man hath for his portion, whether they be dispersed or united, but in the manner of provision, and the means which is used to maintain them: wherein every master or steward of a family endeavoreth to make his provisions at the best hand, and so to husband it, that it may serve for competency, and not for superfluity; and by that means the general plenty of the Country is maintained, and the common wealth flourisheth by well directed moderation. But in the victualling of an Army, there is no such respect had which may any way advantage the publick good for there the gain of the purveyor riseth by expence and superfluous wasting, rather than by thrift and saving frugality: and so the common wealth is weakened by the ill-husbanding of that great portion of victual which is allowed for so great a multitude. And if they should have such variety of viands in an Army, as they have when they are in several families, it were impossible it should continue any time together. And therefore the Romans, notwithstanding the exactness of their discipline, could afford their Armies no other provision, but Corn and Larde, as well in regard of the commodity, which that kind of diet afforded them in the course of their Wars, as also for the good of that Country wherein they were resident. And if it so fell out, that the extremity of the season, or any other cause had brought a dearth into the land, there was no readier way to help that inconvenience, than by dispersing their Armies into di-

vers quarters; which *Cæsar* disposed with that care, that they might be as near together as they could.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Concerning the choice of the souldiers and their manner of inrolment, I had rather refer the Reader to *Polybius*, than enter into the particular discourse of that action, which was carried with such gravity and religious ceremonies, as might best serve to possess their minds of the weight and consequence of that business. But forasmuch as the largeness of their Empire, and the necessity of their occasion would not admit that the inrolment should still be made at *Rome* amongst the Citizens, as it appeareth by this Legion which was inrolled beyond the River *Po*, it consequently followeth, that such Ceremonies which are annexed to the place, were altogether omitted: and therefore I cannot speak of that which the old *Romans* did in that part of their discipline, as a thing continued unto *Cæsars* time. But he that desireth to see the manner of their choice, with such complements as might add both a reverent respect and a Majesty to the work, let him read *Polybius* of that argument.

CHAP. X.

Ambiorix attempteth to surprize the Camp of *Sabinus* and *Cotta*, and failing, praisseth to take them by guile.

Cæsar.

Fifteen days after the Legions were settled in their wintering Camps, there began a sudden Tumult and Rebellion, by the means of *Ambiorix* and *Catuvulcus*, who having received *Sabinus* and *Cotta* into their confines, and brought them in Corn to the place where they lay, at the inducement of *Induciomarus* of *Triers*, they stirred up their people to Rebellion; and suddenly surprising those that were gone abroad to get wood, came with a great power to assault the Camp. But when our Men had took Arms, and were got up upon the rampier, and had overmatched them in a skirmish of Horse, which made a fallly out of the Camp upon the Gallies; *Ambiorix* despairing of good success, withdrew his Men from the assault; and then after their manner they cryed unto us, that some of our company should come and speak with them, for they had somewhat to discover touching the publick State, whereby they hoped all controversies might be ended. Whereupon *Caius Carpienus* a Roman Horseman, and one of *Titurius* his familiar friends, and one *Q. Junius* a Spaniard, who divers times before they had been sent by *Cæsar* to *Ambiorix*, were sent out to treat with them. *Ambiorix* first acknowledged himself much indebted to *Cæsar* for many courtesies, in that by his

means, he was freed from a pension which he paid to the *Aduatici*; and for that both his own Son and his Brothers Son, whom the *Aduatici* had held in prison under the name of Hostages, were by *Cæsar* released and sent home again. And touching the assault of the Camp, he had done nothing of himself, but by the impulsion of the State, among whom such was his condition, that the people had as great authority over him, as he himself had in regard of the people; who were likewise enforced to this War, because they could not withstand the sudden insurrection of the Gallies, whereof his small means might be a sufficient argument. For his experience was not so little, to think himself able with so small a power, to overthrow the people of *Rome*; but it was a general appointment throughout all *Gallia*, upon this day to assault all *Cæsars* garrisons, to the end that one legion might not give relief unto another. Gallies could not easily deny the request of Gallies, especially when it concerned their publick liberty. Now having satisfied that duty which he owed to his Country, he had respect to *Cæsar* and his benefits; in regard whereof, he admonished them, and prayed *Titurius* for the Hospitality that had been between them, that he would look to the safety of himself and his Souldiers. There was a great number of Germans that had already passed the *Rhene*, and would be here within two days; and therefore let them advise themselves, whether they thought it good, before the next borders perceived it, to depart with their Souldiers out of their wintering places, either to *Cicero* or *Labiennus*, of whom the one was not past fifty mile off, and the other a little farther. For his own part he promised them thus much, and confirmed it by oath, that they should have safe passage through his Territories; for so he should bold do a pleasure to his Country in disburthening it of Garrisons, and shew himself thankful to *Cæsar* for his benefits. This speech being ended, *Ambiorix* departed, and *Carpiniens* and *Junius* made report thereof to the Legates.

OBSERVATION.

Leader his counsel, to use the Foxes skin where the Lions saileth, doth shew, that the discourse of our reason is sooner corrupted with error, than the powers of our body are overcome with force. For oftentimes the mind is so disquieted with the extremity of perturbation, that neither the apprehension can take found instructions, nor the judgment determine of that which is most for our good; but according as passion

CHAP. XI.

The Romans call a Council upon this advertisement, and resolve to depart, and join themselves to some other of the Legions.

passion shall happen to Reign in our disposition, so are we carried headlong to the ruine of our fortune without sense of error, or mistrust of well-succeeding: whereas the body continueth firm in his own strength, and is subject only to a greater weight of power, by which it may be subdued and overthrown. It behoveth us therefore to take good heed, that our surest hold be not unfastened by the subtilty of the Fox, when it hath continued firm against the force of the Lyon: and that the treachery of the spirit, do not disadvantage those means, which either our own power or opportunity hath gained in our actions. Wherein a Commander cannot have a better rule for his direction, then to beware that violence of passion do not hinder the course of sound deliberation; and which, to be jealous of whatsoever an Enemy shall, either by speech or action, seem to thrust upon him, how colourable (soever the reasons may be which are alleged to induce him therunto. For first, if the mind be not confirmed by the virtue of her better faculties, to resist the motion of fruitless apprehensions, it may easily be seduced, (either by fear or vain imagination, diffident conceptions, or over-cave credulity, with many other such disturbing powers) from that way which a good discretion, and an understanding free from passion would have taken.

First therefore I hold it necessary to have the consistory of our judgment, well settled with a firm resolution, and with the presence of the mind, before we enter into deliberation of such things, as are made happy unto us by good direction. And then this, amongst other circumstances, will give some help to a good conclusion, when we consider how improbable it is that an Enemy, whose chiefest care is to weaken his adversary, and bring him to ruine, should advise him of any thing that may concern his good; unless the profit which he himself shall thereby gather, do far exceed that which the contrary part may expect.

I grant that in civil Wars, where there are many friends on either party, and have the adverse cause as dear unto them as their own, there are oftentimes many advertisements given, which proceed from a true and sincere affection, and may advantage the party whom it concerneth, as well in preventing any danger, as in the furtherance of their cause; and therefore are not altogether to be neglected, but to be weighed by circumstances, and accordingly to be respected; whereof we have many pregnant examples in the Civil Wars of *France*, and particularly in *Monsieur la Nou* his discourses: but where there are two Armies, different in Nation, Language, and Humour, contending for that which peculiarly belongeth unto one of them, where care to keep that which is dearest unto them possesseth the one, and hope of gain stirreth up the other, there is commonly such an universal hatred between them, that they are to look for small advantage by advertisements from the Enemy. Which if the Romans had well considered, this subtle *Gall* had not dispossessed them of their strength, nor brought them to ruine.

The Romans being troubled at the suddenness of the matter, albeit the things were spoken by an Enemy, yet they thought them no way to be neglected; but especially it moved them, for that it was incredible that the *Eburones*, being base and of no reputation, durst of themselves make War against the people of *Rome*. And therefore they propounded the matter in a Council, wherein there grew a great controversy among them. *L. Aurunculeius*, and most of the Tribunes and Centurions of the first orders, thought it not good to conclude of any thing rashly, nor to depart out of their wintering Camps, without expresse commandment from *Cæsar*; forasmuch as they were able to resist never so great a power, yea even of the Germans, having their Garrisons well fortified: an argument whereof was, that they had valiantly withstood the first assault of the Enemy, and given them many wounds. Neither wanted they any Vittuals; and before that provision which they had was spent, there would come succor from other Garrisons and from *Cæsar*. And to conclude, what was more dishonourable or favoured of greater inconstancy, then to consult of their weightiest affairs by the advertisement of an Enemy? *Titurius* urged vehemently to the contrary, that it then would be too late for them to seek a remedy, when a greater power of the Enemy, accompanied with the Germans, were assembled against them; or when any blow were given to any of the next wintering Camps. He took *Cæsar* to be gone into Italy; for otherwise the Carnutes would not have adventured to kill *Talgetius*, neither durst the *Eburones* have come so proudly to the Camp. Let them not respect the author, but the thing is self: the *Rhene* was not far off, and he knew well that the overthrow of *Arivovistus*, and their former victories, were grievous to the Germans. The Gallies were vexed with the Continualties they had received, being brought in subjection to the Roman Empire, and having lost their former reputation in deeds of Arms.

And to conclude, who would imagine that *Ambiorix* should enterprise such a matter without any ground or certainty thereof? but howsoever things stood, his counsel was sure, and could bring no harm; for if there were

no worse thing intended, they should but go safely to the next Garrisons; or otherwise, if the Gallies confisted with the Germans, their only safety consisted in celerity. As for the Counsel of Cotta and such as were of the contrary opinion, what expectation could be had thereof? wherein if there were not present danger, yet assuredly Famine was to be feared by long Siege. The dispute being thus continued on either part, and Cotta with the Centurions of the first orders, earnestly repugning it; do as please you, since you will needs have it so, said Sabinus, (and that he spoke with a loud voice, that a great part of the Soldiers might well hear him) for I am not he that most feareth death among you: let these be wife; and if any mischance happen unto them, they shall ask account thereof at thy hands; inasmuch, as if thou wouldst let them, they might join themselves within two days to the next Garrisons, and with them sustain what chance soever their common destiny should allot them, and not perish with famine and sword, like a people cast off and abandoned from their fellows. After these words, they began to rise out of the Council; but bold was laid upon them both: entreaty was made, that they would not by their discussion and obliquity, bring all unto a desperate hazard; the matter was allone whether they went or stayd, so that they all agreed upon one thing; whereas in disagreeing there was no likelihood of well-doing. The dispute was prolonged until midnight; at length Cotta yielded, and the Sentence of Sabinus took place. And thereupon it was proclaimed, that they should set forth by the break of day. The rest of the night was spent in watching. Every Soldier sought out what he had to carry with him, and what he should be constrained to leave behind him of such necessities as he had prepared for winter. All things were disposed in such sort, to make the Soldiers believe that they could not stay without danger, and that the danger might be augmented by wearying the Soldiers with watching.

OBSERVATION.

By the resolution in this dispute it appeareth, how little a grave and wise deliberation availeth, when it is impugned with the violence of passion, according to the truth of my former observation: for the matter was well reasoned by Cotta, and his positions were grounded upon things certain, and well known to the whole Council; and yet the fear of Sabinus was such, that it carried the conclusion by such supposed assertions, as the quality of his passion had ratified for

true principles; being grounded altogether upon that which the Enemy had suggested, and not upon any certain knowledge of the truth. Neither is it often seen, when a Council disputeth upon matters of such consequence, that their deliberations are altogether clear from such troublesome motions, but that it will somewhat incline to the partiality of a strong affection; so powerful is passion in the Government of the Soul, and so interrelated in the other faculties. And this one cause of the uncertainty of Man's judgment, from whence all contrary and different opinions do arise. Neither is this so strange a matter, that a Council of War should so much vary in case of deliberation, when as many especial points of military discipline remain yet undecided, having the authority of the great Commanders of all ages to ratify the truth on either part; whereof I could allege many examples, But concerning the issue and event of our deliberations, what can be more truly said, than that of the Poet?

*Et male consultis pretium est prudentia fallax,
Nec fortuna probas causas sequiturque merentes;
Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine ferur.
Scilicet est aliud quod non cogatque regatque,
Majus, & in propriis ducat mortalia teget.*

Notwithstanding, so far as our wisdom is not so subject to fortune, but that it very commonly within it self the good or evil of all the occurrences, which fall within the course of our business; or if we must needs miscarry, yet it somewhat helps our ill fortune to think that we went upon best probabilities; it shall not be amiss to set down some rules for the better directing of a mature consultation. Wherein we are to understand that, as all our knowledge ariseth from some of our senses, and our senses comprehend only particularities, which being carried unto the apprehension, are disposed into forms and degrees, according as they either concur or disagree in their several properties; from whence there arise intellectual notions, and rules of Art, wherein the science of the said particulars consisteth: so he that intendeth to debate a matter with found deliberation, must descend from confused conceptions, and a knowledge in general, to the exact distinction of particular parts, which are the occurrences to be directed, and the material substance of every action. He therefore that can give best direction, either by experience or judicious discourse, concerning such particularities as are incident to the matter proposed, can best advise which is the safest way to avoid the opposition of contradicting natures. But to make this somewhat plainer, I will allege two examples: the one modern in case of consultation; the other ancient, and may seem not so pertinent to this matter, in regard it is a meer Apology; yet forasmuch as it freely censureth the quality of particular circumstances, it may give great light to that which we seek after.

The modern example is taken out of Guicciardin from the Wars which Lewis the French King had, with the Pope and the Venetians, concerning the State of Ferrara, and the Dutchy of Milan: wherein there arose a controversy amongst the French Captains, whether it were better to go directly to seek the Enemy, who albeit they were lodged in a strong and secure place, yet there was hope

Lib. 9.

that with the vertue of Armes, and importunity of Artillery, they might be dilogged, and driven to retreat; or otherwise to take the way, either of Modena or Bologna, that so the Enemy, for fear of losing either of those Towns, might quit their hold, and, by that means, Ferrara should be freed from the War. Monsieur Charnom, the General of the French inclined to the former advice: But, Trivulce, a man of great authority and experience, having been an executioner in 18 Battels, reasoned thus in particulars to the contrary. We debate (saith he) to go seek the Enemy to fight with him; and, I have always heard great Captains hold this as a firm principle, Not to attempt the fortune of a battel, unless there be either an offer of an especial advantage, or otherwise compulsion by necessity. The Rules of War give it to the Enemy that is the invader, and hath undertaken the conquest of Ferrara, to seek to assail and charge us; but to us, to whom it is sufficient to defend our selves, it cannot be but impertinent to undertake an action contrary to all direction and discipline of War. I am of opinion, which is confirmed by evident reason, that there is no possibility to execute that devise, but to our harms and disadvantage: for, we cannot go to their Camp but by the side of a Hill, a streight and narrow way, where all our Forces cannot be employed, and yet they, with small numbers, will make resistance, having the opportunity of the place favourable to their vertues. We must march by the rising of a hill, one horse after another, neither have we any other way to draw our Artillery, our Baggage, our Carts and Bridges, but by the streight of the Hill: and, who doubteth not, but in a way so narrow, and cumbersome, every Artillery, every Cart, or every Wheel that shall break, will stay the Army a whole hour at the least? By which impediments, every contrary accident may put us to disorder. The Enemy is lodged in covert, provided of Victuals and Forrage; and, we must incamp all bare and naked, not carrying with us that which should serve for our necessary nouriture, but expect the things to come after, which, in reason, ought to go with us. To attempt new enterprises, whereof the victory is less certain than the peril, is contrary to the gravity and reputation of a Leader; and, in actions of the War, those enterprises are put to adventure, that are done by will, and not by reason. Many difficulties may compel us to make our abode there two or three days; yea, the Snows and Rains, joynted with the extremity of the season, may suffice to detain us: how shall we then do for Victuals and Forrages? What shall we be able to do in the Wars, wanting the things that should give us strength and sustenance? What is he that considereth not how dangerous it is to go seek the Enemy in a strong Camp, and, to be driven at one time to fight against them, and against the discommodity of the place? If we compel them not to abandon their Camp, we cannot but be enforced to retire: a matter of great difficulty in a Country so wholly against us, and where every little disfavour will turn to our great disadvantage. &c.

And thus proceeded that grave discourse, in the discovery of the particular occurrences incident to that enterprise; which being layed open to their confused judgements, did manifestly point at the

great disadvantages, which were to be undergone by that attempt.

The other example is of more antiquity, taken out of Tacitus, and concerneth the arraignment of certain Senators for the friendship that had past between Sejannus and them. Amongst whom M. Tereus thus answered for himself, according as it hath of late been published by Translation.

It would be peradventure less behoveful for my estate, to acknowledge, then to deny the crime I am charged with: but, hap what may, I will confess, that I have been Sejannus's Friend, and that I desired so to be; and, that after I had obtained his friendship, I was glad of it. I had seen him joint-Officer with my Father, in the Government of the Prætorian Cohort, and not long after in managing the City affairs, and matters of War: his Kinsmen and Allies were advanced to honor: as every man was inward with Sejannus, so he was graced by Cæsar; and contrariwise, such as were not in his favour lived in fear, and distressed with poverty. Neither do I allege any man for an example of this; all of us, who were not privy to his last attempts, with the danger of my only Estate I will defend: not Sejannus that usage; for, we cannot go to the Claudian and Fulvian Family, which, by alliance, he had entered into. Thy son in law, Cæsar, thy companion in the Consulship, and him who took upon him thy charge of administering the Commonwealth, we did reverence and honor. It is not our part to judge of him, whom thou dost exalt above the rest, nor for what considerations: to thee the highest judgment of things the gods have given; and, to us the glory of obedience is left. We look into those things, which we see before our eyes, whom thou dost enrich, whom thou dost advance to honors, who have greatness of hurting or helping; which, Sejannus, to have had, no man will deny. The Princes hidden thoughts, or if he go about any secret drift, it is not lawful to found, and dangerous; neither shalt thou, in the end, reach unto them. Think not only, Lords of the Senate, of Sejannus's last day; but of sixteen years, in which we did likewise favour upon, and court Saurius and Pomponius; and, to be known unto his freed men and partners, was reckoned for a high favour. What then? shall this defence be general, and not distinguished, but a confusion made of times past, and his later actions? No: but let it by just bounds and terms be divided: let the Treasons against the Commonwealth, the intentions of murdering the Emperor be punished; but, as for the friendships, duties, pleasures, and good turns, the same end shall discharge and quit thee, O Cæsar, and us.

The constancy of this Oration prevailed so much, that his Accusers were punished with exile. And thus we see, how particularities decide the controversy, and make the way plain to good direction.

P

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

The Romans take their journey towards the next Legion; and are set upon by the Galles.

Cæsar.

As soon as the day-light appeared, they set forth of their Camp (like men perswaded, that the Counsel had been given them not by an Enemy, but by Ambiorix an especial friend) with a long-tailed march, and as much baggage as they were able to carry. The Galles understanding of their Journey, by their noise and watching in the night, secretly in the Woods, some two miles off, layed an Ambuscado in two several places of advantage, and there attended the coming of the Romans: and when the greatest part of the Troops were entred into a Valley, suddenly they shewed themselves on both sides the Vale, pressing hard upon the rearward, and hindering the foremost from going up the bill, and so began to charge upon the Romans in a place of as great disadvantage for them as could be. Then at length Titurius, as one that had provided for nothing beforehand, began to tremble, ran up and down, and disposed his cohorts, but so fearfully, and after such a fashion, as if all things had gone against him; as it happeneth, for the most part, to such as are forced to consult in the instant of execution.

OBSERVATION.

It now plainly appeareth, by this negligent and ill-ordered march, and the unlooked for encounter which the Galles gave them, that fear had ratified, in the judgment of Sabinus, the smooth suggestion of Ambiorix, with an approbation of a certain truth; and, layed that for a Principle, which a discourse, free from passion, would have discerned to be but weak, and of no probability: which so much the more amazed Titurius, by how much his apprehension had erred from the truth, and betrayed good counsel to a court full of danger: which, as Cæsar noteth, must needs fall upon such, as are then to seek for direction, when the business requireth execution. I have handled already the inconveniences of disappointment, and therefore, at this time, will but bring it only into remembrance, that we may take the greater care to prevent an accident of that nature: vvherein, as the best remedy for an evil, is to foresee it, according to the saying, *Prævisâ percutit mala*, evils foreseen fall of themselves; so, the greatest mischief in an evil, is, when it cometh unthought of, and besides our expectation, for then it falleth upon us with a supernatural weight, and affrighteth the mind with a superstitious astonishment, as though the divine powers had prevented our designments vvvith an irremediable calamity, and cut off our appointment with a contrary decree: although peradventure, the thing it self carry no such importance, but might be remedied, if we

wvere but prepared vvvith an opinion, that such a thing might happen.

It vvvere no ill counsel therefore, what resolution soever be taken, to make as full account of that, which may fall out to cross our intentions, as that which is likely to happen from the direction of our chiefest projects; and so we shall be sure to have a present mind in the midst of our occasions, and fill no further danger then that vvich the nature of the thing inforceth.

CHAP. XIII.

The Romans cast themselves into an Orbe, and are much discouraged.

But Cotta, who had before thought that these things might happen by the way, and, for that cause would not be the author of the Journey, was not wanting in any thing that concerned their common safety: for, both in calling upon the Soldiers, and encouraging them, he executed the place of a Commander, and in fighting the duty of a Soldier. And when they found, that by reason of the length of their Troop, they were not able in their own persons to see all things done, and to give direction in every place, they caused it to be Proclaimed, that they should all forsake their Baggage, and cast themselves into an Orbe. Which direction, although in such a case it be not to be reprov'd, yet it fell on illsvouredly; for, it both abated the courage of the Romans, and gave the Enemy greater encouragement, inasmuch as it seemed, that that course was not taken, but upon a great fear, and in extremity of peril. Moreover it happened, as it could not otherwise chuse, that the Soldiers went from their Ensignes, to take from the Carriages such things, as were most dear unto them: and there was nothing heard amongst them but clamours and weepings. But, the barbarous Galles were not to learn how to carry themselves. For, their Commanders caused it to be Proclaimed, that no man should stir out of his place; for the prey was theirs, and all that the Romans had laid apart was reserved for them: And therefore let them suppose, that all things consisted in the Victory. The Romans were equal to the Galles both in number of Men and Valour; and, albeit they were destitute of good Captains, and of good fortune, yet they repos'd in their Manhood all the hope of their safety: and, as often as any Cohort issued out, they failed not to make a great slaughter of the Enemy on that part.

Cæsar.



The

The first OBSERVATION.

I Have already handled the nature of an Orbe, with such properties as are incident to a Circle; wherein I shewed the conveniency of this figure, in regard of safe and strong imbatrelling. I will now add thus much concerning the use thereof, that, as it is the best manner of imbatrelling for a defensive strength, and therefore never used but in extremity; so we must be very careful, that the sudden betaking of our selves to such a refuge, do not more dismay the Soldiers, then the advantage of that imbatrelling, can benefit them. For, unless a Leader be careful to keep his men in courage, that their hearts may be free from despair and amazement, What profit can there arise from any disposition, or body forever, when the particular members shall be senseless of that duty, which belongeth unto them? For, order is nothing but an assistance to courage, giving means to manage our valour with advantage. In the War of *Africk*, we read, that *Cæsars* Legions being incircled about with great multitudes of enemies, were forced to make an Orbe; but he quickly turned it to a better use, by advancing the two Cornets two contrary wayes; and so divided the Enemy into two parts, and then beat them back to their great disadvantage.

The second OBSERVATION.

I Need not stand upon this order, which the *Galles* here took concerning pillage, that no Soldier should forsake his station, or disfrank himself in hope of Spoil; which is a thing, that from the very infancy of Wars, hath often changed the fortune of the day, and sold the honor of a publick Victory, for private lucre, and petty pilfering. Amongst other examples, let that which *Guicciardine* reporteth of the Battel of *Taro*, suffice to warn a well-directed Army, as well by the good which *Charles*, the Eighth of that name, King of *France*, received at that time, as by the loss which the *Italians* felt by that disorder, not to seek after pillage, until the Victory be obtained.

The third OBSERVATION.

The insufficiency of these Commanders, whereof *Cæsar* novv complaineth, as the only vvant which these *Romans* had to clear themselves of this danger, bringeth to our consideration, that, which former times have made a question; which is, Whether it were the virtue of the *Roman* Leaders, or the valour of their Soldiers, that enlarged their Empire to that greatness, and made their People and Senate Lords of the World. *Polybius* weighing the causes of a Victory, which the *Carthaginians* gained of the *Romans*, by the counsel and good direction of one *Zantippus* a *Grecian*, having before that time received divers overthrowes, during the time of those Wars in *Africk*; concludeth, that it was more in the worthiness of the Commanders, then in any extraordinary virtue of the Soldiers, that the *Romans* atchieved so many Conquests. And, besides the present example of *Zantippus*, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of *Hannibal*; who, from the beginning of

the second *Punic* War, still gained of the *Roman* Empire, enlarging the Territories of *Carthage*, and strengthening the jurisdiction of mighty *Rome*, until it had got a Leader matchable to that subtle *Carthaginian*, and found a *Scipio* to confront their *Hannibal*. To this may be added that famous Battel between the old *Romans* and the last *Latines*; wherein both parties were equally balanced, both in number and quality of their Soldiers, having both the same Armes, the same use of their Weapons, and the same Discipline, as if it had been in a Civil War. Neither could fortune tell, by the presence of their Armies, where to bestow her favour, or where to shew her disdain; but that the worthiness of the *Roman* Leaders brought the odds in the Trial, and made *Rome* great with the ruine of the *Latines*. Whereby it appeareth, how much it importeth the whole fortune of the Army, to have a Leader worthy of the place which he holdeth; for as much as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequality, between two equal Armies, then the wisdom and experience of a grave Commander, or the disability of an unskillful Leader; which are so powerful in their several effects, that there is greater hope of a herd of Harts led by a Lion, then of so many Lions conducted by a Hart.

CHAP. XIV.

Ambiorix directed the *Galles* how they might best fight with advantage, and frustrate the weapons of the *Roman* Soldiers.

The which thing, when Ambiorix perceived, he commanded his men to throw their casting weapons a far off, and keep themselves from coming near at hand, and, where the *Romans* charged them, to give way, for that by reason of the lightness of their Armes, and their daily exercise, the *Romans* could do them no harm: and again, as they saw them retire to their Ensignes, then to pursue them. Which commandment was so diligently observed by the *Galles*, that, as oft as any Cohort sallied out of the Orbe, to give an assault, the Enemy gave back as fast as they could; and, in the mean time there was no help, but that part might be left naked and open to the inconvenience of casting weapons: and again, as they retired to their place, they were circumvented, as well by them that had given place unto them, as by such as stood next about them. And, if they went about to keep their ground, they could neither help themselves by their Manhood, nor, standing thick together, avoid the darts that such a multitude cast upon them. And yet, notwithstanding these inconveniences, besides the wounds which they had received, they stood still at their defence, and, having so spent the greatest part of the day (for they had fought eight houres together) they

Observations upon CÆSARS

committed nothing dishonourable, or unworthy of themselves.

THE OBSERVATION.

I Have spoken already of the manner of the Roman fight, consisting altogether in good disposition of imbatelling, and in firm standing, and buckling at handy-blows: as may appear by this circumstance, where Ambiorix forbiddeth his men to buckle with them, but to give back and follow on again, as the lightness of their Armes gave them opportunity. In like manner, in the First Book of the Civil Wars, in the Battel between Caesar and Afranius, it appeareth, that Caesar his Soldiers were bound to keep their array, not to leave their Ensignes, nor without a weighty occasion to forsake their stations appointed them: whereas the Afranians fought thin, and scattered here and there; and, if they were hard laid unto, they thought it no dishonour to retire and give back, as they had learned of the Persians, and other Barbarous Nations.

CHAP. XV.

The Romans are overthrown.

Caesar.

Then T. Baluentius, who the year before had been Primpile of that Legion, a valiant man, and of great authority, had both his thighs darted through with a javelin; and Q. Lucanius, of the same order, valiantly fighting to succour his son, was slain; and L. Cotta the Legate, as he busily encouraged all the Cohorts and Centuries, was wounded in the mouth with a sling. Titurius moved with these things, as he beheld Ambiorix asar off encouraging his men, sent Cn. Pompeius unto him, to intreat him, that he would spare him and his soldiers. Ambiorix answered, that if he were desirous to Treat, he might: for he hoped to obtain so much of the People, to save the Soldiers; but, for himself, he should have no harm at all; for the assurance whereof, he gave him his Faith. Titurius imparted the matter to Cotta, and, that if he liked, that they two should go out of the Battel, and have Conference with Ambiorix, he doubted not but to obtain of him the safety of themselves, and their Soldiers. Cotta absolutely denied to go to an Armed Enemy, and continued resolute in that opinion. Titurius commanded such Tribunes and Centurions as were present, to follow him; and, when he came near to Ambiorix, being commanded to cast away his Armes, he obeyed, and willed those that were with him to do the same. In the mean time, while they treated of the conditions, and Ambiorix began a solemn Protestation of purpose, Titurius was, by little and little, encompassed

about and slain. Then, according to their custom, they cried Victory; and, taking up a howling, charged the Romans with a fresh assault, and routed their Troops. There L. Cotta fighting valiantly, was slain, and the most part of the soldiers with him. The remnant retired into their Camp; amongst whom, L. Petrofidius the Eagle-bearer, when he saw himself over-charged with Enemies, threw the Eagle within the Rampier, and fighting, with a great courage, before the Camp, was slain. The rest, with much ado, endured the assault until night: and, in the night, being in despair of all succor, slew themselves every man. A few that escaped from the Battel, came, by unknown wayes, through the Woods, to Labienus, and certified him how all things had fallen out.

OBSERVATION.

And thus have we heard of the greatest loss that ever fell, at any one time, upon Caesar his Army, from the time that he was first Proconsul in Gallia, unto the end of his Dictatorship. For, in the two overthrowes at Dyrrachium, he lost not above 1000 Men; and, in that at Gergovia, not so many: but here, fifteen Cohorts were cut in pieces, which amounted to the number of 7000 Men, or thereabout. Which maketh cowardise and ill direction the more hateful, in regard that the great Victory, which his valour obtained in Pharsalia, cost him but the lives of two hundred men.

The resolution of such as returned to the Camp witnesseth the exceeding valour of the Roman Soldier, if a valiant Leader had had the managing thereof; or, if Cotta alone had been absolute Commander, there had been great hope of better fortune in the success. But, here it happened, as it commonly doth, that where there are many, that are equal sharers in the chief Authority, the direction for the most part followeth him, that is more violent in opinion then the rest: which being a property rather of passion, then of judicious discourse, forceth a consent against the temperate opposition of a true discerning understanding. And so consequently it falleth out, that one Coward, having place and authority in the Council, doth either infect, or annihilate the sound deliberations of the rest of the Leaders: for, his timorousness lieth alwayes to extremities, making him rash in consultation, peremptory in opinion, and base in case of peril; all which are enemies to good direction, and the onely instruments of mischieving fortune.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Ambiorix bethought to besiege Cicero, and stirred up the Aduatuci, the Nervii, and so raised a great power.

* Caesar.

Ambiorix took such spirits unto him, upon this victory, that with his Horsemen he went immediately unto the Aduatuci, being the next borderers upon his Kingdom, without intermission of night or day, commanding his footmen to follow him. The Aduatuci upon his opening the matter, being stirred up to commotion, the next day after he came to the Nervii, exhorting them not to let slip this occasion of recovering to themselves perpetual liberty, and revenging them of the Romans, for the wrongs they had received. He told them, that two Legates were already slain, and a great part of the Army overthrown: it was now no great matter suddenly to surprize the Legion that wintered with Cicero; so the performance whereof, he offered himself to be their assistant. These remonstrances easily persuaded the Nervii, and therefore they dispatched speedy messengers to the Centrones, Grudii, Leuaci, Pleumosi, and Gorduni, who were all under their dominion, and raised very great forces, and with them they hastened to the Camp where Cicero wintered, before any inkling of the death of Titurius was brought unto him.

OBSERVATION.

The ambitious and working spirit of Ambiorix, that could attempt to rattle the balancis of a small and ignoble State to so high a point of resolution, that they durst adventure upon the Roman Legions, being settled in the strength of their Empire, by the memory of so many victories in Gallia, wanted now no means to make an overture to an universal commotion, propounding liberty and revenge to the Gallies (two the sweetest conditions that can happen to a subdued people) if they would but stretch out their hands to take it, and follow that course, which his example had proved sure and easy. Which may serve to shew, that he that will attempt upon doubtful and unsafe principles, will take great advantage from a probable entrance, and make a small beginning a sufficient means for his greatest designs.

CHAP. XVII.

Cicero defendeth his Camp from the surprize of the Nervii, and prepareth himself against a Siege.

* Caesar.

It happened to Cicero also, (as it could not otherwise chooseth) that many of the Souldiers that were gone into the woods for timber and munition, were cut off by the sud-


dain approach of the Enemies Horsemen. These being circumvented, the Eburones, Nervii, and Aduatuci, with all their Confederates and Clients began to assault the Camp. The Romans betook themselves speedily to their weapons, and got upon the Rampier. With much ado they held out that day: for the Gallies trusted much upon celerity, hoping if they sped well in that action, to be victors ever after.

Cicero dispatched letters with all speed to Caesar, promising great rewards to him that should carry them: but all the ways were so fore-laid that the Messengers were taken. In one night there was built in the Camp one hundred and twenty Towers, of such timber as was brought in for fortification; and whatsoever wanted of the rest of the work was performed.

The Enemy the next day with a far greater power assaulted the Camp, and filled up the ditch. The Romans made the like defence as they had done the day before, the like was continued divers days after. The Romans made no intermission of their work at any part of the night, nor gave any rest either to the sick or the wounded. Whatsoever was needful for the next days assault, was provided in readiness the night before: a great number of stakes hardened in the fire were prepared, and many mural piles were made; the Towers were floored in their stories; pinacles and parapets were set up of hurdles, and Cicero himself being sickly and of a weak constitution, took not so much leisure as to rest himself in the night time: so that the Souldiers of their own accord compelled him by intreaty to spare himself.

OBSERVATION.

This Q. Cicero is said to be the Brother of Marcus Cicero the famous Orator, and to him were the Letters sent which are found in his Epistles directed Quinto fratri. In this action his carriage deserved as great reputation in the true censure of honor, as ever his Brother did for his eloquence pro Roscio. And if it had been the others fortune to have performed the like service, he would have made it the greatest exploit that ever Roman had achieved by arms. Wherein particularly may be commended the diligence and industry which was used, in raising so many Towers in so small a time; for providing the night before such things as were necessary for the next days defence; for making so many stakes hardened in the end with fire for the defence of the Rampier; and for the store of their mural pile, which resembled the form of the ordinary pile, but were far greater and weightier, in regard they were to be cast from the Rampier, which gave them such an advantage



b y reason of the height, that being cast by a strong and well practised arm, they were very effectual and of great terror.

CHAP. XVIII.

The Nervii propound the same things to Cicero; which Ambiorix had done to Sabinus; but are rejected.

Cæsar.

Then the Princes and chief Commanders of the Nervii, which had any entrance of speech and cause of acquaintance with Cicero, signified their desire to speak with him. Which being granted, they propounded the same things which Ambiorix had used to deceive Sabinus; all Gallia were in Arms, the Germans were come over the Rhene, Cæsar and the rest were besieged in their wintering Camps; Sabinus and his Men were cut in pieces; and for the more credit to it they threw him Ambiorix. They said, they were much deceived if they expected any help from those who were at present scarce able to help themselves. Notwithstanding they carried this mind to Cicero and the people of Rome, that they refused nothing but their wintering among them, which they would not suffer to be made a common practice. They might depart in safety whether they would, without disturbance or fear of danger. Cicero only made this answer, that it was not the custom of the people of Rome, to take any article or condition from an armed Enemy; but if they would lay their Arms aside, let them use his forbearance in the matter; and send some to negotiate it with Cæsar: there was great hope, in regard of his justice and equity, that they should not return unsatisfied.

OBSERVATION.

The first attempt which Ambiorix made upon the Camp of Sabinus and Centa was but short, but here what with the pride of the former victory, and the great multitude of the assailants, they continued it longer, in hope to carry it by assault. For the first assault of a place, especially when it cometh by way of surprise, is of greater hope to the assailant, and of greater danger to the defendant, than such as afterward are made in the sequel of the War: for after the first brunt the heat of the Enemy is much abated, as well through the nature of a hot desire, which is most violent in the beginning, and afterward groweth cold and remiss, as also with the harms and peril which they meet with in the encounter; and on the contrary side, the defendants having withstood the first fury, wherein there is most terror and distrust, grow more confident and better assured of their manhood, and in experience of their strength stand firm against any charge whatsoever.

CHAP. XIX.

The Nervii besiege Cicero with a ditch and a rampier, and work means to set fire on their Tents.

The Nervii disappointed of this hope, carried a ditch and a rampier round about the Camp: the rampier was eleven foot high, and the ditch fifteen foot deep; which they had learned of the Romans, partly by being conversant among them certain years before, and partly by the prisoners and captives which they had taken. But they had no iron tools fit for that purpose, but were driven to cut up turf with their Swords, and gather earth with their hands, and carry it away with their Mantles and Gaberdines. Whereby may be gathered, what a multitude of Men there were at the Siege; for in less than three hours, they finished the Fortification of fifteen miles in circuit. The days following the Enemies built Towers to the height of the Rampier, prepared great books and strong penthouses, or safeguards of board and timber, according as the Captives had given them instruction. The seventh day of the Siege being a very windy day, they cast hot bullets of clay out of slings, and burning darts upon the cabins of the Romans, which after the manner of the Gallies were thatched with straw. These cabins were quickly set on fire, which by the violence of the wind, was carried over all the Camp. The Enemy pressing forward with a great clamour, as though the victory were already gotten, began to bring their Towers and Testudines to the rampier, and to scale it with Ladders. But such was the valor of the Roman Souldiers, that albeit they were scorched on all sides with fire, and overcharged with multitude of weapons, and saw all their wealth burned before their face, yet no Man forsook the rampier, or scarce looked back at that which had hapned, but they all fought valiantly, and with an exceeding courage. This was the first day the Romans had, and yet it had this issue, that a very great number of the Enemies were slain and wounded; for they had so thronged themselves under the rampier, that the hindmost hindered the foremost from retiring back. The flame at length abating, and the Enemies having brought on one of their towers to the very work the Centurions of the third cohort drew back themselves and their Men from the place where they stood, and with sign and voice called to the Enemies to enter if they thought good, but none of them durst approach. Then did they

Cæsar.

by casting stones from all parts, beat them from the works, and set their Tower on fire.

OBSERVATION.

This one example may serve to shew the excellency of the Roman discipline, and the wisdom of the first founders of that Art. For they perceiving that the fortune of Wars consisted chiefly in the mastering of particular occurrences, trained their Souldiers in that form of discipline, as might struggle with inconveniences, and strong oppositions of contradicting accidents; and so overcame all difficulties and hindrances with a constant perseverance and a courage invincible. For the great attempting spirit of an ambitious Commander, that seeketh to overtop the trophies of honor, with the memory of his exploits, will quickly perish by his own direction, if the instruments of execution be weaker, than the means which lead him to his designments. For where the weight is greater than the strength, the Engine will sooner break than lift it up. Let a discreet Leader therefore so level his thoughts, that his resolution may not exceed the ability of his particular means: but first let him be well assured what his Souldiers can do, before he resolve what he will do: or otherwise let him so infuse them by discipline and instructions, according to the example of the old Romans, that their worth may answer the height of his desires, and follow his aspiring mind with a resolution grounded upon knowledge and valor; and so making their ability the ground of his designs he shall never fail of means to perform what he intendeth. The want of this consideration hath within these late years repayed our Commanders in many parts of Christendome, with loss and dishonor, when as they have measured the humor of their poor needy and undisciplined Souldiers, by the garb of their ambitious thoughts, and so laid such projects of such difficulty, as were very unfitable in the particularity of occurrences to that which their Souldiers were fit to execute.

CHAP. XX.

The emulation between two Centurions, Pulio and Varenus, with their fortunes in the encounter.

Cæsar.

There was in that Legion two valiant Men, Titus Pulio, and L. Varenus, Centurions, coming on apace to the dignity of the first orders. These two were at continual debate, which of them should be preferred one before another, and every year contended for place of pre-ferment, with much strife and emulation. Pulio at a time that the fortification was very sharply assaulted, called to Varenus, and asked him why he now stood doubtful; or what other place he did look for to make trial of his manhood. This is the day, said he, that shall decide our controversies. And when he had spoken these words, he went out of the Fortification, and where he saw the Enemy thickest,

he fiercely set upon them. Then could not Varenus hold himself within the rampier, but for his credit sake followed after in a reasonable distance. Pulio cast his pile at the enemy, and struck one of the multitude through, that came running out against him. He being slain, the Enemies cover him with their shields, and all cast their weapons at Pulio, giving him no respite or time of retreat. Pulio had his Target struck through, and the dart stuck fast in his girdle. This chance turned aside his scabbard, and hindered his right hand from pulling out his Sword; in which disadvantage the enemy pressed hard upon him. Varenus came and rescued him. Immediately the whole multitude, thinking Pulio to be slain with the dart, turned to Varenus, who speedily betook him to his Sword, and came to handy strokes; and having slain one, he put the rest somewhat back. But as he followed over hastily upon them, he fell down. Him did Pulio rescue, being circumvented and in danger: and so both of them, having slain many of the Enemy, retired to their Camp in safety, to their great honor. Thus fortune carried as well the contention, as the encounter of them both, that being Enemies, they nevertheless gave help to save each others life, in such sort, as it was not to be judged which of them deserved greatest honor.

OBSERVATION.

Cæsar inserteth this accident of the two Centurions, as worthy to be related amongst the deeds of Arms contained in these Commentaries. Wherein we are first to observe the grounds of this quarrel, which was their continual strife for place of pre-ferment, which they fought after, by shewing their valor in time of danger, and approving their worth by the greatness of their desert: a contention worthy the Roman discipline, and may serve for a pattern of true honour full of courage, accomplished with Vertue. For these Simulates which desire of honor had cast between them, brought such emulation, which is the spur of Vertue, far from enmity or hateful contention, for the difference between these two qualities is, that enmity hunteth after destruction, and only rejoiceth in that which bringeth to our adversary utter ruin, dishonour or ill achievement; but emulation contendeth only by well deserving to gain the advantage of another Mans fame, that each the same means to attain to the like end; and is always mixed with love, in regard of the affinity of their affections, and the sympathy of their desires, not seeking the overthrow of their Competitor, but succouring him in time of danger, and defending him from foul and unfortunate calamity, that he may still continue to shew the greatness of his worth by the opposition of inferior actions, which are as a lesser scandal to

desire

defer to measure the estimation of the others honour.

A virtue rare and unknown in these days, and would hardly find subjects to be resolute in, if she should offer her help in the course of our affairs, or sue to be entertained by the crooked dispositions of our times: For we can no sooner conceive the thoughts that breed emulation, but it turneth presently to hatred, which is followed to the uttermost of our malice, and reiteth better satisfied with the miserable end of our opposed partner, then with the use of Trophies, deservingly erected to our honor. Which maketh me wonder, when I look into the difference of these and those ages, whether it were the discipline of that time, which brought forth such honest effects of Vertue, to their glory and our ignominy, having learned better rules then were known unto them; or whether the World weakened with age, want strength in these times to bring forth her creatures in that perfection, as it did in those days; or what other cause hath made our worst affections so violent, and our better faculties so remiss and negligent, that vertue hath no part in us but words of praise, our whole practice being consecrated to actions of reproach. The injuries, murders, scandalous carriages, of one towards another, which in these days are so readily offered and so impatiently digested, will admit no satisfaction but private combat; which in the first Monarchies was granted only against strangers and foreign enemies, as the only objects of Arms and wars, and capable of that justice which the private sword should execute: for they well perceived that these single battels were as sparkles of civil discord, and intestine Wars, although not so apparent in the general view of their state, yet as odious in particular, and as dishonourable to good government. And if there were a true record of such as have been either slain or wounded within these forty years, either in this Kingdom, or in France, or in Germany, by this licentious and brutish custom, I make no question but they would amount to a number capable of that fearful stile which is attributed to Civil Wars.

Neither is there any law, how rigorous or hard soever, that can give relief to this disorder, but the restraint will draw on as great enormities, and as intolerable in a good Government. *Rodericus King of the Lombards* forbade his Subjects this manner of combat: but shortly after he was constrained to recall the Edict for the avoiding of greater evils, although he protested the thing to be inhumane and barbarous. The like Edict was published in France by Philip the Fair; but was within two years revoked again at the instant request of his subjects, in regard of the Murders and assassinations committed in that Kingdom.

The only remedy that I find to take effect in this case, was that of late time which the Prince of Melbye in Piemont invented to prevent this evil; for perceiving how ordinary quarrels and bloodshed were in his Camp, he assigned a place between two bridges, for the performance of the *Duelum*, with this charge, that he that had the worst, should always be slain, and cast from the bridge into the water. The danger joined with dishonour (which by this Decree attended such as undertook private combat) made the soldiers wiser in their carriage, and put an end to their sedition and civil discords.

But that which is yet worst of all is, that custom hath now made it so familiar, that every trifles seemeth sufficient to call the matter to a private combat, a cross look calleth another Mans honour in question, but the word lye is of as great consequence as any stab or villany whatsoever. Whereat we may well wonder, how it hapeth, that we sell our selves so much exasperated at the reproach of that vice, which we so ordinarily commit: for in the custom of these times, to cast upon the Lye is the greatest injury that words can do unto us; and yet there is nothing more frequent in our mouth. It may be a property in our nature, to stand chiefly in the defence of that corruption, unto which we are most subject.

I speak not this to qualify the foulness of this vice; for I hold a Lye to be a monster in nature, one that condemneth GOD, and feareth Man, as an ancient Father saith: but to shew the crookedness of our disposition, in disdaining to acknowledge that fault which we so commonly commit. But I would fain learn when honor first came to be measured with words: for from the beginning it was not so. *Cæsar* was often called to his face Thief and Drunkard, without any farther matter, and the liberty of invectives which great personages used one against another, as it began, so it ended with words. And so I think our Lye might too, for I take him that returneth the Lye, and so let it rest until farther proof, to have as great advantage in the reputation of honour as the former that first gave the disgrace.

CHAP. XXI.

Cicero findeth means to advertise Cæsar of this act, who halting, raiseth the Siege, and putteth the Enemy to a great slaughter.

As the Siege grew daily hotter and sharper, and specially for that a great part of the Soldiers were laid up with wounds, and the matter brought into a few Mens hands that were able to make any defence; so they sent out Letters and Messengers the more often to Cæsar: of whom some were taken, and in the sight of our Soldiers tormented to death. There was one within the place besieged of the Nation of the Nervii, called Vertico, of honest parentage, who in the beginning of the Siege had fled to Cicero, and carried himself faithfully in that service. This man did Cicero choose, persuading him with hope of liberty, and other great rewards, to carry Letters to Cæsar, which he took, and having tied them up in his dart, travailed as a Gall, amongst the Gallies, without any suspicion, and so came to Cæsar, of whom he understood how dangerously Cicero and the Legion was beset.

Cæsar having received those Letters about the eleventh hour of the day, dispatched presently a Messenger to M. Crassus the Treasurer, in the Country of the Bellovacii, twenty

five miles off, commanding the Legion to set out at midnight, and speedily to come unto him. Crassus set out, and came along with the Messenger. He sent another Post to Caius Fabius the Legate, to bring that Legion to the confines of the Atrebatas, through which he was to pass. And wrote in like manner to Labienus, that, if it stood with the convenience of the State, he should bring his Legion to the Territories of the Nervii: for the rest of the Army that were further off, he thought good not to expell. He drew Four hundred Horse, or thereabouts, from the nearest Wintering-Camps. And, being advertised about the third hour (by the fore-runners) of Crassus coming, he marched that day Twenty miles.

Cantabry.

He made Crassus Governor of Samarobrina, and gave him one Legion for the defence thereof; in regard, that the Baggage of the whole Army, the Hostages of the Provincers, the publick Transfactions and Letters, together with all the Corn which he had got for the provision of the Winter, was left in that place. Fabius, according to his directions, without any delay, met him with his Legion.

Labienus understanding of the death of Sabinus, and the slaughter of the Cohorts, and knowing also, that the whole Forces of the Treviri were marching toward him, doubted, that if his setting forward out of his Winter station should seem as a stealing away, he should not be able to undergo the charge of the Enemy, whom a late Victory had made insolent: and therefore informed Cæsar, by his Letters, what danger it would be to draw the Legion from their Wintering Camp; relating what had hapned amongst the Eburones, and how that all the Forces of the Treviri, both Horse and Foot, lay but three miles distant from his Camp.

Cæsar allowing of these reasons, howsoever his hope of three Legions was fallen unto two, yet his whole trust was in celerity, as the only means of all their safeties: and so by great Journeys came into the confines of the Nervii; where he understood, by the Captives, how matters passed with Cicero, and what danger he was in. At what time he perceived a certain horseman of the Gallies, by great rewards offered unto him, to carry a Letter unto Cicero; which he sent writ in Greek Characters, lest his purposes should be discovered, if the Letter had been intercepted: advising, that if he could not come to his presence, he should tie it to the string of a Dart, and so cast it in-

to the Fortifications. He advertised them by his Letter, that he was on the way with the Legions, and would be there instantly to raise the Siege, exhorting him to persevere in his wonted gallantry. The Gall, fearing some danger, followed the directions, and cast it into the Works by a Dart; which fell by chance upon a Turret, and there stuck two days before it was perceived: the third day a soldier finding it, took it down, and brought it to Cicero; who read it publicly in the Assembly of the Soldiers, and put them all into exceeding great joy. And, at the same time, the smook of their fires began a far off to be discovered; which put them out of all doubt of the approach of the Legions.

The Gallies being advertised thereof, by their Discoverers, left the Siege, and made towards Cæsar, with all their Power; which consisted of 60000 Men, or thereabouts. Cicero finding himself at liberty, sought out the same Vertico before mentioned, to carry Letters to Cæsar, advising him to be wary and diligent in his passage: signifying, by those Letters, that the Enemy had left the Siege, and turned all his Forces towards him. Which Letters being brought unto Cæsar about midnight, he certified his party of the Contents thereof, and prepared them, by encouragement, to fight. The next day, as soon as it began to be light, he removed his Camp; and, having marched about four miles, he discovered the multitude of the Enemy beyond a great Valley and a River. It was a matter of exceeding danger, to give Battel to so great a number, in a place of disadvantage: and, for as much as he knew, that Cicero was freed of the Siege, he thought he might the better forbear to make such haste, and thereupon sat down, and in as indifferent a place as he could choose, fortified his Camp. Which being of it self very little, as not having scarce Seven thousand men, and those without any Carriages; yet he lessened it as much as he could, by narrowing the usual Streets thereof, to the end he might the better defend it, if happily the Enemy might be drawn to engage himself seriously in any attempt upon the same. In the mean time, having sent out Discoverers into all parts, he informed himself, which way he might most conveniently pass over the Valley.

The same day, after small encounters of the Cavalry at the water, either party contained themselves within their Fortifications: the Gallies, as expelling greater Forces, which were not yet come; and Cæsar, that by a counterfeint

counterfeit fear, he might draw the Enemy to the place where he was lodged, on this side the Valley, and so strike the Battle before his Camp; and, if he could not bring it so about, then, upon discovery of the way, to pass the Valley, and the River with less danger. As it began to be day-light, the Cavalry of the Enemy came near unto the Camp, and began to skirmish with our Horsemen. Cæsar, of his purpose, commanded the Horsemen to fall back, and to betake themselves into the Camp; and withall, to fortifie their Camp on all sides with a higher Rampier, to stop up the Gates; and, in doing of these things, to carry themselves tumultuously, and with a feigned show of great fear. With which inducements, the Enemy was so drawn on, that he brought over all his Forces, and imbatelled them in an unequal and disadvantageous place. Our men being drawn from the Rampier (to make the matter more apparent) they were imboldened to come nearer, and to cast weapons, from all parts, into our Works: sending Heralds round about, with Proclamation, That if any Gall or Roman, would come over unto them before the third hour, he should be taken into their safe protection; but, after that time, there was no hope of any such reception. And they did so condemn our party, that whereas the Ports were shut up for a show, with a single row of Turfs, to the end they might appear to be made up in such manner, that they could not be broken open; some of them began to break down the Rampier with their hands, and others to fill up the ditches.

Which Cæsar perceiving, sallied out at all the Ports at once; and, sending out the Cavalry, put the Enemy so suddenly to flight, that not one of them resisted, by way of fighting: in so much, as he slew a great number of them, and put them all besides their Armes. But, because he feared to follow them far, in regard of the Woods and Bogs that lay in their passage, (being unwilling to hazard himself upon the least occasion of danger) he returned with all his Forces in safety, and the self-same day came to Cicero. Where he admired the Towers, the Mantlets and Works which were begun and prepared by the Enemy: and, drawing out the Legion, he found, that the tenth man had not escaped without wounds. By all which circumstances he understood, with what danger and valor the business had been carried. He commended Cicero and the Legion according to their merit; calleth out by name such Centurions and Tribunes of the Soldiers,

as by testimony of Cicero were found to have deserved extraordinarily in that service; informed himself by the Captives, of the certainty of Sabinus and Cotta's misfortune. The next day he spake publicly to the Soldiers, opened the particulars of that matter, and then seasoned them with comfort and encouragement; shewing, that the loss which happened, through the fault and temerity of a Legate, was to be born with better patience: and the rather, for as much as by the assistance of the immortal gods, and by their own virtue, the loss was redeemed in such a fashion, as neither the Enemy did long joy it, nor themselves were long afflicted with grief for the same.

OBSERVATION.

THE passages in this Chapter are of great variety, and do give occasion of much discourse. But that which is most remarkable, is, that to exceed in Forces and Troops of men, may be a means to bring a Party to an overthrow: for, an extraordinary power doth always beget an opinion sorting to their own desires, and can hardly think of any other end, than that which futech with security, and victorious success; which being crossed in any material circumstance, and put besides the course of their intendments, whereby they fail of what they expected, doth consequently draw all the other way, and changeth hope into milhap: as it fared here with the Galles upon Cæsar's sudden falling out of the Camp.

CHAP. XXII.

The Commotions of the States of Gallia. Induciomarus attempting great matters, is slain, and the Country quieted.

IN the mean time, the report of Cæsar's victory was carried to Labienus, with incredible speed, through the Countrey of those of Rheims: in so much, as being Fifty miles distant from that place, where Cicero wintered, and that the overthrow was given about three of the clock in the afternoon, there was a shout at the Camp-gate before midnight; whereby the men of Rheims congratulated Labienus for that Victory. The same whereof being carried to the Treviri, Induciomarus, that purposed the next day to besiege Labienus, fled, in the night time, and carried all his Forces back to the Treviri. Cæsar remanded Fabius, with his Legion, into their winter Stations: He himself, with three Legions, determined to Winter about Samarobrina. And, for as much as there were such commotions throughout all Gallia, himself resolved to abide with the Army all the Winter. For, upon the news of the overthrow of Sabinus

Sabinus, almost all the States of Gallia did enter into a consultation of War; sent Messengers and Ambassadors into all parts; to make overtures for future resolutions, and to understand in what place the War might best be set on foot; holding their Conventicles by night, in secret and desert places: in such manner, as there passed not a day, during all that Winter, which brought not some new care or trouble to Cæsar, whilst he was daily advertised of new meetings, and conspiracies amongst the Galles

Amongst others, he had intelligence from L. Roscius the Legate, whom he had set over the thirteenth Legion. That great Forces of those States and Cities of the Galles, that are called Armorice, were assembled together to fight against him, and were come within eight miles of his Camp: but, understanding of Cæsar's Victory, they fell back in such a fashion, as though they meant to fly away. But Cæsar, having called unto him the Princes, and chief men of every State, terrifying some, as seeming to understand their Compliments, and persuading others, kept a great part of Gallia in obedience. Howbeit, the Senones, (a strong People, and of great authority amongst the Galles) went about, by a publick decree, to kill Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had set to be King over them; (whose brother Moritagus, at Cæsar's coming into Gallia, and whose Ancestors formerly were possessed of that Kingdom) which he perceiving, fled away, and was prosecuted to the very borders, and so driven as well out of his private house, as of his Kingdom. And, having sent Embassadors to Cæsar, to satisfie him herein; whereas he commanded the whole Senate to come unto him, they refused to obey his warrant. So much it prevailed amongst barbarous people, that there were some found that durst avouch the undertaking of a War, which made such an alteration in the minds of all men; that besides, the Hedui, and the State of Rheims, whom Cæsar had in great favour and respect (the one for their ancient and perpetual fidelity to the People of Rome, and the other, for their late services in the War of Gallia) there was almost no State that was not well, whether it may not be wondered at or no, as well for many other reasons, as specially for that they greatly grieved, that they, who excelled all other Nations in deeds of Armes, had now lost their reputation so far, as they were forced to bear the yoke of the People of Rome.

The Treviri and Induciomarus lost the time of all that winter, but sent Commissioners beyond the Rhene, soliciting the Cities, and promising Money, with confident assurance, that the greatest part of our Army was already cut off, and that which was left was but a small remainder of the same: and yet, for all that; no people of the Germans could be persuaded to pass the Rhene. For, having twice made trial, to their cost, in the War of Ariovistus, and in the passage of the *Tenchtheri, they would tempt fortune no further.

Induciomarus cast down from his hope, did, notwithstanding, train and gather Forces, got Horses from the bordering States, and, with great rewards, drew unto him banished and condemned men from all parts of Gallia; and did thereby get such an opinion throughout all that Continent, that Embassadors came flocking unto him from all quarters, and sought his favour both in publick and private. When he understood, that men made to him of their own accord, and that on the one side, the Senones and Carpuates were instigated with a remembrance of their offences, and on the other side, the Nervii and Aduaticus made provision of war against the Romans, and that he should not want voluntary Forces, if he did but once go out of his Confiners; he gave order to call a Council of Armes: which, according to the manner of the Galles, was always the beginning of a War; being such, as constrained all the men that were of years, by the Common Law of the Land, to assemble together in Armes: and, he that came last, was, in the sight of all the rest, put to death with exquisite torture. In that Council, he took order to Proclaim Cingetorix, the Chief of the other Faction, and his Son in Law (who, as we have before declared, had followed Cæsar, and not left him in any of those services) a Traitor to the State, and that his goods should be confiscated.

That being done, he published in the Council, that he was sent for by the Senones and the Carnutes, and many other States of Gallia: whether he meant to go through the Territories of the inhabitants of Rheims; and, that he would harry and waste their Country. But, first his purpose was, to take the Camp of Labienus, and, accordingly gave order what he would have done. Labienus being in a Camp exceedingly fortified, as well by Nature as by Art, did not fear any danger that might happen to himself or the Legion; but rather studied, not to let pass any occasion

*Frankfort.

to carry the matter handsomely, and to purpose. And therefore, being advertised by Cingetorix, and his Allies, what Speech Induciomarus had delivered in the Council, he sent Messengers to all the confining Cities, and commanded Horsemen to be sent unto him by a certain day.

In the mean time, Induciomarus rid up and down almost every day, with all his Cavalry under his Camp; sometimes to view the site thereof, otherwhile to Parlee, or else to terrifie the Soldiers; and, his Horsemen, for the most part, would cast their weapons within the Rampier. Labienus kept all his men within the Fortifications, and did what he could to make the Enemy believe, that he was sore afraid. And, as Induciomarus came daily with greater contempt to the Camp, one night, having taken in the Cavalry of the bordering Cities, which he had formerly sent for, he kept all his party (by good guarding) within his Camp, with such diligence, that their reception could not possibly be bruited abroad, or carried to the Treviri. In the mean time, Induciomarus, according to his wonted custom, approached near the Camp, and there spent a great part of the day: the Horsemen cast their weapons, and with words of high reproach, called out our men to fight; without any word given in answer by them. And, a little before the Evening, as they dispersed

themselves and departed, upon a sudden, Labienus let out all the Cavalry at two Ports, commanding them, that after the Enemy was put to flight (which he saw would necessarily happen) that every one should wake after Induciomarus; and, that no man should so much as wound any other Enemy, before they saw him slain; being very unwilling to give him time to escape, while the Soldiers were engaged with the rest: and propounded great rewards to them that slew him. He sent out also several Cohorts to assist the Horse. Fortune made good that direction: for, as all made after one, Induciomarus was surpris'd in the Ford of a River, and slain, and his head was brought back into the Camp. The Horsemen returning, slew as many of the rest as they could take. This thing being known, all the Forces of the Eburones and Nervii, which were met together, departed home; and, after that time, Cæsar had Gallia better settled in quietness.

OBSERVATION.

AS the misfortune which befell *Sabinus* and *Cotta*, put all *Gallia* into troubles, and Comotions; so the head of *Induciomarus* reduced all into peace. According as it is said of the *Spaniard*, that, in some cases, one man is worth a Thousand.

And thus endeth the Fifth Commentary.

THE

THE Sixth Commentary OF THE WARS in GALLIA.

THE ARGUMENT.

THIS Summers Commentary setteth forth the malice of an Enemy, that refuseth open Encounter, but keeping himself in the fastness of his holds, forceth the adverse party either to leave him untouched, or to seek him out upon disadvantage: together with such casualties annexed to the matter, as the power of fortune doth commonly intermingle with such occurrences: as also the manners and fashions of life then in use amongst the *Germans* and *Galles*.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar fearing a greater commotion in Gallia, musters more Forces.

Cæsar,



CÆSAR for many reasons expecting greater troubles in Gallia, appointed *M. Silanus*, and *C. Antistius Reginus*, and *T. Sextius*, Legates in his Army, to make a new choice, and

muster up more Soldiers; and withal he intrated, *Cnecius Pompeius Proconsul*, forasmuch as he continued at the City, about publick busineses, that he would recal to their ensignes, and send unto him such Souldiers, as were before discharged of the Consuls Oath, for he thought it very material for the future time, to the opinion of the *Galles*, when they should see Italy so mighty, that if they had received any loss by the casualties of War, they could not only in a short time make a supply thereof, but augment their Army with great

ter forces. Which when Pompey had granted, both for the good of the Commonwealth, and Cæsar's friendship, the choice being speedily by his Ministers performed, before the winter was ended, three Legions were enrolled and brought unto him, whereby the number of cohorts were doubled, which were lost with *Q. Titurius*, and withal he made experience both by the speed and by the forces, what the wealth and discipline of the people of Rome could do.

The First OBSERVATION.

NOTWITHSTANDING any former purpose, I will begin this Commentary with the manner of the choice which the Romans used when they mustred Souldiers for an intended War: and will lay it first down as the basis and ground of all military architecture, and carried by them with such a ceremonious and grave respect, as might best expresse the seriousness of the action, and make the Souldiers understand what consequence the sequel imported. Polybius, who only remaineth of them that have written of the ancient fashion of the Roman War, amongst other parts of their discipline, hath left unto posterity a compendious relation,

relation of their musters and enrolments, which with the help of other Historics may be thus understood.

Upon the choice of their Consuls in the beginning of every year, their custom was to enrol four legions, two for either Consul. At which enrolment they first chose fourteen Tribunes out of the body of their Gentlemen, whom they called *Equites*. These fourteen were such as had served five years in the Wars, whereby they became eligible of that dignity. And again, they chose ten other Tribunes out of the Commonalty, being such as had been ten years service: grounding this custom upon another law, which commanded the *Equites* to serve ten, and the *Pedites* or Commons twenty whole years before they could be freed and discharged from the Wars. And therefore according to the proportion of their stipendary time; as the *Equites* were admitted Tribunes at five years, so were the legionary footmen at ten, as at half their compleat time of serving in the Wars. The general respect which the *Romans* had in the choice of every particular Man, from the highest to the lowest, was included in the circumstances of their age, and of their wealth. The age which they deemed fit to endure the labors of war, was from seventeen to fix and forty, for so faith *Tubero* concerning the first limit of military ability, that *Jervius* did injul fouldiers from the age of seventeen years, adjudging such to be fit for the service of Common-wealth. And *Censorinus* expresseth the second with an etymology of the name, where he faith, that Men were called *Juvenes* unto the age of forty six years, *Quod rempublicam in re militari possint servare*, because till then they were able to help and serve their Country in War. In this ability of years we are to understand that the law required every Man to perfect the compleat number of twenty years stipend; if there were occasion of so many Wars in that space of nine and twenty years, which is comprehended between seventeen and forty six. The wealth, which is the second circumstance that made Men capable of military dignity, was necessarily required to amount to the value of *Drachmas quadringentas*, as *Polybius* faith, which by the Latine phrase was termed *quaterna milia aris*: such as were not worth so much, were neglected in this choice, and reserved for sea service: neither was it lawful for any Man to attain to any office or magistracy within the City, until he had merited ten years stipend. Upon a resolution to make an enrolment, which was almost every year, the Consuls did proclaim a day, when all Men of military age, were to present themselves. Upon which day the *Roman* youth being assembled in the City, and then in the Capitol, the fourteen Tribunes, elected out of the body of the *Equites*, divided themselves according as they were chosen by the people into four parts; forasmuch as in former time, the whole Forces of their Empire consisted of four Legions or Regiments, whereof I have discoursed at large in the former Book. And the four Tribunes first chosen, were allotted to the first Legion, the three next to the second Legion, the four other to the third, and the three last to the fourth. In like manner the ten Tribunes which were taken out of the common body of the people, divided themselves into four parts: and the two first chosen, were enrolled in the first Legion, the three next in the second Legion, the two follow-

ing in the third Legion, and the three last in the fourth. By which ingenious and discreet allotment, it came to pass, that the Community were intermingled in the Government of their Armies with the Gentlemen, in such an excellent mixture, that the *Equites* were either superior or equal to the *Plebeii*; notwithstanding that every Legion had an equal number of Tribunes. The election being thus far carried, the Tribunes of every Legion laid them down by themselves: the people being divided first into their Tribes, and then into their classes and centuries, casting lots which Tribe should be taken; and out of that Tribe, whereon the lot fell, they drew four men, as equal as they could, both in age and habitude, who being brought forth, the Tribunes of the first Legion made the first choice of one of those four; then the Tribunes of the second Legion had their choice, they of the third Legion took the next, and the fourth had the last Man. And again, out of the same Tribe, were other four chosen; and then the Tribunes of the second Legion began first to make their choice, and so consequently the first Legion had the last Man. Again four other being chosen, the Tribunes of the third Legion had the first election, and in that course the second Legion had the last Man. And by this alternate and successive election it came to pass, that every Legion was equally compounded, both in quality and in number. The enrolment proceeding in this manner, until their numbers were full, the Tribunes of every Legion assembled their several Troops together, and took one out of every Regiment, and gave an oath unto him that he should execute and obey, according to his power, whatsoever was commanded him by his General: the rest being particularly called, were sworn to keep the same oath, which their fore-man had taken. And thus we see both who were the electors, who were eligible, and the manner of their choice. Wherein we may observe what means they used to ingage every particular Man, with an interest in the general cause: for they thought it not sufficient to force Men out by public authority, and to bind them simply to that service, by the mandates of their Empire, considering the labors and difficulties of War, which oftentimes are able to dull the edge of the greatest spirit, and to cause omissions of duty in the most honest and obedient minds; but they tied them likewise with such particular respects, as did both concern the possessions of their fortune, and the Religion of their soul. For it is observed concerning Mans actions, that unless the mind do faithfully affect the execution, it may be carried with such a perfunctory service, as shall betray the true intent to no effect, and deceive the end of that which was promised by designation. And therefore they refused to enrol any man that had not a convenient proportion of wealth, to maintain a steadfast and well-resolved courage, and to settle the motions of a staggering mind, when they brought themselves that the public duties wherein they were engaged, were the defensive powers of their Empire, and the means whereby the public weale continued happy: and so by consequence their private fortunes were assured from violence, and preserved only by an effectual observance of their military discipline. I grant that it is not altogether wealth that doth grace and formalize the actions of men; for in some cases penury and want makes

men more valurous, according to the answer which a fouldier once made to *Laculus*:

Horace.

Isis eo quo vis, qui zonam perdidit, inquit.
Whither you will be I go who's lost his purse.

Notwithstanding, for as much as the public cause is either misperfed or well affected according as it doth concern every Man in particular: as who will doubt of the utmost diligence of those Mariners, that have their Vessel fraught with their own goods; or contrarywise, who will blame a mercenary Pilot for making peace with death, with the loss of other Mens Merchandise? for *Patris est ubicunque bene est*; That's a mans Country where he is well, as one truly faith; and the estimation we have of this life, is entertained only by the benefits we hold by our life: therefore it much importeth a State to have such Agents to negotiate the publick businesses, as are engaged in the same by the interest of their own particular. Neither was it sufficient in that Government to choose Men of ability both in their body and in their subsilance, but they found it necessary to bind their conscience with a religious consecration, and to swear a faithful obedience to their General, which with the reverence of the place, being the Capitol, and other ceremonies of Majesty attending the enrolment, doth manifestly shew how much the *Romans* imputed to this part of their discipline, being the foundation of the sequel of that action.

•The Second OBSERVATION.

Reinforcing
of Troops
decreased.

Secondly, I observe the benefit which an opulent and able State may make of any loss or misfortune received by an enemy: which consisteth chiefly in the reinforcing, or if it may be, in the redoubling of such Troops as the casualties of war have consumed. For it much abateh the spirit of a people, and turneth the pride of a victory into discouragement and faintness of heart, when they see their belt and most fortunate endeavors achieve nothing but a reiteration of their labors, and are driven to begin again that work which with much difficulty and hazard they had once overcome. For it is the end that maketh any labour to be undertaken, being otherwise nothing but a pain of the body and vexation of the spirit. And therefore when it shall be found either circular, or of many confrontments, before it can answer the designments of our mind, we choose rather to forego that contentment which the accomplishment of our desires would afford us, then to buy it with such a measure of trouble, as exceedeth that which the proportion of our means seemeth able to effect. In regard whereof the ancient sages of the world, made a task of this quality, to be one of *Hercules* labors, by feigning the serpent *Hydra* to be of this nature, that when one head was smitten off, two other heads grew out presently from the same stump: and so his labor multiplied his travel, and his valor increased the difficulty of his work. It was *Cæsar*'s custom in other cases, to have such a beginning of strength at his first entrance into a War, as by continuance might be augmented, and rather increase than decay upon the resistance of an enemy. So he began the war in *Gallia* with six Legions, continued it with eight, and ended it with ten: he began the civil War but with one Legion; he arrived

at *Brundisium* with six; he followed *Pompey* into *Greece* with fifteen thousand foot and five thousand horse; and ended that War with two and twenty thousand foot and a thousand horse. He began the War at *Alexandria*, with three thousand two hundred foot, and ended it with six Legions. He began the War in *Africa* with six, and ended it with eight Legions. And thus he imitated natural motion, being stronger in the end than in the beginning, and made his Army as a plant like to grow great, and sprout out into many branches, rather than to die or decay for want of strength or fresh reinforcing.

CHAP. II.

The Treviri sollicite the Germans and some of the States of Gallia, Cæsar carrieth four Legions into the Territories of the Nervii.

Induciomarus being slain, as is related in the former Book, the Treviri gave the Government unto his Kinsfolk: who intermitted no time to sollicite their borders with the Germans, and to promise them Money for the Wars. When they could not prevail with their Neighbors, they tried those that were farther off, and having found some that hearkened to their design, they confirmed their League with a mutual oath, giving pledges for assurance of Money, and withal, they drew Ambiorix unto their society and confederation. Which things being known, Cæsar perceiving the preparations which in every part were made for War, the a Nervii, b Aduatic, and the c Menapii, with all the Germans on the other side of the Rhene to be in Arms, the Senones not to come being summoned, but to be in council with the Carnutes and their bordering States, the Germans to be solicited with often Embassages from the Treviri; he held it best to think of War sooner than heretofore he was accustomed. And therefore before the winter was ended, with four Legions that lay next together, he entered suddenly upon the confines of the Nervii, and having taken a great number of men and cattle, before they could either make head or fly away, he distributed the booty to the Soldiery, wasted the Countrey, caused the people to come in, and to give pledges unto him. That business being speedily ended, he brought the Legions back again into their wintering Camps.

The First OBSERVATION.

This exemplary course of proceeding in punishing some one for the offences of many, hath ever been held the best means to repress rebellious and factious motions, as well amongst particular subjects which do conspire against the common Policy of a State, as also of such inriour Cities and States, as shall entertain a confederacy prejudicial

Cæsar.
* Part of the
Diocese of
Colen.

a Tournay.
b Beaumont.
c Gueldres.

* Chatter.

Exemplary
justice.

Thirteen
pounds
stealing or
thereabouts

prejudicial to the Sovereignty of an Empire: for, in all such combinations, the undertakers are ever more confident in the assistance and mutual encouragement of each others assent and forwardness, than in the strength of their own particular means. For, the mind propounding a course contrary to a virtuous direction, is always suspicious and mistrustful of the issue: for, as honest motions and conceptions of the heart, are attended with assurance, so doth diffidence wait upon indirect and perfidious designs. And thence it happeneth, that when the inward thoughts can afford no means of emboldening, they commonly rely upon each others example, and do make the action to appear honest unto themselves, for as much as so many associates do approve it. For the prevention whereof in the Continent of Gallia, Cæsar first layd a heavy hand upon the Nervii, being well assured, that as rebellious motions are strengthened, and drawn on, by the mutual example of conspiring members, so they may be weakened and extinguished by the exemplary ruine and subversion of some one or more of the said members, which is as forcible to disswade, as the Justice, which ought to be carried in such sort against Offenders, that, by the punishment of some few, the fear may touch all. According as the Poet describeth the nature and effect of Thunder;

*Ipsæ Pater media nimborum in node coruscæ
Fulmina molitur dextra, quo maxime metu
Terra tremit, fugere Jera, & mortalia corda
Per genes humilis flans pavor; ille flagrant
Aus Athlon, aut Rhodopa, aut alia Ceraunia
Dejicit.* (dextra)

The whole earth trembled, but one hill only shook for it.

The second OBSERVATION.

Upon extraordinary service, the soldier extraordinary rewarded.

Secondly, I observe, the respect which Cæsar had to the extraordinary labour of his Soldiers: for, whereas they were drawn out of their Wintering-Camps before Winter was ended, and were carried unseasonably upon a service, he rewarded them with the booty and spoil of the Enemy, contrary to the ordinary course of the Roman warfare, which reserved either all, or the most part thereof, for the publick Treasury, and left the Soldier to his stipendiary entertainment. Which is a point very observable in the carriage of a War: wherein are required, as well eminent and extraordinary attempts, as common and usual duties; and, in the judgement of a wise Commander, are thought worthy their answerable rewards. At the siege of *Grœnova*, as it followeth in the Seventh Commentary, *L. Fabius* a Centurion told his companions, that the booty and pillage which he had got at the taking of *Avaticum*, would not suffer any man to get up upon the wall before himself. And so, for the most part, it falleth out, that honourable attempts, being honourably rewarded, do, as seed sown in good ground, multiply the increase of like virtuous actions. And this was one principal means which he used, to give courage and valour to his Soldiers; as when he went to get *Spain* from *Pompey* and that

Faction, he borrowed money of the Tribunes and Centurions, and gave it in larges to the Soldiers, whereby he gained (as the faith) two advantages, quod *pignore animæ Centurionum devinxit, & largitione redemit milium voluntates*, for he engaged the Centurions to him whilst he had this pledge from them, and by his larges purchased the good will of the Soldiers.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar summons a general Council, and carrieth his Army against the Senones.

A General Council or meeting of all the States of Gallia, being summoned, according to his first resolution, in the beginning of the Spring, whereas all the rest, saving the Senones, Carnutes, and the Treviri made their appearance; he conceived of it as the beginning of war and defection, and thereupon setting all other things aside, he transferred the Council to the City of Paris in the confines of the Senones, which, in the time of their fathers, had united their State unto them, but were held clear of this confederacy. This thing being published from the Tribunal, the same day he carried the Legions against the Senones, and, by great journeys came into their Country. His coming being known, Acco, the chiefest Author of this Rebellion, commanded the multitude to go into the Cities and Towns of defence: but, as they endeavoured, before it could be accomplished, news was brought, that the Romans were already come; whereby they necessarily left off their purpose, and sent Ambassadors to Cæsar to intreat for favour. They used the mediation of the Hedui, whose State had of old time been in faith and league with the Romans. Cæsar, at the suit of the Hedui, did willingly afford them pardon, and accepted their excuse, for as much as he judged the summer time fitter to be spent in the War which was coming on him, rather than in matter of question and judgment: and, having commanded an hundred pledgers, he delivered them to be kept by the Hedui. The Carnutes likewise sent Messengers and Pledgers, and, by the intreaty of the men of Rhemes, whose Clients they were, received the same answers. Cæsar ended the Council, and commanded Horsemen to be sent him from all the States of Gallia.

Cæsar.

The first OBSERVATION.

The benefit and use of Councils and Parliament.

IT shall not seem impertinent to the Reader, that I take occasion here to say forth what touching the use and benefit of this Parliament, or Council-general, wherein all the States of Gallia, or at the least such as did acknowledge the Roman Sovereignty, presented their fealty, and were mutual witnesses of each others allegiance. Concerning which, we are to understand, that, as all natural bodies have a transitory being, depending upon motion and function of parts; so specially States and Commonwealths, as sympathizing with natural causes, have no certain continuance in one and the same being, but are subject to the alteration of time and fortune, and do pass the ages of a natural life, from infancy growing to better strength, until it cometh to the best perfection which years can afford it, and then decaying again by like degrees, even to the period and death of that policy. For remedy whereof, and for the prevention of any weakening disease, which might infect either the whole powers of the body, or so possess any part thereof, as it might thereby prove, either dangerous or unprofitable, amongst other helps, these Councils and Meetings have been thought necessary; wherein every particular State and City had some of their society present, as well to open their grievances, if any were, and to seek ease and relief, by way of Treaty and Dispute, as also to receive such directions and mandates, as the wisdom of the Prince should think meet for their Government. For, as this common Council, or general assembly, may well be termed the pulse of a politic body, whereby the true state and temperature thereof is discerned: so is it also as a Treaty or Parlee, and a renewing of the conditions of Peace between the head and the members: where sovereignty and obedience being mutually propounded, do concur in the establishing of true and perfect Government. And, this is that, which the Politicians of later time, do, in their Writings, call the reducing of a Commonwealth to the first beginning: for, the noisome and superfluous humors, being, by this means, purged and abated, the Body of the Publick Weal is refined, into such true and natural Elements, and settled, in that disposition of health, as may give great hope of long continuance. Besides this use, and benefit of these Assemblies, there were many necessary businessess concluded, and many things agreed unto, serving to the maintenance of War, against Parties and Factions; as, namely, the Levies and Supplies of Horse and Foot, granted by this Council, as a Subsidy, which, in the Roman Army, received stipend and pay, by the name of Auxiliary, or Associate Forces, whereof, we read, in many places of these Commentaries, and particularly in this Book. But, the Romans used specially the service of their Horsemen, as the flower of their strength, and far exceeding their Foot Companies, in execution of Armes, and use of War, wherein the Gallies have ever challenged a preeminence, before other their neighbour Nations, and have continued the same reputation even unto this time. Whether it be in regard of the nimble and quick motions of their spirits, which are better fured with the swift and speedy execu-

The French are better Horsemen then Footmen.

cution of Horse, then with any readines which their own strength can afford them, or what other cause it hath, I know not: but, this I am sure of, that, as the World taketh notice of their hot Phantasies, so would the French be reckoned the best Horsemen of any other Nation. The last saying, which I observe, concerning this Council, is, the time wherein it was summoned, which was the beginning of the Spring, rather than any other part of the year, whereof there is this reason; that, if any State neglected the Summons, and refused to make their appearance according to custom, the Summer time coming on, gave good means to the Roman Legions, to punish the infolence of such a contempt: as it happened in this place to the Senones, Carnutes, and Treviri, whose absence, from this Meeting, was a sufficient argument to Cæsar of their Rebellion, and delivered the reward of open revolt.

The second OBSERVATION.

THE second thing which I will briefly observe in this Chapter, is the pardon which Cæsar willingly gave the Senones at the mediation of the Hedui: not so much for the respect he bare unto the Hedui, although they had of long time performed good service to the Roman Empire, and were found more faithful than all the States of Gallia: (howbeit, I doubt not, but that he was glad of that occasion, to gratify the Hedui;) but, as a Master in that faculty, well knowing, what best fured with the Publick profit, in all times and seasons, he would not mispend the Summer in questions and dispute, concerning former errors, which might better be remembered upon other occasions, but rather in prosecuting War against other special revolvers, as a matter more behoveful to the advancement of the Empire, and best fitting the time of Summer. For, in following a business, there is nothing more available to a fortunate issue, then to be able to distinguish of the validity of the parties, and to discern, which hath most interest in the bulk of the matter, that so we may not be mistaken in our designs, but follow that course as shall most advantage our purpose. And here a General is to take special care, that no humorous respect do hinder that resolution which true Judgement approveth: for, oftentimes it falleth out, that either particular profit, delighting pleasures, desire of revenge, or some other unseasonable affection, doth so intangle them in their proceedings, as they never attain to the main drift of the action: and, this is called stumbling by the way.

Not to mispend the time in unnecessary services.

CHAP. IV.

Cæsar intendeth the War of the Treviri.

THIS part of Gallia being quieted, he bent his whole mind to make War against the Treviri and Ambiorix, commanding Cavarinus, with the Cavalry of the Senones, to go along with him, lest any Tumult should happen in his absence, either through his discontentment, or the malice of the State. These things being thus determined,

Cæsar.

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mined, for as much as he well knew, that Ambiorix would not come to blows in open fight, he endeavoured, by what means he could, to understand his other purposes. The Menapii were neighbour-borderers upon the confines of the Eburones, inclosed about with a defence of Bogs and Woods; and only they of all the States of Gallia, had never sent to Cæsar, touching any contract of Peace: of them Ambiorix was received, and had familiar entertainment. And further, he understood, that by the means of the Treviri, the Germans were brought to a contract of friendship with him also. These helps, he thought, were fit to be taken from Ambiorix, before he set upon him with open War: least, despairing of his safety, he should either hide himself amongst the Menapii, or be compelled to fly over the Rhene to the Germans. In this resolution he sent the baggage of the whole Army, with a Convoy of two Legions to Labienus, who was then in the Territories of the Treviri, and he himself, with five expedite and unburthened Legions, made towards the Menapii. They having made no head, but trusting to the strength of the place, fled into the Woods and Bogs, and carried all they had with them. Cæsar dividing his Forces to C. Fabius a Legate, and M. Crassus the Treasurer, having made speedy provision of Bridgers, did set upon them in three parts, and burnt Houses and Villages, and took great numbers of Men and Cattel, whereby the Menapii were constrained to send to Cæsar for Peace. He having taken Pledges of them, assured them, that he would esteem them as Enemies, if they did either receive Ambiorix into their Country, or any Messengers from him. The matter being thus compounded, he left among them Comius of Arras, with certain Horse, as a Garrison to that place, and he himself made towards the Treviri.

OBSERVATION.

Hence we may observe, that as it falleth out in other things, for the most part, so specially in matter of War, there is such a medley, and interlacing of material circumstances with the body of the action, that commonly one business begets another. Cæsar's chief design, at this time, was the War against Ambiorix, and the Treviri: but, considering the Contract and League between them and the Menapii, he would not prosecute the War of the Treviri, until he had taken away that assistance, and left them in the nakedness of their own strength. Wherein we may first observe, what opinion Cæsar held of Allies and Associates, or any other that gave help or assistance to an Enemy: for, besides this particu-

lar, we may read in the fourth Commentary, that the chiefest cause that moved him to take the voyage into Britain, was, for that the Britani had, underhand, given succor and assistance to the Galles: a matter not to be neglected in his judgment, whether it were in regard of any Friendship, or good respect, which they bare unto the Galles, or otherwise to keep the Romans occupied there, that they, in the mean time, might live quietly at home, which I need not here dispute: but, the matter proveth it self plainly, by Cæsar's own confession, that the continual supplies sent from Britain, were a sufficient cause to move him to that war. And, as it followeth in this Commentary, concerning the self-same matter, the only cause that drew him to pass the Rhene the second time into Germany, was, the Succors which the Germans had formerly sent to the Treviri; according to reason, in cases of other natures, that he that will extinguish a lamp, must not suffer an addition of oyle, nor admit the influence of lesser flames, when he goeth about to dry up the greater River. But, that which was the occasion of this business, and might have challenged the first place in this discourse, was, for that Cæsar was almost assured, that Ambiorix would not be brought to a trvall of Battel; and therefore he laboured to understand his other projects. From whence, a Commander may receive direction, what course to hold in a refusal of open encounter: for, as the art and sleight of war, is to lull the Enemy, so, are there more ways and means to be used, than in a purpose, then by waging Battel, as I have discovered at large in the third Commentary: whereunto I may add thus much, which is generally observed in the carriage of great and eminent Commanders, that such as failed in matter of negotiation, and wanted dexterity in managing the course of their business (notwithstanding any fortune or singularity in striking a Battel) did never attain to firm and permanent honor. If any man be desirous to descend into particulars, let him look into the lives of King Pyrrhus, Demetrius, Hannibal, and Caius Marius, whose latter ends, or shutting up of their lives, were not answerable to their excellency in deeds of Armes, for want of that Judicial disposition of their business, which Cæsar might boast of, of whom it may be truly said, that (notwithstanding the many Battels which he fought, y^t he did *plura consilio, quam vi gerere*, do more by his head, than his hand.

CHAP. V.

Labienus overthroweth the Treviri by a guile.

WHILE Cæsar was about these things, the Treviri having raised great Forces, both of Horse and Foot, had a purpose to assault Labienus, wintering in their Confines with one Legion. And, as they were within two dayes journey of him, they had intelligence of two Legions more, which Cæsar had sent unto him; whereupon they encamped themselves some fifteen miles distant from him, and resolved there to attend the Germans Forces. Labie-

Cæsar.

nus

nus being advertised of their resolution, hoping, through their rashness, to find some good opportunity of encounter, he left five Cohorts, for the safety of the Carriages, and, with five and twenty other Cohorts, besides great Forces of Horse, he marched towards the Enemy, and encamped himself within a mile of them. Between Labienus and the Enemy there ran a River, the passage whereof, by reason of the broken banks, was very hard and difficult: this River he did not purpose to pass himself; and doubted the Enemy would not be drawn to do it. They had every day more hopes of fresh aid. In the Meetings and Counsels of War, he gave out, that, for as much as the Germans were said to be at hand, he would neither hazard himself, nor the fortunes of the Army, but he would rather remove his Camp the next day very early in the morning. This was quickly carried to the Enemy, as amongst many of the Galles that were with him, some of them did naturally favour the proceeding of their own Nation. Labienus having, in the night time, called unto him the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and the Centurions of the first Orders, acquainted them with his purpose, and, to the end he might give greater suspicion of fear to the Enemy, he caused the Camp to be dislodged, with more noise and tumult than the Roman Discipline had usually observed; and, thereby, made the Retreat not unlike a flight, or escape: which, before day-light (the two Camps being so near one to the other) was, by the discoverers, brought to the Enemy. The last Troops of the Romans were scarce gone out of the Camp, but the Galles, encouraging one another not to lose so hopeful a prey, thinking it long (specially the Romans, being thus affrighted) to expect the German Forces, and that it stood not with their dignity, being so able, and so many in number, not to adventure upon a handful of men, flying from them, and troubled besides with baggage and burden; and therefore they doubted not to pass the River, and to give them battel in a place of disadvantage. Labienus suspecting that which now had happened, to the end he might draw them all over the River, he made as though he would go on forward. At length, sending the Carriages a little before, and placing them upon a Hill, he gave now, (said he) fellow Soldiers, that opportunity which ye desired, the Enemy in a cumbersome and unequal place; only afford me, your Leader, at this time, that valour, which oftentimes, heretofore, you have shewed to your General; imagine him to be present, and to see this service

with his own eyes. And withall, he commanded the Ensigner to be carried towards the Enemy, and the Army to be imballotted: and, leaving a few Troops of Horse with the Carriages, he disposed the rest in the wings of the Army. The Romans taking up a cry and a shout, did speedily cast their Pikes at the Enemy: who, when they saw the Romans ready to assault them, whom they had thought had fled from them for fear, they were so discouraged, that even in the first close they betook themselves to flight towards the next Woods: Labienus pursuing them with his Horsemen, killed many of them, and took more prisoners, and within a few dayes took in the whole State of the Treviri: for the Germans which came to their succor, understanding of their overthrow, returned home again; and, with them, went also the Kinsmen of Induciomarus, the Authors of that defection. The Sovereignty and Government was given to Cingetorix, who, from the beginning, had ever been true and loyal to the Romans.

The first OBSERVATION.

I Have already handled this practice of a pretended fear, which the History doth so often recommend to our consideration, and have shewed the inconvenience of over-light credulity, leading such easy weenars to a disappointment of their hopes, and consequently to the hazard of their fortune. I will now proceed to that which is further implied in this relation, and respecteth the chiefest duty of a Chief Commander: and, that is, what specially is required of a General, in the carriage and direction of a Battel. Concerning which point, as there is nothing more material to the effecting of any business, then opportunity of time, convenience of place, and an orderly disposition of the means, according to time and place: so, in question of encounter, or waging battel, the duty of a Leader may be included, in these three circumstances. Concerning the quality of the place, as the chiefest and first respect in the choice of a judicial director, the whole scope of the Roman Discipline, from the time of their first Kings, even to the last of their Emperors, did always aim at the advantage of place, as a necessary help for the obtaining of Victory: which I have already noted in the Helvetian action. Yet, for as much as the wisdom and experience of those times, did deem it a circumstance of such importance, give me leave once again to enforce the use thereof by their Examples. Labienus, milites (saith Labienus in this place) *quam perisistis facultatem, hostem iniquo atque impedito loco secutis, præstare eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam Japannero Imperatori præstistis*. Ye have, fellow-soldiers, that opportunity which ye desired, &c. Whereby he cleareth himself of all imputation of ill-direction, as having performed the utmost duty of a Commander, and given such helps, by the

Com. 1.
Cap. 8.

The duty
of a General
in every
Battel.

Lib. 1. cap.

Cæsar's opinion
of allies and as-
sociates.

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the

Battel of
Newport.

the advantage of the place, as are requisite to an easy Victory, leaving the rest to the execution of the Soldiers. *Cæsar*, at the loss he received at *Dyrachum*, cleared himself to his Soldiers in this sort: *Quod esse acceptum detrimenti, cuius potius quam sua culpa debere tribui, locum securum ad dimicandum dedisse, &c.* the damage that was received, was to be attributed to any body, rather than him, he had chosen them a safe place of fighting, &c. And, as it followeth in the Seventh Commentary, being embattled upon the side of a hill, right over against the Army of the *Gallæ*, which stood likewise in a readiness to entertain the Roman valour, he would not suffer his men to hazard themselves in the passage of a Bogge of fifty foot in breadth, lying between both the Armies, but rather persuaded his Soldiers, disdaining the confinement of the Enemy, to endure their contumely, rather than to buy a Victory with the danger of so many worthy men, and patiently to attend some further opportunity. Which passage of *Cæsar*, even in the said terms as it is there related, was urged to good purpose by Sir *Francis Vere*, in the year One thousand six hundred, at a consultation before the Battel of *Newport*. For the Army of the *Netherlanders* being posselt of the Downs, which are small swelling hills rising unevenly along the Sea-shore, upon the coast of *Flanders*, and the Enemy making a stand upon the Sands, at the foot of those hills, and so cutting off the passage to *Offend*, it was disputed by the Commanders, whether they should leave the Downs, and go charge the Enemy where he stood imbat-telled upon the Sands, or attend him in the fallowness of the Downs, whereof they were posselt. The whole Council of War were earnestly bent to forsake the Downs, and to hazard the fight on equal terms, as impatient, that their passage and retreat to *Offend* should be cut off. But, Sir *Francis Vere* well knowing, how much it imported the buifness of that day, to hold a place of such gain and advantage, persuaded Count *Maurice*, by many reasons, and specially by this of *Cæsar*, which I last alleged, not to forgoe the help of the Downs, but to expect the Enemy in that place, and so make use of that benefit upon the first encounter, rather then to adventure the success of the Battel on worse terms, in hope of clearing the passage: and shewing also, many probable conjectures, that the Enemy would not continue long in that gaze. Wherein, as his opinion then prevailed, so all that were present were eye-witnesses, both of the truth of his conjecture, and the soundness of his judgment. For, the Enemy, within a while after, coming on to charge the Troops of the States, was received with such a counterbuffe from the Hills, and were violently beaten back in such rude manner, as our men had the execution of them for the space of a quarter of a mile, or more, which was no small advantage to the fortune of that day. Touching the opportunity of time, which *Pindarus* calleth the Mother of worthy exploits, and oftentimes dependeth upon the circumstance of place, a General ought carefully to advise, that he neither precipitate nor forefellow the occasion, which is well expressed in this particular service of *Labienus*. For, where his purpose was to draw the Enemy over a River, that had steep and uncafe banks, and thereby of a hard and difficult passage,

he would not shew his resolution, until he had drawn them all over the River: for, he was well assured, that the Roman Legions would so charge the Enemy, upon their first encounter with the unresistible weight of their Piles, that in their giving back, they could not escape the danger of the River. And therefore, to make the Victory more absolute and compleat, he suffered them all to come over the water, that all might be endangered in their passage back again. And, this is the benefit which opportunity bringeth, which is the rather to be attended with all carefulness, for as much as *Non sepe, ac diu, eadem occasio est*, a man hath neither often nor long the same opportunity.

Concerning the last circumstance, of the apt and fit disposition of the Forces, according to time and place, which is necessarily required in the duty of a General; it is referred to this end only, that they may be ranged in such manner, that as one man is assistant to another, in their several files and ranks, so one Troop may be in *subsidio*, assistant to another, to the end that no part may stand naked, or fall in the fingleins of its own strength, but that one may second another from the first to the last. *C. Sempronius* a Roman Consul having fought unadvisedly, and received an overthrow, *Fulius* the Tribune of the people caused *Tempanus* a Horseman, that was present at the Battel, to be called, and, as *Livie* reporteth it, *Corum eis*, *Sexte Tempani, inquit, adversarii ne C. Sempronius Consul, aut in tempore pugnam inisset, aut firmasse subsidii aciem* he said thus before them, *Sextus Tempanus*, you believe that *C. Sempronius* the Consul chose a good time to fight, or that he took order for assistant supplies to his Army? for *Livie* saith, he fought *incaute inconsultaque, non subsidii firmata acie, non equite apte locato*, heedlessly, and without good advice, neither strengthening his Army with supplies, nor well placing his Cavalry. And, of these three circumstances consisteth the duty and office of a General, touching the direction of a Battel; wherein whosoever faileth, doth hazard the Prerogative of his command over that Army which he leadech, according to that of *Cæsar*, in the first of his Commentaries, *Se scire, quibuscumque exercitus dicto audienti non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam desuisse, aut aliquo facinore comperio, evarit esse comitum*. That he knew well, whensoever an Army refused to be obedient to their Commander, it was either because, upon some ill success, they saw he was unfortunate, or that by the discovery of some notorious matter, they found him convicted of avarice. Which *Cæsar* himself needeth not to fear, if we may believe *Plutarch*, who writeth, that he was indowed by Nature with an excellent promptitude and aptness, to take opportunity in any buifness.

The second. OBSERVATION.

I May not omit to insill a little upon this noise or shout, which the Soldiers took up in the instant of the charge, and is related in this place as a material point in their carriage at this service. A matter ancient and usual in the Roman Armies, as well in the time of their first Kings, as their first Consuls. *Euph* primo impetu & clamore hostes, the Enemies were overthrown at first

In the life
Cæsar.

The use and
benefit of a
shout took
up in a
charge or
assault.

Lib. I.
Lib. 3.

Lib. 3.
Civil.

first on set and shout, saith *Livie* concerning *Romulus*, And, not long after, *Conqui nec promittit aciem, nec clamorem reddi passus*, the Consul neither marched his Army forward, nor suffered them at all to shout. *Cæsar*, in the censure which he gave concerning Pompey his direction for the Battel at *Pharsalia*, doth expose a double use of this clamour or shouting: first, the terror of the Enemy, and secondly, the encouragement or assurance of themselves: *Est quædam animi incitatio* (saith he) *aque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, que studio pugne incenditur: hæc non reprimere sed augere imperatores debent: neque quædam antiquitus institutum est ut signis vocibus excitarent, clamorem universi tollerent, quibus rebus & hostes terretur & suos incitari excitarentur*. There is a certain rascall and cheerfulness of the mind imbred naturally in all, which is stirred up by an eagerness to fight: this a General should not crush, but cherish. So that it was not without cause, that, in old times, they had a custome, that the whole Army should make a noise, and raise a general shout, whereby they supposed, as the Enemies were affrighted, so their own men were encouraged. Two contrary effects proceeding from a cause, which, to common sense, careeth no shew of any such efficacy: *Fox & prætere nihil*, a bare voice, and nothing more; as one faid of the Nightingale in another sense. But such as do seriously look into the reasons thereof, shall find the saying true which is ascribed to the elder and wiser *Cato*, *Verba, plus quam gladium, & voces quam manuum hostes terrentur, & in fugam vertere*: Words will do more than Swords, and Voices sooner than Hands may affright the Enemy, and put him to flight. The ear, as I have already noted, will sooner betray the foul to the distrust of fear, than any other of the five senses. Which *Josephus* well understood, although peradventure he applied not to fit a remedy, when he commanded his men to stop their ears at the Acclamations of the Roman Legions, lest they might be daunted and amazed thereof. The reason may be, for that our discourse (diligently attending upon a matter of that consequence, which calleth the lives of both parties in question, and valuing every circumstance at the utmost) doth always presuppose a cause answerable to such an effect of joy and assurance. For these shouts and acclamations are properly the consequents of joy, and are so available, that they deceive both parties: for such as take up the shout by way of anticipation, do seem to conclude of that which is yet in question; and, the Enemy thereupon apprehendeth danger when there is none at all, where-by it happeneth, *Hostes terretur, & suos incitari*, that the Enemies are affrighted, and our own men encouraged, as *Cæsar* noteth. Besides these examples, I might allege the authority of Holy Writ, but that it might seem both unfavourable and unreasonable, to make a commixture of such diversities. I will therefore content my self with a practice of our time at the Battel of *Newport*, where, after divers retreats and pursuits, either side chasing the other, as it were by turn and mutual appointment; and, as it often falleth out in such confrontments; at last commandment was given to the *English* to make head again, and, after some pause, to charge the Enemy with a shout; which being accordingly performed, a man might have seen the Enemy startle, before they came to

the stroke; and, being charged home, were fo routed, that they made not head again that day. For the prevention of such a disadvantage, there can be no better precedent then that which *Plutarch* noteth, touching the Battel between the Romans and the *Ambrons*, a dart of that deluge of People, which came down into Italy with the *Cimbri* and *Teutones*; for, these *Ambrons* coming out to give Battel, to the end they might strike fear into the Romans, made an often repetition of their own name with a loud sounding voice, *Ambrons, Ambrons, Ambrons*. The Italians on the other side, that first came down to fight, were the *Ligurians*, inhabiting the coast of *Genoa*, who, hearing this noise, and plainly understanding them, made answer with the like cry, sounding out their own name, *Liguri, Liguri, Liguri*. Whereupon the Captains, of both sides, made their Soldiers cry out altogether, contending for envy one against another, who should cry it loudest: and so both sides were encouraged, and neither of them disadvantaged, *Clamore utrinque sublato*, whilst both sides continued the cry.

In *Marius's*
Life.

The third OBSERVATION.

This *Labienus* was a great fiddler, and well acquainted with *Cæsar's* manner in leading an Army, and made many good gifts while he continued under his command: but, after he betook himself to Pompey's part, and joined with a Faction against his first master, he never achieved any thing but loss and dishonour.

—Dux fortis in armis
Cæsaricus Labienus erat, nunc transfuga militis.

Once Labienus was a Captain stout
On Cæsar's side, now a base Turn-about.

And, upon that occasion, he is often mentioned as a memorial of his disloyalty, to prove, that good success in matter of War, doth follow the General, rather then any inferior Captain. For it is observed of divers, whose fortune hath been great under the conduction of some Commanders, and as unlucky under other Leaders: like Plants or Trees, that thrive well in some grounds, and bear store of fruit, but, being transplanted, do either die, or become barren. And, doubtless, there may be observed the like sympathy or contrariety in the particular courtes of Mans life, wherein they are carried upon the stream of their fortunes, according to the courtes of their first im-barking. And therefore, such as happen in a way that leadech to successful ends, shall much wrong themselves, either to turn back again, or to seek by-paths, whose ends are both unknown and uncertain; and, herein the French saying may serve to some purpose,

Si vous estes bien, tenez vous la,

If you find your self well, hold your self there.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar carries his Army over the Rhene into Germany.

Cæsar.

CÆSAR being come from the Menapii to the Treviri, did resolve to pass the Rhene for two causes: the one was, for that the Germans had sent succors and supplies to the Treviri; the other, that Ambiorix might have no reception or entertainment among them. Upon this resolution, a little above that place where he carried his Army over before, he commanded a Bridge to be made, after the known and appointed fashion, which, by the great industry of the Soldiers, was ended in a few days: and, leaving a sufficient strength at the Bridge, lest any sudden motion should rise amongst the Treviri, he carried over the rest of his Forces both horse and foot. The Ubii, which before-time had given hostages, and were taken into obedience, sent Embassadors unto him to clear themselves from imputation of disloyalty, and that the Treviri had received no supplies from their State: they pray and desire him to spare them, lest the general distrust of the Germans should cause him to punish the innocent for the guilty: and, if he would ask more hostages, they would willingly give them. Cæsar, upon examination of the matter, found, that the supplies were sent by the Suevi: and, thereupon he accepted the satisfaction of the Ubii, and inquired the way and the passages to the Suevi. Some few days after, he understood by the Ubii, that the Suevi had brought all their Forces to one place, and had commanded such Nations as were under their dominion, that they should send them Forces of Horse and Foot. Upon this intelligence he made provision of corn, and chose a fit place to encamp in. He commanded the Ubii to take their Castel, and all their other goods from abroad out of the fields into their Towns, hoping, that the barbarous and unskillful men, might, through want of vittual be drawn to fight upon hard conditions. He gave order also, that they should every day send out discoverers to the Suevi, to understand what they did. The Ubii did as they were commanded, and, after a few days, brought word, that all the Suevi, having received certain news of the approach of the Roman Army, had retired themselves, and all their Forces, to their utmost confines, where there was a Wood of an infinite greatness, called Bacenis, which served as a Native wall, or defence, to keep the Chirufci from

the incursions of the Suevi; and the Suevi from the injury and spoil of the Chirufci. That, at the entrance of this Wood, the Suevi did expect the coming of the Romans.

OBSERVATION.

I Will hold my former purpose, not to deliver any thing concerning Bridges, whereof there are so many Treatises already extant: neither will I go about to describe the substantial building, or ingenious workmanship of this Bridge here mentioned, which might well between Cæsar and his Army: for, as he only could, or at the least did put in practice the making thereof, so will I leave the description to himself, as best fitting with his eloquence. But, for as much as Brancatio, an Italian Writer, taketh occasion from hence to run into ignorance and error, give me leave to set a mark upon this place, lest others, not knowing the ancient course, should run their Bark upon the same shallows. Amongst other advertisements (being but fourteen in all) which he hath given upon Cæsar's Commentaries, he noteth and commendeth the use of Bridges made of Boats, which are commonly carried in an Army Royal to that purpose, before this, or any other invention of former times, specially in regard of the ease and expedition, which may be used, both in making such a Bridge, and taking it up again: for, the Boats being prepared ready, as usually they are in Camp-Royals, such a Bridge may be made in a day, which Cæsar could not do in ten, but with great wonderment and admiration. And therein I hold well with Brancatio, that, for the speedy transportation of an Army over the River, there is no readier means then a Bridge of Boats, pre-supposing the Boats to be first in a readiness. But that which he concludeth, is, that mens wits in these times, are much sharper and readier then those of former ages, for as much as they have found out an ease and expedite course, which former times could never reach unto. Wherein I will not go about to derogate any thing from the condition of the time in which we live and breath, but do desire to find them better accomplished then any other foregoing ages: howsoever, I may suspect a greater weakness of wit in these days, wherein the temperature of the body is so easily conditioned, then it was in the time of our Forefathers; as may appear by many arguments, and serveth not so fitly to the working powers of the mind, as it did before this multiplicity of mixture, when the state of mens bodies were compounded of those perfect elements, which were in our first Parents. But, for this reason which Brancatio alledgeth, the Reader may be pleased to understand, that the use of Boat-bridges was both known, and in practice, as well before the Roman Empire, as in the time of their Government. Herodotus relating the passage of Xerxes Army into Greece, describeth this Bridge of Boates (which Brancatio would attribute to the invention of our times) in the self-same manner, or rather more artificially then hath been accustomed in these later ages, for, finding that no Timber-works would serve the turn, to make a sufficient Bridge over the Straights of Hellespont, being seven furlongs in breadth, he caused Biremes and Triremes to be placed

Bridges.

Hib. 1.

Brancatio lib. 5.

Cæsar.

Whether mens wits be sharper and readier then in former times.

Polyphemus Herodotus.

ced in equal distance one from another, and fastened with anchors before and behind, and to be joined together with planks and boards, and then covered with sand and gravel, raising a hedge or blind on each side thereof, to the end the horse and carrel might not be afraid at the working of the billow, and so made a bridge for the passage of Army. And in the time of the Roman Empire, Tacitus describeth the like Bridge to be made over the River Po, by Valens and Cecina, with as great skill as can be shewed at these times: for faith he, they placed boats a cross the River, in equal distance one from another: and joined them together with strong planks, and fastened them with anchors; but in such sort, as Anchorarum funes non extensi fluitabunt, ut agegente flumine inoffensus ordonaviu extolleretur, the cables of the Anchors floated loose, not being extended to their length, that upon the increase of the River; the ships might be lifted up without any prejudice to them. Whereby it appeareth how much Brancatio was deceived, in ascribing that to these later times, which was the invention of former ages; and may serve as a caveat to our out-linguist humorists, that can endure no reading but that which foundeth with a strange idiom, not to trust too much upon their Authors, lest whilst they stifle their memory with strange words, in the mean time they starve their understanding.

CHAP. VII.

The Factions in Gallia in Cæsars time.

BUt here it shall not be amiss to deliver somewhat touching the manner and fashion of life, both of the Galles and of the Germans, and wherein those two Nations do differ. In Gallia not only in every City, Village, and Precinct, but almost in every particular house there are parties and factions, the heads whereof are such as they think to be of greatest authority, according to whose opinion and command, the main-course of their actions is directed. And this seemeth a custom instituted of old time, to the end that none of the common people, how mean soever, might at any time want means to make their party good, against a greater man: for if they should suffer their parties and followers to be either oppressed or circumvented, they should never bear any rule or authority amongst them. And this is the course throughout all Gallia, for all their States are divided into two factions. When Cæsar came into Gallia, the Hedui were chief ring-leaders of the one party, and the Sequani of the other. These finding themselves to be the weaker side, (forasmuch as the principality and chiefest powers was anciently seated in the Hedui, having many and great adherents and clients) drew the Germans and Ariovistus by many great promises to their

party: and after many great victories, all the Nobility of the Hedui being slain, they went so far beyond them in power and authority, that they drew the greatest part of Clients from the Hedui to themselves, and took the children of their Princes for pledges, and caused them to take a publick oath, not to undertake any thing against the Sequani's besides a great part of their Country which they took from them by force: and so they obtained the principality of Gallia. And thereupon Divitiacus went unto Rome to seek aid of the Senate, but returned without effecting any thing. Cæsars coming into Gallia, brought an alteration of these things; for the pledges were restored back again to the Hedui, and their old followers and clients did likewise return to their protection: besides other new followers, which by Cæsars means did cleave unto them; for they saw that those which entered into friendship with them, were in a better condition, and more fairly dealt with. Whereby their nobleness and dignity was so amplified and enlarged, that the Sequani lost their authority, whom the men of Rhemes succeeded. And forasmuch as the World took notice that they were no less favoured of Cæsar then the Hedui, such as by reason of former enmities, could not endure to join with the Hedui, put themselves into the clientele of the men of Rhemes, and found respective protection from that State; which caused a new and sudden raised authority of the men of Rhemes. So that at that time the Hedui went far beyond all the other States of Gallia, in power and authority, and next unto them were the men of Rhemes.

OBSERVATION.

FActions are generally the rent of a State, and a disjoining of those parts which common unity hath knit together for the preservation of good Government. But the Galles maintained sides and parties throughout the whole body of their Continent, and found it necessary for the upholding of their policy at home; and as it fell out in the course of these Wars, rather a help then otherwise, in their general defence against a foreign Enemy. The reason of the former benefit was grounded upon two causes, as Cæsar noteth: the one proceeding from the oppression used by the rich and mighty men towards the poorer and meaner people; and the other from the impudence of those of inferior condition, refusing to acknowledge any authority or preeminence at all, rather than to endure the wrongs and contumelies of the mighty. And therefore to prevent the licentious might of the great ones, and to give countenance and respect to the lower sort, these factions and sides were devised: wherein the foot had always a head

CHAP. VIII.

Two sorts of Men in Gallia, Druids, and Equites.

head sensible of the wrongs which were done unto it. Things of greater condition are always injurious to lesser natures, and cannot endure any competency not so much as in comparison, or by way of relation. In things without life, the prerogative of the Mountains doth swallow up the lesser rising of the downs, and the swelling of the downs, the unevenness of the mole-hills: the stars are dimmed at the rising of the Moon, and the Moon loseth both her light and her beauty in the presence of the Sun. So amongst brut beasts and fishes, the greater do always devour the less, and take them as their due by the appointment of nature: and men more injurious in this point, then either Mountains or brute beasts, inasmuch as they do always overvalue themselves beyond their own greatness, have in all ages verified the old Proverb, *Homo homini lupus*, one Man's a Wolf to another. And on the other side, as nature maketh nothing in vain, but hath given a being to the least of her creatures: so they endeavor not to be annulled, but to keep themselves in being and continuance. *Hædes & malæ splenem*. The very Fly hath her spleen, saith the Poet: and the Flea and Bess have their common-weals, though not equal to a Monarch. And therefore that the mighty and great Men of Gallia might not devour the lowest of the people, but that every Man might find in his own condition, and by the help of a *Romand* live by an *Oliver*, and again, that the poorer sort might give a Tribute for their protection, that respect and obedience to their superiours, as belongeth to such high callings, these factions and bandies were ordained: whereby the Nobles were restrained from oppressing the poor, and the poor compelled to obey the Nobility, which is the best end that may be made of any faction.

Concerning the advantage which the *Galles* received by these factions against forraign enemies, it was rather in regard of the multiplicity of States and Common-weals, which were in the Continent of Gallia, then otherwise, for it manifestly appeareth, that their factions and contentions for forraign authority, caused one party to bring for forraign authority, the *Germani*; and the other party the *Romans*, to make good their banly. But forasmuch as Gallia had many divisions, and contained many several States, relying chiefly upon their own strength, and effecting the subversion of their neighbour City, as a calamity befalling their neighbour, from which the rest stood as yet free, it was not so easily conquered, as it had been all but one Kingdom. The battell which *Cæsar* had with the *Nervi*, which was fought so hard, that of three score thousand men there were left but five hundred, nor of six hundred Senators above three; nor again, the selling of three and fifty thousand *Galles*, for bond-slaves at one time, did not so much advantage the Conquest of Gallia, as the battell of *Edward the Third*, or that of *Henry the Fifth*, our two English *Cæsars*: In the former whereof were slain at *Cressle* thirty thousand of the *French*, and in the latter at *Agincourt* but ten thousand. The reason was, for that the former losses, though far greater, concerned but particular States, whereas these latter overthrows, extended to the members and branches of the whole Kingdom.

Throughout all Gallia there are but two sorts of men that are of any reckoning or account: for the common people are in the nature of servants, and of no worth of themselves, nor admitted to any Parliament; but being kept under either by debt, or by great Tributes, or by the oppression of the mighty, do put themselves in the service of the Nobility, and are subject to the authority which the Master hath over his bond-slave. Of these two sorts, the one are Druids, and the other Equites or Gentlemen. The Druids, which are always present at their Holy Duties, do give order for their publick and private sacrifices, and expound their Religion. To the Druids great numbers of the youth do resort for Learnings sake, and have them in great honor and reputation; for they do determine almost of all controversies both publick and private: for if any offence be committed, as murder or man-slaughter, or any controversy arise touching their lands or inheritance, they sentence it; rewarding the virtuous, and punishing the wicked. If any private man or State do not obey their Decree, they interdict him from holy duty, which is the greatest punishment that is amongst them. Such as are thus interdicted, are reputed in the number of impious and wicked men, every man leaves their company, and doth avoid to meet them, or speak with them, lest they should receive any hurt by their contagion: neither have they law or justice when they require it, nor any respect or honor that doth belong unto them. Over all the Druids there is one Primæ, that hath authority of the rest. At his decease, if any one do excel the rest in dignity he succeedeth: if many equals are found, they go to election, and sometimes they contend about the primacy with force and arms. They meet at a certain time of the year in the confines of the *Carnutes*, which is the middle part of all Gallia, and there they sit in a sacred place, thither they resort from all parts that have controversies, and do obey their orders and judgments. The art and learning of the Druids was first found out in Britany, and from thence is thought to be brought into Gallia; and at this time such as will attain to the perfect knowledge of that discipline, do for the most part travel thither to learn it. The Druids are exempt from warfare and payments, and have an immunity from all other duties,

Cæsar.

Potestas vi-
tae et ædific.

Druides.

England.

England.

duties: whereby it falleth out, that many do betake themselves to that profession of their own free will, and divers others are sent to that School by their parents and friends. They are said to learn many Verses, and that some do study therein Twenty years. Neither is it lawful for them to commit any thing to writing: beside, that in other publick and private businesses, they only use the Greek Tongue: and, that as *Ysaie* it, for two causes, first, for that their Learning may not become common and vulgar; secondly, that Scholars might not trust so much to their Writings, as to their Memory, as it happeneth for the most part, that men rely upon the trust of Books and Papers, and, in the mean time omit the benefit of good remembrance. They endeavour chiefly to teach men, that their Souls do not die, but that they do remove out of one body into another after death; and this they think to be very important to stir Men up to Vertue, neglecting the fear of death. They dispute further, and give many Traditions to the youth, touching the Stars and their motion, the magnitude of the Earth and the World, the nature of things and the might and power of the gods.

OBSERVATION.

The quality and condition of the Druids is in this place very particularly described by *Cæsar*, and may be reduced to these heads, First, their Office, extending both to things Divine, and things Temporal, whereby they executed the place both of Priests and of Judges. And for that purpose, there was one known place appointed, where they late in Judgement: and, as I understand it, there was but one Terme in the year, which both began and ended their sutes in Law. The second thing is their Authority, having power to reward vertue, and to punish vice. Thirdly, their privileges and immunities, being free from Contribution, from Warfare, and all other burthens of the State. Fourthly, their doctrine and learning, which was partly Theological, concerning the might and power of the gods, the Immortality of the Soul; and partly Philosophical, touching the Stars and their motion, the Earth and the magnitude thereof. And lastly, their manner of learning, which was altogether *Pythagorick*, refusing the help of Letters and Books, and committing their Doctrine to the Tradition of their Elders. But that which is specially to be observed, is, that this Learning was not only found out here in Britany: but, such as would perfectly attain to the knowledge thereof, came into England to study the same, contrary to the experience which heretofore hath been observed of the Northern and Southern parts of the World: for, as the South giveth a temper to the body, fit for the science and contemplation of Arts, whereby the mind being enlarged, and purified in her faculties,

doth dive into the secret depth of all Learning, and censure the hidden miseries thereof; so, the Northern Climates do bind in the powers of the Soul, and restrain all her vertues to the life of the Body, whereby they are said to have *animum in digitis*, their Soul in their fingers, not affording her that delight and contentment which is usually received by speculation. And, thence it happeneth, that all speculative Arts and Sciences, and what else chiefly concerneth the inward contemplation of the mind, was found out and perfected by such as border upon the South, and from them it was brought by little and little into the Northern Regions: and such as would be Masters in the Arts they professed, went always Southward for the attaining thereof. But here the South was beholding to the North, as well for their Principles of Divinity, as for their Philosophy and Moral Learning, being as pure, as that which any Heathen People ever drank of. Which proveth an ancient singularity in the Inhabitants of this Island, touching the study of Arts and matter of Learning, and may, with like evidence, be proved from age to age, even to this time. I witness whereof, I appeal to the two Universities of this Land, as a demonstration of the love which our Nation hath ever borne to Learning, being two such Magazines of Arts and Sciences, so beautified with curious buildings, and supplied with Endowments for the liberal maintenance of the Muses, enriched with Libraries of learned Works, adorned with pleasant places for the refreshing of wearied spirits, Gardens, Groves, Walkes, Rivers, and Arborets, as the like such *Athenæ* are not to be found in any part of the World.

By reason
of the ca-
rious and
artificial
works.Oxford and
Cambridge.

CHAP. IX.

The second sort of men in Gallia, called the Equites in Cæsar's time.

The other sort of People are Equites, or Gentlemen. These, when there is occasion, or when any War happeneth, (as before *Cæsar* his coming was usual every year, that either they did offer injuries, or resist injuries) are always partick therein: and as every man excelleth other in birth or wealth, so is he attended with Clients and Followers, and this they take to be the only note of Nobility and greatness. The whole Nation of the *Galles* are much addicted to Religions; and, for that cause, such as are either grievously diseased, or conversant continually in the dangers of War, do either sacrifice men for an oblation, or vow the oblation of themselves, using in such sacrifices the ministry of the Druids; for as much as they are persuaded, that the immortal Deity cannot be pleased, but by giving the life of one man for the life of another: and, to that purpose they have publick sacrifices appointed. Others have Images of a monstrous magnitude, whose limbs and parts being made of Officers, are filled

Cæsar.

led with living men, and being set on fire, the Men are burned to death. The execution of such as are taken in Theft or Robbery, or any other crime, they think to be most pleasing to the gods; but, wanting such, they spare not the innocent. They worship chiefly the god Mercury, and have many of his Images amongst them; him they adore as the inventor of all Arts, the conductor and guide in all voyages and journeys; and they think him to have great power in all Merchandise and gain of Money. Next unto him they prefer Apollo, Mars, Jove, and Minerva, and of these they carry the same opinion as other Nations do: Apollo to be powerful in healing diseases, Minerva in finding out Artificial works, Jove ruling the celestial Empire, and Mars for War. When they are to encounter with an Enemy, they vow all the Spoil unto him; and, such Rewards as are taken, they sacrifice, other things they lay up in some one place; and, many such heaps of things so taken, are to be seen in the holy places of divers of their Cities. Neither doth it often happen, that any man neglecting his Religion in this point, dare either keep back any thing so taken, or take away ought laid up in their Repositories; for, they incur a heavy punishment and torture for that offence. The Galles do all boast themselves in the stock from whence they are descended, understanding by the Druides, that they come of the god Dis. And therefore they end the space of all their times by the number of nights rather than by the number of days, observing the days of their Nativities, the beginnings of their Months and their Years, in such sort, as the day doth always follow the night. And herein they differ from other Nations, that they suffer not their children to come openly unto them; but when they are grown fit for war: thinking it shameful and dishonest, that a son in his childhood, should, in publick places, stand in the sight of his father. To the Portions which they have with their Wives, they add as much more of their own goods; and the oft of this Money thus added together, is kept apart, and the longer liver hath both the principal and the interest for all the former time. The men have power of life and death both over their Wives and their Children. And when a man of great place and parentage shall happen to decease, his Kinsfolke assemble themselves together, to enquire of his death: if there be any occasion of suspicion, they put his Wife to the Torture, after the manner of a servant's and, if it be found, she dies Tyrranized with Fire;

and all other Tortures as may be imagined. Their Funerals (according to the rest of their Life) are magnificent and sumptuous, burying with the dead Corps, all that be took delight in while he lived, not sparing living creatures: and, not long out of memory, the Custom was to bury with the body such Clients and Servants as were favoured by him in his life-time. Such States as are careful in the Government of their Common-wealths, do prohibit, by a special Law, that no man shall communicate a rumour or report, touching the State, to any man, saving a Magistrate's for as much, as it had been often found, that rash and unskilful men were so terrified with false reports, and moved to such desperate attempts, that they entered into resolutions touching the main points of State. The Magistrates do keep secret such things as they think fit, and that which they think expedient they publish; but, it is not lawful to speak of matter of State, but in Assemblies of State.

The first OBSERVATION.

Concerning the beginning of days and times, which Cæsar useth in this place, to be observed by the Galles after Sun-setting; (whereby it happened, that in the Natural day of four and twenty hours, the night always preceded the day-time, contrary to the use of Italy, where the day began at Sun-rising, and the night followed the Artificial day, as the second part of the day Natural;) we are to understand, that as all time, and the distinction of the parts thereof, dependeth upon the two motions of the Sun: the one as he moveth in his own orb, from West to East, begetting the revolution of years, and the seasons of Summer and Winter, the Spring and the Autumn, with the measure of months, as it passeth through the signs of the Zodiacs; and the other, as it is carried from East to West by the first moving sphere, making the distinction of nights and days, hours and minutes: so the beginnings of these times and seasons are diversly taken amongst divers People and Nations of the Earth. The Frowes had the same computation touching the beginning of the day, as the Galles had; but, upon other grounds and reasons then could be alleged for this custom in Gallia: for, they began their day in the evening at Sun-setting, as appeareth by many places of the Scripture: and Moses, in the repetition of the first seven days work, upon the accomplishment of a day, saith, The evening and the morning were one day, giving the evening precedency before the morning, as though the day had begun in the evening. The Jews, in like manner, do observe the beginning of their day in the evening; and do hence follow the use of the Frowes. Other Nations do begin at Sun-rising, and take the computation of their day Natural, from the first appearing of the Sun in the East. The Greeks begin and end their day at midnight, observing the certainty of that time, and the correspondence between the equal

The beginning of the day diversly observed.

and planetary hours in the meridian Circle: whereas otherwise, by reason of the inequality of the dayes and the night, out of a right sphere there is always some difference between the said hours. And this use also is observed by us in England.

This god Dis, whom he nameth for the Father of that Nation, is the same whom the Heathen called Pluto, the god of hell and darkness; and, for that cause, they put darkness before light, touching the beginning of their natural day.

But, for as much as this circumstance giveth occasion to speak of dayes and times, give me leave to insert the reformation of the year, which Cæsar so happily established, that succeeding times have had no cause to alter the same.

And, although it neither concerneth the art of War, nor happened within the compass of these seven Summers: yet, for as much as it was done by Cæsar, and deserveth as often memory as any other of his noble acts, it shall not seem impertinent to the Reader, to take thus much by the way concerning that matter. There is no Nation of any civil Government, but observeth a course or revolution differed with times and seasons, in such manner, as may be answerable to the motion of the sun, in the circuit which it maketh through the signs and degrees of the Zodiac. But, for as much as the Government of a civil year, doth not well admit any other composition of parts, to make it absolute and complete, then by Natural dayes; and, on the other side, the Sun requirith odd hours and minutes to finish his race, and return again to the Goal from whence it came; there hath always been found a difference between the Civil and the Solar year. Before Cæsar's time, the Romans using the ancient computation of the year, had not only such uncertainty and alteration in months and times, that the sacrifices and yearly feasts, came, by little and little, to seasons contrary for the purpose they were ordained: but also, in the revolution of the Sun or Solar year, no other Nation agreed with them in account; and, of the Romans themselves, only the Priests understood it: and therefore, when they pleased (no man being able to controul them) they would, upon the sudden, thrust in a month above the ordinary number, which, as Plutarch reporteth, was, in old time, called *Mercedarius*, or *Mensis intercalaris*. To remedy this inconvenience, Cæsar, calling together the best and most expert Astronomers of that time, made a Kalender, more exactly calculated, then any other that was before: and yet such a one as by long continuance of time hath bred a difference; for the matter standeth thus.

It is found, by certain observation of Mathematicians of all ages, that the Sun being carried from the West to the East, by the motion of his own Sphere, finisheth his yearly course in the space of 365. days, five hours, nine and forty minutes, and some odd seconds: whereupon it was then concluded, that their civil year must necessarily contain, Three hundred threecore and five days, which maketh two and fifty weeks and one day. And, for as much as those five odd hours, nine and forty minutes, and some odds did, in four years space, amount unto a Natural day, (wanting two and forty minutes, and six and fifty seconds,

which was thought nothing in comparison) they devised every fourth year to add a day more then ordinary, to answer that time: which is usually added to February: whereby it happeneth, that in every fourth year, February hath nine and twenty days. And so they made an order to reform their year, without any sensible error, for a long time. But, since that time, being One thousand six hundred years and more, those two and forty minutes, and six and fifty seconds, which, as I said, do want of the natural day, of four and twenty hours, which is inserted in every fourth year, have bred a manifest and an apparent error: for, whereas the civil year, is, by that means, made greater then the solar years, the Sun ending his task, before we can end our times, it happeneth, that such Feasts, as have relation to seasonable times, do, as it were, forego the opportunity, and fall out further in the year, as though they had a motion towards the Summer solstice. And, as these go forward, so doth the Equinoctial return backwards towards the beginning of the Month. For Cæsar, by the help of the Astronomers, observed the Equinoctium the five and twentieth of March. Ptolemy, in his time, observed the Equinoctium the two and twentieth of March. And, it was observed the one and twentieth of March, in the year from the Incarnation 322, what time was holden the first General Council at Nice, a City of Pontus, in respect whereof, the Paschal Tables, and other rules, were established for the celebration of Easter. But, since that time, there are passed 1481. years, and the Equinoctium cometh before the one and twentieth of March ten dayes.

As this error is reformed among other Nations, and reduced to that state, as it was at the Nicene Council: so there might many reasons be alleged, to prove the reformation convenient of a greater number of dayes then ten. For, if the Kalender were so ordered, that every month might begin, when the Sun entereth into that Sign which is for the month, and end, when the Sun goeth out of that sign, it would avoid much confusion, and be very easie to all sorts of people, as have occasion to observe the same: which doubtless was the purpose of the first institution of months; and was observed (as it seemeth) by the old Romans, who began the year at the Winter solstice, as Ovid noteth:

Bruma novi prima est, veterisque novissima solis

Principium capiunt Phœbeus & annus idem.

And therefore they called that month *January*, of *Janus*, that had two faces, and saw both the old and the new year. Such therefore as would go about to reform the year to this course, must not cut off ten dayes only, but one and twenty; and, for one year, make *December* to continue but ten dayes, and then *January* to begin, and so successively to the rest of the months. But, it may be said, that although we help our selves, and put off the inconvenience which is fallen upon us, yet, in tract of time, the like error will fall again upon succeeding ages, and put their yearly Feasts besides the dayes appointed for them. For re-

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medy whereof, it may be answered; That whereas this error hath happened, by adding every fourth year a Natural day, which, in true calculation, wanted two and forty minutes, and fix and fifty seconds of four and twenty hours, and, in every 136 years, hath accrued within one minute, to a day more then needed, the oney way is, every 136 years, to omit the addition of that day, and to make that year to contain but 365 days, which, by the order of *Cæsar's* Kalendar, is a Leap year, and hath one day more, which hath brought this error. And, so there would not happen the error of a day in the space of 111086. years, if the World should continue so long.

But, I say we should seem more curious, in reforming the course of our Civil year, then the manners of our Civil life, I will proceed to that which followeth.

The second OBSERVATION.

THE second thing, which I observe, in their manner of life, is the respect they had to matter of State, and the care which they took, that no man should dispute of the Common-weal, but in Assemblies appointed for the service of the Common-weal. Whereby they gained two special points for the maintenance of good Government. The first, that no man might speak of points of State, but the Governors of State: for such I understand to be admitted to their Councils and Parliaments. Secondly, That such matters of consequence as touched them so nearly, might not be handled, but in such places, and at such times, as might best advantage the State. Concerning the former, we are to note, that Government is a kind, to be an establishing of order best fitting the maintenance of a People, in a peaceable and happy life. Order requireth degrees and distinctions, investing several parts in several functions and duties: to these duties there belongeth a due observance, according to the motion and place, which every part holdeth in the general order. Of these degrees and distinctions, sovereignty and Obedience are two main relatives, the one invested in the Prince or Magistrate, the other in the People and Subject, incommunicable, in regard of their terms, and subjects, and yet concurring in the main drift of Government, intending the benefit of a happy life. And therefore the Gallies did carefully provide, that no man should exceed the limits of his own rank, but that such as late at the helm might shape the course; and for the rest, whose lot it was to be directed, they would have them take notice of their mandates by obedience, and not by dispute.

Touching the second point, we are to consider the danger which may happen to a State, by common and ordinary discourse of the Principles of that Government, or of such circumstances as are incident to the same (without respect of time or place, or any other due regard) which the wisdom of a well-ordered policy doth hold requisite thereunto: for whatsoever is delivered by speech, without such helpful attendance, is both unreasonable and unprofitable, and the Common-weal is always a sufferer, when it falleth into such rash considerations; for, our most serious cogitations, afflicted with the best circumstances, can

but speak to purpose. And, as the execution falleth short of the purpose intended by discourse, so is our speech and discourse lame, and wanting to our inward conceit. And therefore, as Religious actions stand in need of *boe* age, so may polittick consultations use the help of the same remembrance.

CHAP. X.

The manner and life of the Germans.

THE Germans do much differ from the Gallies in their course of life, for they have neither Priests nor Sacrifices. They worship no gods but such as are subject to sense, and from whom they daily receive profits and help, as the Sun, the Fire, and the Moon; for the rest, they have not so much as heard of. Their life is only spent in hunting, or in use and practice of War. They inure themselves to labour and hardiness, even from their childhood; and such as continue longest hardiest are most commended amongst them: for this some think to be very available to their stature, others, to their strength and sinews. They hold it a most dishonest part for one to touch a Woman, before he be twenty years of age: neither can any such matter be hid or dissembled, for as much as they bathe themselves together in Rivers, and use skins, and other small coverings, on the Reins of their backs, the rest of their body being all naked. They use no tillage, the greatest part of their Food is Milk, or Cheese, or Flesh: neither hath any man any certain quantity of Land to his own use; but, their Magistrates and Princes do every year allot a certain portion of Land to Kindreds and Tribes that inhabit together, as much, and in such places as they think fit, and the next year appoint them in a new place. Hereof they give many reasons: left they should be led away by continual custom, from the practice of War, to the use of Husbandry; or, left they should endeavour to get themselves great Possessions, and so the weaker should be thrust out, and dispossess of their livings by the mighty; or, left they should build too delicately for the avoiding of cold or heat, or left they should wax covetous, and thirst after Money, which is the beginning of all Factions and Dissensions; and lastly, that they might keep the Commons in good contentment, considering the parity between their Revenue, and the possessions of the great ones. It is the greatest honour to their States, to have their Confines lie waste and desolate far and near about them: for that they take to be an argu-

Cæsar.

ment of valor, when their borderers are driven to forsake their Countrey, and dare not abide near them; and whilst they think themselves by that means much safer from any sudden incursion. When a State maketh War, either by way of attempt or defence, they choose Magistrates to command that war, having power of life and death: but in time of peace they have no common Magistrate, but the chiefest men in the country and the villages, do interpret the Law and determine of Controversies. Their committed out of the confines of their State is not infamous or dishonest, but commended as an exercise of the youth, and a keeping them from sloth. When any one of their Princes and chief men shall in an assembly or council publish himself for a leader upon some exploit, and desire to know who will follow him upon the same, they that have a good opinion of the man and the matter, and do promise him their help and assistance, are commended by the multitude: the rest that refuse to accompany him, are held in the number of traitors, and never have any credit afterward. They hold it not lawful to hurt a stranger that shall come unto them upon any occasion, but do protect him from injuries; to such every mans house is open, and his table common. The time was when the Gallies excelled the Germans in prowess and valor, and made War upon them of their own accord, and by reason of the multitude of their people, and want of ground for habitation, they sent many Colonies over the Rhene into Germany. And so those fertile places of Germany, which are near unto the wood Hercynia, (which Eratosthenes and other Grecians took notice of by the name of Orcinia) were possessed by the Volcæ Teutofages, who dwell there at this time, and keep their ancient opinion of justice and warlike praise. Now the Germans still continue in the same poverty, want, and patience, as in former time; do use the same dyet and apparel for their bodies: but the neighborhood and knowledge of other Nations hath made the Gallies live in a more plentiful manner, who by little and little have been weakened and overbrowen in divers Battels, so that now they stand not in comparison with the Germans. The breadth of the wood Hercynia, is nine days journey over, for they have no other differences of space but by means of days journey. It beginneth at the confines of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and runs along the River Danubius, to the Territories of the Daci; thence it declineth to the left side, from the said River, and by reason of the

large extension thereof, it bordereth the confines of many other Countries. Neither is there any German that can say, that either he durst adventure, or did go to, or had heard of the beginning of the same, although he had travell'd therein three score days journey. In this Wood are many sorts of wild beasts, which are not to be seen in any other place: amongst the rest, the most unusual and remarkable are, an Ox like unto a Hart, that in the midst of his forehead between his ears, carrieth a horn longer and straighter than usual, divided at the end into many large branches, the female is in all respects like unto the male, and beareth a horn of the same magnitude and fashion. There is likewise another sort of beast called Alces, not unlike unto a Goat, but somewhat bigger, and without horns: their legs are without joints, that when they take their rest, they neither sit nor lie upon the ground, and if they chance to fall they cannot rise again. When they take their rest in the night, they lean against trees. The Hunters having found out their footprints and their haunts, do either undermine the roots of such trees, or so cut them asunder, that a small matter will overthrow them; so that when they come according unto their use to rest themselves against those trees, they overthrow them with their weight, and fall without themselves, and so are taken. The third kind of beast are those which are called Urti, somewhat lesser then an Elephant, and in colour kind and shape, not unlike unto a Bull. They are both strong and swift, and spare neither man nor beast that cometh in their sight: these they catch with greater labor and diligence in pits and ditches, and so kill them. The youth do inure and exercise themselves in this kind of hunting, and such as kill many of these beasts, and shew most horns, are highly commended: but to make them tame, or any their little ones, was never yet seen. The largeness of their horns, as also the fashion and kind thereof, doth much differ from the horns of the Oxen, and are much sought after for cups to be used in their greatest banquets, being first bound about the brim and trimmed with silver.

OBSERVATION.

CÆSAR in this Chapter describeth the course of life which the Germans in his time held throughout the whole policy of their Government, the scope whereof was to make them warlike: to which he faith, that in times past the Gallies were as valiant and as warlike peoples as the Germans; but the neighborhood and knowledge

The respect
to matter of
State.

Tibi sum-
mam rerum
dilectet,
nobis obli-
viam relata est:
Tacitus.

ledge of other Nations, had taught them a more plentiful manner of life, which by little and little had weakened their strength, and made them far inferior to the Germans. Which bringeth to our consideration, that which is often attributed to a civil life, such as taste of the sweetness of ease, and are qualified with the complements of civility, have always an indispotion to warlike practices. The reason is grounded upon use and custom: for discontinuance doth always cause a strangeness and alienation, becoming the aptest parts with uncertainty and painful gestures; and is so powerful, that it doth not only steal away natural affection, and make parents forget to love their children; but like a Tyrant it is able to force us to those things, which naturally we are unfit for, as though the decrees of nature were subject to the controulment of custom. Much more then the things got by use and practice, are as easily forgot by discontinuance, as they were obtained by studious exercise. On the other side, there is nothing so horrible or dreadful, but use maketh easy. The first time the Fox saw the Lion, he fawned for fear, the next time he trembled, but the third time he was so far from fear, that he was ready to put a trick of craft upon him: whereby it appears, that the Germans had no farther interest in deeds of Arms above the Gallies, than what the use of War had gained them; for as usage continueth the property of a tenure, so non-usage implieth a forfeiture. *Cato* was wont to say, that the Romans would loathe their Empire, when they suffered the Greek Tongue to be taught amongst them: for by that means they would easily be drawn from the study and practice of war, to the bewitching delight of speculative thoughts. And *Marcellus* was blamed for being the first that corrupted Rome with the delicate and curious works of Greece, for before that he brought from the sacking of *Syracusa*, the well-wrought tables of pictures and imagery, Rome never knew any such delicacy, but stood full fraught with armour and weapons of barbarous people, of the bloody spoils and monuments of victories and triumphs, which were rather fearful shews to inure their eyes to the horror of War, than pleasant sights to allure their minds to affections of peace. Whereby it appear th, that such as suffer themselves to be guided by the easy rein of civil Government, or take a disposition to that course of life, can hardly endure the yoke of war, or undergo the tediousness of martial labors.

CHAP. XI.

Basilus his surprize upon Ambiorix.

Cæsar.

Cæsar finding by the discoveries which the Ubii sent out, that the Suevi had all beaken themselves to the woods, and doubting want of corn, foresaw much as the Germans of all other Nations do least care for tillage; he determined to go no farther. But that his return might not altogether free the barbarous people from fear, but hinder the helps and succors which they were wont to send into Gallia, having brought back his Army, he cut off so much of the furthest part of the bridge next unto the Ubii,

as came in measure to two hundred foot, and in the end of that which remained, he built a tower of four stories, making other works for the strengthening of that place, wherein he left a Garrison of twelve cohorts under the command of young C. Volcatius Tullus: he himself as corn waxed ripe, went forward to the War of Ambiorix by the way of the Wood of Arduenna, which is the greatest in all Gallia, and extendeth it self from the banks of Rhene, and the confines of the Treviri, to the seat of the Nervii, carrying a breadth of five hundred miles. He sent L. Minutius Basilus before with all the horse, to see if he could effect any thing, either by prevention and speedy arrival, or by opportunity, commanding him not to suffer any fire to be made in his Camp, lest his coming might be discovered, promising to follow him at his heels. Basilus followeth his directions, and coming upon them, contrary to their expectation, took many of the Enemy abroad in the fields, and by their condullion made towards Ambiorix, where he remained in a place with a few horsemen. As fortune is very powerful in all things, so she challenge a special interest in matter of War: for as it happened by great luck, that he should light upon him unawares and unprovided, and that his coming should sooner be seen then heard of; so was it great hap, that all the arms which he had about him should be surpris'd, his horses and his charriots taken, and that he himself should escape death. But this happened by reason of the wood that was about his house, according to the manner of the Gallies, who for avoiding of heat, do commonly build near unto Woods and Rivers: his followers and friends sustaining a while the charge of the Horsemen in a narrow place, while he himself escap'd in the mean time on horseback, and in flying, was protected and sheltered by the Woods: whereby Fortune seem'd very powerful both in drawing on a danger, and in avoiding it.

The First OBSERVATION.

The Prerogative which Fortune hath always challenged in the accidents of War, and the special interest which she hath in that course of life more then in other mensations, hath made the best souldiers oftentimes to sing a song of complaint, the burthen whereof yet remaineth, and serveth as a reason of all such misadventures, *Fortune de la guerre*, The Fortune of the War. Such as have observed the course of things, and have found one and the same Man continuing the same means, this day happy, and the next day unfortunate; and again, two other Men, the one advised and respective, and the other violent and rash,

The Second OBSERVATION.

Quintus Curcius speaking of Alexander, saith, *Nisi an virtutem Regis illius magis quam ceteris laudaverim*, I can commend no vertue in this King before his speed and celerity: where of this might be a ground, that he followed *Darius* with such speed after the second battel he gave him, that in eleven dayes he march'd with his Army six hundred miles, which was a chafe welling Alexander the Great, and might rest unexampled, notwithstanding *Sustinius* giveth this general report of Cæsar, that in matter military, *aus equis praeflavit omnium gloriam, aus excessit*; he either equalled or exceeded the glory of the best, and for this particular he saith, *quod persepe muris de se præsens*, that he was very often the Messenger of his own success. And to sp ak truly, he seemeth to challenge to himself expedition and speed as his peculiar commendation, grounding himself upon the danger which lingering and foreflowing of time doth usually bring to well advised resolutions, according to that of *Lucan* the Poet.

Ptoarch in the life of Sylla.

In the life of Alexander.

Ptoarch in the life of Sylla.

Others are not willing to ascribe so much to Fortune, as to make themselves the Tennis-ball to her Racket: and yet they are content to allow her halfe of everything they go about, reserving the other moiety to their own directions. And so like partners in an adventure, they labor to improve their share for their best advantage.

Some other there are, that will allow fortune no part at all in their actions, but do confront her with a goddess of great power, and make industry the means to annul her Deity. Of this opinion was *Timotheus* the *Athenian*, who having achieved many notable victories, would not allow of the conceipt of the Painter, that had made a Table, wherein Fortune was taking in those Cities, (which he had won) with a net whilst he himself kept, but protested against her in that behalf, and would not give her any part in that business.

And thus the Heathen World varied as much in their opinions touching Fortune, as Fortune herself did in her events to themward: which were so fivers and changeable, as were able to enslave the deepest Wits, and confound the wisdom of the greatest judgments, whereby the word Fortune usurp'd a Deity, and got an opinion of extraordinary power in the Regiment of humane actions. But our Christian times have a reader lesson, wherein is taught a sovereign Providence, guiding and directing the thoughts of Mens hearts, with the faculties and powers of the Soul, together with their external actions, to such ends as shall seem best to that omnipotent wisdom, to whom all our abilities serve as instruments and means to effect his purposes, notwithstanding our particular intentions, or what the heart of Man may otherwise determine. And therefore such as will make their ways prosperous unto themselves, and receive that contentment which their hope expecteth, or their labors would deserve, must use those helps which the rules of Christianity do teach in that behalf, and may better be learned from a Divine, then from him that writeth Treatises of War.

Fortune.

Celerity and expedition.

Ptoarch in the life of Pompey.

Veni, vidi, vici.

Lib. 2. bell. civil.

up in some hold, to the end he might bring the matter to a speedy upshot, as he did with *Vercingetorix* at *Alésia*. But that which is most memorable touching this point, at the first taking in of *Spain*, in the garbail of the Civil Wars, he defeated two Armies, overthrew two Generals, and took in two Provinces in the space of forty days. Neither did he make use of expedition only in his carriage of a war, but also in the action and execution of battel: for he never forsook an enemy overthrow and discomfited, until he had raken their Camp, and defeated them of their chieft helps, which *Pompey* felt to his utter overthrow; for the same day he routed him at *Pharsalia*, he took his Camp, and inclosed a hill with a ditch and a Rampier, where twenty five thousand *Romans* were fled for their safety, and brought them to yield themselves unto him: and so making use (as he saith) of the benefit of fortune, and the terror and amazement of the Enemy, he performed three notable Services in one day.

And this he used with such dexterity, and depth of wisdom, that commonly the first victory ended the War; as by this at *Pharsalia*, he made himself Commander of the East, and by that at *Tapsa*, he made himself Lord of *Africa*, and by the Battel at *Monda*, he got all *Spain*.

To conclude this point, I may not forget the like speed and expedition in his works. In fifteen days he cast a ditch and a rampier of fifteen foot in height, between the Lake at *Geneva* and *St. Claud* hill, containing nineteen miles. He made his bridge over the *Rhone* in ten days. At the siege of *Marcellis* he made twelve Gallies, and furnished them out to sea within thirty days after the timber was cut down. And the rest of his works with the like expedition.

CHAP. XII.

Catullus posesseth himself, Cæsar divideth his Army into three parts.

Cæsar.

Now whether *Ambiorix* did not make head and assemble his forces on purpose, for that he determined not to fight, or whether he were hindered by the shortness of the time, and the suddain coming of the horsemen, thinking the rest of the Army had followed after, it remaineth doubtful; but certain it is, that he sent privy messengers about the Countrey, commanding every man to shift for himself; and so some fled into the Forest *Ardennæ*, others into fens and bogs, and such as were near the Ocean, did hide themselves in such Islands as the water do commonly make: many forsook their Countrey, and committed themselves to their fortunes, to meet strangers and unknown people. *Catullus* the King of the one half of the *Eburones*, who was a party with *Ambiorix* in this matter, being now grown old, and unable to undergo the labors either of war or of flying, desisting *Ambiorix* with all manner of execrations, as the author of that mat-

ter, drank the juice of *Yew*, (whereof there is great store in *Gallia* and *Germany*) and so died. The *Segni* and *Condrusi*, of the Nation and number of the Germans, that dwell between the *Eburones* and the *Treviri*, sent messengers to *Cæsar*, to intreat him not to take them in the number of the Enemy, and that he would not adjudge all the Germans dwelling on this side of the *Rhene*, to have one and the same cause; for their part, they never so much as thought of War, nor gave any aid to *Ambiorix*. *Cæsar* having examined the matter, by the torture of the Captives, commanded them, that if any of the *Eburones* should fly unto them, to bring them unto him, and in so doing he would spare their Countrey. Then dividing his forces into three parts, he left the baggage of the whole Army, at *Vatuna*, a Castell in the midst of the *Eburones*, where *Titurius* and *Aurunculeus*, were lodged. He made choice of this place the rather, for that the fortifications made the year before continued perfect and good, to the end he might ease the Souldier of some labor, and there left the fourteenth legion for a guard to the carriages, being one of the three which he had left enrolled in Italy, making *Q. Tullius Cicero* their Commander, and with him he left two hundred horse.

The Army being thus divided he commanded *Titus Labienus* to carry three Legions towards that part of the sea coast, which bordereth upon the *Menapii*, and sent *Trebonius* with the like number of legions to wast and harry that Countrey which confineth the *Aduaticci*: he himself with the other three determined to go to the River *Scaldis*, which runneth into the *Muse*, and to the farthest parts of the wood *Ardennæ*, for that he understood that *Ambiorix* with a few horsemen was fled to those parts. At his departure he assured them, that he would return after the seventh days absence; for at that day he knew that corn was to be given to that Legion which he had there left in Garrison. He counselled *Labienus* and *Trebonius* to return likewise by that day, if they conveniently could, to the end that after communication of their discoveries, and intelligence of the projects of the Enemy, they might think upon a new beginning of war.

OBSERVATION.

This sudden surpris upon *Ambiorix* and the *Treviri*, prevented (as I have already noted) their making head together, and put the enemy to such shifts for their safety, as occasion or opportunity would afford them in particular. And albeit the *Treviri* were by this means dispersed, yet

they were not overthrown, nor utterly vanquished, but continued still in the nature and quality of an enemy, although they were by this occasion defeated of their chieft means. And therefore the better to prosecute them in their particular flights, and to keep them disjoined, he divided his Army into three parts, and made three several inroads upon their Countrey, hoping thereby to meet with some new occasion, which might give an overture of a more absolute conquest: for diversity of motions do breed diversity of occasions, whereof some may happily be such, as being well managed, may bring a man to the end of his desires. But herein let us not forget to observe the manner he used in this service: for first he left a Rendezvous, where all the Carriages of the Army were belloved, with a competent Garrison for the safe keeping thereof, to the end the Souldiers might be assured of a Retreat, what difficulty soever might befall them in that action, according to that of *Servilius*, that a good Captain should rather look behind him then before him, and appointed withal a certain day, when all the Troops should meet there again; *Ut rursus* (as he saith) *communicatio consilio, exploratique hostium rationibus, aliud initium belli capere possint*. That, after communication of their discoveries, &c.

Plutarch in the Life of Sertorius.

Cæsar.

Cæsar sendeth messengers to the bordering States, to come out and sack the *Eburones*.

There was (as I have already declared) no certain band or troop of the Enemy, no Garrison or Town to stand out in Armes; but, the multitude was dispersed into all parts, and every man lay hid, either in some secret and unknown Valley, or in some rough and Woody place, or in some Bog, or in such other places as gave them hope of shelter, or safety: which places were well known to the States of that Countrey. And, the matter required great diligence and circumspection, not so much in regard of the general safety of the Army, (for there could no danger happen unto them, the Enemy being all terrified and fled) as in preserving every particular Soldier; which, notwithstanding, did in part concern the safety of the whole Army: for hope of booty did draw many far off out of their ranks, and the Woods, through uncertain and unknown passages, would not suffer the Soldiers to go in Troops. If he would have the business take an end, and the very race of those wicked people rooted out, the Army must be divided, and many small bands must be made for that purpose: but, to keep the Maniples at their Ensignes, according to the custome and use of the Roman Army, the place it self was a sufficient guard for the barbarous people, who did not want

courage in particular, both to lie in wait for them, and circumvent them as they were severed from their Companies. Yet, in extremities of that nature, what diligence could attain unto was provided, but in such manner, that somewhat was omitted in the offensive part, though the Soldiers minds were bent upon revenge, rather then it should be done with any detriment or loss to the Soldier. *Cæsar* sent messengers to the next bordering States, calling them out to sack the *Eburones*, in hope of booty and pillage, to the end the Gallies should rather hazard their lives in the Wood, then the Legionary Soldiers; as also, that there might be many spoilers and destroyers, to the end, that both the name and race of that State might be taken away. Hereupon a great multitude speedily assembled from all quarters. These things were acted in all parts and quarters of the *Eburones*, and the seventh day drew near, which he had appointed for his return to the carriages.

The benefit of open countrey.

OBSERVATION.

It is a commodity which a General hath, when the Enemy doth not refuse open encounter, for so he may be sure, that the weight of the business will rest upon military virtue, and proofs of armes, as ready way-makes to a speedy victory: but, when it shall happen, that the Countrey doth afford covert and protection to him, that is more malicious then valorous, and through the falseness of the place, refuseth to shew himself, unless it be upon advantage, the War, doubtless, is like to prove tedious, and the Victory less honourable. In such cases there is no other way, then so to harry and waste a Countrey, that the Enemy may be famished out of his holds, and brought to subjection by scarcity and necessity. Which is a means so powerful, as well to supplant the greatest strength, as to meet with subterfuge and delay, that of it self it subdueth all opposition, and needeth no other help for achieving of victory, as may appear by the sequel of this Summers action. And herein let us further observe the particular care which *Cæsar* had of his Soldiers, adjudging the whole Army to be interested in every private mans safety. A matter strange in their times, and of small consequence in the judgement of our Commanders, to whom particular fortunes are esteemed more-entires, and men in several of no value: for as much as Conquests are made with multitudes. Concerning which point, I grant it to be as true, as it is often spoken in places besieged, that the loss of one man is not the loss of a Town, nor the defeating of twenty the overthrow of a Thousand; and yet it cannot be denied, but the lesser is paid for the Lawful wreath, the more precious is the Victory; and, it stretcheth then at a hard rate, when it maketh the buyer Bankrupt, or inforceth him to confess,

T that

Plutarch in
the life of
Sextius.

that such another Victory would overthrow him. And therefore he that will buy much honor with little blood, must endeavour, by diligent and careful labour, to provide for the particular safety of his Soldiers. Wherein, albeit he cannot value an unity at an equal rate with a number, yet he must consider, that without a unity there can be no multitude: and not so only, but the life and strength of a multitude consisteth in unities; for otherwise, neither had *Nero* needed to have withed the People of *Rome* to have had but one head, that he might have cut it off at a stroke, nor *Sextius* device had carried any grace, making a lusty fellow fall, in plucking off the thin tail of an old lean jagd, and a little wearish man leave the stump bare of a great tailed horric, and that in a short time, by plucking hair by hair.

CHAP. XIV.

The Sicambri send out Two thousand Horse against the Eburones, and, by fortune, they fall upon Cliterno at Vatuca.

Cæsar.

Here you shall perceive the power that fortune hath, and what chances happen in the carriage of a War. There was (as I have already said) the Enemy being scattered and terrified, no troop or band which might give the least cause of fear: the report came to the Germans on the other side of the Rhene, that the Eburones were to be sacked, and that all men had liberty to make spoil of them. The Sicambri dwelling next to the Rhene, who formerly received the Tencheri and Ulspites in their flight, set out Two thousand horse, and sent them over the River, some thirty miles below that place where Cæsar had left the half bridge with a Garrison. These Horse made directly towards the Confiner of the Eburones, took many prisoners, and much Cattel, neither bog nor mood hindered their passage, being bred and born in War and Theft. They inquire of the Prisoner, in what part Cæsar was, and found him to be gone far off, and that all the Army was departed from thence. But one of the prisoners speaking to them, said, Why do ye seek after so poor and so slender a booty, when otherwise you may make your selves most fortunate? In three bowers space you may go to Vatuca, where the Roman Army hath left all their fortunes, the Garrison in that place is no greater, then can hardly furnish the Walls about, neither dare any man go out of the Trenches. The Germans in this hope did hide the pillage which they had already taken, and went directly to Vatuca, taking him for their guide, that gave them first notice thereof.

OBSERVATION.

It were as great a madness to believe, that a man were able to give directions to meet with all chances, as to think no foreknowledge can prevent any casualty. For, as the Soul of man is endued with a power of discourse, whereby it concludeth, either according to the certainty of reason, or the learning of experience, bringing these directions as faulty and inconvenient, and approving others as safe, and to be followed: so we are to understand, that this power of discourse is limited to a certain measure or proportion of strength, and inscribed in a circle of lesser capacity, then the compass of possibility, or the large extension of what may happen; for otherwise the course of destiny were subject to our contrivance, and our knowledge were equal to universal enticement, whereas the infinity of accidents do far exceed the reach of our shallow senses, and, our greatest apprehension is, a small, and imperfect experience. And therefore, as such as through the occasion of publick employment, are driven to forsake the shore of minute and particular courts, and to float in the Ocean of casualties and adventures, may doubtless receive strong directions, both from the load-stone of reason, and tramontane of experience, to shape an easy and successful course: so notwithstanding they shall find themselves subject to the contrariety of winds, and extremity of tempests, besides many other lets and impediments, beyond the compass of their direction, to interrupt their course, and divert them from their Haven, which made the Carthaginians, that was more happy in conquering, then in keeping, to cry out: *Nūquam minus quam in bello evenit rerum respondet*. The event of things doth no where answer expectation less, then in War, as it happened in this accident.

CHAP. XV.

The Sicambri come to Vatuca, and offer to take the Camp.

Cliterno having, all the dayes before, observed Cæsar's direction with great diligence, and kept the Soldiers within the Camp, not suffering so much as a boy to go out of the Trenches, the seventh day distrustful of Cæsar's return, according to his promise, for that he understood he was gone farther into the Country, and heard nothing of his return; and withall, being moved with the speeches of the Soldiers, who termed, their patient abiding within their trenches a Siege, for as much as no man was suffered to go out of them, and expecting no such chance within the compass of three miles: whith was the furthest he purposed to send them for Corn: especially considering, that nine Legions were abroad, besides great Forces of Horse, the Enemy being already distressed, and almost extinguished. Accordingly

Hannibal.

Cæsar.

he sent five Cohorts to gather Corn in the next Fields, which were separated from the Garrison, only with a little hill lying between the Camp and the Corn. There were many left in the Camp of the other Legions that were sick, of whom, such as were recovered, to the number of three hundred, were sent with them all under one Ensign: besides a great company of Soldiers boyes, and great store of Cattel which they had in the Camp. In the mean time came these German Ruters, and, with the same gallop as they came thither, they sought to enter in at the Decumane Gate; neither were they discovered, by reason of a Wood which kept them out of sight, until they were almost at the Trenches; in so much, as such Trademen and Merchants, as kept their Booths and Shops under the Rampier, had no time to be received into the Camp. Our men were much troubled at the unexpectedness of the thing; and, the Cohort that kept watch, did hardly sustain the first assault. The Enemy was quickly spread about the works, to see if they could find entrance in any other part. Our men did hardly keep the Gates: the rest was defended by the Fortification, and the place itself. The whole Camp was in a great fear, and one inquired of another the reason of the Tumult: neither could they tell which way to carry their Ensigns, or how any man should dispose of himself. One gave out, that the Camp was taken; and another, that the Army and General was overthrown, and that the barbarous people came thither as Conquerors: many took occasion from the place, to imagine new and superstitious Religions, recalling to mind the fatal calamity of Cotta and Titurius that died in that place. Through this fear and confusion, that had possessed the whole Camp, the Germans were confirmed in their opinion which they had received from the prisoner, that there was no Garrison at all in the Works. They endeavoured to break in, and encouraged one another not to suffer so great a Fortune to escape them. Publius Sextius Baculus, that had been Primpilus under Cæsar (of whom mention hath been made in the former Battels) was there left sick, and had taken no sustenance of five dayes before. He hearing the danger they were in, went unarmed out of his Cabbins, and seeing the Enemy ready to force the Gates, and the matter to be in great hazard, taking Armes from one that stood next him, he went and stood in the Port. The Centurions of the Cohort that

kept watch followed him, and they, for a while, engaged the Enemy. Sextius having received many great wounds, fainted at length, and was hardly saved by those that stood next him. Upon this respite, the rest did so far assure themselves, that they durst stand upon the Works, and make a shew of defence.

OBSERVATION.

In the former observation, I disputed the interest which the whole Army hath in one particular man, which, out of Cæsar's opinion, I concluded to be such, as was not to be neglected: but, if we suppose a party extraordinary, and eye him to such singular worth, as was in Sextius, I then doubt, by this example, whether I may not equal him to the multitude, or put him alone in the balance, to counterpoise the rest of his fellows. For doubtless, if his valour had not exceeded any height of courage, elsewhere then to be found within those Walls, the whole Garrison had been utterly slaughtered, and the place had been made fatal to the Romans by two disastrous calamities. In consideration whereof, I will refer my self to the judgement of the wise, how much it importeth a great Commander, not only in honor, as a rewarder of vertue, but in wisdom and good discretion, to make much of so gallant a spirit, and to give that respect unto him, as may both witness his valiant carriage, and the thankful acceptance thereof, on the behalf of the Common-weal, wherein, we need not doubt, of Cæsar's request to this Sextius, having, by divers honourable relations, in these Wars, touching his valiantness and prowess in armes, made him partaker of his own glory, and recommended him to posterity, for an example of valour.

CHAP. XVI.

The Sicambri continue their purpose in taking the Camp.

In the mean time, the Soldiers, having made an end of reaping and gathering Corn, heard the cry. The Horsemen basted before, and found in what danger the matter stood. There was, in that place, no Fortifications to receive the affrighted Soldiers: such as were lately involved, and had no experience in matters of War, set their faces towards the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and to the Centurions, and expected directions from them. There was none so assured or valiant, but were troubled thereat. The barbarous people having spied the Ensignes afar off, left off their assault: and first, they thought it had been the Legions that had returned, which the prisoners had told them to be gone a great way off; afterward, contemning the smallness of their number, they set upon them on all sides.

sides. The Soldiers boyes betook themselves unto the next hill, and, being quickly put from thence, they cast themselves headlong amongst the Maniples and Ensignes, and so put the Soldiers in a worse fear then they were before. Some were of opinion, to put themselves into the forme of Battel, which resembled a Wedge, and so (for as much as the Camp was at hand) to break speedily through the Enemy: in which course, if any part should be circumvented, and cut a piece, yet they hoped the rest might save themselves. Others thought it better to make good the Hill, and all of them to attend one and the same fortune. This advised the old Soldiers did not like of, who (as I said before) went out with the others that were sent a Harvesting, all under one Ensign, by themselves: and therefore encouraging one another, Caius Trebonius, a Roman Horseman, being their Captain, and commanding them at that time, brake through the thickest of the Enemy, and came all safe into the Camp. The Boyes and Horsemen following hard after them, were likewise saved by the valour of the Soldiers: But those that took the Hill, having never had any use of service, had neither the courage to continue in that resolution which they had before chosen, to defend themselves from that place of advantage, nor to imitate that force and speed which they had seen to have helped their fellows; but, endeavouring to be received into the Camp, fell into places of disadvantage: wherein, divers of the Centurions, who had lately been taken from the lowest Companies of other Legions, and, for their valours sake preferred to the highest and chiefest Companies of this Legion, least they should lose the honour which they had before gotten, fighting valiantly, died in the place. Part of the Soldiers, by the provokes of these Men, that had removed the Enemy, beyond all hope, got safe into the Camp; the rest were defeated, and slain by the Germans.

The first OBSERVATION.

This circumstance doth afford us two observable points. The one, how much an old experienced Soldier, that hath the use and knowledge of service, exceedeth the rawness of such as are newly enrolled. The second, which dependeth upon the former, that valour and military virtue, is a consequent of use and practice, rather than any inherent gift of nature.

Camillus being sent with an Army against the Thulcans, the Roman Soldier was much affrighted at the greatness of the Host which the Enemy had put on foot: which Camillus perceiving, he used no other motives of persuasion, to strengthen their weakened minds, and to assure them of a happy day, but this; *Quod quisque didicit aut consuevit, faciat*. Let every man do that which he hath been taught, and used to; as well knowing where to rouse their valour, and in what part their greatest strength rested. For, as men cannot prevail in that wherein they are unexperienced, but will be wanting in the supplies of their own particular, and miscary even under the directions of another Annibal: so a known and beaten track is quickly taken, and the difficulties of a business are made easie by acquaintance. Use maketh Malle-ries, faith our English Proverb, and Practice and art doth far exceed Nature. Which continual exercise, and use of Armes amongst the Romans, attained to such perfection, as made *militum sine relore stabilem virtutem*, the valour of the Soldiery firm without their Commander, as Livie witnesseth: And, as Antiochus confessed to Scipio; *Quod si vincuntur, non minuitur animis tamen*, though they were overcome, yet their courage abated not. Caesar, in all his Battels, had a special respect to the experience of the new enrolled Bands, placing them either behind the Army, for a guard to their Carriages, as he did in the Helvetian action, or leaving them as a defence to the Camp, or shewing them aloof off, signifying thereby, as Livie faith of the Sidicini, *Quod magis nomen quam vires ad præsidium adferre-bant*, that they made more noise of an Army, then they did good. Whereby it consequently followeth, that Military virtue proceedeth not so much from nature, or any original habit, as it doth from exercise and practice of Armes. I grant, there is a disposition in nature, and a particular inclination to this or that Art; according to that line of the Poet;

Fortes creantur fortibus & bonis.

Stout men are got by stout and good.

But this disposition must be perfected by use, and falseth short of valour or Military virtue, which consisteth of two parts. The first, in knowledge of the discipline of War, and the rules of service: whereby they may understand the course of the execution of such projects, as the rules of War do propound for their safety. Both which parts are gotten only by use. For, as the knowledge of Military discipline is best learned by practice; so the often repetition thereof begetteth assurance in action, which is nothing else but that which we call Valour. In which two parts, the new enrolled Bands had small understanding; for, they were as ignorant what course to take in that extremity, as they were unassured in their former resolutions.

The

The second OBSERVATION.

A Cuneus
described.

This Cuneus, or Troop of Soldiers, disposed into a Triangle, was the best and safest way to break through an enemy. For an Angle hath a renting and dividing property, and is so sharp in the meeting of the two side lines, that the point thereof remembereth indivisibility, and therefore is apt and proper to divide asunder, and to make a separation of any quantity. Which form nature hath also observed in the fashion of such creatures, as have a piercing and dividing motion; as in Filhes that have all heads for the most part sharp, and thence Angleswise are enlarged into the grossness of their body. And Birds likewise, the better to divide the air, have sharp bills and little heads, with a body annexed of a larger proportion. The manner of the Romans was (as I have already shewed) to fix righten the piercing Angle with thick compacted targets; and then enlarging the sides as occasion served, either to the quantity of an acute, or a right, or an obtuse Angle, they gave the charge in such sort, *ut quacunq; parte percutere impetu suo vellet, sustineri nequeant*, that wheresoever they fell on, they were not long to be endured, as Livie faith.

CHAP. XVII.

The Sicambri give over their purpose and depart.

Cæsar.

The Germans being out of hope of taking the Camp, forasmuch as they saw our Men to stand upon the works they returned over the Rhene with the booty which they had in the woods. And such was the fear of the Roman Souldier, even after the Enemy was gone, that Caius Volusenus being sent that night to the Camp with the horsemen, they would not believe that Cæsar and the Army were returned in safety. Fear had so possess'd their minds, that they did not let to say, that all the Legions were overthrowen, and the horse had escaped by flight, and desired there to be received; for they could not be persuaded the Army being safe, that the Germans would have attempted to surprize their Camp. Of which fear they were delivered by Cæsar's arrival. He being returned, not ignorant of the events of War, complained of one thing only, that the cohorts that kept the watch, were sent from their Stations, forasmuch as no place ought to be given to the least casualty. And there he saw how much Fortune was able to do by the sudden coming of the Enemy, and how much more in that he was put off from the rampier and the gates which he had so nearly taken. But of all the rest this seemed the strangest, that the Germans coming over the Rhene, to depopulate and spoil Ambiorix and his Country, had like to have taken the Roman Camp, which would have been

as acceptable to Ambiorix as any thing that could happen.

OBSERVATION.

It is an old saying, avouched by Plutarch; *Fortuna id unum hominibus non avertit, quod bene fuerit consilium*, what a man hath once well advised, that and only that fortune can never depoll him of; which Tiberius the Roman Emperor well understood; of whom Suetonius reporteth, *Quod minimum fortune, casusque permittat*. That he trusted very little to fortune or casualties; and is the same which Cæsar councelleth in this place, *Ne minimo quidem casui locum relinqui debuisset*. That no place is to be given to the least casualty. It were a hard condition to expose a naked party to the malice of an enemy, or to disadvantage him with the loss of his light. An Army without a guard at any time is merely naked, and more subject to slaughter, then those that never took arms: and the rather where the watch is wanting, for there sudden chances can hardly be prevented: and if they happen to avoid any such unexpected casualty, they have greater cause to thank fortune for her favor, than to be angry with her for her malice; for prevention at such times is out of the way, and they are wholly at her mercy, as Cæsar hath rightly delivered touching this accident. And therefore, whether an Army march forward, or continue in a place, sleep or wake, play or work, go in hazard or rest secure, let not so great a body bear any time without a competent strength, to answer the spite of such misadventures.

CHAP. XVIII.

Cæsar returneth to spoil the Enemy, and punisheth Acco.

Cæsar returning again to trouble and vex the Enemy, having called a great number of people from the bordering Cities, he sent them out into all parts. All the villages and houses, which were any where to be seen, were burned to the ground, pillage and booty was taken in every place; the Corn was not only consumed by so great a multitude of Men and Cattel, but beaten down also by the unseasonableness of the year and continual rain: insomuch, that albeit divers did hide themselves for the present, yet the Army being withdrawn, they must necessarily perish through want and scarcity. And oftentimes they baped of the place, (the Horsemen being divided into many quarters) where they did not only see Ambiorix, but kept him for the most part in sight: and in hoping still to take him some that thought to demerit Cæsar's highest favor, took such infinite pains, as were almost beyond the power of nature: and ever there seemed but a little between them, and the thing they most desired. But he conveyed himself away through dens and woods and dales.

dales, and in the night time sought other country and quarters, with no greater a guard of horse than four, to whom only he durst commit the safety of his life. The Country being in this manner harried and depopulated, Cæsar with the loss of two Cohorts, brought back his Army to Durocortorum in the State of the Men of Rhemes, where a Parliament being summoned, he determined to call in question the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes, and especially Alco the principal author of that Counsel; who being condemned, was put to death more majorum. Some others fearing shelve judgments, saved themselves by flight: these he interdicted fire and water. So leaving two Legions to winter in the confines of the Treviri, and two other amongst the Lingones, and the other six at Agendicum in the borders of the Senones, having made provision of corn for the Army, he went into Italy, ad conventus agendos.

OBSERVATION.

THE conclusion of this Sommers work, was shut up with the sack and depopulation of the Eburones, as the extremity of hostile fury, when the enemy lyeth in the fastness of the Country, and refuseth to make open War. That being done, Cæsar proceeded in a course of civil judgment, with such principal offenders as were of the conspiracy, and namely with Alco, whom he punished in such manner, as the old Romans were accustomed to do with such offenders, as had forfeited their loyalty to their Country, a kind of death which Nero knew not, although he had been Emperor of Rome thirteen years, and put to death many thousand people. The party condemned was to have his neck locked in a fork, and to be whipped naked to death, and he that was put to death after that manner, was punished more majorum. Such others as feared to undergo the judgment, and fled before they came to trial, were banished out of the Country, and made incapable of the benefit of fire and water in that Empire.

And thus endeth the sixth Commentary.

THE

THE
Seventh Commentary
OF THE
WARS in GALLIA.

The ARGUMENT.

THIS last Commentary containeth the specialities of the War which Cæsar made against all the States of Gallia united into one confederacy, for the expelling of the Roman Government out of that Continent, whom Cæsar overthrew in the end, *Horribili vigilantia, & prodigiosis operibus*, by his horrible vigilancy and prodigious actions.

CHAP. I.

The Gallies enter into new deliberations of revolt.

Cæsar.



GALLIA being in quiet, Cæsar according to his determination, went into Italy to keep Courts and Sessions. There he understood that P. Clodius was slain, and of a Decree which the Senate had made, touching the assembly of all the youth of Italy, and thereupon he purposed to inrole new bands throughout the whole Province. These news were quickly carried over the Alpes into Gallia, and the Gallies themselves added such rumors to it, as the matter seemed well to bear, that Cæsar was now detained by the troubles at Rome, and in such dissensions could not return to his Army. Being stirred up by this occasion, such as before were inwardly grieved that they were subject to the Empire of the people of Rome, did now more freely and boldly enter into the consideration of War. The Princes and chiefest men of Gallia having appointed counsels and meetings in remote and woody places, complained of the death of Alco, and shewed it to be a fortune which might concern themselves. They pity the common

misery of Gallia, and do propound all manner of promise and rewards to such as will begin the War, and with the danger of their lives, redeem the liberty of their Country: wherein they are to be very careful not to fore-slow any time, to the end that Cæsar may be kept from coming to his Army before their secret conferences be discovered. Which might easily be done, forasmuch as neither the Legions durst go out of their wintering Camps, in the absence of their General, nor the General come to the Legions without a convoy. To conclude, they held it better to die in fight, then to lose their ancient honor in matter of war, and the liberty left them by their predecessors.

OBSERVATION.

THIS Chapter discovereth such sparkles of revolt, rising from the discontentment of the conquered Gallies, as were like to break out into an universal burning; and within a while, proved such a fire, as the like hath not been seen in the continent of Gallia. For this summers work verified the saying of the Samnites, *Quod pax servieribus gravior quam liberis bellum esset*. That peace is more grievous to those that are in vassallage, than War is to free men: and was carried on either part with such a resolution, as in respect of this service, neither the Gallies did before that time in-

page

Plutarch in
the life of
Marcellus.

Plutarch in
the life of
Cicero.

Ne quid
trip. de
ment. capi-
at.

Gallia Cis-
alpina &
Transalpina

gaged themselves seriously in their Countries cause, nor did the Romans know the difficulty of their task. But as *Euphrates* called the fields of *Boc-tia*, Mars his scaffold where he kept his games; or as *Xenophon* nameth the City of *Ephesus* the Armorer's shop, so might *Gallia* for this year be called the Theatre of War. The chief encouragement of the Gallies at this time, was the trouble and dissension at Rome, about the death of *Clodius*, and the accusation of *Milo* for killing *Clodius*.

This *Clodius*, (as *Plutarch* reporteth) was a young man of a noble house, but wild and insolent, and much condemned for profaning a secret sacrifice, which the Ladies of Rome did celebrate in *Cæsar's* house by coming amongst them disguised in the habit of a young singing wench; which he did for the love of *Pompeia*, *Cæsar's* wife: whereof being openly accused, he was quitted by secret means which he made to the Judges; and afterwards obtained the Tribuneship of the people, and caused *Cicero* to be banished, and did many outrages and insolencies in his Tribuneship: which caused *Milo* to kill him, for which he was also accused. And the Senate fearing that accusation of *Milo*, being a bold spirited man, and of good quality, would move some uproar or sedition in the City, they gave commission to *Pompey* to see justice executed, as well in this cause, as for other offences, that the City might be quiet, and the Commonwealth suffer no detriment. Whereupon *Pompey* posset the market-place, where the cause was to be heard with bands of footsolders and Troops of armed men. And there were the troubles in Rome upon the death of *Clodius*, which the Gallies did take as an occasion of revolt, hoping thereby that *Cæsar* (being in *Gallia Cisalpina*, which Province was allotted to his Government, as well as that *Gallia* Northward the *Alpes*) would have been detained from his Army.

CHAP. II.

The men of Chartres take upon them the beginning of a Revolt, under the condution of Cotuatus and Conetodunus.

Cæsar.

These things being thus disputed, the Men of Chartres did make themselves the chief of that War, refusing no danger for the common safety of their country. And forasmuch as at that present, they could not give caution by hostage, left the matter should be discovered; they desire to have their Covenants strengthened by oath, and by mutual collation of their military ensignes, which was the most religious ceremony they could use to bind the rest not to forsake them, having made an entrance and beginning to that War. The men of Chartres being commended by the rest, and the oaths of all them that were present being taken, and a time appointed to begin, they brake up the assembly. When the day came, they of Chartres, under the condution of Cotuatus and Conetodunus, two desperate fellows, upon a watchword gi-

ven, ran speedily to * Genabum, and such Roman Citizens as were there upon business, namely C. Fulvius Cotta, a Knight of Rome, whom Cæsar had left overseer of the provision of Corn, they slew, and took their goods. The report thereof was quickly spread over all the States of Gallia, for when any such great or extraordinary matter happeneth, they signify it through the Country by an out-cry and shout, which is taken by others, and delivered at the next, and so goeth from hand to hand, as it happened at this time: for that which was done at Genabum at Sun-rising, was before the first watch of the night was ended, heard in the confines of the Arverni, which is above a hundred and threescore miles distant.

OBSERVATION.

This manner of out-cry here mentioned to be usual in Gallia, was the same which remaineth in use at this present in Wales, although not so frequent as in former times. For the custom is there, as often as any robbery happeneth to be committed, or any man to be slain, or what other outrage or riot is done, the next at hand do go to some eminent place where they may be best heard, and there they make an outcry or howling, which they call *Hobowb*, signifying the fact to the next inhabitants, who take it as passionately, and deliver it farther, and so from hand to hand it quickly spreadeth over all the Country. It is a very ready way to put the country in arms, and was first devised (as it seemeth) for the stay and apprehension of robbers and outlaws, who kept in strong holds, and lived upon the spoil of the bordering inhabitants: but otherwise it favourerth of Barbarisme, rather than of any Civil Government.

CHAP. III.

Vercingetorix stirreth up the Arverni to the like commotion and revolt.

In like manner Vercingetorix the Son of Celtillus, of the Nation of the Arverni, a young man of great power and authority, (whose Father was the Commander of all Gallia, and because he sought a Kingdom, was slain by those of his own State) calling together his followers and clients did easily incense them to Rebellion. His purpose being known, every man took Arms, and so he was driven out of the Town of Gergovia by Gobanito his Uncle, and other Princes, who thought it not safe to make trial of that fortune. And yet he desisted not, but enrolled needy and desperate people; and with such Troops, whomsoever he met withal of the State, he did easily draw them to his party, persuading them to take arms for the defence of common liberty. And having at length got great forces

* Celtillus.

The Welsh
Hobowb.

OBSERVATION.

It is observed, by such as are acquainted with matter of Government, that there ought to be always a proportion of quality between him that commandeth, and them that obey; for, if a man of *Sardanapalus* condition, should take upon him the charge of *Marius* Army, it were like to take no better effect, then if *Antiochus* had the leading of lascivious *Cinades*. And, as we may observe in economical Policy, a dissolute Master may as soon command hair to grow on the palm of his hand, as to make a virtuous Servant; but, the respect of duty, between such relatives, doth likewise infer the like respect of quality: so, in all sorts and conditions of Command, there must be sympathizing meanes, to unite the diversity of the parts in the happy end of perfect Government. In this new Empire, which befall Vercingetorix, we may observe a double proportion between him and his people. The first, of strength and ability, and the other, of quality and resemblance of affection: upon the assurance of which proportion, he grounded the authority of his command. For, it appeareth, that his first beginning was by perfwation and intreatie, and would indure no direction, but that which was guided by a loose and easie rein: holding it neither safe nor seemly, but rather a strain of extreme madnes, first to punish or threaten, and then to want power to make good his judgments: but, being strengthened by authority from themselves, and backed with an Army, able to control their disobedience, he then added punishment, as the ensign of Magistracy, and confirmed his power by rigorous commands; which is as necessary a demonstration of a well-setled Government, as any circumstance belonging thereunto.

Touching the resemblance and proportion of their qualities, it is manifestly shewed by the sequel of this History, that every man desired to redeem the common liberty of their Country, in that measure of endeavour as was fitting to great a cause. Amongst whom, Vercingetorix being their Chief Commander, *summa severitatem* (as the story saith) added, *summam severitatem* (as the diligence, great severity, as well assured, that the greater part would approve his Justice, and condemn the uncertainty of doubtful resolutions, desiring no further service at their hands, then that wherein himself would be the foremost). Imitation of *Valerius Corvinus*: *Fausta mea, non diu, vos milites sequi volo; nec disciplinam modo, sed exemplum etiam a me petere*; I would have you, O my Soldiers, do as I do, and not to much mind what I say; and to take not your Discipline only, but your pattern also from me. And therefore the party was like to be well upheld; for as much as both the Prince and the People were so far engaged in the matter intended, as by the resemblance of an earnest desire, might answer the measure of due proportion.

There ought to be a proportion of quality between a Commander and his Soldiers. Such a Master, such a Servant.

Liv.

CHAP. IV.

Cæsar cometh into Gallia, and by a device getteth to his Army.

Cæsar.

These things being told Cæsar in Italy, as soon as he understood that the matters in the City, were, by the wisdom of Pompey, brought into better state, he took his journey into Gallia, and, being come thither, he was much troubled how to get to his Army. For, if he should send for the Legions into the Province, he understood, that they should be certainly fought withal by the way in his absence. If he himself should go unto them, he doubted how he might safely commit his person to any, although they were such as were yet in peace. In the mean time Lucius of Cahors being sent against the Rutheni, doth easily unite that State to the Arverni: and proceeding further against the Nitiobriges and the Gabali, he received hostages of both of them, and having raised a great Power, he laboured to break into the Province, and to make towards Narbo. Which being known, Cæsar resolved, by all means, to put him by that purpose, and went himself to Narbo. At his coming, he encouraged such as stood doubtful, or timorous, and placed Garrisons amongst the Rutheni, the Volci, and about Narbo, which were frontier places, and near unto the Enemy, and commanded part of the Forces, which were in the Province, together with those supplies which he had brought out of Italy, to go against the Helvii, which are adjoining upon the Arverni. Things being thus ordered, Lucius being now suppressed, and removed, holding it to be dangerous to enter among the Garrisons, he himself went towards the Helvii. And, albeit the Hill Gebenna, which divideth the Arverni from the Helvii, by reason of the hard time of Winter, and the depth of the Snow, did hinder their passage; yet, by the industry of the soldiers, making way through Snow of six foot deep, they came into the confines of the Arverni: who being suddenly and unawares suppressed, little mistrusting an invasion over the Hill Gebenna, which incloseth them in as a Wall, and, at that time of the year, doth not afford a path to a single man alone, he commanded the Horsemen to scatter themselves far and near, to make the Enemy more afraid. These things being speedily carried to Vercingetorix, all the Arverni, full of fear and amazement, flockt about him, beseeching him to

have a care of their State, and not to suffer themselves to be sacked by the Enemy, especially now at this time, when as all the War was transferred upon them. Upon their instant intreaty he removed his Camp out of the Territories of the Bituriges, and marched towards the Country of the Arverni. But, Cæsar having continued two dayes in those places, for as much as he understood, both by use and opinion, what course Vercingetorix was like to take; he left the Army, pretending some supplies of Horse, which he went to raise, and appointed young Brutus to command those Forces, admonishing him to send out the Horsemen into all quarters, and that he himself would not be absent from the Camp above three dayes. These things being thus sealed, none of his followers knowing his determination, by great journeys he came to Vienna; where, taking fresh Horse, which he had laid there many dayes before, he ceased neither night nor day, untill he came through the confines of the Hedui to the Lingones, where two Legions wintered; to the end, if the Hedui should undertake anything against him, he might, with speed, prevent it. Being there, he sent to the rest of the Legions, and brought them all to one place, before the Arverni could possibly have notice of it.

OBSERVATION.

Cæsar, upon his first entrance into Gallia, was perplexed how to get to his Army: and, the matter stood in such termes, as brought either the Legions, or his own person into hazard. For, (as he saith) if he should send for the Legions to come unto him, they should, doubtless, be fought withal by the way, which he was loath to adventure, unless himself had been present: or otherwise, if he himself had gone unto them, he doubted of the entertainment of the revolting Gallies, and might have overthrown his Army, by the loss of his own person. In this extremity of choice, he resolved upon his own passage to the Army, as less dangerous and more honourable, rather then to call the Legions out of their wintering Camps, where they stood as a check to bridle the insolency of the mutinous Gallies, and so to bring them to the hazard of Batle, in fetching their General into the field: whereby he might have lost the Victory, before he had begun the Wars. And, for his better safety in this passage, he used this cunning. Having assured the Roman Province, by strong and frequent Garrisons on the Frontiers, and removed Lucius from those parts; gathering together such supplies as he had brought with him out of Italy, with other Forces which he found in the Province, he went speedily into the Territories of the Arverni, making a way over the Hill Gebenna, at such a time of the year, as made it unpassable for any Forces,

To abuse an Enemy by way of stratagem, commendable in a Commander.

• Aurigat.
• Le manège
de Q. nev.

ces, had they not been led by Cæsar; only for this purpose, to have it noised abroad, that whereas Vercingetorix, and the Arverni, had principally undertook the quarrel against the Romans, and made the beginning of a new War, Cæsar would first deal with them, and lay the weight thereof upon their shoulders, by calling their fortunes first in question, to the end he might possess the world with an opinion of his presence in that Country, and draw Vercingetorix back again to defend his State, whilst he in the mean time did slip to his Army, without suspicion or fear of peril: for, slaying there no longer then might serve to give a sufficient colour to that pretence, and leaving those Forces to execute the rest, and to make good the secret of the Project, he conveyed himself to his Army with such speed and celerity, as doth verify the saying of Suetonius; quod persepe muncios de se prevenit, that he often outwent the ordinary messengers.

These blinds and false intendments are of special use in matter of War, and serve as well to get advantages upon an Enemy, as to clear a difficulty by cleanly evasion: neither is a Commander the less valued for fine conveyance in Military projects, but deserves rather greater honour for adding art unto valour, and supplanting the strength of opposition, with the sleight of wit.

— Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirit?

Who looks at fraud or valour in a foe?

hath always been held a principle amongst men of War. And, Liliander his Counsell is the same in effect; that, where the Lions skin will not serve the turn, there take the Foxes. Carbo spake it to the commendation of Sylla, that he had to do both with a Lion and a Fox; but, he feared more his Foxes pate then his Lions skin. It is reported, that Annibal excelled all other of his time, for abusing the Enemy in matter of Stratagem, for he never made fight but with an addition of assistants, supporting force with Art; and, the fury of Armes with the subtilty of wit.

Of late time, amongst other practices of this nature, the Treaty at Quesnoy is most memorable, entertained only to gain time: that while speech of Parlee was continued, and pledges delivered to the Archduke Albertus, for the safety of such as were sent into the Town to capitulate with the General, there might be time gained for the sending in of such supplies of Men and Munition as were wanting, to make good the defence thereof; which were no sooner taken in, but the Treaty proved a stratagem of War.

In these foiles and tricks of wit, which at all times, and in all ages, have been highly esteemed in men of War, as special virtues becoming the condition of a great Commander, if it be demanded how far a General may proceed in abusing an Enemy by deeds or words; I cannot speak distinctly to the question: but sure I am, that Surenna, Lieutenant-General of the Partisan Army, did his Master good service, in abusing Crassus the Roman General by fair promises; or as Plutarch saith, by foul Perjury, till in the end he brought his head to be an Actor in a Tragedy: albeit Surenna never deserved well of good report since that time,

Vit. Cæsar.
tit.

Plut. Cras.
tit.

CHAP. V.

Vercingetorix besiegeth Gergovia. Cæsar taketh in Vellaunodunum and Genabum.

This being known, Vercingetorix brought back his Army again into the Country of the Bituriges, and thence marched to besiege Gergovia, a Town held by the Boii, whom Cæsar had left there after the Helvetian War, and given the jurisdiction of the Town to the Hedui, which brought Cæsar into great perplexity, whether he should keep the Legions in one place for that time of Winter which remained, and so suffer the stipendiaries of the Hedui to be taken and spoiled, whereby all Gallia might take occasion to revolt, for as much as the Romans should seem to afford no protection or countenance to their friends; or otherwise draw his Army out of their Wintering-Camps sooner then was usual, and thereby become subject to the difficulties of provision and carriage of corn. Notwithstanding, it seemed better, and so he resolved, rather to undergo all difficulties, then by taking such a corn, to lose the good wills of all his followers. And therefore persuading the Hedui diligently to make supply of necessary provisions, he sent to the Boii, to advertise them of his coming; to encourage them to continue Loyal; and nobly to resist the assaults of the Enemy: and, leaving two Legions, with the Carriages of the whole Army, at Agendicum, he marched towards the Boii. The next day, coming to a Town of the Senones, called Vellaunodunum, he determined to take it in, to the end he might leave no Enemy behind him, which might hinder a speedy supply of Victuals: and in two dayes he inclosed it about with a ditch and a rampier. The third day, some being sent out touching the giving up of the Town, he commanded all their Armes and their Castel to be brought out, and Six hundred pledges to be delivered. Leaving C. Trebonius a Legate to see it performed; he himself made all speed towards Genabum, in the Territories of the men of Chartres; who, as soon as they heard of the taking in of Vellaunodunum, persuading themselves the matter would not rest so, they resolved to put a strong Garrison into Genabum. Thither came Cæsar within two dayes, and incamping himself

Cæsar.

il 2 before

before the Town. The evening drawing on, he put off the Assault unto the next day, commanding the Soldiers to prepare in a readiness such things as should be necessary for that service. And, for as much as the Town of Genabum had a bridge leading over the River Loire, he feared lest they of the Town would steal away in the night: for prevention whereof, he commanded two Legions to watch all night in Armer. The Townsmen, a little before midnight went out quietly, and began to pass over the River. Which being discovered by the Scouts, Cæsar, with the Legions which he had ready in Armer, burnt the Gates, and entering the Town took it: the greatest number of the Enemy being taken, and a very few escaping, by reason of the narrowness of the Bridge, and the way which shut in the multitude. The Town being sacked and burned, and given for a booty to the Soldiers, he carried his Army over the River Loire, into the Territories of the Bituriges.

The first OBSERVATION.

IT is known and an approved saying, *Emalis minimum est eligendum*, of evils the least is to be chosen: but, in a presentment of evils, to be able to discern the difference, and to chuse the least, *Hic labor, hoc opus*, here's all the skill and work. Vercingetorix besieging Gergovia (a stipendiary Town, belonging to the *Fœdus*, at such a long time had served the Roman Empire) at such a time of the year as would not afford provision of victual for the maintenance of an Army, but with great difficulty, and inconvenience of carriage and convoy; Cæsar was much perplexed, whether he should forbear to succor the Town, and raise the siege, or undergo the hazard of long and tedious Convoies. A matter often falling into dispute, although it be in other termes, whether honesty, or honourable respect ought to be preferred, before private ease and particular commodity. Cæsar hath declared himself touching this point, preferring the honour of the People of Rome, as the Majesty of their Empire, and the reputation which they desired to hold, touching assistance and protection of their friends, before any inconvenience which might happen to their Army. And not without good reasons, which may be drawn as well from the worthiness of the cause, as from the danger of the effect: for, duties of virtue, and respects of honesty, as the noblest parts of the mind, do not only challenge the service of the inferior faculties of the Soul; but do also command the body, and the casualties thereof, in such sort, as is fitting the excellency of their prerogative: for, otherwise, virtue would find but bare attendance, and might leave her Scepter for want of lawful authority. And therefore Cæsar chose rather to adventure the Army upon the casualties of hard provision, then to blemish the Roman name with the infamy of dilatory. Which was less dangerous also, in re-

gard of the effect: for, where the bond is of value, there the forfeiture is great: and, if that tie had been broken, and their opinion deceived, touching the expectation of assistance and help, all Gallia might have had just cause of revolt, and disclaimed the Roman Government for non-protection. To conclude then, let no man deceive himself in the present benefit, which private respect may bring upon the refusal of honest regard, for the end will be a witness of the error, and prove honesty to be best policy.

The second OBSERVATION.

IT is observed by some Writers, that Cæsar never undertook any action, or at the least brought it not to trial, but he first assured himself of these four things.

The first was provision of Victuals, as the very foundation of Warlike expeditions, whereof I have already treated in the first Commentary: the difficulty whereof made him so doubtful to undertake the relief of Gergovia. And doubtless, whosoever goeth about any enterprise of War, without certain means of victual and provision, must either carry an Army of Camellions, that may live by the air, or intend nothing but to build Castles in the aire, or otherwise shall be sure to find his Enemy either in his bosome, or as the Proverb is in *Plutarch*, to leap on his belly with both his feet.

The second thing was provision of all necessities, which might be of use in that service: where-with he always to abound, that there might rather want occasion to use them, than he be wanting to answer occasion. And these were the instruments whereby he made such admirable works, such Bridges, such Mounts, such Trenches, such huge Armadoes, as appeareth by the Sight with the Maritime Cities of Gallia: according to which his former custom, for as much as the day was far spent before he came to Genabum, he commanded such things to be fitted and had in a readiness, as might serve for the siege the next day.

The third thing was an Army, for the most part of old Soldiers, whom the Romans called *Veterani*, whereof he was likewise at this time provided; for the two Legions, which were fresh and lately inrolled, he left at *Agendicum* with the Carriages, taking only the old Soldiers for this service, as knowing, that *in pugna usum amplius prodesse quam vires*, usefulness is more servicable in War than numbers.

The fourth thing was the trial and experience of the Enemies Forces, which the former victories assured him to be inferior to the Romans; it being always a Rule in the Roman Discipline, (as I have already noted) by light and easy skirmishes, to acquaint the Soldiers with the manner of the enemies fight, *Ne eos novum bellum, novus hostis terret*, lest a new kind of fight, or enemy, might affright them; as *Livy* saith.

Cæsar went always provided of four things,

Plutarch in the life of Læna lxx.

Comment. 3

Comment. 1

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar taketh in Noviodunum, and beatech the Enemy coming to rescue the Town.

Vercingetorix understanding of Cæsar's coming, left the Siege, and went to meet him. Cæsar resolved to take a Town lying in his way in the Territories of the Bituriges, called Noviodunum. Which they of the Town perceiving, sent out unto him to beseech him to spare them, and to give order for their safety. To the end therefore that he might speed that business with as much celerity, as he had accomplished former services, he commanded them to bring out their Arms, their horse, and to deliver pledges. Part of the Hostages being given, while there were in delivering over, divers Centurions and a few Soldiers being admitted into the Town to seek out their weapons and their horses, the horsemen of the Enemy, which marched before Vercingetorix Army, were discovered a far off; which the Townsmen had no sooner perceived, and thereby conceived some hope of relief, but they presently took up a shout, and betook themselves to their arms, shut the gates, and began to make good the Walls. The Centurions that were in the Town perceiving some new resolution of the Gallies, with their Swords drawn, possist themselves of the gates, and saved both themselves and their Men that were in the Town. Cæsar commanded the horse to be drawn out of the Camp, and to begin the charge. And as they began to give ground, he sent four hundred German horsemen to second them, whom he had resolved to keep with him from the first: who charged the enemy with such fury, that the Gallies could no way endure the assault, but were presently put to flight; and many of them being slain, the rest retired back to the Army. Upon their overthrow, the Townsmen were worse affrighted then they were before; and having apprehended such as were thought to have stirred up the people, they brought them to Cæsar, and yielded themselves unto him. Which being ended, Cæsar marched towards the Town of Avaricum, which was the greatest and best fortified of all the Towns in the Territories of the Bituriges, and situate in the most fertile part of the Country; for that being taken in, be doubted not to bring the whole State of the Bituriges easily into his subjection.

OBSERVATION.

FOrafnuch as nothing is more changeable than the mind of man, which (notwithstanding the low degree of baseness, wherein it often stireth) will as occasion giveth way to revenge, readily mount to the height of tyranny, and spare no labor to cry quittance with an Enemy: it hath been thought expedient in the wildome of foregoing ages, to pluck the wings of so mounting a bird, and to deprive an Enemy of such means, as may give hope of liberty by mutiny and revolt.

The practice of the Romans in taking in any Town, was to leave them forceless, that howsoever they might stand affected, their nails should be surely pared for scratching, and their power confined to the circuit of their mind. For as it appeareth by this and many other places of Cæsar, no remedy of any Town was accepted, until they had delivered all their Arms, both offensive and defensive, with such engines and instruments of War, as might any way make for the defence of the same. Neither that only, but such beasts also, whether Horfe or Elephant, or any other whatsoever, as might any way advantage the use of those weapons. Which as it was a great dismay and weakening to the Enemy, so was it short of the third condition, commanding the delivery of so many hostages or pledges as were thought convenient, being the prime of their youth, and the flower of their manhood, and were as the marrow to their bones, and the sinews to that body. Whereby it came to pass, that the remnant was much disabled in strength, concerning their number of fighting Men, and such as were left had neither arms nor means to make resistance.

The Turke observeth the same course with the Christians, but in a more cruel and barbarous manner; for he cometh duly at a certain time, not regarding any former demeanor, and leadeth away the flower of their youth, to be invested in impiety and infidelity, and to be made vassals of heathenish impurity.

Often times we read, that a conquered people were not only interdicted arms, but the matter also, and the art whereby such arms were made and wrought: for where the people are great, and metall and matter plenty, it is a chance if artificers be wanting to repair their loss, and to refurbish their armory. At the Siege of Carthage, the Romans having taken away their Arms, they notwithstanding, finding force of metall within the Town, caused workmen to make every day a hundred Targets and three hundred swords, besides arrows and casting slings, using Womens hair for want of hemp, and pulling down their houses for timber to build shipping. Whereby we may perceive, that a General cannot be too careful to deprive an enemy of all such helps as may any way strengthen his hand, or make way to resistance.

CHAP.

Clement in l'Avougue.

The means which the Romans used to weaken an enemy.

CHAP. VII.

Vercingetorix persuadeth the Galles to a new course of War.

Cæsar.
* Ville neu-
sue en la
Franche
comte.
* Orleans.
* Noyon.

Vercingetorix having received so many losses one in the neck of another, * Vellaunodunum, * Genabum, and * Noviodunum, being taken, he calteth his men to counsel, and telleth them that the War must be carried in another course then it hath been heretofore; for they must endeavour by all means to keep the Romans from forrage and convey of vittual, which would easily be brought to pass, forasmuch as they themselves did abound in horsemen, and for that the time of the year did not yet forrage in the field, the Enemy must necessarily seek it in houses and barns, whereby their forragers would daily be cut off by their horsemen. Moreover, for their safety and defence, they were to neglect their private commodity; their houses and their villages were to be burnt up round about as far as Boia, wherefore the Romans might go to fetch their forrage. For themselves they thought it reason that they should make supply of vittual and provision, in whose possessions they were, and for whom they fought. By this means the Romans would never be able to endure that want as should befall them, or at the least be constrained to fetch their provisions far off, with great danger and peril to themselves: neither did it make any matter whether they killed them, or put them besides their carriages, for without necessary supplies they were never able to hold War. And to conclude, such Towns were likewise to be set on fire, as by the strength of their situation, were not safe from danger, lest they should prove receptacles to linger and detract the War, and serve the Romans for booty and supplies of provision. And albeit these things might seem heavy and bitter: yet they ought to esteem it more grievous to have their Wives and Children led away into servitude, and themselves to be slain by the Sword of the Enemy: which doth necessarily fall upon a conquered people. This opinion was generally approved by the consent of all Men, and more then twenty Cities of the Bituriges, were burnt in one day, the like was done in other States, great fires were to be seen in all parts. And although all Men took it very grievously, yet they proposed this comfort unto themselves, that the Enemy being by this means defeated, they should quickly recover their losses. Touching Avaricum they disputed it in common counsel,

whether it should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges do prostrate themselves at the feet of all the Galles, that they might not be forced to set on fire with their own hands. The fairest City in all Gallia, being both an ornament and a strength to their State, they would easily defend it by the site of the place, being incircled round about with a River and a bog, and being accessible by one narrow passage only. At length leave being granted them to keep it, Vercingetorix at first dissuading them from it, and afterwards yielding unto it, moved by the intreaty of the Galles, and the commiseration of the common multitudes, and so a fit Garrison was chosen to defend the Town.

OBSERVATION.

I Have seen an Impress with a Circle, and a hand with a sharp stile pointing towards the centre with this Motto, *Hic labor, hoc opus*, this is a thing of work and labor; signifying thereby, that albeit the Area thereof were plainly and distinctly bounden, and the Diameter of no great length, yet it was not an easy matter to find the Centre, which is the heart and chiefest part of that figure. In like manner there is no business or other course so easy or plain, but the center may be mistaken, and the difficulty commonly reflecteth in hitting that point, which giveth the circumference an equal and regular motion.

The Galles were resolved to undertake the defence of their Country, and to redeem their liberty with the hazard of their lives: but it seemeth they were mistaken in the means, and ran a course far short of the center. For Vercingetorix perceiving the Romans daily to get upon the Galles, first by taking in one Town, secondly another, and lastly of a third, he advised them to set on fire all the Country Houses, Villages, and Towns, for a great circuit round about, and to force the Romans to fetch their forrage and provisions far off, and undergo the difficulties of long Convoys, whereby the Galles, might make use of their multitude of horse, and keep the Romans without supplies of necessary provisions: and so they doubted not but to give a speedy end to that war. And this he took to be the centre of that business, and the true use of their advantage.

Polibius writeth, that M. Regulus having divers times overthrowen the Carthaginians in Battel, one Xanthippus a Lacedemonian, clearly perceiving the cause of their often routs, began openly to say, that the Carthaginians were not overthrowen by the valor of the Romans, but by their own ignorance for they exceeding the Romans in Horse and Elephants, had neglected to fight in the Champaign, where their Cavalry might fight itself, but in hills and woody places, where the foot Troops were of more force, and so the Romans had the advantage. Whereby the manner of the War being changed, and by the counsel of the pregnant Greek, brought from the hills into the level of the plain, the Carthaginians recovered all their former losses by one absolute Victory. In like manner Annibal finding himself to exceed the Romans in strength

It is a hard matter in following a business, to hit that course which may most advantage it.

Plutarch in the life of Fabius.

Servus a natura. Tull. 1.

Illud, 10.

strength of Cavalry, did always endeavor to affront them in open and champion Countries; and as often as the Romans durst meet him, he put them to the worse: but Fabius perceiving the disadvantage, kept himself always upon the hills, and in covert and uneven places, and so made the advantage of the place equal the multitude of the Enemies horsemen.

There is no greater scorn can touch a man of reputation and place, then to be thought not to understand his own business. For as wisdom is the excellency of humane nature, so doth want of judgment deject Men to the condition of such as Aristotle calleth servants by nature: whose Wit being too weak to support any weight, doth recompence that want with the service of their body, and are wholly employed in a porters occupation. Which Homer layeth upon Diomedes shoulders, with as fine conveyance as he doth thereof of his inventions. For Ulysses and he going out on a party, to do some exploit upon the Trojans, they carried themselves so gallantly, that they fell to share King Rhesus Chariot and Horses. Ulysses presently seized upon the Horses, being of a delicate Thracian breed, and Diomedes seemed well contented with the Chariot. But being to carry it away, Pallar advised him to let it alone, lest he might prove his strength to be greater then his Wit, and yet not find so much neither as would carry it away.

But for these directions which Vercingetorix gave unto the Galles, I refer the Reader to the sequel of the History, wherein he shall find how they prevailed.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar besiegeth Avaricum, and is distressed for want of Corn.

Cæsar.

Vercingetorix followed Cæsar by small and easy journeys, and chose a place to incamp in, fortified about with bogs and woods, fifteen miles distant from Avaricum: where he understood what was done at Avaricum every hour of the day, and commanded likewise what he would have done. He observed all our forraging and harvesting, and did set upon such as went far off upon any such occasion, and incumbered them with great inconveniences: albeit they took what course they could to meet with it, as to go out at uncertain times, and by unknown and unusual ways. Cæsar incamping himself before that part of the Town, which was not shut in with the River nor the bog, and afforded but a narrow and straight passage, began to make a Mount, to drive vines, and to raise two Towers (for the nature of the place would not suffer him to inclose it round about with a ditch and a rampier) and never resteth to admonish the Hedui and the Boii to bring in supplies of corn: of whom the one, by reason of the small care and pains they took,

did little help him; the other of no great ability, being a small and a weak State; did quickly consume all that they had. The Army was distressed for want of Corn, by reason of the poverty of the Boii, and the indigence of the Hedui, together with the burning of the houses in the Country, in such manner as they wanted Corn for many days together, and sustained their lives with beasts and cattle which they had fetched a great way off: and yet no one voice at all was heard to come from them, unworthy the Majesty of the Roman Empire, and their former victories. And when as Cæsar did speak unto the Legions severally as they were in the works, that if their wants were heavy and bitter unto them, he would leave off the Siege, all of them with one voice desired him not to do so, for since they had so served many years under his command, as they never had received any discomfure, neither had they at any time depared and left the business undone; it would be imputed unto them, as an ignominy and disgrace to leave this siege, and that they had rather undergo all difficulties, then not to revenge the death of the Citizens of Rome, that by treachery were slain at Genabum. The same Speeches they delivered to the Centurions and Tribunes, to be told Cæsar.

The First OBSERVATION.

The worth of a Soldier consisteth in a disposition of mind and body, which maketh him apt to suffer and undergo the difficulties of War. For let his resolution otherwise be never so great, and his courage invincible in the day of battel; yet if he faint under the burthen of such tediousness, as usually attendeth upon warlike engagements, he is no way fit for any great enterprise. Pindarus saith, that he understandeth not the war, that knoweth not, that the achieving of one piece of service, is always accompanied with the suffrance of another difficulty as great as that which was first intended. Et facere, & pati fortis, Romanum est. It was the peculiar commendation of the Roman people, patiently to endure the extremities of warfare: which made the *Profecti* cry out, That either they must forswear arms, and forget to make War, and receive the yoke of thralldome and bondage; *autis quilibet de imperio cesseret, nec virtute, nec patientia, nec discipline rei militaris cedendum;* or else they must shew themselves no ways inferior to their antagonists, either in valor or suffrance, or military discipline. Apian forgetteth not to say, that the Roman Empire was raised to such greatness, not by fortune or good luck, but by mere valor, and patient enduring of hardness and want. Which is the self same thing Crassus in his sorrow uttered to his Soldiers, who neither did, nor spake many things well: for as Plutarch rightly censureth him out of the Comical Poet, he was

Patientie ita a soldatis excellens valor.

Lib. lib. 6.

Plac. Crassus

Agood Man, any way else but in Wars.

CHAP. IX.

The Empire of Rome (saith he) came not to that greatness which it now possesseth by good fortune only, but by patient and constant suffering of trouble and adversity, never yielding or giving place to any danger.

Boetius ad
Principes.

Some Italian Writers are of opinion, that the two chiefest parts of a Soldier, Valor and Suffrance, are in these times divided unto two Nations, the French and the Spaniard, the Spaniard making War rather by suffrance, then by violence of assaults; and the French impatient of delay, and furious in assaults; so that according to his opinion, a Spaniard and a Frenchman will make one good Soldier. Touching the Spaniard, I cannot deny, but that he hath the name of one of the best Soldiers in Christendome, and I do gladly allow all that Vertue can challenge, for truth will prevail against all affection; yet I may say thus much on the behalf of our own people, that we have seldom lost honor in confronting any Nation. Concerning the suffrance and patient enduring of hardships, which is said to be in the Spaniard, being able to live long with a little, it may peradventure not unjustly be attributed to the property of their Country, and the nature of their Climate, which will not bear nor digest such plenty of food, as is required in colder Countries; and thereupon being born to so weak a digestion, they are as well satisfied with a root or a fallot, as others with better plenty of food; and therein they go beyond other Nations. Of the French I say nothing, but leave them to make good the opinion of the Italian Writer.

Suetonius witnesseth of Cæsar, that he himself was laboris ultra fidem patiens: one that endured toil beyond belief, whereby he might the better move his Army to endure with patience the difficulties of the Siege; and yet so artificially, as he seemed rather willing to leave it uneffected, then impose any burthen upon them, which they themselves should be unwilling to bear; the rather to draw the Legions to engage themselves therein, by denying to forsake it, then to cast that upon them, which their unwillingness might easily have put off.

The second OBSERVATION.

WE may farther observe, the means the Soldiers used to acquaint Cæsar with their desires, which was by the Tribunes and Centurions. For as these were mediate Officers between the General and them, and delivered the mandates and directions of the Emperor to the Soldiers; so did the Soldiers use their help to make known unto him their requests: as besides this place may appear in the first Commentary, where they desired to give him satisfaction touching the fear they had conceived of Ariovistus and the Germans, which they likewise did by the Centurions and Tribunes.

Cæsar leaveth the Siege, and goeth to take the Enemy upon advantage, but returneth again without fighting.

WHEN the Towers began to approach near unto the Walls, Cæsar understood by the Captives, that Vercingetorix having consumed all his provision of Forrage, had removed his Camp nearer to Avaricum, and that he himself was gone with the Cavalry, and such ready footmen as were accustomed to fight among the Horsemen, to lye in ambush in that place where he thought our Men would come a foraging the next day. Which being known, setting forward about midnight in silence, in the morning he came to the Enemy's Camp. They having speedy advertisement by their Scouts of Cæsar's coming, did hide their carriages in the woods, and imballt all their forces in an eminent and open place. Which being told Cæsar, he commanded the baggage to be speedily laid together, and their Arms to be made ready. There was a hill of a gentle rising from the bottom to the top, compassed round about with a difficult and troublesome bog of fifty foot in breadth. Upon this hill, the bridge being broken, the Gallies kept themselves, trusting to the strength of the place, and being distributed into Companies, according to their several States, they kept all the fords and passages of the bog with watch, with this resolution, that if the Romans did pass over the bog, they might easily from the higher ground keep them under, as they stuck in the mire, who little reckoning of so small a distance, would deem the fight to be upon equal terms; whereas they themselves well knowing the inequality of the condition, did make but a vain and idle ostentation. The soldiers disdaining that the Enemy could endure their presence so near at hand, and requiring the sign of battel, Cæsar acquainted them with what detriment and loss of many valiant Men, the Victory must at that time be bought, who being so resolute that they refused no danger to purchase him honour, he might well be condemned of great ingratitude and villany, if their lives were not dearer unto him then his own safety: and so comforting the Soldiers, he brought them back again the same day into the Camp, and gave order for such things as were requisite for the Siege of the Town.

OBSERVATION.

OBSERVATION.

CHAP. X.

Vercingetorix excuseth himself to the Gallies for his absence.

THIS Chapter hath divers special particulars worthy observation. The first is, the opportunity which Cæsar took to visit the Army of the Gallies, when Vercingetorix was absent and gone to lye in ambush for the Roman Foragers: which was a caveat to Vercingetorix, not to be too busie with the Roman Convoies, least his absence might draw on such an inconvenience, as might make him repent for going a biding.

The second is, the inequality which the advantage of the place giveth to a party: which I have already so often spoken of, as I am almost weary to repeat it; and the rather, for that I have produced this passage in the former Book, to signify the benefit of such an advantage. Yet, for as much as it is so pregnant to that effect, as may well deserve a double consideration, and was also produced by Cæsar himself, upon occasion, at Gerogavia; give me leave to note, how much it swayeth to counterpoise the want of the adverse party. Wherein, as it cannot be denied, but that it may give such help, as may make a small number equal a far greater proportion of men; so, in Cæsar's judgment, it countervailt the absence of the General, and maketh the body perfect without the head. Neither were they weakened only with the absence of their General; but their Cavalry, wherein they so much trusted, was absent likewise; and yet more then that too, by how much the Roman Legions excelled the Gallies in valour and prowess of armes, which being all put together, is no small advantage. For doubtless, if the matter had stood upon equal termes, touching the place, neither the presence of Vercingetorix, nor the addition of their Cavalry to assist them, had hindered the Battel, or turned the Romans back to their Camp.

The third thing is, the moderation which he shewed, forbearing to fight, the Gallies insolently vaunting, and the Roman Soldiers fretting and disdainning the Enemies pride: whereby he setled such a confidence of his directions in the minds of his men, by shunning the peril of apparent danger, which might fall upon them in particular, as afterwards they would make no question of his commands, but take them as the only means of their safety, being never better assured, then in performing what he commanded. The practice of later times hath not so well deserved of that vertue, but hath often shewed it self more prodigal of blood, as though men were made only to fill up ditches, and to be the wofull executioners of other mens rashness.

The last thing is, the making ready of their weapons, arms expediti iusti. Concerning which point, we must understand, that the Romans alwayes carried their Targets in cases, and did hang their Helms at their backs, and fitted their piles, as might be most convenient with the rest of their carriages. And therefore, whensoever they were to give Battel, they were first to put on their Helms, to uncase their Targets, to fit their Piles, and to make them ready for the charge: and this was called Arme expedite.

Vercingetorix returning back to the Army, was accused of Treason: in that he had removed his Camp near unto the Romans; and further, that he had gone away from it, and took all the Cavalry with him; that he had left so great an Army without any one to command it; that upon his departure the Romans should come so opportunely and so speedily: for all these things could not fall out by chance, without counsel and direction: it seemed he had rather have the Kingdome of Gallia by a grant from Cæsar, then by their means and gift. Being thus charged, he answereth, That he removed the Camp for want of Forrage, they themselves desiring it. He came near unto the Romans, being led thereunto by the opportunity of the place, which was such, as might defend it self by its own strength; the Cavalry was of no use in a boggy place, but might do good service there where it went. He left no man to command the Army of purpose, least by the persuasion of the multitude he should be forced to fight, which he knew they all desired, as not able long to endure any labour. If the Romans came by chance, they were to thank Fortune; if by any mans direction, they were beholding unto him that had brought them where they might, from the higher ground, both see how small a number they were, and condemn their valour; who, not daring to fight, did shamefully return into their Camp. He desired to receive no Imperial dignity by Treachery from Cæsar, which he might otherwise have by lawful victory, which was now most certain and sure, both to himself and the rest of the Gallies. And for that Authority, which he had received from them, he was ready to give it up into their hands again, if they thought the honour which they gave him to be greater then the help and safety which they received from him. And, to the end you may understand these things to be truly delivered by me (saith he) hear the Roman Soldiers. And therewithal he brought forth Servants, which were taken foraging a few dayes before, miserably tormented with famine and irons. They being taught beforehand what to answer, said, they were Legionary Soldiers, and had stole out of the Camp to see if they could meet with any Corn or Cattel in the fields: the whole Army suffered

ferred the like penury, and mens strength began to fail them, in so much, that they were not able to undergo any labour: and therefore their General had resolved, that if he prevailed not against the Town, he would withdraw his Army within three dayes. These benefits (saith Vercingetorix) you have of me, whom you accuse of Treason: for, by my meane, without shedding of your blood, you see so great a conquering Army almost consumed with hunger: and, by me it is provided, that when they fly from hence, no State shall receive them into their Territories. The noble multitude applauded his Speech, by shaking and striking their bands together, as their manner is in such cases, commending Vercingetorix for a great Soldier, whose Loyalty, as it was not to be distrustful, so the War could not have been carried with better directions. They agreed further, to send 10000 choise men out of all their Forces into the Town, as not thinking it fit, to commit the common safety of Gallia solely to the Bituriges, for they were persuaded, that the sum of all the Victory consisted in making good that Town against the Romans.

OBSERVATION.

Horace.

A Multitude is *Bellua multorum capium* (as one faith) an unreasonable beast of many heads, apt to receive froward and perverse incitements, and hard to be drawn to better understanding, jealous, impatient, treacherous, unconstant, an instrument for a wicked spirit, and sooner moved to mischief by Theyses, then reclaimed to vertue by the authority of Agamemnon, or the eloquence of Ulysses, or the wisdom of Nestor, more turbulent then the raging either of the Sea, or of a devouring fire. And therefore they may well go together to make a triplicity of evils, according to the saying, *Ignis, mare, populus, tria mala*; Fire, the Sea, and the rabble multitude, are three evils.

Vercingetorix had both his hands full in this service, for his care was no less to keep the Gallies from being distaffed, then to make his party good against Cæsar. It is disputed, touching the Government of a multitude, whether it be fitter to be severe, or obsequious. Tacitus saith peremptorily, that *In multitudine regenda plus pona quam obsequium valet*; foul means does more then fair to the governing of a multitude. But he understandeth such a multitude as are subject to their Commander, either by ancient service, or the interest of Regal Authority, whereby they are tied to obedience by hereditary duty, and cannot refuse that which custome prescribeth. For otherwise, where the people stand free from such bonds, and have submitted themselves to Government for some special service, there clemency, or obsequious smoothing prevaileth more then the severity of command: according to the saying, *Homines ducti volunt, non cogi*; Men will be led by fair means,

not compelled. Upon a discussion which happened at Rome, between the People and the Senate, the People were presently sent into the Field under the leading of two Senators, Quintus, and Appius Claudius. Appius, by reason of his cruelty and severity, was not obeyed by his Soldiers, but forsook his Province and returned *non profectus*, they will do nothing: Quintus being courteous and benigne, had an obedient Army, and came home a Conqueror. In the like termes did Vercingetorix stand with the Gallies, who, not long before, were all of equal authority, and for the defence of the Common Cause, had submitted themselves to order and government: and therfore he carried himself accordingly, but with some cunning too, for he made no scruple to abuse the beal, and to present them with a lesson of deceit, taught to servants and Roman slaves, as the confession of Legions Soldiers, which is a liberty that hath ever been allowed to such as had the managing of an unruly multitude, who have made as much use of the false reed, as the bit or the spur, or any other help belonging to that art.

CHAP. XI.

Cæsar continueth the Siege at Avaricum, and describes the Walls of the Towns in Gallia.

B I the singular valour of our Soldiers, all the Counsels and Devices of the Gallies were made void and of none effect. For they are a Nation of great dexterity, apt to imitate and make any thing which they see other men do before them: for they turned aside the books with ropes, and drew them into the Town with Engines: they withdrew the Earth from the Mount with Mines, with their great skill, by reason of their Iron Mines, wherein they are much practised: they set up Towers upon every part of the Wall, and covered them with raw hides: they sallied out of the Town night and day, and either set fire to the Mount, or assaulted the Soldiers as they were at work; they did every day make their Towers equal to that height of our Towers, which the daily increase of the Mount had added to their height: they hindered the open Trenches, and kept them from approaching the Walls with sharp burned stakes, cast into them with but pitch, and with great stones. All their Walls are almost of this fashion: Long strait beams are placed upon the ground, with an equal distance of two foot one from another, and bound together on the inside of the wall, and fastned with great store of earth: the distances between the beams are filled, and fitted with great stones in the front of the Wall. These being thus placed and fastned with Morter, another such course is laid upon that, keeping always the same distance, so as one beam be not laid upon

upon that, keeping always the same distance, so as one beam be not laid upon another, but in the second rank placing them upon the distances filled up with stones, and so forward, until the wall be raised to the due height. This fashion, as it is a work not deformed, either in show or variety, observing alternate courses of beams and stones, which keep their order by even lines; so is it profitable also, and very much advantaging the defence of the Town: for, as the stone keeps it from burning, so doth the wood from the violence of the Ram, for as much as the beams are, for the most part, forty foot long, and can neither be broken, nor pull'd out.

The first OBSERVATION.

The usage and practice of ancient time, in besieging and defending Towns.

T His Chapter doth in some part expresse the manner of their siege in ancient time, and the means which the defendant had to frustrate the assaults and approaches of the Enemy. Besides the Ram which the Romans used to shake and overthrow the Wall (whercof I have already spoken) they had commonly great hooks of iron to catch hold of a Turret, and to pull it over the wall, or to pull down the parapet, or to disturb any work which was to be made upon the wall. These hooks were used by the Legionary Soldiers, being covered with vines in the same manner as they handled the Ram: and were averted and put off by the ingenious practices of the Gallies, with ropes cast and insnared about them, and then by force of Engines drawn into the Town. In like manner the open Trenches, by which the Romans made their approaches to the wall, were answered from the Town with Stakes or Piles, hardened at the end with fire, and then cast into them to hinder such as were at work, together with scething Pitch and great Stones. Furthermore, as the Romans raised their Mount, and brought matter unto it to enlarge it in breadth and height, so did the Gallies undermine it, and drew the Earth away, or set it on fire to burn it: for, as I have already noted in the description of a Mount, it was made as well with wood and timber, as with earth and stones. They strengthened their walls with turrets and towers, and covered them with raw hides, to keep them from burning: and, as the Romans mounted in height with their turrets and engines, so the Gallies raised their towers answerable unto them, that in the defence of the Town they might fight with equal advantage.

And thus they proceeded, both in the offensive and defensive part, as far as either vaunt or wit could improve those means which were then in use in besieging a Town.

The second OBSERVATION.

I T was the use of all Nations, to fortifie their strong Towns with such Walls, as might make best defence against the practice of those times, wherein they lived, touching the taking and besieging of Townes. So the Gallies, as it appeareth by Cæsar, raised their Walls of Wood and Stone, laid in mutual courtes one with another, that the Wood might make void the violence of the Ram, and the Stone keep it from burning with fire, which in those dayes were the means to assault and overthrow a Wall. In their times, the Wall of strong and fortified Townes, are only made and built of Earth, as the best defence against the fury of the Artillery. But, for as much as the old manner of Fortification is here in part delivered by Cæsar, give me leave to have a word or two touching the Fortifications of these times.

And first touching the art itself, in respect of the matter and the manner, it is a member of Architecture, but the end is military: for, to fortify, is nothing else but to make a building answerable to necessity, and the occurrences of war, Neither is it the end of Fortification, to make a place inextinguishable, or unpossible to be taken, for so it were *ars artem*; but, to reduce it to a good and reasonable defence.

Wheresoever then any such defence is required, the mystery of Fortification is, to raise such a fort, and to apply such a figure, answering the quality and site of that place, as may give greatest strength thereunto: for, as all places are not capable in the disposition of their best strength of all sorts of figures, so there is a difference of strength between this and that figure. And, as the place wanteth the advantage of motion and agility for its own defence, so is it requisite it should be furnished with the best means and commodities, both to annoy the Enemy, and to defend its own People. And, in that respect, all circular formes, as compounded of parts of one and the same nature, are unfit for fortification: for, where a Fort ought to be disposed, that it may have as many hands to strike as *brachia*, and as a *Hydra* never to want a head, it is necessary that the figure thereof be of different and unlike parts, as apt to work divers effects. For, unless it be able to discover a far off, to command the Country about as far as the Artillery will play, to stop the passages, to hinder approaches and assaults, to dammify the Enemy at hand and far off, sometimes with the Artillery, sometimes with small shot; sometimes with fireworks, and othertimes by sallies, it hath not that perfection as is requisite.

Admitting therefore composition of parts, next unto the circle the triangular Fortres is most unperfect; first, in regard it is a figure of less capacity then any other of equal bounds, which is a great inconvenience in a hold, when the Soldiers shall be pin'd up for want of room, and through the straightness of the place, not to be able to avoid confusion. Secondly, the bulwarks of all such triangular Fortresses, have alwayes such sharp cantons, as are easily subject to breaking, which giveth the Enemy means to approach them, without disturbance from the Fort.

The Quadrangle Fortres hath almost the same

The manner of Fortification in use in these dayes.

Fortification defined.

Circular Forts.

Triangular Forts.

Quadrangle Forts.

Whether severity or clemency do more averting a multitude.

same imperfection of angles as the Triangle hath, but is more spacious within, and of greater capacity.

Five-sided and six-sided fortresses.

Ports in a plain level.

Advantages.

Disadvantages.

Ports upon a hill.

Advantages.

Disadvantages.

The hands of all Forts.

A plain champaign level doth admit all sorts of figures, and may take the best; having these advantages: it easily hindereth an Enemy from approaching near unto it, or incamping before it, and is not subject to Mines, by reason of the water rising in such levels. But, on the other side, a small troop will besiege it, and battery may be laid to divers places of it: it is always subject to mounts of earth, and needeth many bulwarks, ditches, and much cost to keep it.

A Fortress upon a Hill hath these advantages: an Enemy can hardly lodge near unto it, or lay battery against it, it requirith more men to besiege it, and is not subject to Mounts. The disadvantages are, that it is not in our choice to make it in the best form or strength, but must give it such a figure, as may best fit the place, being sometimes too large and spacious, and sometimes too strait. The Enemies Artillery hath greater force against it, playing upward, and the Artillery of the Fort playeth not so sure downward.

The hands of all Forts are the bulwarks from whence the Artillery playeth; the supplements to the bulwarks are the ravelins, the platforms, the casemates, and the cavaleros. The Walls are made in carp-canting inwards, the better to bear the weight of the earth, with this proportion, that to every five foot and half, or fix foot in height, there be one foot allowed in carp. The counter-carp is another Wall outward to the first, and slopeh inward in the same manner as the former.

And thus much touching the general view of Fortification, which is as much as may well be comprehended in these short observations, reserving the further consideration thereof to a particular Treatise by it self.

CHAP. XII.

The Siege of Avaricum continued.

Cæsar,

THe siege being hindered by so many disturbances, and the Soldiers afflicted all the time with cold and continual rain, yet they overcame all these lets with continual Labour, and, in five and twenty dayes they raised a Mount of three hundred and thirty foot in breadth, and four-score in height. When it came almost to touch the Wall, Cæsar himself attending the Work, as his custom was, and encouraging the Soldiers to omit no time from the same: a little before the third watch of the night, the Mount was seen to shake, the Enemy having set it on fire with a Mine. And, at the same instant of time, a shout being taken

up by them that stood upon the Wall, they made a Sally out at two Gates on both sides the Towers. Some cast firebrands and dry matter from the Wall unto the Mount, pouring pitch, and other things, to nourish the fire, that no man knew whether to run first, or where to give help. Notwithstanding, for as much as Cæsar had appointed two Legions by turn, to watch before the Camp, and two other to follow the Works, it happened, and that quickly, that some were ready to confront the Sallies, and others to draw back the Towers from the front of the Mount, and to cut the Mount asunder, the whole multitude coming out of the Camp to quench the fire. The rest of the night being now spent, the fight continued every where, and ever the Enemy took new spirits, and had hope of victory, the rather because they saw the sheds or bowels belonging to the towers, burnt, and that the Soldiers could not come near the said Towers, to manage them as was fitting, without shelter and covert, and that they ever sent fresh men to take the rooms of such as were weary and over-laboured: supposing the safety of all Gallia to consist in that instant of time. There happened, our selves beholding it, an accident worthy memory, which I think not fit to omit. A certain Gall before the Gate of the Town, casting with his hands Balls of Tallow and Pitch, to increase the fire, right over against the tower, was shot through the right side with a Cross-bow, and fell down dead. One that stood next him stepped over him, and began to do the like service: he likewise was slain with a shot out of a Cross-bow. Him a third man succeeded, and the third a fourth. Neither was the place forsaken, until the Mount was quenched, the Enemy removed, and the fight ceased.

The first OBSERVATION.

IT were a matter worthy observation, to consider, whether there need not as many men to defend a Town, as to besiege it. Which, at the first sight, may peradventure seem frivolous: for as much as the Defendants are but to make good the place which they hold, and to stand only upon their defensive guard, having the advantage of the place, the shelter of the Walls, the strength of the Ditch, and many other like helps, for their defence and safety; whereas the Assailant is to strive against all these advantages, and to expose himself to the danger of so many difficulties. But, if we look a little nearer into the matter, and consider the service to be performed on either part, we shall find, that to say, As many men are necessary to defend a Town as to besiege it, is no Paradox.

For

The defence of a Town consisteth in four points.

For the better understanding thereof, we are to know, that the defence of a Town touching matter of fight, consisteth chiefly in their four points. First, in manning and making good all parts of the wall. For if the defendant be not able to strengthen all parts with a competent force, then he hath not Men enough to defend the Town; forasmuch as all parts are subject to assault, and what part soever is not made good; that lyeth open to an Enemy: or otherwise if the assault be only to be made at a breach, the rest of the wall being strong enough to defend it self, there is required a competent strength within the Town to defend that breach. In this point there is little difference touching a competent number of Men, between the assailant and the defendant: for if he that layeth Siege to a Town, hath men enough to assault all parts at one instant, the enemy must have an answerable proportion to defend all; or if he have no use of more men than may serve to give an assault at a breach, the defendant must have the like proportion for the defence of the breach.

The second point is, in relieving wearied men, either fighting or working, with fresh supplies to continue that business, as oftentimes it falleth out in the Siege of a Town. Wherein likewise there is a small or no difference, touching an equality between both parties. For if the defendant be not as well able to relieve his wearied Soldiers with fresh supplies, as the Enemy is to continue the assault, the Town may quickly have a new Master.

The third point is, in defeating and making void such works as the Enemy shall make against the Town, as Mounts, Mines, Approaches, and such like inconveniences; which being suffered to go on without opposition and prevention, the Town cannot hold out long. In this point the defendant hath the disadvantage, having need of more Men to overthrow and prevent the works, then the assailant hath to make them good. For there he that besiegeth the place, fighteth with the advantage, and hath the same helps as the defendant hath in the fastness of his hold, which caused this extraordinary accident, Cæsar noteth, touching the successive slaughter of so many Gallies, who labouring to burn the Roman works, with balls of tallow and pitch, were all slain with the blow of one Mans bow.

The last point is in Sallies, which is as necessary for the defence of a Town, as any thing else whatsoever. For if the defendant be not able to fall out, the Enemy will quickly coop him up, and tread upon his belly. And herein the defendant needeth more men than the assailant. For he that is in the field, lyeth in the strength of his Trenches; whereas the other cometh out naked upon him.

And thus much touching this question in particular. Concerning the general, if it be demanded whether there have been more men lost in the defence of Ostend, than in besieging it; I answer. That neither side can much vaunt of a small loss,

The Second OBSERVATION.

IN the second place there are two observable points. The one, Cæsar's continual attendance upon the works, being present night and day, without any long intermission, which did much

The eye of the Master feedeth the host.

advantage their proceeding at that time, and was as important to a fortunate issue, as any other thing whatsoever. For where an enemy is extraordinary, either in valor or diligence, there must needs be extraordinary means to countervail the height of his great resolution: which Cæsar overtop with monstrous and huge works, and speeded those works with his continual attendance.

The second point is the successive task of the Roman Army, being eight Legions present at that Siege, (for the other two were left at Agendicum with the carriages of the Army) in such fort, as half the Army was always at rest, and the other half employed; two Legions at work, and two Legions in the watch; and thus they ealed each other, and still continued the work. For otherwise they had not been able to have undergone the burthen, as the laying is;

Quod caret alterna requie durabile non est. It cannot hold that rest not now and then.

CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar by an assault taketh Avaricum.

THe Gallies having tryed all means, Cæsar, and none taking effect, the next day they consulted touching their leaving of the Town, Vercingetorix both commanding and persuading them unto it: which they hoped they might do in the night time, without any great loss unto themselves, forasmuch as Vercingetorix was not far off with his Camp, and all the way thither was a continual bog, which would hinder the Romans from following after them. And for that purpose, they prepared themselves against the next night. Which the women perceiving, did run suddenly out into the streets, and other publick places, cast themselves at the feet of their Husbands; and by all means intreated them, not to leave them and their Children to the cruelty of the Enemy, whom nature and infirmity of body would not suffer to fly away. But finding them to continue resolute in their purpose, forasmuch as in extreme peril, fear for the most part hath no commiseration, they cried out, and signified their flight unto the Romans. Whereunto the Gallies being feared, they desisted from their purpose, left the ways should be forestalled and laid by the Roman horsemen. The next day Cæsar having advanced forward the Tower, and perfected those works which he had determined to make, there happened to fall a great rain, which he thought to be a fit occasion for his purpose. And forasmuch as he saw the guard upon the wall, to be somewhat negligently disposed, he commanded his Men to work fair and softly, and showed them what he would have done. And encouraging

the Legions which were hid in a readingst under the Vines, at length, to enjoy the sweetness of Victory for their manifold labors, he provided a reward for such as were seen first upon the walls, and gave them the sign to begin. The Soldiers flying suddenly out of all parts, did quickly possess themselves of the walls. The Enemy being frighted with so sudden an accident, and put from the Towers and Walls, imbrattled themselves angle-wise, in the market-place, and in other spacious streets of the City, with this resolution, that if they were assaulted in any part, they would resist in form of battel. But when they saw no Man to defend on even ground, but to inclose them round about upon the Wall, fearing lest there would be no way to escape, they cast their Arms away, and fled all to the farthest part of the Town. Part of them sticking in a throng at the gate, were there slain by the Soldiers; and part being got out of the gate, were slain by the Horsemen. Neither was there any Man that looked after pillage, but being moved to anger with the slaughter of our Men at Genabum, and with the travel and labor of those great works, they neither spared old men, women nor children. In the end, of all that number, which was about forty thousand, scarce eight hundred (that upon the first noise forsook the Town) came safe to Vercingetorix. These received with great silence, being now far in the night, left any sedition should have grown in the Camp, through the pity and commiseration of the vulgar people, and sent out his familiar friends and chieft men of each State to meet such as had escaped away, and to bring them to their own people, as they lay quartered in the Camp.

The first OBSERVATION.

The Gallies in the beginning are more then Men, and in the end less then women

WE may see here the saying verified touching the disposition of the Gallies for matter of valor: which in the beginning seemed so great, that it needed no farther strain to countervail the worth of Cæsars Army, and was expressed with such industry and resolution, both in spoiling and disappointing the Roman works, as also by ingenious fortifying and making good their own labors; that a man would have deemed them *virtute pares*, equal in valor. But being a little spent in the action, like a pot that hath a mouth as big as the belly, and povereth out all the liquor at an instant, they fell at length to that baseness, as shewed less spirit then the women did, who chofe rather to betray their Husbands purposes to the Enemy, then to hazard their lives by escaping to Vercingetorix. And this is that which is often noted by Historiographers; *Quod multa bella impetu valida peredia & moras evanescere*: That many Wars which are hot at the first, slacken and vanish up-

on a tedious continuance. The first thing that I observe is, that which Cæsar himself noteth: *Quod plerumque in summo periculo, timor misericordiam recipit*. That usually in case of extreme danger, fear hath no mercy, which was true on either side. For the Gallies were so set upon flying to Vercingetorix, that they regarded not the wofull lamentations of the women and children, whom they were well content to hazard, whilst they themselves might escape in safety. And on the other side, the Women did forget to be pitiful to their Husbands, whom they would not suffer to escape, and leave them in their weakness behind as a prey, to appease the wrath of the bloody Souldier, which would consequently follow in that escape. Which sheweth, that there is no rye comparable to the bond of nature, especially when it concerneth the preservation of life. For as in other things, respect and affection may easily work a communication of good things unto others, as also a participation of their evils, for their relief: so here in we are altogether senseless, and the love we owe to our lives is so great, that it admitteth no respect. Agefianus to his friend was without respect a friend: and yet notwithstanding being driven one day to remove upon the sudden, and to leave one sick behind him whom he loved dearly; the sick Man calling him by his name as he was going away, besought him that he would not forsake him. Agefianus turning back again, answered: O how hard it is, both to love and to be wile! according to the saying, *Sapere & amare vix Deo conceditur*. To be wile and to love, God himself can scarce do it.

The Second OBSERVATION.

IT is a principle among Men of War, not to put necessity upon an Enemy, nor make him valiant whether he will or no, (as I have already noted in the former Commentaries) which the Romans well observed in this particular service at *Avaticum*: for being possell of the walls, they did not suddenly assault them in the market-place, where they had made head for their defence, but gave them a breaching time, the better to understand what they did, and respit, to bethink themselves of a starting hole for the safety of their lives. Which as it was quickly apprehended by the Gallies so it made an easy execution to the Roman Souldier.

And as it seemeth, it was the more carefully handled in respect of the condition of the enemy being revolters: for such Provinces have rebelled, are harder to be recovered after their revolt, then they were at first to be subdued. For at the first, they have no occasion to fear any hard condition, but yielding to subjection do look for favor, whereas rebels and revolters, besides the condition of an Enemy, are in the nature of offenders, and stand in fear of the extremities of War, which maketh them more obdurate, then otherwise they would be. And therefore it behoveth a General not to impose any farther necessity upon an enemy, then the quality of the War doth lay upon him; which oftentimes is more then can be well avoided.

A General must not put necessity upon an enemy

Revolters are in the condition both of an enemy and of an offender.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Vircingetorix doth comfort the Gallies for the loss of Avaticum.

Cæsar.

THE next day calling a Council, he comforted the Gallies, and exhorted them not to be utterly dismayed with that loss: for the Romans had not overthrown them with valour, nor in a set battel, but with a kind of art and skill in besieging a Town, whereof they themselves were ignorant. He erred much that looked for all the events of war to fall out prosperously. It was never his opinion, that *Avaticum* should be kept; whereof they themselves were winnifer. But it fell out by the imprudence of the Bituriges, and over-great indulgence of the rest, that this loss happened unto them: which notwithstanding, he would speedily heal with greater help. For by his diligence he would unite such States unto them, as were not yet of the confederacy, and make one purpose of all Gallia, which the whole World was not able to resist: and that he had almost effected already. In the mean time he thought it fit that they should yield unto one thing for their safeties sake, which was to fortify their Camp; to the end they might better sustain the sudden assaults of the Enemy. This Speech was not displeasing to the Gallies; and the rather, that he himself, was not dejected in spirit upon so great a loss, nor did hide himself, or fly the presence of the multitude: being the more esteemed, forasmuch as when the matter was in question, he first thought it fit that *Avaticum* should be burned, and afterwards be persuaded them to forsake it; wherein as misfortune and adversity do impair the authority of other Commanders; so contrariwise his honour daily increased by the loss which he received. And withall, they were in great hope upon his affirmation, to win the rest of the States unto them. And that was the first time that the Gallies began to fortify their Camp, being so appalled in spirit, that where they ever were unaccustomed to labor, yet they thought it their part to suffer and undergo all that was commanded them.

The First OBSERVATION.

NEXT to the knowledge and experience of war, there is nothing more requisite in a great Commander, then greatness of spirit: for where his employment consisteth in managing the great business of the World, such as are the slaughter of many thousands in an hour, the sacking of Cities, the fighting of battels, the taking of Commonwealths, Victories, Triumphs, and

A great Commander must have a great courage.

the conquest of Kingdoms, which like the confutations in the eight Iphicar, are left to succeeding ages in such characters as cannot be defaced, and make an impression of the greatest measure of joy, or the greatest heap of sorrow; it is necessary that his courage be answerable to such a fortune, neither to be crushed with the weight of adversity, nor puffed up with the pride of victory; but in all times to shew the same constancy of mind, and to temper extremities with a settled resolution.

Of this metall and temper is the Philosophers *Rome quadrans* made of, such as *Camillus* was in *Rome*. For never speech did better between a great personage then that of his, having known both the favor and the disgrace of Fortune: *Nec mihi disitura animos fecit, nec exitum admittit*. Neither did my Dictatorship puff me up, nor my banishment sink my spirits, saith he. Whereas weak spirits do either vanish away in the smoke of folly, being drunk with the joys of pleasing fortune, or otherwise upon a change of good time, do become more base and abject, then the thief that is taken in the fact: such as *Perseus* the last *Macedonian* King was, who besides his ill fortune for losing his Kingdom, in the space of one hour, hath ever since stood attainted of a base and abject mind, unworthy the Throne of *Alexander* the Great.

Homo quadratus.

Plutarch. Paulus Emilius.

The wife Romans used all means to give courage and spirit to their Leaders, and to free their minds from such external respects, which loss or dishonour might cast upon them. And therefore when *Varus* had fought so rashly at *Cænna*, that he had like to have lost the Roman Empire to *Amiball*, upon his return to *Rome*, the whole Senate went out to meet him, and although they could not thank him for the battel, yet they gave him thanks that he was returned home again, whereby he seemed not to despair of the State of *Rome*.

In like manner did the Gallies congratulate Vercingetorix, that notwithstanding so great a loss, he was neither dejected in spirit, nor did hide himself from the multitude; but as a Commander of high resolution, had found out means to heal those harms, and to recompence the loss of *Avaticum*, with the uniting of all the States of Gallia into one confederacy.

The Second OBSERVATION.

SECONDLy we may observe, how dangerous it is, to be the author of a Counsel touching any important or grave deliberation, or to lay down any project for the service of a State: for all Men are blind in this point, that they judge of good or ill counsel by the success, and look no farther then the end which it taketh, which proving dissatisfactory or unfortunate, doth either bring the author to destruction, or into danger both of life and honor.

It is dangerous to be the author of a counsel in a State.

In the occurrences of this Kingdom, it appeareth that Henry the fifth being solicited by the Commons touching the Abbess in *England*, and moved by Petition exhibited in Parliament, to that which was afterwards accomplished by Henry the eighth, was diverted from those thoughts by an eloquent Oration made in Parliament by Henry Chicheley, Archbishop of *Canterbury*, a grave and learned Prelate, perceiving the King by many concluding reasons, to carry a great power into *France*, and there to make his claim for that Kingdom, according to

Holinshed.

to the right: derived unto him, from his noble Progenitors. Whereupon the King was perwaded to undertake that War, which albeit it fell out most happily, yet the Bishop to falsifie both the King and the people for his former counsel, where- by many Men were lost, built a Colledge in Oxford ded cated to *All Souls*, wherein he placed forty Scholars, to make supplications for all Souls, and specially for such, as had been mischieved in France in the time of that War.

Vercingetorix was happy in this point, for he perwaded the *Galls* not to keep *Avareicum*, but to suffer it to be burned as an enemy to their safety, and thereupon he did not let to put them in mind of his opinion, as free from the danger which hap- ned to a great man near unto *Perseus*, whom I last spake of, who after his overthrow by *Paulus Æmi- lius*, being told by that party of many errors which he had committed in the carriage of that War, turned himself suddenly, saying, Traitor, hast thou referred thy Council unto now, when there is no remedy, and therewithal, (as some report) flue him with his own hand. And this was it that gave *Vercingetorix* that happiness: *Ut reliquorum imperatorum res adversæ, auctorem minuit: sic bujus ex contrario, dignitas incommodo accepto indies augetur*; as misfortune and adversity, &c. as be- fore.

CHAP. XV.

Vercingetorix laboureth to unite all Gallia into one League for the upholding of their War.

Neither did *Vercingetorix* omit any endeavor for the accomplishment of his promise, to draw the rest of the States unto him, and to that purpose he dealt with their chiefest men, both by rewards and promises, and chose out six men, that either by subtle speeches, or friendship, or some other means, might win them unto him. He took order that such as had escaped from *Avari- cum*, should be both clothed and armed: and withal, that he might reinforce his Troops which were weakened, he commanded every State to furnish out certain supplies, and to be brought by a day to the Camp. He com- manded likewise all the Archers, of whom there is great store in Gallia, to be sought out and sent unto him. And by this means he speedily repaired his losses at *Avareicum*. In the mean time *Teutomatus*, the son of *Ollivo* King of the *Nitiobriges*, whose Father had the Title of a Friend from our Senate, came to him with a great number of horsemen, which he had brought out of Aquitain.

OBSERVATION.

Archery.

It seemeth by this place, that France in those days did favor archery: (for as the story saith) they had great store of Archers amongst them, but of what value they were, is not here deliv- ered. The use they made of them, followeth af-

ter in this Commentary, which was to intermingle them amongst the horse, and so they fought as light armed men.

In the times that our English Nation carried a scourging hand in France, the matter between us and them touching archery, stood in such terms as gave England great advantage: for I have not heard of any bow-men at all amongst them; where- as our Nation hath heretofore excelled all other, as well in number of bow-men, as in excellent good shooting, and hath made so good proof there- of against the French, as it needeth not any long dispute.

* Concerning Archery I find these things con- siderable.

First, that every Man be so fitted with bow and arrows, as he may be apt for strong and quick shooting: wherein I cannot so much commend these lively bowes, being for the most part heavy flugs, and of greater weight then strength, and of more shew than service.

Secondly, that in a day of service, the bow- men endeavour so to deliver their quivers, that the whole band or fleeve of shot, may let go all at one instant oftentimes for the shower of arrows will be more fierce and terrible, and more available against an Enemy.

Thirdly, the fittest form of imballtelling for bow-men, which must not at any hand be deep in flank, for so such as are in the hindmost ranks, will either shoot short or to no purpose. And therefore the fittest form of imballtelling for Archery hath ever been accounted a long-lined figure resembling * a hearle, broad in front, and narrow in flank.

Fourthly, their defence in a day of battel; which must either be a covert woody place, where the horse of the enemy cannot come at them, or a trench cast before them, or the place must be for- tified with galltrops and flakes, such as were de- veloped by Henry the fifth at *Agincourt* field, or some other means to avoid the Cavalry.

The last thing is the effects which the bow- men work: which are two; first the galling of the enemy, and secondly disorder. Touching the galling of the Enemy, there cannot be a better description, then that which *Plutarch* maketh of the overthrow of the *Romans* by the *Parthians* arrows. The *Roman* souldiers hands (saith he) were nailed to their Targets, and their feet to the ground, or otherwise were for wounded in their bodies, and died of a cruel lingering death, cry- ing out for anguish and pain they felt, and turning and cornmenting themselves upon the ground, they brake the arrows sticking in them. Again, striving by force to pluck out the barbed heads, that had pierced far into their bodies through their veins and sinews, they opened the wounds wider, and so cast themselves away.

The disorder of routing of an enemy which is caused by the bow-men, cometh from the fearful spectacle of a drift of arrows, for a shower of arrows well delivered and well seconded, for a while is so terrible to the eye, and so dreadful in the flics, that it is almost unpossible to keep the enemy from routing.

The two great Victories which our Nation had in France at *Cressie* and *Agincourt*, next to the valor of the English, are attributed to our archery: and

The Battel of Cressie.

and the effect of our Archery at those times, was first disorder, and consequently slaughter. In the Battel of *Cressie* the King of *Bokemia* fighting for the French, caused his horsemen to tie the bristles of their horses together in rank, that they might keep order, notwithstanding the galling which he feared from our English Archery: but it fell out as ill as if he had tied their heads and their tails together in file; for the drift of arrows fell so terribly amongst them, that they ran together on heaps, with such confusion, as made the slaughter great, and their particular distresses most misera- bly fortified. At *Agincourt*, the number of pris- oners, which every soldier had, was admirable to speak of; for, some report, that many of our English had ten prisoners apiece: which hapned chiefly from the disorder which fell amongst the French, and that disorder came by our archery.

The Battel of Agincourt.

And doubtless, if ever we should have occasion to go against an Enemy that so aboundeth in horse as the French do, there could be no better means against such horse, then our English bow-men. I know it hath been said, that now the times are altered, and the harquebuse and musket are so generally received, and of such reputation in the course of our modern Wars, that in comparison of them bow-men are not worth the naming. Whercia I will not go about to extenuate the use of either of these weapons, as knowing them to be both very serviceable upon fit and conveni- ent occasions, nor take upon me to determine which of them is most effectual in a day of ser- vice: but only deliver my conceit touching their effects, and leave it to the consideration of wise and discreet Commanders.

How far a Wing of Archers is available against an Enemy.

And first touching that. A wing of musket- ers is available against an Enemy, only in such bullets as do hit; for such as do not hit, pass away silently without any further fear, and the crack is but as the lofe of the bow. Of such bullets as do hit, the greatest part do not strike to death, but are oftentimes carried until the skirmish be ended, before the party do feel himself hurt: so that an Enemy receiveth no further hurt by a charge of shot, then happeneth to such particular men as shall chance to be slain outright, or sore hurt. But, a fleeve of Archers is available against an Enemy, as well in such arrows as do not hit, as in such as do hit: for, whereas the cloud of ar- rows is subject to our sight, and every arrow is both suspected and able to bring death sitting on the head, an Enemy is as much troubled at such arrows as come fair upon him and do not hit, as at those that do hit: for no man is willing to ex- pose his flesh to an open and eminent danger, when it lieth in his power to avoid it. And therefore, whilst every man seeketh to avoid hurt, they fall into such confusion, as besides the loss of particular men, the Enemy doth hardly escape disorder, which is the greatest disadvantage that can befall him. Moreover, the arrows ha- ving barbed heads, although they make but a light hurt, yet they are not easily pulled out, which maketh the Soldiers not to tend the fight until they be delivered of them: and the Horse lo to sting and chafe, that it is impossible they should either keep their rank, or be other- wise managed for any service.

And thus much touching bow-men and archery, which is a weapon as ancient, as the first and

truel History, and is of the number of such wea- pons as men use to fight with afar off. The use whereof is too much neglected by the English of their times, considering the honour they have at- chieved by it in former ages.

CHAP. XVI.

A controversie fell out in the State of the Hedui touching the choice of their chief Magistrate.

Cæsar stayed many dayes at *Avari- cum*; for, finding there great store of Corn, and of other provisions, he refreshed his Army of their former labour and wants. The Winter now being almost ended, and the time of the year being fit for War, he determined to follow the Enemy, to see whether he could draw him out of the Woods and Bogs, or besiege him in some place. Being thus refreshed, divers of the principal men of the Hedui came unto him, beseeching him that he would stand to them, and assist their State in a time of great need, the matter being in extreme danger: for as much as their ancient usage was, for one to be created their annual Magistrate, having Regal Authority for that year; whereas now two had taken upon them the said Office, both of them af- firming themselves to be lawfully created, the one was *Convictolanis*, a famous and flourish- ing young man, the other *Cotus*, born of an ancient family, and he himself of great power and kindred, whose brother *Vedelicus* had born the said Office the year before. All their State was in Armes, their Senate and their People divided, together with their clients and followers: if the controversie con- tinued for any time, it would come to a battel; the prevention whereof consisted in his dili- gence and authority. Cæsar, though he knew it would be disadvantageous unto him to leave the War, and to forsake the Enemy: yet knowing what inconveniences do usually ar- rise of such discords and dissensions, least so great a State, and so near to the People of Rome, which he himself had always fa- voured, and by all means honoured, should fall to War amongst themselves; and that *Falton* which distrusted their own strength, should seek help of *Vercingetorix*; he thought it most necessary to be prevented. And for as much as such as were created chief Magi- strates among the Hedui, were, by their Laws, forbidden to go out of their Confiner: to the end he might not seem to derogate any thing from their Laws, he himself determined to go unto them. At his coming he called before

him to Decetia all the Senate, and those also that were in controversy for the office. And finding in an Assembly almost of the whole State, that one of them was chosen by a few privately called together, in another place, and at another time then was accustomed, the brother pronouncing the brother: whereas their Laws did not only forbid two of one Family, both being alive, to be created Magistrate, but also to be of the Senate together: he compelled Cötus to give over his interest in the Magistracy, and confirmed Convictolitanis being created by their Priests, and according to the custom of their State. This Decree being ratified, he adorned the Hedui to forget their private controversies and dissensions, and to give their best help to the War in hand, wherein they might challenge and expect (the Gallies being subdued) such rewards as they deserved; commanding all their Horse, and Ten thousand Foot to be speedily sent unto him, which he meant to dispose into Garrisons, for the better provision of Corn. And then dividing his Army into two parts, he sent four Legions towards the Cenones and the Parisians, under the Leading of Labienus; the other four he led himself against the Arverni, to the Town of Gergovia, along the River Elaver, sending part of the Horse with him, and keeping part with himself.

OBSERVATION.

Non minor est virtus, quam quæritur, parata tueri.

TO lose the least jot of that which a man hath in possession, is more dishonourable, then to fail of getting what he hath not. And therefore Cæsar chose rather to forgo the advantages which a speedy pursuit of the Enemy might have afforded him to the ending of that War, then to hazard the loss of so great a State, and so well affected to the People of Rome as were the Hedui, wherein he carried so equal and indifferent a hand, that he would do nothing but what the Laws of that State directed him unto, as most assured that such directions were without exception.

CHAP. XVII.

Cæsar passeth his Army over the River Elaver, and incampeth himself before Gergovia.

Cæsar.

Which thing being known, Vercingetorix having broken down all the Bridges of that River, took his journey on the other side of Elaver; either Army being in view each of other, and incamping almost over against one another: discoverers being sent out to watch, lest the Romans should make a Bridge in any

place, and carry over their Forces. Cæsar was much troubled, lest he should be hindered by the River the greatest part of that Summer, for as much as Elaver is not passable at any ford untill towards the Autumn. And therefore to prevent that, he encamped himself in a Woody place, right over against one of those Bridges which Vercingetorix had commanded to be broken. The next day he kept himself there secretly with two Legions, and sent forward the rest of the Forces, with all the carriages, as were accustomed, taking away the fourth part of each Cohort that the number of Legions might appear to be the same; commanding them to go on as far as they could: and making conjecture by the time of the day, that they were come to their Camping-place, upon the same piles, (the lower part whereof remained there whole) he began to reedifie the bridge; and having speedily ended the work, and carried over the Legions, and chosen a fit place to encamp in, he called back the rest of his Forces. Vercingetorix having notice thereof, lest he should be forced to fight against his will, went before, by great journeys. Cæsar, with five incampings, went from that place to Gergovia; and, after a light skirmish between the Horse the same day he came, having taken a view of the situation of the Town, which was built upon a very high hill, and had very hard and difficult approaches on all sides, he despaired of taking it by assault, neither would he determine to besiege it, until he had made provision of Corn. But Vercingetorix having set his Camp on a hill before the Town, had placed the several Forces of the State by themselves, in small distances round about him, and having possessed himself of all the tops of that hill, made a very terrible show into all parts where he might be seen: he commanded likewise the chief men of the State, whom he had chosen out to be of the Council of War, to meet always together with him at the dawning of the day, to know if any thing were to be communicated unto them, or what else was to be done. Neither did he omit any day to skirmish with his Horsemen, with Archers intermingled amongst them: to the end he might try what courage and valour was in his people. Right over against the Town, at the foot of the Hill, there was a known exceedingly fortified, and hard to be come unto on all sides, which if our men could get, they were in hope to hinder the Enemy, both of a great part of their water, and also from free foraging: but the place was kept with a strong garrison.

garrison. Notwithstanding Cæsar went out of his Camp in the silence of the night, and before any help could come out of the Town, he put by the Garrison, possessed himself of the place, left two Legions there to defend it, and drew a double trench of twelve foot in breadth from the greater Camp to the less, that single men might go safe to and fro from any sudden incursion of the Enemy.

OBSERVATION.

The means which Cæsar used to pass over the River Elaver.

Dampis quæritur, cuiusque coheretibus.

First we may observe his manner of passing over the River Elaver, without any impediment from the Enemy, notwithstanding the care which Vercingetorix had to hinder his passage, which was plotted with as great dexterity as could be devised in such a matter: and, to shadow his purpose the better, that the number of Legions marching up the River might appear to be the same, he took the fourth part of every Cohort, which in the whole amounted to two Legions. For, as I have already delivered in my former Observations, a Legion consisted of ten Cohorts, and every Cohort contained three Maniples, and every Manipulus had two Companies; which they called Orders: so that every Cohort having six Companies, the fourth part of a Cohort was a Company and a half, and in a Legion came to Fifteen Companies, and in eight Legions to One hundred and twenty Companies: which being reduced, make Threecore Maniples, which were equal to two Legions: and, provided that which I have already noted, the fit and convenient disposition of their Troops, to take out at all times competent Forces for any service, without seeming to lessen any part. Secondly, I observe the phrase which he useth in this place, *Quintus castris Gergovianis pervenit*, he came to Gergovia at five incampings: which implyeth their infallible custom of encamping every night within a ditch and a rampier: for, as we usually say, that to such a place is so many dayes journey, because an ordinary Traveller maketh so many journeys before he come thither; so the Romans reckoned their journeys with their Army by their incampings; which were as duly kept as their journeys, and were the most signal part of their dayes journey.

CHAP. XVIII.

Convictolitanis moveth the Hedui to a revolt.

Cæsar.

Which these things were doing at Gergovia, Convictolitanis the Heduan, to whom the Magistracy was adjudged by Cæsar, being wrought upon by the Arverni with Money, brake the matter to certain young men, amongst whom Litavicus was chief, and his brethren, being joyned of a great House: with them he treated at first, and wished them to remember, that

they were not only born free-men, but also to Empire and Government. The Hedui were the only State which kept Gallia from a most assured Victory: for by their Authority and example, the rest would be concluded, which being set over, there would be no place in Gallia for the Romans to abide in. Touching himself, he had received a good turn from Cæsar, but in such sort, as he had but his rights: but he owed more to the common liberty. For why should the Hedui rather dispute of their customs and laws before Cæsar, then the Romans come before the Hedui? These young men were quickly persuaded, as well by the speech of the Magistrate, as by rewards; in so much, as they offered themselves to be the authors of that Counsel. But now the means was to be thought on, for as much as they were persuaded, that the State would not easily be drawn to undertake that War. They determined at last, that Litavicus should have the Leading of those Ten thousand men that were to be sent to Cæsar, and that his brethren should be sent before to Cæsar, and concluded likewise in what sort they would have other things carried.

Litavicus having received the Army, when he was about Thirty miles from Gergovia, calling the Soldiers suddenly together, and weeping: *Whither do we go (saith he) fellow Soldiers? all our Horsemen and our Nobility are slain, the Princes of our State, Eboracodorus and Viridomarus, being falsely accused of Treason, are put to death by the Romans, without calling them to their Answer. Understand these things from them that are escaped from the slaughter: for I myself (my brethren and kinsmen being slain) am hindered with grief from telling you what hath happened. Presently those were brought forth, whom he had taught before hand what he would have said: who verified to the multitude those things which Litavicus had spoken: that all the Horsemen of the Hedui were slain, for as much as they were said to have had speech with the Arverni: for themselves, they were hid amongst the multitude of Soldiers, and were escaped out of the midst of the slaughter. The Hedui cry out all together, and do beseech Litavicus to look to himself, and to them also. As though (saith he) the matter needeth any advice or Counsel, and that it were not necessary for us to go directly to Gergovia, and to joyn our selves with the Arverni: For do we doubt, but that*

the Romans, having begun so wickedly, will run presently upon us to take away our lives? And therefore, if there be any courage at all in us, let us persecute their death that have perished so undeservedly, and let us kill these thieves. He showed them divers Roman Citizens, that were in the Troops for safety of Conway: and forthwith he seized upon a great quantity of Corn and other Provisions, and tortured them cruelly to death. He sent out messengers throughout all the State of the Hedui, continuing the same false suggestion touching the slaughter of the Horsemen, and the Princes; persuading them to revenge their injuries, in like manner, as he had done.

The first OBSERVATION.

This treacherous practice of *Conuuliohanit*, who, a little before (as we may remember) had received so great a benefit from Cæsar, proveth true the saying of *Cornel. Tacitus*, That men are readier to revenge an injury, than to requite a good turn; for as much as *Gratia oeri, ultio in questu habetur*. A good turn is as a burthen, and a debt to a man, whereas revenge is reckoned a gain. The debt of loyalty and good affection, wherein *Conuuliohanit* had engaged to Cæsar, for confirming that right unto him, which civil dissension had made doubtful, together with the respect of the general cause, made him so willing to revolt from the *Romans*, and in lieu of thankful acknowledgment, to requite him with hostility. A part so odious and detestable, that *Vortue* grieveth to think, that a man should be capable of any such wickedness, or be stained with the infamy of his horrible a crime. Other vices are faint in special, and are branded with the several marks of ignominy: but ingratitude is equal to the body of evil, and doth counterveil the whole nature of hateful affections; according to that of the Philosopher, *Ingratum hoc dixeris bonis dixeris*: Ingratitude is culpable of all sorts of wickedness, and deserveth the greatest measure of revenge. And the rather, for that it taketh away the use of vertue, and maketh men forget to do good. For, whereas the nature of goodness is specially seen in communicating it self to the relieve of other mens wants, we ought to give all diligence, not to hinder this enlargement, nor by a froward and crooked example to prejudice others that stand in need of the like favour.

Seneca.

I have often heard it spoken, but I know not how true it is, and am loath to believe it, that in the exchange of a good turn, the party that receiveth it, hath more assurance of his Benefactor, touching a faithful and friendly disposition for the future time, than he that shewed the kindness can have of the receiver: for men are loath to lose both the fruit and the seed, and will rather bestow more cost and labour, then forego the hope of their first endeavours, expecting both in reason and nature, fruit answerable to their

seed: whereas the badness of our nature is such of it self, *Us gratia oneri, ultio in questu habetur*.

The second OBSERVATION.

There is no means so ready to abuse a multitude, as false suggestion, which, like a lying spirit, seduceth the minds of men from the truth conceived, and fashioneth their hearts to such purposes, as seemeth best to the abuser: and the rather, when it is delivered by a man of Place and Authority, and such a one as pretendeth carefulness for the safety of a People; for then it flieeth as fast as the Lightning in the Air, and deludeth the wisest and best experienced of the multitude. A mischief that can hardly be prevented, as long as there is a Tongue to speak, or an Ear to hear. But, as *Socrates* said of pain and ease, that they are always tied together: so men must endeavour to redeem the hurts of such an evil, by the benefit which thereby is consequently implied: for it were hard, if wise men could not make the like use of a multitude to good purposes, as these deceivers do for their own advantage.

Numa Pompilius (to whom the *Roman* Empire did owe as much for Lawes and Civil Government, as to *Romulus* for their Martial discipline) the better to establish such ordinances and decrees as he made in his Kingdom, feigned familiar acquaintance with a goddess of that time called *Egeria*, and by her he said he was assured, that the Statutes which he made were both equal and just, and good for the *Romans* to observe: and the People found no hurt in believing it.

In like manner, *Iscurgus* having given many Lawes to the *Spartans*, repaired to the City of *Delphos*, and there he got a pleasing Oracle, which he sent to *Sparta*, assuring them, that his Lawes were very good, and that City keeping them, should be the most renowned of the World.

And *Sertorius*, for want of other means, used the service of a white Hind, as a gift sent him from *Diana*, to make the *Lusitanians* believe whatsoever might best advantage his business. And thus a multitude lieth open to good and ill purposes, and is either happy or unfortunate in the counsel of their Leader.

CHAP. XIX.

Cæsar hindereth the revolt of the Hedui.

Eporodix the Heduan, a young man, of great parentage, and of great power in his Country, together with *Viridomarus*, of like age and authority, but not so nobly born, who being preferred to Cæsar by *Divitiacus*; was by him advanced from mean estate to great dignity, came both to Cæsar with the Heduan horsemen, being called out by name to that War by him. Between these

A multitude is easily abused by false suggestions.

Phædo: Platonis.

two there was always contention who should be the chiefe, and in that controversie for Magistracy, the one stood for *Convictiolianis*, and the other for *Cotus*. Of these two *Eporodix* understanding the resolution of *Litavicus*, opened the matter to Cæsar almost about midnight. He prayed him not to suffer their State to fall away from the friendship of the people of Rome, by the wicked counsel of young Men, which would necessarily fall out, if he suffered so many thousand men to join themselves to the enemy, whose safety as neither their kinsfolks would neglect, so the State could not lightly esteem of. Cæsar being much perplexed at this message, forasmuch as he had always cherished the State of the Hedui, without any farther doubt or dispute, he took four expedite and unburthened Legions, and all the horse out of the Camp: neither was there space at such a time to make the Camp lesser, forasmuch as the matter seemed to consist in expedition. He left behind him *C. Fabius* a Legate, with two Legions for a Garrison to the Camp. And having given order for the apprehending of *Litavicus* brethren, he found that a little before they were fled to the enemy. Thereupon adverting the Soldiers not to think much of their labor in so necessary a time, every man being most willing, he went five and twenty miles, and then met with the Forces of the Hedui. The horsemen being sent to stay their march, he commanded not to kill any one of them, and gave order to *Eporodix* and *Viridomarus* (whom they thought to be slain) to ride up and down amongst the horsemen, and to call to their Countrymen. They being once known, and the fraud of *Litavicus* discovered the Hedui stretched out their hands, making signs of submission, and casting away their weapons, desired to be spared from death. *Litavicus* with his clients and followers, who by the custom of *Gallia*, must not forsake their patrons in the extremest danger, fled to *Gergovia*. Cæsar having dispatched messengers to the State of the Hedui, to acquaint them that he had saved their people, which by the law of arms he might have slain, gave the Army three hours rest that night, and then returned towards *Gergovia*. In the mid-way certain Horsemen sent by *Fabius*, made known unto Cæsar in what danger the matter stood: that the Camp was assaulted with all the Enemies forces; and forasmuch as such as were wearied were still relieved with fresh Men, it came to pass that our Men fainted with continual labors; for the Camp was so great, that they were always to stand upon the

Rampier to make it good: and that many were wounded with the multitude of arrows, and other sort of weapons; wherein their engines had served them to good purpose for their defence. *Fabius* when these messengers came away, had shut up two gates, and left other two open, and had made sheds and bowels, for the better defence of the wall, and prepared himself for the like fortune the next day. These things being known, by the exceeding travel of the Soldiers, Cæsar came into the Camp before Sun-rising.

OBSERVATION.

As often as the people of Rome had occasion to make War, besides the body of the Army inrolled for that service, in such sort, and with such ceremonies as I have formerly delivered; the Consul or General had authority to call out such others, either of the Community or the Equites; as for their long service were freed by the Laws from giving in their names at a muster: and these they called *Evocati*, as a Man would say, called out, being all Men of special note and service; and such as were able to give sound advice for matter of War. These *Evocati* went all for the most part under an ensigne, and were lodged together in the Camp behind the pavilion of the General, near unto the gate which they called *Porta Prætoris*, and were always free from ordinary duties; as watching, incamping, and fighting, unless it came to such a pass, that every Man would put to his helping hand, but in all services they had their place appointed them according to their former experience and worth. And thus the *Romans* strengthened their Army with the wisdom and experience of such, as for many years together had been acquainted with the difficulties and casualties of War, and oftentimes were able to afford good helps, both by example and otherwise by good directions, as the wisdom of the General did gladly embrace. Concerning these two young Nobles, *Eporodix* and *Viridomarus*, whom he nameth in this place *Evocati*, we are to understand that they were called out to that War under the same Title, but to an other end: for being men of great place and authority, he feared least in his absence they might be so wrought to favor *Percegetorix*, as neither himself nor the Hedui should have any cause to commend them, according as it happened to *Litavicus*.

Evocati who they were.

CHAP. XX.

The Hedui rob and kill divers Roman Citizens.

While these things were a doing at *Gergovia*, the Hedui having received the first Messages from *Litavicus*, gave themselves no time to undervise the truth: some being led on by covetousness, others by anger and rashness, as

Cæsar.

it is naturally ingrafted in that Nation to take a light bear-fay, for a certain truth, spoiled the Roman Citizens of their goods, and flew them besides, or drew them into bondage: Convolitanis stirring up the common people to madness, that when they had done some wicked fact, they might be ashamed to be good again. They drew Marcus Aristius a Tribune of the Soldiers, as he went to the Legion, out of the Town Cavillonium, notwithstanding their faith and promise before given, causing the rest to do the like, which were there for matter of Trade: these they set upon forthwith as they travelled, robbed them of their carriages, and besieged such as made resistance day and night: many were slain on both sides, and a greater number were stirred up to take Arms. In the mean time news being come, that all their Soldiers were under Cæsar's power, they ran speedily to Aristius, they tell him, that nothing was done by publick ambority, they called such as robbed the Romans of their goods to answer the matter, they confiscate the goods of Litavicus and his brethren, they send Ambassadors unto Cæsar to clear themselves of these disorders: and this they do for the better recovery of their people that were now with Cæsar. But being contaminated with a wicked fact, and taken with the shame of robbing the Roman Citizens, many of them being touched in the fact, and much perplexed for fear of punishment; they privily entered into consultations of War, and solicited other States to that purpose by their Ambassadors. Which although Cæsar understood, yet he entertained them as curiously as he could, telling them, that for the ignorance and levity of the common people he would not think hardly of the State, nor abate any thing of his good will and favor to the Hedui.

The first OBSERVATION.

One ill act begeth another.

A Wicked act is not only hurtful in it self and of its own condition, but is like that box of evil, which the Poets feign to have been given to Pandora to be kept always shut: for when the way is once made, and the gap opened, one mischief draweth on another, and the tail that followeth is more viperous than the head. There was never any one that stained himself with any detestable crime, but was moved to commit a second evil that had relation to the first: for wicked deeds are justified by themselves, and one crime is upheld by another. When the hand is dipped in blood, it seemeth no great matter to imbrue the arm: and the loyalty of a people being once shaken by the indirect practices of a few, it is no strange

matter if the whole body of that State do immediately enter into treasonable consultations, as it happened in this place with the Hedui, who from that time which disclosed the treachery of their heart, carried no faithful regard to the Roman government, until the bitterness of that war which happened shortly after had made them know their error.

It shall be necessary therefore, as much as lyeth in the possibility of our means, to keep the body of virtue safe from wounding: for albeit the wound be never so little, yet it is always wide enough to let out both the blood and the spirits, even to the evacuation of the vital breath of moral honesty.

The second OBSERVATION.

Convolitanis plebem ad furorem impellit, stirred up the common people to madness (saith the story) as the fittest instruments to trouble the State, and to leave the rest of the people with the fury of madness. For the poorer and meaner people, that have no interest in the common-weal, but the use of breath, nor any other substance but a sty in the commons, are always dangerous to the peace of that Kingdom: for having nothing to lose, they willingly embrace all means of innovation, in hope of gaining something by other Mens ruine, believing altogether in Proverb, which averreth the fishing to be good, which is in troubled waters.

Catiline conspiring against the Roman Empire, made choice of such to accompany him, whose fortune was desperate. And thereupon Salust faith, *Hominis potentiam querent, egenissimos, cui neque sua clara, quippe que nulla sunt. Et omnia conspecto honesta videntur*: Indigent fellows are the fittest instruments for ambitious men, who regard not their own, because they have nothing, electing all actions honest that they gain by.

Lucie writeth, that upon the rumor in Greece of War between Perseus and the Romans, the poorer sort did put themselves in pay under Perseus, with this resolution, that if there happened no alteration upon this occasion, they would then cleave to the Romans, and assist them to put the state of Greece into a garboil. *Semper in civitate (saith Salust) quibus opes nulle sunt, bonis invident, malos extollunt; vetera odere, nova exoptant, odio suorum verum mutari omnia student.*

There are these two means left for a State to cafe it self of this sort of people: either to employ them abroad in Wars, or to interress them in the quiet of the Common-weale, by learning them such Trades and Occupations as may give them a taste of the sweetness of peace, and the benefit of a civil life.

CHAP. XXI.

Cæsar spied an occasion to advance the service at Gergovia.

Cæsar suspecting a greater revolt of the Gallies, lest he might be benighted in the strength of all the States of Gallia, he entered into deliberation how he might

The poorer sort of people do embrace all means of innovation.

Salust in the conspiracy of Catiline.

might leave Gergovia, and get all his Army together again, that his departure might not seem to rise from the fear of their revolt, and thereby be thought of flying away. And as he thought upon these things, he seemed to spy an occasion of doing somewhat to purpose: for coming into the lesser Camp to view the works, he observed a knoll, which was kept by the Enemy to be bare of men, which the day before could scarce be discerned, by reason of the multitude of people: and wondering at it, he enquired the cause of the runswaies, which came daily in great numbers unto him. They all agreed of that which Cæsar had before understood by the discoverers, that the back of that hill was almost level, but narrow and woody, where it gave passage to the other part of the Town: The Gallies did much fear that place, for the Romans having took one knoll, if they should possess themselves of another, the Gallies were almost blockt in round about, and cut off from foraging, or any other issuing out of the Town: and therefore Vercingetorix, had called them all to fortify that place. This being known, Cæsar sent many Troops of horse to that place about midnight, commanding them to ride up and down all thereabout somewhat tumultuously. And early in the morning he caused many horses and mules for carriage to be taken out of the Camp with horsekeepers upon them, having casks upon their heads, the better to resemble horsemen, and to be carried round about the hills. And to them he added a few horsemen, to the end they might spur out the more freely, and so make a better show, commanding them all to go to the same place by a long circuit about. These things were done in view of the Town; for Gergovia so stood, that they might from thence see into the Camp, but yet in so great a distance they could not certainly perceive what was done. He sent likewise one Legion to the same hill, and appointed them to go a little way, and then to make a stand in a dale, and to bide themselves in the Woods. The Gallies began more to suspect that place, and all their forces were drawn thither for the strengthening of it. Cæsar perceiving the Enemies Camps to be void of men, hiding his ensigns and colors, he drew the Soldiers by little and little out of the greater into the lesser Camp, and acquainted the Legats, to whom he had given the several Legions in charge, what he would have done; warning them especially to keep in the Soldiers, lest they should be carried out either with a desire of fighting or in hope of booty. He propounded unto them the incommodities of

the disadvantage of place, which must only be avoided by expedition, the matter consisting rather in occasion and opportunity, then in fighting.

The first OBSERVATION.

It is an easy matter to begin a business, and to make work for many hands; but to put it off again, and to quit it without prejudice of other important respects, is no small labor. Cæsar being engaged in the Siege of Gergovia, and fearing a general revolt throughout all Gallia, was not a little troubled how he might clear himself of that business, without suspicion of fear or flight, and gather all his forces into one body again, which he had before divided into two Armies: for as Marcellus said to Fabius, touching the Siege of Castellum, *Multa magnis ductibus sicut non aggredieris, ita semel aggressus non dimittenda esse*. *quæ magna fæmæ momenta in utramque partem sunt*: Many things are not to be attempted by great Capitains so when they are once attempted they must not be left unattended; for in either their reputation is much concerned. An Enemy will conceive greater hopes from such a retreat, then from a greater advantage. And therefore a General ought to have as special a regard to the opinion which he desireth to be held of his proceedings, as of any part belonging to his charge: for fame is the spirit of great actions, and maketh them memorable or unworthy by report. *Ceteris mortalibus in eo (saith Confutius) quid sibi conducere putant; Principum (saith Tacitus) diversam esse sortem, quibus præcipuerunt ad famam dirigenda*: Other Mens consultations tend only to what may most advantage them elvs: Princes have more to do, to look in their management of things principally at their honor and reputation. Wherein there cannot be a better rule for the avoiding of that inconvenience, then that which Lucienus observed, of whom Lucie faith, *Id prudenter ut in temere suscepere Romanus fecit, quod circumspexit difficultatis, ne frustra tempus tereret, celeriter abstinis incepto*: He did thus far prudently in a business rashly undertaken; that when he saw what difficulties attended the enterprise, rather then spend time in vain, he forthwith desisted from his purpose. For the speedy leaving of any such enterprise, doth excuse the rashness which might be imputed to the beginning; and men are not so much blamed for making trial of an ill-digested project, as they are for obstinate continuing in the same.

The second OBSERVATION.

Some services (saith Cæsar) are *Res occasiones, non prælii*, businesses of opportunity, not of war: whereof I have already disputed. Notwithstanding give me leave to add the mistake, which often falleth out in matter of opportunity. For in viewing the occurrences of the Wars of these latter times, we may find that some hotspur Commanders, having tasted of the good success which occasion affordeth, have thought of nothing but of services assisted with opportunity, in such manner as at length they forgot that occasion came but seldom, and carried their Men upon

It is an easier matter to begin a work, then to quit it again with credit.

Lucie.

Some services are Res occasiones non prælii.

on such desperate attempts, as proved the business to be a matter scarce affording means to fight for their lives, but were often swallowed up with devouring danger: wherein they did mistake the condition of the service, and fell short of *Cæsars* example. For albeit he sent out his Men to struggle with the height of the hill, and the disadvantage of well-fortified Camps; yet he knew they should find little resistance by the enemy, being drawn away upon other occasions, if they made that expedition as was requisite in this service; whereby he left them not without means to over-sway those difficulties, and so made it *Rem opportunum, non proliis*, a business of opportunity, not of War.

CHAP. XXII.

The Romans make an assault upon Gergovia.

Cæsar.

These things being delivered, he gave the Souldiers the sign to begin, and at the same time he sent out the *Hedui*, by another ascent on the right side. The Wall of the Town was distant by a right line from the plain, and the foot of the hill (if it lay even without any dale or valley) a thousand and two hundred paces: whatsoever more was added in fetching circuits about to climb the steep of the hill, was over and besides that distance. From the midst of the hill in length, as the nature of the place would bear it, the Gallies had with great stones raised a wall of six foot in height, to hinder the assault of our Men; and all the lower part being left void and empty, they filled the upper part of the hill, even to the wall of the Town with thick and frequent Camps. The Souldiers upon the sign given, were quickly come to the works, and passing over them they posted themselves of three Camps, with such speed and expedition, that *Teutomatus* the King of the *Nitiobriges*, being surprised in his tent as he rested about noon time, the upper part of his body being naked, and his horse wounded, did hardly escape the hands of Souldiers occupied in booty. *Cæsar* having got that which he propounded to himself, commanded a retreat to be sounded; and the Ensigns of the tenth Legion staid. But the Souldiers of the other Legions not hearing the sound of the Trumpet, forasmuch as a great valley was between them, were staid notwithstanding at first by the Tribunes of the Souldiers and the Legates, according as *Cæsar* had given in charge. But being carried away, as well with a hope of speedy victory, as by the flight of the enemy, and the fortunate battels of former times, they thought nothing so difficult but they could overcome it by their valor, inasmuch as they desired not from following, until they

came to the wall and the gates of the Town. Then a great outcry being took up in all parts of the Town, such as were further off being terrified by the suddenness of the tumult, thinking the Enemy had been within the gates, did cast themselves out of the Town: and the Women cast down their apparel and their silver from the Walls; and holding out their naked breasts, with their hands spread abroad, adjured the Romans to save them, and that they would not, (as they have done at *Avaticum*) destroy both Women and Children: and some Women slipped down by their hands from the wall, and gave themselves freely to the Souldiers. *L. Fabius* a Centurion of the eighth Legion, who was heard to say that day, that the booty which he had got at *Avaticum*, so stirred him up; that he would suffer no Man to get up upon the wall before himself; having got three of his manipular Souldiers, with their help he climbed up to the top of the wall, and then he himself did help up his fellows. In the mean time such as were on the other side of the Town, busied in fortifying that place, (as we have already delivered) first the noise being heard, and then stirred up by often messengers, that the Romans had took the Town, sending their horsemen before, they hasted thither in great numbers, and still as they came, they stood under the wall, and increased the number of such as they found fighting. A great multitude being at length come together, the Women that a little before had reached out their hands from the wall to the Romans, began now to adjure their own people, and as the manner of the Gallies is, so shew their hair loose about their ears, and to bring out their Children.

OBSERVATION.

It is both safe and honourable for Souldiers and inferior Commanders to keep their directions; for whensoever they go about to enlarge their business according to their own fantastic, howsoever occasion may seem to further their desires, they invert the whole course of discipline, and do arrogate more to themselves, than they do attribute to their General.

The Romans were strict in this point, as may appear by that of *Manlius*, who put his own son to death for making a happy fight against the enemy, contrary to his directions: for although it happened to fall out well at that time, yet the example was so dangerous, in a well ordered War, that he chose rather to bring a mischief upon his own son, than an inconvenience to their Military Government. *Insuper* too, (saith one in *Livie* to the Consul) *nunquam pugnabo, non secutam victoriam videam*; unless thou biddest, I will never fight, no, though I see the victory clear before me; making profession

It is honourable for Souldiers to keep their directions.

Institution of Cyrus.

profession of true obedience, and ranging himself in the order of such parts, as have no other office but observance. For, an Army is as a body, and the Souldiers are as particular parts, every man according to his place: the General is as the life and soul, and giveth motion to every part according to reason. And, as in a natural body, no part can move without directions from the life; so in the body of an Army, when any part moveth without the consent of the head, the motion is either monstrous or exorbitant, and sureth with such an effect as condemneth the instruments of unadvised rashness.

Polubius saith, that men have two ways to come by wisdom, either by their own harms, or by other mens misadventures. Such wisdom as is got through correction, happening by their own errors, is dearly bought; but sitting near them, is not easily forgotten: that which is obtained by other mens misfortunes, is well come by, and at an easier rate; but for the most part it is soon forgotten: but such as can retain it to a good use, are most happy men. This precept to Souldiers, touching obedience, and the precise keeping of their directions, hath, by other mens harms, so often been urged, as a man would think, that later ages should beware of this disorder. And yet it falleth out almost in every small service. For the greatest loss which the English received at any one time at *Offend*, was in a Sally; wherein Captain *Woodward* having possessed himself of some of the Enemies Works, when by his directions he should have stayed, thinking to improve his reputation by some further service, desiring it easily, peradventure to go forward, he went on beyond the compass of his command: whereby it happened, that both the Enemy had greater scope to revenge their former dishonour, and the rest of our English Troops that had their part in that project by way of second helps, could not proceed according to their directions: and so they all returned with loss.

That which *Xenophon* reporteth touching one *Chrystianus*, is notable to this purpose; who being in the heat of a conflict, and having his Sword lift up to strike one of the adverse party, he chanced to hear a retreat sounded, whereupon he presently withdrew his hand, and did forbear to smite him. Which howsoever to some may seem ridiculous, and unfitting the temper of a soldier in time of battle; yet let them know, that *Xenophon* a great Commander, and an excellent Historian, did alledge that example to the eternal memory of the fornamed party, for the knowledge and instruction of *Cyrus*, whom he propoundeth to the World as an absolute pattern both of Military and Civil vertue.

CHAP. XXIII.

The Romans continue the assault, and are beaten off with loss.

Cæsar.

The contention was not indifferent to the Romans, neither in place, nor in number of Combatants, being wearied withal, both with the long race which they had run, and with the continuance of their

fight, whereby they did not so easily bear the Enemy being whole and fresh. *Cæsar* seeing the fight to be in an unequal place, and the Enemy still to increase their Forces, fearing his People, he sent to *T. Sextius* the Legate, whom he had left to command the left camp, to bring out the Cohorts speedily, and to place them at the foot of the hill, on the right side of the Enemy's to the end, that if our men were forced to forsake their place, yet the Enemy might be terrified from following them over-freely. He himself removing a little out of that place where he stood with the Legion, attended the event of the Battel. And at they fought at hand very fiercely, the Enemy trusting in the place and in the multitude, and our men in their valour. The *Hedui* suddenly appeared on the open side of our men, whom *Cæsar* had sent up by another ascent on the right hand, to keep off part of the Enemy. These, by the likeness of their armour, did wonderfully astonish our men: who, although they saw their right armies shewed, or put forth, which was a sign of peace, yet they doubted, lest the Enemy had used that policy to deceive them. At the same instant, *L. Fabius* the Centurion, and those that climbed up upon the Wall with him, being slain, were cast down from the Wall again, and *M. Petreius*, a Centurion of the same Legion, as he was about to cut down the Gates, being oppressed with the multitude, and despairing of his own life, having received many wounds; For as much (saith he to his Souldiers: that followed him) as I cannot save myself and you too, I will certainly provide for your safety, whom I have brought into danger, whilst I shifted after honour. You, while you may, shift for your selves. And withal he brake through the thickest of the Enemy, and with the slaughter of a couple he removed the rest from the Gate. And, as his Souldiers went about to help him, in vain (saith he) do you endeavour to save my life, which blood and strength have already forsaken: and therefore get you hence while you have means, and betake your selves to the Legion, and so fighting fell down dead, but saved his men. Our men being overcharged on all sides, with the loss of Six and forty Centurions, were beaten down from the place: but the Tenth Legion, which stood for a rescue in a more equal place, hindered the Gallies from following over-eagerly. And again, the Cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion, which *Sextius* had brought out of the Camp, seconded that Legion, having got the advantage of the upper ground.

ground. The Legions, as soon as they came into the Plain, stood still, and turned head to the Enemy. Vercingetorix drew back his men from the foot of the hill, and brought them into their Camps. That day few less than Seven hundred Soldiers were wanting.

OBSERVATION.

And this is the end of presumptuous rashness, when men become so pregnant, as to take upon them more than is required. But, as they say of fair weather, that it is pity it should do hurt: so it is great pity that valour and resolution should prove disadvantageous. For, this overdoing of a service, is but the spirit of valiant carriage, and the very motion of Prowess and courage, memorable in the offenders themselves; as we may see by this particular report of Fabius and Petreus: and much to be pitied, that virtue should at any time be overquell'd with a greater strength.

At this service the Romans stood in these terms; they were over-matched in number, they had spent their strength in speedy running to the place which in it self was not favourable unto them, but almost as great an Enemy as the Galles, only they trusted in their Valour, and thought by virtue to clear all difficulties. The Galles had the favour of the place, a far greater number of fighting men, they came fresh to the Battel, and were always seconded with fresh supplies. Cæsar seeing the two Armies engaged one with another, could neither part them, nor recall his Soldiers, but let such Forces as were free, in such convenient places, as might rescue his People in the retreat, and keep the Galles from following the chase, or making any great slaughter of the Roman Soldiers. Whereby it happened, that in so great an inequality, where there were so many sword drawn to make way to death, there were not Seven hundred men lost of the Roman Army. And yet it happened to be the greatest loss that ever he received in those Wars in his own presence, when the issue of the Conflict gave the Enemy the better of the day.

CHAP. XXIV.

Cæsar rebuketh the rashness of his Soldiers; and maketh light, but successful Skirmishes upon the Enemy.

Cæsar.

Cæsar the next day calling the Army before him, rebuked the temerity and cupidit of the Soldiers, for as much as they took upon them to judge how far they were to go, or what they were to do; neither would they stay upon the sounding of a Retreat, nor hearken to the Tribunes nor the Legates, that would have kept them back. He laid open unto them, how available the inequality of the place was, and what he himself thought of it, when at Avaricum he took

the Enemy without a General, and without Cavalry, yet did forgoe a most assured Victory, lest in the buckling he might have received a small loss through the inequity of the place. How admirable was the greatness of their spirit, whom neither the Fortifications of the Camps, the height of the Hill, nor the Wall of the Town could stop or hinder! Wherein he blamed their licentious arrogancy the more, for as much as they had took upon them to judge better of the Victory, and the success of that service, then the General himself: neither did he so much desire to find courage and virtue in his Soldiers, as modesty and sobriety. This Speech being delivered, and in the end confirming their minds, that they might not be discouraged at the matter, nor attribute that to the worth of the Enemy, which indeed was in the nature of the place; keeping his former purpose of departure, he brought the Legions out of the Camp, imbatell'd them in a convenient place, and finding that Vercingetorix would not be drawn into an indifferent place, after a light skirmish of Horse, wherein the Romans had the better, he carried his Army back again into the Camp: and doing the like the next day, thinking it sufficient to abate the pride of the Galles, and to strengthen the courage of his Soldiers, he removed his Camp into the State of the Hedui, the Enemy refusing to make after him.

OBSERVATION.

Reparation of honor is a chief point in the carriage of an Army: for he that leaveth an Enemy upon a loss received, when his Soldiers are either awed, or well beaten, must look to find the same spirit and courage in them, when they shall come again to confront the Enemy, as they had when they last left him with a disadvantage; which is nothing else but an unsatisfactory continuance of his own loss, and a preparation to a second overthrow. In the War the Romans had with Annibal, in all the fights they made, they continued their first loss unto the Battel at Nola: at what time, by Marcellus good directions, they gave him an overthrow; which was the first time that ever Annibals Soldiers began to give place to the Romans, and repaired the Romans valour again, after so many Battels as they lost. For then they were perfwaded, that they fought not with an Enemy altogether invincible, but that he was subject to loss and overthrow. And in respect of this so happy a fortune, restoring the Roman Soldiers to their antient valour and good fortune, it is that Livie saith, *ingens eo dies, ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta sit*, A great piece of service was performed that day, and I think I may say the greatest that was done in that War. Cæsar did well understand this Philosophy: and therefore

Reparation of Honor, what it is.

Plunder, in the Life of Marcellus.

Lit. j. bel. civil. post. pugnam. Pyrrachiam. Cæsar neq; satis militibus persequi confidebat, spemque interpres. dem ad recordandos animos putabat.

therefore he laboured to repair the breach, which the Enemy had made in the valour of his Soldiers, by light and small Skirmishes, before he would adventure to hazard the main drift of the business in any set conflict. And the rather, for that he had a purpose to leave the Enemy for a time, whereby he seemed to end the former services; wherein he had a special care, not to depart with the last blow, having always before that time had the better: for the condition of the end doth challenge much of the former proceedings, and doth draw the opinion of men to deem of all as the conclusion importeth. According as Claudius Nero told his Soldiers: *Semper quod postremo adjectum sit, id rem totam videri traxisse*: As the end of the Service is, so the whole seems to have been.

CHAP. XXV.

The Hedui revolt: Cæsar passeth his Army over the River Loire.

Cæsar.

The third day he repaired the bridge at the River Elevar, and carried over his Army. There he understood by Viridomarus and Eporedorix, that Litavicus was gone, with all the Enemies Horse, to solicit the state of the Hedui, and therefore it was requisite, that Cæsar should send them before to confirm the State, and keep them in Loyalty. And, although Cæsar did mistrust the State of the Hedui for many causes, and did think, that the departure of these two Nobles, would hasten their revolt; yet he did not think it fit to detain them, lest he should either seem to do them wrong, or to give any suspicion of distrust. At their departure, he propounded unto them, briefly, how well he had deserved of their State, how low and weak they were when he received them, confined within their Towns, their Lands extended, all their Associates taken from them, a Tribute laid upon them, pledges extorted from them, with great continuance; and, into what fortune and greatness he had brought them again, that not only they had recovered their former state, but did exceed the Dignity and favour of all former times: and with these Mandates he let them go. Noviodunum was a Town of the Hedui, situate in a convenient place, upon the bank of the River Loire. Thither had Cæsar sent all the Hostages of Gallia, the Corn, the Publick Treasure, and the greatest part of the Baggage of the Army; and thither he had likewise sent great store of Horse, which he had bought in Spain and Italy for the service of this War. Eporedorix and Viridomarus coming thither, and understanding touching the affairs of their State, that Lita-

vicus was received into Bibract by the Hedui, which is the Metropolitan City of their State, and that Convictolitanis their chief Magistrate, and a great part of the Senate were come unto him, and that publick Messengers were sent to Vercingetorix, touching a League of Peace and Amity; they did not think it fit to omit so great an opportunity. And thereupon having slain the Guard at Noviodunum, with such others as were there, either by way of Trade or Travel, they divided the Money and the Horses between them, and took order, that the Hostages of the other States should safely be conveyed to Bibract. For the Town, for as much as they thought they were not able to keep it, left the Romans might make any use of it, they burned it: such Corn as they could carry on the sudden, they conveyed away in Boats, the rest they either burned or cast it into the River. They began to raise Forces in the Country next adjoining, to dispose of Watches and Garrison on the Bank of the River Loire; to send their Cavalry in all places, to strike fear into the Romans, to the end they might exclude them from provision of Corn, or drive them, through necessity of want, to forsake the Province. Whereof they were the rather assured, for as much as the Loire was much swelled by a fall of Snow, whereby it was unsailable at any Ford. These things being known, Cæsar thought it necessary for him to make haste (especially if he must make up the Bridges) to the end he might give them Battel before they had gathered a greater head: for, touching his purpose for returning into the Province, he did not think it fit, by any means, both in respect of the shame and infamy thereof, as also for as much as the opposition of the Hill Gebenna, and the difficulty of the passage did hinder him; but especially for that he did exceedingly desire to join himself with Labienus and the Legions that were with him. And therefore making great journeys, both by day and night, beyond all mens expectation, he came to the River Loire, where the Horsemen having found a convenient Ford for the necessity of the time, that the Soldiers might pass over with their Armes and Shoulders above the water, to bold up their Weapons, disposing the Horse in the River to break the force of the Stream, and the Enemy being affrighted upon their first show, he carried over his Army insafely. And having satisfied his Soldiers with Corn which he found in the Fields, and good store of Cattel, he determined to march towards the Senones.

OBSERVATION.

The change
which the
revolt of the
Hedui made
in Gallia.

THE greatest difficulty that ever Cæsar found in the course of these Wars, was at this instant upon the revolt of the Hedui. For, whereas that State, after Cæsars coming into Gallia, was ever reputed the favourite of the Roman Empire, having received such special privileges and prerogatives above the rest, as might tie them with an inviolable bond of amity to the People of Rome: it was not to be expected, that they should forsake so great a stay, or favour any thing that might tend to the weakening of that authority, which preferred them in dignity before all other States of that Continent: and was as a Remorse to divers other Nations of Gallia, from shewing that defection by plain and open revolt, which they had so long before conceived in their minds.

But, when it appeared (notwithstanding any precedent benefit, or the merit of imperial favours) that the Hedui did affect the common cause of their Countries liberty, and were content to engage themselves therein, as far as their lives or fortunes could any way be valued: it was not to be doubted, but that such other Common-weals, as before that time had remained neutral, and had less cause than the Hedui to keep back their hands from a work of that piety, would apprehend the matter as a business importing the safety of their Country, wherunto Cæsar and the Legions were common Enemies. The consideration wherof made Cæsar to think of returning back into the Province, had not the dishonour of such a retreat, and the desire he had to joyn with Labienus, hindered that purpose.

CHAP. XXVI.

Labienus cometh to Lutetia with four Legions.

Cæsar.

WHILE these things were done by Cæsar, Labienus having left those supplies which came last out of Italy, at Agendicum, for the safety of the Carriages, went himself with four Legions towards Lutetia, a Town of the Parisians, built in an Island in the River Sequana. The Enemy understanding of his coming, great Forces were speedily brought together out of the Countries near about. The chieftest Command was given to Camulogenus, of the Nation of the Auleri, who, notwithstanding his great age, was called to that honour for his singular knowledge in matter of War. He finding it to be a continued bog that ran into Sequana, and much hindered all that place, did stay there with his Army, and purposed to hinder the passage of the Romans. Labienus did first endeavour to drive the Vines, to fill up the bog with hurdles and earbs, and so to make the passage firm: but after that he perceived it to be very hard to effect, in the third watch of the night he went out of the Camp with silence,

and the same way that he came, he went to Melodunum, a Town of the Senones, situate in an Island of Sequana, as Lutetia is: and having surprised some fifty Ships and Boats, and manned them with Soldiers, the Townsmen being affrighted with the novelty of the matter, of whom, a great part were called out to that War, he possessed himself of the Town without any resistance. The Bridge being repaired which the Enemy had cut down a few days before, he transported over the Army, and went down along the River towards Lutetia. The Enemy having notice thereof, by such as escaped from Melodunum, commanded Lutetia to be burned, and the Bridges of the Town to be broken: they themselves forsaking the bog, sat down upon the banks of Sequana, right over against the Camp of Labienus. By this time Cæsars departure from Gergovia was known abroad, with the revolt of the Hedui: and rumours were brought of a second rising and motion in Gallia. It was certainly confirmed, that the Galles were in consultation, that Cæsar was kept back, both by the difficulties of the passage and the River Loire, and for want of Corn was constrained to return into the Province. The Bellovaci also understanding of the revolt of the Hedui where-as they were before treacherous and disloyal of themselves, did now begin to raise Forces, and prepare for open War. Labienus, upon so great a change of things, understood, that it was necessary for him to take another manner of course than was before intended. For, now he thought not of making any Conquest, or urging the Enemy to Battel, but to bring the Army back in safety to Agendicum. For, on the one side, the Bellovaci stood ready to charge him, being a People that had the name for deeds of Armes of all the Nations in Gallia; the other side was kept by Camulogenus, with an Army ready in the field: and last of all, the Legions were kept from their Garrison and their Carriages with a great River that ran between them and it.

OBSERVATION.

THE great alteration which the revolt of the Hedui made in Gallia, caused Labienus to let fall his former resolutions, and to shape such a course, as might best answer the extremity of the tempest. For, he that will attain the end of his desires, or make peace with the affections of his mind, must not think at all times to carry away contentment with the strength of his means, or subdue resistance with force of Armes, but must be well pleased to be driven with the stream,

He that will do things well, must vary with the time.

until he meet with a tide of better opportunity for oftentimes it fall:th out, that the opposition of resisting power, is more available than ten Legions commanded by Cæsar, or what the Roman Empire could add besides, to so great an Army. For there is no quantity so great, but there may be found a greater; nor none so little, but there may be a less; which may teach a Man neither to conceit himself in a matchless singularity, nor to despair of a weak condition. And this is that which is so often recommended to the consideration of discreet Governors, whether they be Magistrates in peace, or Commanders in war, to put them in mind of the condition of times, and to carry themselves answerable thereunto, so far as much as fortune and happy success, riseth for the most part from such means as have respect to the occurrences of the time, not running always upon one bias, nor failing at all times with a fore-wind; but sometimes to press forward, and sometimes to give back, according as the circumstances of the time shall make way to good fortune.

Plutarch in the Life of Fabius.

Fabius the great Roman thought it no (corn to be called coward, or to undergo the displeasure of the people of Rome, while he gave place to the fury of the Carthaginians, and refused to receive a third overthrow. And thus he altered the course of the Roman warfare, according to the time, and overthrew that Enemy by shunning to encounter him, which in a battel would have hazarded the Conquest of Rome. In like manner Cn. Scipio the Dictator did intimate this wisdom of Fabius, against the Galles, by lingring out the War: *Non levis fortis committere adversus hostem, (as Livy saith) quem tempus deteriorum indies & locus alienus faceret.* Not willing to put the trial to Fortune, when he dealt with an Enemy, which time and ignorance of the place rendered every day weaker and weaker. And to conclude this point, Cæsar upon the loss which he received at Dyrrachium, *omnem sibi commodam belii rationem exstimavit*, thought it his best way to alter the whole course of War, as the Story saith: which was nothing else but varying with the time, and helping a bad fortune with new directions.

CHAP. XXVII.

Labienus passeth the River Sequana, and fighteth with the Galles.

Cæsar.

FOR the avoiding of these great difficulties, which came so suddenly upon him, he knew there was no help to be had, but that which the virtue of his mind would afford him: and therefore calling a council a little before the evening, he adorted them to execute such things as he commanded, both with diligence and industry; and so taking the ships which he had brought from Melodunum, he divided them amongst the Roman horsemen, and after the first watch, he commanded them to go four miles down the River in silence, and there to attend him. He left five cohorts, which he thought to be too weak for any fight, as a Garrison to the Camp, and sent the other five Cohorts of the same Le-

gion about midnight, with all the carriages up the River, commanding them to make a great noise and tumult as they went. He fought out all barges and boats and sent them up the River, with much noise and beating of oars: and a little while after, he himself went quietly with three Legions to the place where he had commanded the ships to abide him. At his coming thither, the enemies discoverers, which were disposed on all parts of the River, were suddenly and at unawares surprised by our Men, by reason of a suddain tempest that did rise in the mean time: and the Army and the Horse were by the diligence of the Roman Knights (to whom he had committed that business) carried over. At the same time a little before day light, the enemy had intelligence that there was an extraordinary noise and tumult in the Roman Camp, and a great Troop went up the River, and the beating of oars was heard that way, and a little below the Souldiers were carried over. Which being known, so far as they judged that the Legions were carried over in three places, and that they were so perplexed at the revolt of the Hedui, that they fled away; they divided their forces also into three parts, for a Garrison being left right over against the Roman Camp, and a small band sent towards Gloffendium, which was to go so far as the boat went, they carried the rest of their Army to meet Labienus. By the dawning of the day, all our men were carried over, and the Enemy was discovered ranged in battel. Labienus adhorting the Souldiers to betink themselves of their ancient virtue, and to recall the memory of their fortunate battels, and to suppose that Cæsar himself was present, under whose leading they had oftentimes overthrowen the Enemy; he gave the sign of battel. Upon the first affront, on the right wing, where the seventh Legion stood, the Enemy was beaten back and put to flight; in the left corner, where the twelfth Legion was, the former ranks of the enemy being pierced through and beaten dead down with the piles, the rest notwithstanding did stoutly resist, neither did any man give suspicion of flying. Camulogenus the General was present with his men, and encouraged them to fight, the Victory being uncertain. When the Tribunes of the seventh Legion understood what was done in the left Wing, they steered the Legion behind on the back of the Enemy, and there began to charge them: and yet none of them forsook his place, but were all inclosed and slain, Camulogenus ending his days by the same fortune.

tune. Such of the Enemy as were left over against the Roman Camps, understanding that the battle was begun, came to second their fellows, and took a hill, but were not able to abide our conquering Souldiers; but joining themselves to the rest that fled, were neither protected by the woods nor the mountains, but were all slain by the horsemen. This business being ended, Labienus returned to Agendicum, where the carriages of the whole Army were left, and from thence came to Cæsar with all the forces.

The first OBSERVATION.

Necessary for a General to understand the purposes of the Enemy.

Labienus being to pass the River of *Seine*, which was strongly guarded by the *Gallæ*, was forced to seek a means out of the straits of his mind, (as Cæsar saith) and to lay such a project, as might amuse the Enemy, and keep him in suspense what way to take to prevent his passage, until he had effected that which he desired. Which bringing to our consideration the saying of *Epaminondas* the Theban. That there is nothing more necessary or behoveful for a General, than to understand the purposes of the Enemy. A point so much the more commendable, by how much it is in it self difficult, and hard to be discovered; for it were hard to understand their secret deliberations, which for the most part are only known to the General, or to such chief Commanders as are near about him, when their very actions which every Man knoweth, and such things as are done in the open view of the World, are oftentimes doubtful to an enemy.

Lucius hath a notable story to this purpose. *Sempronius* the Roman Consul, giving battle to the *Æqui*, the fight continued until the night parted them, not without alteration of fortune, sometimes the *Romans* prevailing, and sometimes the *Æqui*; the night coming on, both sides being weary and half routed, they forsook their Camps, and for their better safety, took each of them a hill. The *Roman* Army divided it self into two parts: the one part followed the Consul, and the other a Centurion, named *Tempanius*, a fellow of great spirit, and had shewed much worth in the battle. The next morning the Consul without farther inquiry, made towards *Rome*; and so did the *Æqui* withdraw their Army back into their Country: either of them deeming themselves overthrown, and calling victory upon each others Shoulders. It happened that *Tempanius*, with that part of the Army that kept with him, enquiring after the enemy, found him to be overthrown and fled: whereupon he first went to the *Roman* Camp, and made that good, and then marched to the Camp of the *Æqui*, which he took and rifled, and so returned victor to *Rome*.

Notwithstanding, Henry the 5.

The morning following, the battle of *Agincourt*, *Montjoy* the French Herald coming to enquire for prisoners, King *Henry* asked him who had won the field: To which he answered, That the French had lost it, which was unknown to that worthy Conqueror. *Plutarch* writeth; that *Cassius* killed himself upon the like error, not knowing the fortune of the right wing of his Army. And therefore it must needs be a commendable matter, to understand the deliberations of an enemy, when the issue of a battle is oftentimes so uncertain.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Camillus hath the report in this place of singular knowledge and experience in matter of War, and being of a great age, he fought as resolutely as the youngest gallant of them all, which may bring to our consideration the fittest age of life to be withed in a General, for the achieving of noble and worthy exploits. Wherein we are to consider, that the youth and form-r years of a Mans age, are plentifully stored with hot blood and nimble spirits, which quickly apprehend the conceptions of the mind, and carry them with such violence to execution, that they bereave the judgment of her prerogative, and give it no respite to censure them; whereby it cometh to pass, that young men are for the most part heedless, inconsiderate, rash, and resolute, putting more upon hazard then upon good advice.

On the other side, old age is cold in blood, and not so quick of spirit, but being beaten with the rod of long experience, it learneth to be slow and lingering, full of doubts and consideration, inclining rather to a feminine fear, then to a forward resolution.

Neither of these attributes are simply in themselves the best attendants of noble enterprises: for a hot-spir gallant may run apace, but not go sure; and what young man forever is advanced to command, had need of an old Mans Wit to discharge it. And if authority did at any time fall into the hands of youth in the *Roman* Government, which was very seldom, it was *Pramium virtutis, non ætatis*; for his vertues sake, not his age. *Pompey* was extraordinary happy in that behalf, for he attained the surname of Great, because he had deserved the honor of triumph before his beard was grown. And yet *Sextorius* took such advantage at *Pompey*'s youth, coming against him in *Spain*, that he laid he would have whipped the young boy to *Rome* again with rods, had not that old woman (meaning *Metellus*) come to help him.

Again, where old age heareth doubt upon doubt and falleth into the danger of unprofitable lingering, *Nec ausus est satis nec providit*, it wanteth boldness to feed the enterprise, and falleth also short of good providence, as *Tacitus* speaketh of *F. Valens*. *Augustus* Cæsar purposing to commend *Tiberius* his successor with an extraordinary praise, said he was a man that never put one thing to be twice consulted of. And it is said of *Marius*, that being come to the age of threecore and five years or thereabouts, he shewed himself very cold and slow in all his enterprises, forasmuch as age had mortified his active heat, and killed that ready disposition of body that was wont to be in him. The *Roman* finding *Fabius Maximus* to be full of doubts and delay, good to defend, but not to offend, and *Marcellus* of a stirring spirit, neither quick with good nor ill fortune, (as *Annibal* truly said of him) they thought to join *Marcellus* youthful courage with *Fabius* fear and wisdom, and so make a temperate fit for a General; whereupon they called *Marcellus* the sword, and *Fabius* the buckler: wherein Cæsar of himself was excellent, of whom *Suetonius* reporteth, *Dubium cautior, an audacior*: It is uncertain whether he was more wary or daring.

The best state of years then for this business, is that

The fittest age of life for a General.

Plutarch in the Life of Sextorius.

H.R. 3.

Plutarch in the Life of Marcellus.

that which tempereth the heat of youth with the coldness of age, and quickeneth the slow and dull proceedings of double advice, with the rashness of youthful resolution: and falleth out between the years of five and thirty and five and fifty. *Scipio Africanus* commanded the *Roman* Army in *Spain*, at four and twenty years of age, and died at four and fifty. *Annibal* was chosen General to *Adribal*, at six and twenty years, and poisoned himself at threecore and ten. *Pompey* was slain at nine and fifty, and Cæsar at six and fifty. *Marcellus* kept his youthful resolution to his old days, for being threecore years of age, he never longed for any thing more then to fight with *Annibal* hand to hand.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The Gallies consult of the carriage of that War.

Cæsar.

The revolt of the *Hedui* being known, the War waxed greater. Ambassadors were sent out into all parts, and they laboured to draw the rest of the States to their party, as far as either favor, authority, or money could prevail: having got the pledges into their hands, which Cæsar had left with them, they terrified such as stood doubtful, by threatening to kill them. The *Hedui* do desire *Vercingetorix* to come unto them, and to acquaint them with the course of that War, which being yielded unto, they labor to have the chief command transferred upon them. The matter growing unto a controversy, a general Council of all *Gallia* was summoned at *Bibra*. Thither they repaired in great multitudes: and the matter being put to voices, they all with one consent made allowance of *Vercingetorix* for their General. The men of *Rhemes*, with the *Lingones* and *Treviri*, were absent from this Council; the two first continuing their affection to the *Roman* party: the *Treviri* were far off, and were annoyed by the *German*s; in respect they were absent from that War, and remained neutral. The *Hedui* were much grieved that they were put by the principality, they complain of the change of their fortune, and wished for Cæsar's former indulgences, neither yet durst they disjoin themselves again from the rest, the War being already undertaken; but *Eporodix* and *Viridomarus*, two young Men of great hope, were contrained, though unwilling to obey *Vercingetorix*. He commanded pledges to be delivered by the rest of the States, and appointed a day for that business. He commanded fifteen thousand Horse to be speedily brought together: touching foot forces, he would consent himself with those which he had; for his purpose was not to wage battle, but whereas

he was very strong in horse, he made no doubt to keep the *Romans* from corn and forrage: only they must patiently endure to have their corn spoiled, and their houses burnt, which particular loss would quickly be recompensed with liberty and perpetual sovereignty. These things being ordered, he commanded ten thousand foot to be raised by the *Hedui* and *Seguliani*, bordering upon the Province; and to them he added eight hundred horse, and sent them under the command of *Eporodix* his brother, to make War against the *Allobroges*. And on the other side he caused the *Gabali* and the nearest villages of the *Arverni* to sit upon the *Helvii*, the *Rutheni*, and the *Cadurci*, and to depopulate their Country. Notwithstanding by secret messages he dealt with the *Allobroges*, whose minds he thought to be scarce settled from the former war: he promised Money to their chieft men, and to give the government of all the *Roman* Province to their State. To answer all these chances, there were provided but two and twenty Cohorts, which being raised out of the Province, were disposed by *L. Cæsar* a Legate to prevent these mischiefs. The *Hedui* of their own accord giving battle to their borders, were beaten out of the field, and were driven into their Towns with the slaughter of *C. Valerius Donotaurus*, the Son of *Caburus*, the chief Man of their State, and of many others. The *Allobroges* having set many watches and garrisons upon the *Rhene*, did with great care and diligence defend their borders. Cæsar understanding the Enemy to be stronger in horse then he himself was, and the passages being shut that he could not send either into the Province or into Italy for any supplies, he sent over the *Rhene* into *Germany*, and got horse from such States as he had quieted the year before, with such light armed footmen as were accustomed to fight amongst the horse. At their arrival, forasmuch as they were not well fitted with horse, he took the horses from the *Tribunes*, the *Roman* Knights, and the *Evocati*, and distributed them amongst the *German*s.

OBSERVATION.

OBSERVATION.

Three chief means to win men to favour a matter.
1. Favour, or Friendship.
2. Authority.
3. Money.

There are three principal means to draw a State into a party, which of it self standeth neutral, or to win the minds of Men, when they carry equal or indifferent affections. The first is, by favor or friendship, the second by authority, and the third by money. Friendship relyeth upon former respects, and the exchange of precedent courtesies. Authority concludeth from future dangers, and the inconveniences which may follow the refusal. Money doth govern the present occasion, and is more general then either favor or authority. The *Gallies* were not wanting to make their party good in any of these three prevailing motives, but as *Cæsar* faith, *Quantum gratia, autoritate, pecunia valent, ad sollicitanda civitatis animarum*: They solicited the neighbor States, as far as friendship, authority, and money would go.

Wherein as they went about to lay the stock-upon it, so they left themselves but one trial for the right of their cause, and joined issue for all upon the fortune of that action: for when they should fee their best possibilities too weak, and their uttermost endeavors profit nothing against a mighty prevailing Enemy, the greater their hopes were of their despair, when such means were spent, for it is a throwed thing for men to be out of means, and not to drive a hope before them.

It is usual upon such main occasions to employ the chiefest man in a State, in whom the Soldiers may have most assurance, and to accompany him with such means, as the strength of the Commonwealth may afford him: but if their greatest hopes dye in his ill success, or wax faint through cold fortune, the Kingdom receiveth loss, and the enemy getteth advantage, as may appear by the sequel of this great preparation.

CHAP. XXIX.

The Cavalry of the Gallies, do set upon the Roman Army, and are beaten.

Cæsar.

While these things were a doing, the Enemies forces, and the horsemen that were commanded to be levied in all Gallia, met together, and came out of the Territories of the Averni. A great number of these being gathered together, as *Cæsar* marched against the Sequani by the borders of the Lingones, to the end he might the easier relieve the Province, Vercingetorix fate down about ten miles from the Romans in three several Camps, and calling the Captains and Colonels of horse to counsel, he told them that the time of Victory was now come: for the Romans left Gallia, and fled into the Province: which was sufficient for the obtaining of their present liberty, but availed little for the peace and quiet of future time, forasmuch as the Romans did not purpose to make

an end of the War, but to return again with greater Forces. And therefore it was necessary to set upon them in their march laden with carriages. If the foot did assist their horse, then they were not able to make any way or proceed in their journey. But if (which he hoped would rather happen) forsaking their carriages, every man shifted for himself, they would depart both robbed of their necessities, and of their honors, for they need not doubt of the Enemies horse, of whom he was most assured, that they durst not go out from amongst the foot forces. And to the end they might be the better encouraged, he would draw all the forces in a readiness out of the Camp, and place them so as they might be a terror to the Enemy. The horsemen cryed out all together, that this resolution might be strengthened with an holy oath: Let him never be received under any roof, or have access to his Wife, Children, or Parents, that did not twice run through the Army of the Enemy. The thing being well liked of, and every Man forced to take that oath, the next day he divided his Cavalry into three parts, two Armies shewed themselves on each side, and the third began to make stay of the vanward. Which being known, *Cæsar* divided his horse likewise into three parts, and sent them to make head against the enemy. At the same time they fought in all parts, the Army stood still, the carriages were received within the Legions: if our Men were overcharged anywhere, *Cæsar* bent the Legions that way, which did both binder the enemy from following them, and assure our Men of hope of rescue. At length the Germans having possessed themselves of a hill on the right side, did put the Enemy from their place, and followed them as they fled even to the River, where Vercingetorix stayed with the foot Companies, and slew many of them. Whereupon the rest fearing least they should be encompassed about, betook themselves to flight, execution was done in all places. Three of the Nobility of the Hedui were taken and brought to *Cæsar*; Cotus the General of the horse, who at the last election of Magistrate, stood in controversy with Convictolitans, and Cavarillus, who after the revolt of Litavicus, commanded the foot Troops; and Eporodix, under whose command before *Cæsar*'s coming into Gallia, the Hedui made War with the Sequani. All the Cavalry being put to flight, Vercingetorix drew in his forces which he had embattled before his Camp, and immediately after began to march towards Alafia, a Town of the Mandubii, commanding the baggage to be speedily brought out of the Camp and

and to follow him. *Cæsar* having conveyed his Carriages to the next Hill, under the custody of two Legions, he followed the Enemy as long as the day would give him leave: and having slain some Three thousand of the Rearward, the next day following he encamped at Alafia.

OBSERVATION.

Whether the Cavalry of Infantry be of greater importance and use in a war.

The *Gallies* were much stronger then the Romans in Cavalry, both according to quantity and quality: but the Roman Infantry was greater in virtue and worth then any Foot-forces of the *Gallies*, notwithstanding their inequality in number. Which sheweth, that the Romans did more rely upon their Legionary Soldiers, then upon their Equites: and may serve for an argument in the handling of that question, which is so much debated amongst men of War, whether the Horse, or the Foot Companies be of greater importance in the carriage of a War. Which indeed is a question a male diviser: being both so necessary for the perfect execution of Martial purposes, as they cannot well be disjoined. And if we look particularly in the nature of their several services, we shall easily discern the differences, and be able to judge of the validitie of their parts.

Footmen fight for more freedom then horsemen.

The main stroke in a day of battles given by the footmen. The use of horsemen.

Wherein first it cannot be denied, but that Foot Companies are serviceable to more purposes then Troops of Horse: for the Horsemen are of no use, but in open and champain places; whereas Footmen are not only of importance in Fielden Countries, but are necessary also in Mountainous or Woodie places, in Valleys, in Ditches, in Sieges, and in all other parts of what site or nature soever, where the Horsemen cannot shew themselves. Whereby it appeareth, that the Infantry extendeth its service to more purposes then the Cavalry, and maketh the War compleat, which otherwise would prove lame and uneffectual.

Touching the weight of the business, when it cometh to a day of Battel, it resteth for the most part upon the Foot Troops: for the Horsemen are profitable to the Army wherein they serve, by making discoveries, by harrying the Enemies Country, by giving succor or rescue upon a sudden, by doing execution upon an overthrow, and by confronting the Enemies Horse; but these are but as second services, and fall short of the main stroke, which, for the most part, is given by the Footmen. Neither doth a rout given to the Cavalry (living in Army Royal) concern the body of that Army further, then the services before mentioned; but the Army doth oftentimes go on notwithstanding, and may well achieve a happy victory: whereas, upon the overthrow of the Infantry, the Horsemen have nothing to do, but to shift for themselves, and get away to their own home. So that it appeareth, that the Foot Companies are the bulk and body of the Army, and the Horse as the Armes and outward parts, having expedient and necessary Offices, but always subordinate to the main stroke given by the Foot.

If any man look for proof hereof by example, he shall not need to seek further then the Ro-

mans, being Masters of the Art Military, who, by an ancient Law, interdicting the Dictator to have the use of a Horse in the Wars for his private ease, intimated, as *Plutarch* faith, the strength of their Army to consist in their Footmen, which the General, in a day of Battel, should assist with his presence, and in no wise forsake them if he would. But, touching the use of War amongst them, their Equites were so far short of the service performed by their foot Troops, that when they would stand to it indeed, they forsook their horses and fought on foot: as in the Battel with the *Lutines* at the Lake *Regillus*, which I have already mentioned in my former observations. Neither were the Romans good Horsemen, as it seemeth by *Cæsar*: for he took the Horses from the Tribunes and the Roman Equites, and gave them to the Germans, as better Ritters then any Romans. But howsoever a State that aboundeth in Horse, and trusteth more in them then in Foot Companies, may harry a Champain Country, but shall never be able to follow a War with that strength, as is requisite to make it fortunate.

CHAP. XXX.

Cæsar besiegeth Alafia, and fighteth with the Enemies Cavalry.

Cæsar having viewed the site of the Town, and knowing the Enemy to be much troubled for the overthrow of their Horse, in whom they put all their hopes, exhorting the Soldiers to take a little pains, he determined to inclose the Town round about with a Ditch and a Rampier. Alafia was sited on the top of a Hill, in a very eminent place, and not to be taken but by a continued Siege. At the foot of the Hill ran two Rivers on each side of the Town: before the Town there lay a Plain of three Miles in length: the other sides were inclosed round about, in a reasonable distance, with Hills of equal height with the Town. Under the Wall, on the East side, lay all the Forces of the *Gallies*, having drawn a Ditch and a dry Wall, on that part, of eight foot in height: the whole circuit of the Works which the Romans made to inclose the Town about, contained eleven Miles. Their Camp was sited in a convenient place, where there were made three and twenty Castles, which, in the day time, were kept by Garrisons, to prevent any sudden attempts of the Enemy; and, in the night, by strong watches. The Work being begun, there happened a Skirmish between the Cavalry of both sides, in that Plain which lay before the Town of three miles in length. They fought eagerly on both sides. Our men being overcharged, *Cæsar* sent the Germans to second them, and set the Legions before the Camp, lest there might happen any sudden

A a

Sally

The Dictator forbidden the use of a horse in the wars: and why.

CHAP. XXXI.

Sally by the Foot of the Enemy. Upon the safeguard of the Legions our men took courage. The Enemy was put to flight, and being many in number, one hindered another, and stuck in heaps in the freight passage of their Gates. The Germans followed them close to their Fortifications, and made a great execution amongst them. Many of them forsaking their Fortifications attempted to leap the ditch, and to climb over the dry wall. Cæsar commanded the Legions imballtled before the Camp to advance a little forward. The Gallies that were within the Fortification were in no little trouble: for, thinking the Enemy would presently have come unto them, they made an alarm: some were so frightened, that they brake into the Town. Vercingetorix commanded the Gates to be shut, lest the Camp should be left naked of Defendants. Many of the Enemy being slain, and very many Horses taken, the Germans fell off and returned to Cæsar.

OBSERVATION.

One event is not so certain for the approving of a cause, as when it is seconded with another condition.

FOR as much as casualty and chance have oftentimes the prerogative of a service, and in misdeeming opinions do carry away the honour from virtue and valour: the first trial of a fortune: is not of that assurance, nor so much to be trusted, as when it is seconded again with the like effect: for, when a matter, by often trial, falleth out to be of one and the same quality, it sheweth a certainty of a cause, producing ends of like condition. The Gallies (as it seemeth) were much discouraged upon the first overthrow of their Horse, in whom they so much believed, and altered the course of their high resolutions so far, as where before they swore the overthrow of the Romans, they were now content to take the protection of a strong Town: but, this second foil which they received, did so assure them of a harder confrontation and stronger opposition than they were able to bear, that they never thought of any further Trial, but were content to go away losers, rather than to hazard their lives in a third Combat. And thus, when a second event backeth a former fortune, it taketh away the suspicion of casualty, and maketh the winner bold, and the loser desperate. Pompey was so transported with joy for the Blow which he gave Cæsar at Dyrrachium, that he sent Letters of that day's Victory into all parts of the World, and made his Soldiers so secure touching the issue of that War, *ut non de ratione belli cogitarent, sed vixisse jam sibi viderentur*, that they never thought how the War was to be carried on, esteeming themselves already absolute Victors: nor remembering, as Cæsar saith, the ordinary changes of War; wherein oftentimes a final matter, either of a false suspicion, or of a sudden fright, or some other accident, doth endanger an Army, which the Enemy taketh to himself, *perinde ac si virtute vicisset*, as if he had overcome by his valour.

Vercingetorix sendeth away the Horse: Cæsar incloseth Alesia with a strong wall.

Vercingetorix thought it best to dismiss all the Horse, and send them away in the night, before the Fortifications were perfected by the Romans. At their departure he commanded them, that every man should repair unto his own State, and send all to the War that were able to bear Armes. He layeth open his desires towards them, and doth adjure them to have regard to his safety, and not to suffer him to be delivered over to the torture of the Enemy, that had so well deserved of the Common Liberty; wherein, if they should prove negligent, Four-score thousand chosen men would perish with him in that place. And looking into their provisions, he found, that they had scarce Corn for Thirty dayes, but by sparing and good Husbandry it might be made to serve longer. With these Mandates he sent out the Horsemen in silence, about the second watch of the night, at that part of the Town where the Works were not perfected: he commanded all the Corn to be brought unto him upon pain of death. The Cattel he distributed to the Soldiers by pole, whereof there was great store brought out from the Mandubii: the Corn he began to measure out very sparingly. All the Forces which he had placed before the Town, he received within the Walls; and so he purposed to attend the supplies of Gallia. Which being known by the run-aways and captives, Cæsar appointed to make these fortifications. He drew a Ditch of Twenty foot in breadth and depth, with straight sides, as broad at the bottome as at the top. The rest of the work he made Forty foot short of that Ditch, which he did for these reasons; that the whole body of the Romans might not easily be inclosed about with an Army of Soldiers, which he thought to prevent, by taking in so great a circuit of ground; and secondly, lest the Enemy sallying out upon a sudden, should, in the night, come to destroy the Works, or in the day-time trouble the Soldiers with darts and casting-weapons, as they were busied about the Works. This space of Forty foot being left, he made two Ditches of Fifteen foot in breadth and depth, the innermost whereof being carried through the Fields and the lower ground, he filled, with water drawn out of the River. Behind them he made a Ditch, and a Rampier of Twelve Foot, and strengthened

strengthened it with a parapet and pinacles, and with great boughes of Trees, cut in cags, like unto a Haris bourn, which he set where the Hovels were joynd to the Rampier, to hinder the Enemy from climbing up; and made Towers round about the whole Work, in the distance of Four-score Foot one from another. At the same time, the Roman Soldiers were, both to get stuff for the Fortification, to go a harvesting for provision of corn, and to make such great Works. Our Forces being much weakened, and being to seek corn and stuff far off from the Camp; the Gallies also oftentimes attempting to destroy the Works, and to sally out of the Town at divers Ports: therefore Cæsar thought it fit to add thus much more to the foresaid Works, that the Fortifications might be made good with the less number of men. He made Ditches round about the Works of five foot deep, and in them he planted either the bodies of Trees, or great firm boughes sharpened into may pikes and shags, being bound together at the bottome, that they might not be easily plucked up, and spreading themselves at the top into very sharp cags. There were of these five ranks, so combined and infolded one in another, that which way soever the Enemy should enter upon them, he would necessarily run himself upon a sharp stake. These they called Cippi. Before these, in oblique courses, after the manner of a Quincunce, were digged holes of three foot deep, narrow at the bottome like a Sugar-loaf: these they set with round stakes of the bigness of a mans Thigh, with a sharp hardened point, in such sort, that they stuck not above four fingers out of the Earth; and, for the better fastening of them, they stuck all a foot within the ground: the rest of the whole, for the better ordering of the matter, was hid with Officers and Spreads. Of these were eight courses, three foot distant one from another: and these they called Lillies, from the resemblance they had to the Figure of that Flower. Before these were Galibrops of a Foot long, fastened in the Earth, and beaded at the top with barbed hooks of iron, sowed up and down in all places, in a reasonable distance one from another: and these they called Stimuli. The inner Fortifications being thus perfected, he followed the even and level ground as much as the Nature of the place would give him leave, and took in Fourteen miles in circuit, and made the like Fortifications, in all points, against the Enemy without, as he had done against the Town; to the end, that if he

were driven, upon occasion, to depart and leave the Works, it might be no danger for him to leave the Camp; for as much as a few men would defend it. He commanded every man to have Forrage and provision of Corn for thirty dayes.

The first OBSERVATION.

I Promised in my former observation to speak somewhat touching the Roman Works, and so shew the ufe they made of them in their greatest occasions: but, this description of the Works at Alesia, doth so far exceed the enlargement of commenting words, that it hath drowned the cloquence of great Historians, and in stead of Expositions and inforcements, hath drawn from them speeches expressing greater admiration then belief. *Citrea Alesiam (sith Paternus) tamæ res gessit, quantas adhuc vix hominis, perficere nullus nisi Dei fuerit*: So great things were done at Alesia, that they might seem too great for any than to attempt, or any but a god to effect. To inclose a Town with a Ditch and a Rampier of Eleven miles in circuit, was a matter worthy the Roman Army: but, to add such variety of works, and to make such strange traps and oppositions against an Enemy, was admirable to the hearer; and not that only, but to make the like Works without, to keep the Gallies from raising the Siege, did double the wonder: by which works he did besiege, and was besieged, took the Town, and overthrew the Enemy in the Field.

Such, as since that time have imitated this industry, only by a small Ditch and a Rampier (for I think no man ever made such Works) have wrought wonders in matter of War. *Calistruccio* got the name of renewing the ancient Military Discipline in Italy, chiefly, for that he besieged Pistoia, and with the help of a double Trench, according to the example of Cæsar, he kept in the Pistoians on the one side, and kept out an Army on the other side of Thirty thousand Foot, and Three thousand Horse, in such manner, as in the end he took the City, and made their Succors of no effect. The States Army of the United Provinces, under the Leading of *Grave Maurice*, did the like at the Town of *Grave* in the year 1602. But, of this at Alesia, may well be said that which *Zivy* speaketh of the Battel at *Nola*: *Jugens ut die res, ac nefcio anmaxima illo bello gessit*: A great piece of service was done that day, and I think I may call it the greatest in that whole War.

The second OBSERVATION.

IT is here delivered, that the outward circuit of the works contained fourteen miles, and the circuit of the inward works eleven miles: upon which ground *Fulsius Lippius* maketh an unjust conjecture of the space between the outward and the inward works where the Romans lay incamped. For, according to the proportion between the Circumference and the Diameter, he maketh the Diameter of the greater Circle four, and of the lesser three miles: and then he taketh the lesser diameter out of the greater, and concludeth the space to be almost a mile between the inner

Justus Lipsius militarium, Lib. 2. Dial. 3.

and the outward Rampier, where the *Romans* lay encamped between the works: and least the matter might be mistaken in Ciphers, he doth express it at large in significant words, whereby he maketh the space twice as much as indeed it was. For, the two Circles having one and the same Center, the Semidiameter of the one was to be taken out of the Semidiameter of the other, and the remainder would amount almost to half a mile; which, according to the ground here delivered, was the true distance between the works, if the nature of the place (whereunto they had a respect) would suffer them to keep the same distance in all parts. But, *aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus*, Homer himself is out sometimes; and no disgrace neither to the excellency of his Learning, deserving all honor for the great light which he hath brought to the knowledge of Histories, and for redeeming the truth from blots and Barbarism.

CHAP. XXXII.

The Gallies raise an Army of 248000. to raise the Siege at Aleſia.

Cæſar.

While these things were a doing at Aleſia, the Gallies having summoned a Council of the Princes and chieft men of each State, they thought it not convenient to take all that were able to bear Arms, according to Vercingetorix direction; but to proportion out a certain number for every State, lest that of such a confused multitude there would be no Government, being not able to know their Soldiers, or to martial them in any good order, or to make provision of Victual for so great a Body. The Hedui and their Clients, the Segufiani, Ambivareti, Aulerci, Brannovices, and Brannovii, were commanded to send out Five and thirty thousand: the Arverni with their Clients, the Heluteri Cadurci, Gaballi, Velauni, as many: the Senones, Sequani, Bituriges, Santones, Rutheni, Carnutes, Twelve thousand: the Bellovaci Ten thousand: the Lemovices as many: the Pictones, Turones, Parisii, Heluteri, Suesiones, 8000: the Ambiani, Mediomatrics, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, Nitiobriges, 5000: the Aulerci, Cenomani as many: the Atrebatas 4000: the Bellocassi, Lexovii, Aulerci, Eburones, 3000: the Rauraci and Boii 30000: the States bordering upon the Ocean, whom by the customs of Gallia they call *Aremorici*, such as are the Curiosollites, Rhedones, Ambibarii, Cadetes, Oſismi, Lemovices, Veneti, Unelli, 6000. Of these the Bellovaci refused to give their number, saying, That they would make War with the Romans in their own name, and according to their own directions, neither would they

serve under any mans command. Notwithstanding, being intreated by Comius, for his sake they sent Two thousand. Cæſar, as we have heretofore delivered, had used the help of this Comius the year before in Britain, being both faithful and serviceable: in recompence of which Service he had freed his State of all Duties to the Roman Empire, and restored unto them their ancient Laws and Customs; and to himself he had given the Morini. Notwithstanding, such was the universal consent of all Gallia, to redeem their Liberty, and their antient honour in matter of War, as neither Friendship, nor the memory of former Benefits, could any way move them, every man intending that War, as far as either the power of his mind, or the possibility of his means would reach unto: and, having drawn together Eight thousand Horse, and Two hundred and forty thousand Foot, they Mustered their Forces in the confines of the Hedui, where they appointed Captains, and the Chief Command was given to Comius of Arras, and to Viridomarus, and Eporodorix, Hedui, and to Vergasilaunus of the Arverni, Cousin-german to Vercingetorix. To these, there were certain chosen out of every State, to give assistance in Council of War: and all of them went joyfully and full of hope to Aleſia. Neither was there any man that did think, that the very sight of such a multitude was able to be endured, especially when the Fight would grow doubtful, for Salies made out of the Town, and so great Forces of Horse and Foot should be seen without.

OBSERVATION.

Vercingetorix desire was, to have had as many of the Gallies sent to his rescue, as were able to bear Arms, grounding himself upon that Maxime; Where the whole State is in question, there the whole Forces of that State are to be employed. But, the other Princes of Gallia thought it not expedient to raise so great a number: for they would have accrewed to such a multitude of People, as could not have been contained within the Rules of Government. Which may bring to our consideration, that, which the course of the times doth not often bring into dispute: What number of men, well Martialled, and with good discipline, are a competent proportion for any Service. Xerxes Army which he carried into Greece, was famous for two respects: First, in regard of the multitude, which was so great, that when he himself returned back into Asia, he left behind him Three hundred thousand of the best Soldiers, chosen out of the whole Army, under the conduct of one Mardonius. Secondly, that of so many fighting men, there were Two hundred and threecore thousand slain in one Battel, with the

What number of Men are a competent proportion for any service,

the loss of One thousand and three hundred Grecians. Whereby it appeareth, that the conquest of a Kingdom doth not necessarily follow the multitude of Soldiers in an Army; for, either Xerxes Army was too few in number to Conquer Greece, or too many to be well Martialled.

Marius with Fifty thousand men defeated the Cimbr, that were so many in number, as they made a Battel of Thirty furlong square, and of them he slew a Hundreded and twenty thousand, and took Threecore thousand prisoners. And for that I do remember of that which I have read, the greatest Conquests that ever were made, were achieved with Arms under Fifty thousand fighting men. The Great Alexander subdued all Asia, and set the Monarchy from the Persian into Greece, with Thirty thousand men.

The Romans had very seldom Ten Legions in an Army, which was about that rate, but commonly their Conquering Armies were far under that proportion. Paulus Æmilius only had a hundreded thousand in his Army against Perſeus, and won the Battel in an hour. The condition of our times requireth no dispute touching this point, for we seldom see an Army of Fifty thousand men in the Field, unless it be the Turks, or some such Monarch.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Critognatus his Speech at Aleſia, touching the keeping of the Town.

Cæſar.

They that were besieged in Aleſia, the day being past by which they looked for succor, their Corn being spent, and not knowing what was done abroad, entered into consultations touching the end of their fortune; and divers opinions being delivered, some of them tending to the yielding up of the Town, and others perswading, that as long as strength lasted, there might be Salies continually made upon the Enemy: I will not omit the Speech of Critognatus, for the singular and wicked cruelty which it imported. He was a Man of great birth and authority amongst the Arverni. I will say nothing (saith he) of their opinion, that call base servitude by the name of rendry: neither do I think them fit to be accounted Citizens, or to be admitted to Council of State. With them will I deal that like well of Salies, in whose advice and counsel, even by all your consents, the memory of antient vertue seemeth to consist. It is no verine, but a weakness of the mind, not to be able to bear want a little while. It is an easier matter to find men that will offer themselves willingly to death, then such as will endure labor with patience. For mine own part, I could like well of that opinion (for honour much prevaileth with me;) if I did not see a further loss then of our lives. But, in these our consultations, let us

look upon all Gallia, whom we have called together to succor us. What spirits do you think would our friends and kinsmen conceive, Fourcote thousand men being slain in one place, if they were constrained to wage Battel upon their dead Carcasses? I would not have you to defraud them of your help, that do neglect all perit for your sake, nor by your foolishness and your rashness, or the weakness of your minds, throw down all Gallia, and cast it into perpetual bondage. Do you doubt of their faith and constancy, because they came not by a day? What do the Romans then mean in these outward Works? Do you think they make them for exercise, or to pass away the time? If you cannot then receive assurance by their nussingers, all passage being stop, use them for witnesses, that their coming is at hand, for fear whereof they labour night and day. What then? My advice is, that we do as our Forefathers did in a war against the Cimbr and Teutones, not equal to this, who being sent up within their Towns, and brought to the like necessity, did satisfy their hunger with the bodies of such as were found unfit for War, neither did they yield themselves unto the Enemy: whereof, if we had not an example, yet I would judge it an excellent thing to be begun now for Liberties sake, and to be left to posterity. For what War was like this? Gallia being wasted and dispeopled, and the Kingdom brought into great misery, the Cimbr, at length, forsook our Countrey, and sought out other Territories, and left unto us our Laws, Customs, Lands and Liberty. For the Romans, what is it they desire? or what would they have? But being drawn on with malice and envy, whom they understood to be a noble and a warlike Nation, their Fields and Cities they did desire to take from them, and to yoke them with eternal bondage; as never making war with other condition. For, if you are ignorant what they do far off in other Countreys, look at home in that part of Gallia which is reduced into a Province. Their Laws and Customs being changed, it is subjected to the Axe, and to perpetual servitude. Their opinions being delivered, they decree, That such as through age or sickness were unfit for War, should depart the Town; and that they should prove all means, before they yielded to Critognatus opinion; and yet, if the matter so required, to consent unto it, and to attend their Succors rather then to yield to any rendry and condition of Peace.

OBSER-

OBSERVATION.

IT is oftentimes made questionable in the extremity of a Siege, how far the Commanders may go in continuing their resistance to the danger and hazard of the people besieged, whether they may not in honor proceed as far as *Crispinatus* opinion would draw them, or how they may know when to leave it, in the very point of discreet and valiant carriage. Which is to be answered according to the quality of the Enemy, that giveth siege to be place. For against a treacherous and disloyal enemy, that maketh profession of infidelity, and would not flick after a composition to insure them in a greater danger than the peril of death, there would be much endured rather than to undergo so hard a fortune. And yet I do not way approve the cruel resolution of this *Gall*, but do rather commend the example of the *Hungarians* at the siege of *Agria*. For, in the year 1562, *Mahomet Bassa* lay before that Town with an Army of Three score thousand *Turks*, and laid Battery to it with Fifty Canons. There were within the Town Two thousand *Hungarians*, who endured and put off Thirteen most terrible assaults of the Enemy; and for the better strengthening of their high resolution, they took a mutual Oath, That no Man, upon pain of death, should once speak of a Treaty, or of giving up the Town, or to make any answer to the Enemy, but by the *Harquebuse*, or the Canon: And, if the siege should happen to continue long, rather to die for hunger, than to put themselves in the hands of so cruel and barbarous an Enemy. They determined further, That such amongst them as were not serviceable with a Weapon, should attend continually to reinforce the Rampier, and repair the Ruines. And, to avoid Treachery, they took order, that there might be no Assemblies in the City, above the number of Three together. They commanded likewise, that all the *Vicual*, as was either publick or private, should be divided into equal portions amongst the soldiers, and the best of it should be reserved for such as were hurt in fight. It is further reported, that the *Bassa* having oftentimes offered a Treaty, they only shewed, for an answer to his Summons, a Funeral Bier covered with black, lifted up above the Wall, between two Pikes, to signify thereby, that they would not come out but by death.

As this is a degree short of *Crispinatus* resolution, so I do not deny but that a General may give up a Town before he come to these Terms, with true honour and wisdom. But, the matter (as I have said) consisteth altogether upon the circumstances intercalated. But that which is further to be observed in this place, is the extreme contrariety of opinions, which are usually delivered upon dispute of such difficult cases, wherein *Quædam alteri sententia deest animi, tantum alteri superesse soler*: one mans opinion speaks too much courage, and another as much too little: as *Curio* said upon the like occasion, *Medito turissimis ibi*, -- The mid's the safest way, was *Phæbus* direction to his son *Phæon* in a matter of difficulty and great hazard, and observed in this place by the *Galles*.

The *Galles* do set upon *Cæsar's* Camp, both from the Town and the Field side.

CHAP. XXXIV.

THE *Mandubii*, who had received the Army into the Town, were themselves thrust out with their Wives and Children. They coming to the Roman Works, did, with weeping tears, beseech them to receive them into bondage, and relieve them with food. *Cæsar* gave order they should not be received, and set a Guard on the Rampier to keep them out. In the mean time *Comius*, and the rest of the Captains, that had the Chief Command given them, came to *Alesia* with all their Forces, and, having taken a Hill on the out-side, they sat down, not above half a mile from our Works. The next day bringing their Cavalry out of their Camp, they filled all that Plain, which, as I have already said, extended three miles in length before the Town, setting their Foot-forces a little distant from that place, and hiding them upon higher ground. The prospect lay open out of the Town into the Field: and, upon the sight of these Succors they ran together, and congratulated each other, and all their minds were filled with gladness. And, thereupon, the next day they brought their Forces and placed them before the Town, and began to cover the next ditch unto them with Hurdles, and to fill it up with Earth, and to provide themselves to sally out, and to endure all chances. *Cæsar* having disposed of all his Army on each side of the Works, that if there were occasion, every man might both know and keep his place, he commanded the Cavalry to be carried out of the Camp, and to charge the Enemy. There was a fair view out of all the Camps, which were seated round about upon the ridge of the Hill, and all mens minds were bent upon the expectation of the event of the Fight. The *Galles* had mingled amongst their Horse some few Archers and light-armed soldiers, which might relieve their fellows being overcharged, and sustain the force and assault of our Horse. By these were many hurt upon a sudden, and forsook the Fight. The *Galles* being persuaded that their Men had the better of the fight, perceiving our men to be overcharged with multitude on all sides, as well those that were besieged, as the other that came to relieve them, they took up a shout and a howling to encourage their People. And, for as much as the matter was carried in the fight of all men, so

Cæsar.

that nothing could be hid, whether it were well or ill done; the desire of honour, and the fear of ignominy did stir up both sides to promys and valour. And, having fought with a doubtful fortune, from noon-tide until almost Sun-setting, the Germans on the one side with thick-thronged Troops gave a fierce charge upon the Enemy, and put them to flight; whereby it happened, that the Archers were circumvented and slain. In like manner, on the other side, our men finding them to give ground, did follow them even to their Camp, and gave them no time to recover themselves. Such as were come out of *Alesia*, returned back sad into the Town, despairing of Victory. One day being intermitted, in which time they made provision of great store of Hurdles, Ladders, and Hooks; about midnight they marched silently out of their Camp, and came to the Works on the Field side, and taking up a sudden shout, to give notice of their coming to them of the Town, they cast their Hurdles upon the Ditcher, and with Slings, Arrows, and Stones, they began to put our men from the Rampier, and to put in practice such things as belong to a siege. At the same time the shout being heard, *Vercingetorix* sounded the Trumpet, and brought his men out of the Town. Our men betook themselves to the Fortifications, according as every mans place was allotted him the day before; and with Slings and Bullets, which they had laid ready upon the Works, they did beat down the *Galles*, their fight being taken away through the darkness of the night. Many wounds were received on both sides, and many weapons were cast out of Engines. *M. Antonius*, and *C. Trebonius*, Legates, who had the charge of those parts where our men were most laid, caused men to be taken out of the further Castles, and to be brought to second them. The *Galles* being a good way distant from the Works, did much hurt with multitude of Weapons: but, approaching nearer, either they struck themselves unwarily upon the galibrops, or falling into the holes, were struck through the bodies with the sharp stakes, or died with Mural piles, being cast from the Rampier and the Towers. Many wounds being received on all sides, as the day appeared, the *Galles* fearing least they should be charged on the open side, by a Sallie from the upper Camp, retired back again to their Fellows. On the inner side, whilst they brought out such things as were prepared before-hand by *Vercingetorix*, and were filling up the first Ditches, being somewhat long

in the execution of these things, they understood, that the other *Galles* were departed, before they themselves could come near the Works: and thereupon they returned into the Town, without doing any thing.

OBSERVATION.

THE *Galles* committed the Command of this great Army to Four Generals, contrary to the practice of Warlike Nations, and the order which Nature observeth throughout all the several kinds of Creatures: amongst whom, there was never body found of many heads, but one *Aydra*, being made, as it seemeth, or rather feigned to be made, to the end that *Hercules* might have a task answerable to himself, and make it one of his twelve labours to kill the beast. The Serpent *Amphiphaena* is said to have two heads, whereby the either loath the use of local motion, or at the least moveth so imperfectly, one head taking one way, and the other another, as there is no certain or direct passage in her creeping.

These many-headed Armies do resemble these Serpents, being carried according to the sense of their several heads, and distracted by the diversity of their many Leaders. The Government of *Rome* consisting of several Magistracies, having Sovereign Authority, gave occasion oftentimes to make two heads to one body, but with such success, as they were forced in the end to create one head for the repairing of that loss, which the multiplicity of Leaders had brought upon their State; as it happened in the War against the *Fidenates* revolted, which nothing but their recourse to a Dictator could make happy to their Empire. Whereupon *Livie* saith: *Tres Tribuni, potestate consulari, documento fuerunt quam plurimum imperium bello inutile esset; remando ad sua quisque consilia, cum aliis aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti*: The three Tribunes with consular power, clearly shewed how inconvenient a thing it is to have more than one Commander in Chief: for, while every one adheres to his own advice and judgment, one man thinking this thing convenient, another that, they open a way to the Enemy to make advantage against them. In the time of their Consuls, *Quintius* and *Agrippa* being sent against the *Aqui*, *Agrippa* referred the business wholly to his colleague, concluding, as *Livie* saith: *Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est summum imperii adunum esse*: It is the safest way in the managing of great Affairs, to have one man bear the chief sway. And therefore, as one body requireth but one head, so one business would have but one director, for as much, as *Æmulatio inter pares*, & ex eo impedimentum: Emulation, and consequently hinderance, will be amongst Equals.

One Army would have one General

Ergravis in genium caput Amphiphaena.

Tatitus.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXV.

The Galles do choose out sixty thousand of their best Men, and do assault the weakest part of Cæsar's Camp.

Cæsar.

THE Galles being repelled twice with great loss, do fall into consideration what they were next to do. They call unto them such as were well acquainted with the nature and site of the place, by whom they understand of the situation of the upper Camp. On the north side there lay a hill, which by reason of the greatness of the circuit, our Men could not take in within the compass of their works; and thereupon were necessarily constrained to lay their Camp in an unequal place (some what shelving. This part was kept by Caius Antistius Rheginus, and Cainsius Canius Rebilus with two Legions. This being known by the discoverers, the Captains of the enemy chose out sixty thousand of those States, which carried the greatest opinion of manhood, and did secretly determine amongst themselves, how and in what sort they would have the service carried, and do determine to put in execution, when the Sun should be near about the noon meridian, appointing Vergasillaunus to command those Forces, being one of the four Captains, and kinsman to Vercingetorix. He going out of the Camp in the first watch of the night, came to the end of his journey a little before day. And hiding himself behind a hill, commanded his Soldiers to refresh themselves from the former nights travel. And when it began to be towards noon, he made towards that part of the Camp which I have before mentioned: and at the same time the horsemen began to approach towards the works, and the rest of the forces shewed themselves before the Camp. Vercingetorix perceiving this out of the watch-tower of Alesia, went out of the Town, and carried with him long poles, books, and such other provisions which he had made ready before hand for a siege. They fought at one instant in all places, all ways were tried, and where they thought it to be weakest, thither they ran. The Roman forces were dismembered by reason of the large extension of their works, so that they could not easily defend many places, and the shout which was made behind their backs, did much affright our Men, so much as they perceived that their danger did consist in other Mens valor; for such things as are absent, do for the most part greatly perplex and trouble Mens minds.

Cæsar having got a convenient place, doth see what is done in every part: if any were overcharged he sent them succor, and was ready to answer all occasions on both sides the Camp. He told them that that was the time, wherein it was becomful for them to fight. The Galles would despair of all good success, unless they brake down the works. The Romans if they obtained their purpose, might expect an end of their labors. The greatest contention was about that place to which Vergasillaunus was sent. A small rising in a place, doth give much advantage in a sieging descent. Some cast weapons, others put themselves into a Testudo, and came under the works. The wearied and overlabor'd were seconded by fresh supplies. Every Man cast earth into the works, which raised it so high, that the Galles had advantage of ascent: and the piker and sharp stakes which the Romans had cunningly hid under the earth to annoy the enemy, were thereby covered. It came at last to that pass, that our Men wanted both strength and weapons. Which being known, Cæsar sent Labienus with six Cohorts to relieve those that were overcharged, commanding him, (if they could not bear out the charge) to fall out upon them, but not unless he were constrained unto it. He himself went about to the rest, adhorting them not to faint under their labor, forasmuch as the fruit and benefit of all their former battels consisted in that day and that hour. The Enemy within being out of hope of doing any good upon the works made in plain and champian places, by reason of the strength of the fortifications, tried what they could do in steep and broken places; and thither they brought those things which they had prepared. With the multitude of their casting weapons, they cast out such as fought from turrets, they filled their passages with hurdles and earth, they brake down the parapet and the rampier with books. Cæsar sent first young Brutus with six Cohorts, and after him Fabius a Legate, with seven more, and at length as the fight waxed hot, he went himself with a fresh supply. The fight being renewed, and the enemy beaten off, he bated to that place whither he had sent Labienus, and took four Cohorts out of the next Castell. Part of the horsemen he commanded to follow him, and the rest to compass about the outward works, and to set upon the enemy behind. Labienus finding that neither rampier nor ditches were able to keep out the enemy, having got such forces together as were drawn by chance from the works nearest hand,

hand, to the number of thirty nine Cohorts, he acquainted Cæsar by Messengers what he thought fit to be done. Cæsar made haste to be at the fight. His coming being known by the colour of his Garment, which he was accustomed to wear in time of Battel, and the Troop of Horse and the Cohorts being discovered, which he had commanded to follow him, at the shelving and declining places were subject to the view of higher grounds; the Enemy began the Fight. A great shout was taken up on both sides. Our men having thrown their pikes, betook themselves to their Swords. Suddenly the Horsemen were discovered behind them, and other Cohorts made their approaches towards them. The Enemy turned his back and fled: The Horsemen met them as they fled. The slaughter was great in that place. Sedulius, a Captain and Prince of the Lemovici, was slain. Vergasillaunus was taken alive. Three score and fourteen Ensignes were brought unto Cæsar: and very few of so great a number returned safe into their Camp. Those of the Town beholding the slaughter and flight of their Friends, being out of all hope, drew back their Forces from the Works. This being known, the Galles fled presently out of their Camp: and if the Soldiers had not been wearied with that day's labour, they might easily have destroyed all their Enemies. About midnight the Horse being sent out to fall upon the rearward, a great number was taken and slain, the rest escaped into their Countreys.

OBSERVATION.

IT is an old saying of a hungry man, That it is an easier matter to fill his belly then his eye: which is as true in other cases; wherein our desires are oftentimes so great, that we think no means sufficient to accomplish the same: but when we shall come to put it in trial, and suffer every man to be measured with his own foot, it will appear, that our desires are better applied to the infinity of the mind, then to the necessary occasions of our life. Vercingetorix was so far interested in the success of this War, that he thought all the able men of Gallia not enough to make it happy unto him: but, the other Princes that were not so deeply touched, and yet stood as well affected to the cause, refused to enroll all that were able to bear Arms, but thought Two hundred forty and eight thousand men to be a competent force for this service. But, coming to the execution of the business, they employed only Sixty thousand: and when they failed of their endeavour, and were routed and overthrown by the Romans, the rest flid no longer to dispute the matter, but fled all away by night. Which sheweth the difference between the affections, which are forerunners of a cause, and such as grow and in-

crease with a business, and are not commonly found in one and the same subject in their greatest strengths. For, these antecedent desires are like Womens longings; strong and violent at first, but decaying as fast again before they come to any ripeness. whereas, such affections as rise from the carriage of a business, and grow from the occurrences of that proceeding, are not so easily abated, but do hold out strong either for constancy or obstinacy.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Vercingetorix yieldeth himself and the Town to Cæsar.

THE next day Vercingetorix having called a Council, told them, that he had not undertook that War for his own occasions, but for the cause of Common Liberty: and for as much as they were necessarily to yield to fortune, he made offer of himself unto them, either to satisfy the Romans with his death, or to be delivered unto them alive. Ambassadors were sent to Cæsar touching that point. He commanded their Armes to be delivered, and the Princes to be brought out. He himself sate in the fortifications before the Camp: thither the Captains were brought, Vercingetorix was delivered; their weapons were cast out. The Hedui and the Arverni being reserved, to the end he might recover the rest of the States. by them; of the rest of the Captives, he gave throughout all the Army, to every man a prisoner, by the name of a bootie. These things being ended, he went to the Hedui, and received in the State. Thither did the Arverni send Ambassadors unto him, promising to obey whatsoever he commanded. He demanded a great number of Hostages, and sent the Legions into their Wintering Camps. He sent home twenty thousand Captives to the Hedui and the Arverni. He sent T. Labienus with two Legions, and the Horse, into the Sequani, and gave him M. Sempronius Rutilius to assist him. He lodged C. Fabius, and Lucius Minutius Bassilius, with two Legions, amongst the men of Rhemes, lest they should receive any damage by the near bordering Belovaci. He sent C. Antistius Reginus to the Ambivaceti, and T. Sextius to the Bituriges, and C. Caninius Rebilus to the Rutheni, with each of them a Legion. He placed Q. Tullius Cicero, and P. Sulpitius at Cavillonis, and Matifcona of the Hedui upon the River Arar, for provision of Corn: he himself determined to Winter at Bibract. These years service being known at Rome, there was a Feast of thanksgiving appointed for twenty dayes together.

B b

OBSER-

A little it
enough to
live a long
ing.

Cæsar.

OBSERVATION.

Vercingetorix, notwithstanding a hard Fortune, entertained a noble resolution: for, having first acquainted the *Gallæ*, that he had not undertook that War, for any respect to himself, but for the cause of *Gallia*, and the antient Liberty of that Continent: he made offer to satisfy the angry *Romans* with his Body dead or alive.

Plutarch in
the life of
Cæsar.

Plutarch reciteth the manner of his delivery, to be in this sort: Being Armed at all parts, and mounted on a Horse, furnished with a rich caparison, he came to *Cæsar*, and rode round about him, as he sat in his Chair of Estate; then lighting off his horse, he took off his caparison and furniture, and unarmed himself, and laid all on the ground, and went and sat down at *Cæsars* feet, and said never a word. *Cæsar*, at length, committed him, as a Prisoner taken in the Wars, to be led afterwards in his Triumph at *Rome*: but, the Civil Wars did cut off that Solemnity.

Plutarch in
the life of
Paulus Æ-
milius.

If it be demanded, what became of these great Princes and Personages after the Triumph: It will appear, that they did not stroke their heads, or make more of them, than of miserable Captives. For, *Paulus Æmilius*, after the noble Triumph for King *Perseus*, pitying his Fortune, and desiring to help him, could never obtain other grace for him, than onely to remove him from the common prison, which they called *Cæcar*, into a more cleanly and sweeter house: where, being straightly guarded, he died, either by abstinence, or being kept from sleep by the Soldiers. Two of his Sons di-

ed also, but the third became an excellent Turner or Joyner, and could write the *Roman* Tongue so well, that he afterwards became Chancellor to the Magistrates of *Rome*. And thus the *Romans* dealt with their Captive Princes, making them examples of Fortunes unconstancy, and turning their Diadems into shackles of Iron.

And thus far did *Cæsar* Comment himself upon the Wars he made against the *Gallæ*, being a noble and a worthy People, and bred in a large and fertile Continent; the inhabitants whereof, have in all ages, even to these times, challenged an eminency, both for politick Government and Martial Prowess, amongst the Western Kingdoms of the World: their actions and carriage from time to time deserving as honourable memory, as these Wars recorded by *Cæsars* own hand; whereof *Paulus Æmilius*, *Philip Commenes*, and of late *John de Seres*, are very pregnant witnesses. They continued under the *Roman* Government Four hundred forty and one years, according to the computation made by *John Tillius*, reckoning from the last victory in *Cæsars* Proconsulship, to the time of *Marcomerus*, a General of the *French*, by whose Prowess and means, they denied to pay that Homage and Tribute to the Emperor *Valentinianus*, which *Vercingetorix* had lost to *Cæsar*.

The next Summers Service, complied by *Hirrius*, I have purposely omitted, as intending no further matter, than what *Cæsar* hath related, who best knew the whole project of that business.

And thus endeth the Seventh and last Commentary, written by *Cæsar*, of the war he made in *Gallia*.

FINIS.

OBSERVATIONS
UPON
CÆSAR'S
Commentaries,
OF THE
CIVIL WARS
BETWIXT
Him and Pompey.

BY
CLEMENT EDMUNDS
Remembrancer of the CITY of LONDON.



In the SAVOY:
Printed by *Tho. Newcomb*, for *Jonathan Edwyn*,
at the Three Roses in *Ludgate street*.

M. DC. LXX. VI.

THE
First Commentary
OF THE
CIVIL WARS.

THE ARGUMENT.

THis Commentary containeth the Motions and Contentions at Rome, concerning *Cæsars* giving up his Government: The rent in the State, upon the disagreement of the Senate: How either side bestirred themselves, to seize upon the Provinces. *Pompey* got the East, and *Cæsar* the West part of the Empire, and defeated *Afranius* and *Petereius* in *Spain*.

CHAP. I.

The Senates affection on *Cæsars* behalf.

Cæsar.



Letters being delivered by *Fabius* to the Consuls from *C. Cæsar* it was hardly obtained by the extream importunity of the Tribunes, to get them read in the Senate: but to consult thereof, or to bring the Contents in question, would not be granted. The Consuls propounded busineses concerning the State of the City. *L. Lentulus* Consul, protested his assistance should not be wanting, neither to the Senate nor to the Commonwealth, if they would speak their minds freely and boldly: but if they respected *Cæsar*, and had an eye to his favor (as in former times they usually had) he would then take a course for himself, and not regard the authority of the Senate; neither wanted he means of entrance into *Cæsars* friendship and good acceptance. To the same effect spake *Scipio*: That *Pompey* was resolved to be aiding to the Commonwealth, if the Senate would stand to him: but if they temporized, and dealt coldly, in vain hereafter should they seek aid from him, albeit they instantly desired it. This Speech of *Scipio*'s

seemed to come from *Pompey*'s own mouth, he himself being present, and the Senate kept within the City. Some others spake more temperately. As first *M. Marcellus*, who thought it not convenient that the Senate should bring these things in question, until they had made a leavy of Souldiers throughout all Italy, and inrolled an Army, by whose protection they might safely and freely determine what they thought fit. As also *M. Calidius*, who thought it requisite, that *Pompey* should go to his Provinces and Governments, to remove all occasions of taking Arms: for *Cæsar* having two Legions newly taken from him, feared that *Pompey* kept them near about the City to his prejudice. And likewise *M. Rufus* varying some few words, declared himself of *Calidius* opinion. All these were bitterly reprov'd by *L. Lentulus* the Consul, who utterly denyed to publish what *Calidius* had sentenced. *Marcellus* feared with these menaces, retracted his opinion. And so, what with the clamor of the Consul, the terror of the present Army, and the threatening used by *Pompey*'s faction, most of the Senators were compelled against their will, to allow that which *Scipio* thought fit: which was, that by a certain day *Cæsar* should dissolve and dismiss his Army; which if he did refuse to do, that then he openly shewed himself an enemy to the Commonwealth.

resal. M. Antonius and L. Cassius, Tribunes of the people, did oppose this decree. Their opposition was instantly spoken unto; and many sharp and hard censures were given upon the same: for according as they one spoke most bitterly and cruelly, so they were most highly commended by Cæsar's Enemies.

The First OBSERVATION.

AS the former Commentaries do carry in their front the ensigns of honor, displaying the military valor of the Roman people in the Continent of Gallia, and other Kingdoms of warlike Nations: so are their Relations branded in the forehead, with a note of infamy, and titled with the direful name of civil War. An odious and decried cause, ill befitting the integrity of that State, or the excellency of the Actors, which are chief in this Tragedy; who neglecting all that might enlarge the Empire, or repair Rome's honor for the loss of Crassus, chose rather to imbrue their ambitious Swords in the blood of their own Country, a Eagle against Eagle, and Pile against Pile, in a War which could challenge no triumph. If it be now demanded as formerly it was,

Quis furor, o Cives? que tanta licentia ferri?
What fury's this? what less than licentia Arms,

a Patres A-
dilius, &
pila minan-
tia pili.
Bella pri
placuit nul-
lor habitura
triumphos
Luc. lib. 1.

B Arms civi-
lia neque
parati, ne-
que haberi
per bonos
Artes pos-
sunt.
Tac. 1. An.
c. Amicus
Socrates.
amens, Pla-
to; magis
amica veri-
tas. Aristot.
1. Ethic.
Pom. Mag.
Constantine
was to ja-
lous thereof
that he pub-
lished an
Edict, that
the honor of
all victories
should be
attributed
to him, al-
though they
were accom-
plished by
one hun-
dred legions
off. d. Fonte-
casar dicit
modico,
parvique
impellitur
undis.

of Rome, 695, obtained the Government of Gallia Transalpinga, and likewise of that other Gallia, which they called Cisalpinga, containing the Countries that lye between the Alpes and the d little River Rubicon, together with Sclavonia, and four Legions of Souldiers, for the term of five years. At the expiration whereof, his charge was continued by the like favor and mediation of Pompey, and the assistance of Crassus, for five years longer, with a redoubling of his forces. But after that Crassus was slain in the Partisan War, and that Julia, Cæsar's daughter, whom Pompey had married, was deceased, (whereby Cæsar lost single, without any tie of alliance, or other a counterpoise of a third party, to hold them balanced at the same weight, as they stood while Crassus lived) Pompey, jealous of those Victories and passages of Arms which Cæsar had achieved by his valor, and impatient of any b partner in point of Lordship; found means first to draw two Legions from him, under colour of the Partisan War; and afterwards got a Decree of Senate, to send him a Successor before his time was expired, and wished, to return as a private person to Rome, to render an account of his actions during his employment. Which Cæsar taking as an assurance of his downfall, gave a huge sum of money to gain Paulus Aemilius, one of the Consuls, and C. Curio al Tribune of the people, to resist this Decree. Howbeit, the succeeding Consuls being both his Enemies, having no farther hope of repealing the same, he intruded in the end, that he might hold only Gallia Cisalpinga and Illyricum with two Legions until he should obtain the Consulship which was the effect of these Letters delivered by Fabius. And being denied by Pompey's faction, in their partial and tumultuous assemblies of the Senate, caused him to forfeit his loyalty to the State, verifying the old saying, That oftentimes an injury maketh way to a greater fortune.

The Second OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING the opposition of the Tribunes, it is to be understood, that the people eaten up with insultery and other grievous exactions, the State had the War with the Volscians and the Aequi, and taking themselves unto a Mountain near unto Rome, would not return from thence, until the Senate had given order for their grievances. In which transaction it was agreed, that there should be Magistrats chosen out of the body of the people, to counterpoise the power of the Senate, and to restrain the boundless authority of the Consuls: which office was reckoned in the number of their holiest things, never to be violated either in word or deed, but the offender should redeem it with the loss of his life. Their whole power consisted in letting and hindering. As when either the Senate or any one Senator, went about a matter which might be prejudicial to the people in general, or to any one of the commonality in particular; then did the Tribunes interpose their authority, to frustrate and avert the same: which was available, albeit the matter was gain-faid, but by one Tribune only. By which intervention they kept the Senate in awful moderation, and were always profitable to the people, but when they happened upon factious and turbulent

Punicus
Gallia, et
Limes
ab Ausonia
diffinitus
are ex colu-
Lucan. lib.
c. Fada tri-
bus domus
Noma
Pompeio,
Cæsar, &
Crasso.

a Nam foli
futuri Cæ-
sar, et
la media
mor...
b Nolla
fenda fod-
etas, nec
fides regu-
Rnnius.
Nec qua-
quam iam
terre possi
Cæsarve
priorem,
Pompeium
parcum...
Luc. lib. 1.
c Ardua ne
hæc est op-
trudere mo-
res.
Martial.

a Sæpe ma-
jores for-
tunas locum
fecit.
S. neca.
Epit. 91.

The Tri-
bunes of
the people.

Indign in a
Council, is
as enemy to
the publick
good.

a Nam male
constru-
mistrat im-
pudens & Ri-
mistrat non
suo privati
odii person-
a in publi-
cum exitum
Tac. 1. Hist.
Atheniensis
Sænor ju-
stis & Ri-
cique popu-
lo consula-
tione.
Demost.
one & Mare
Philipp.

turbulent persons; howbeit, their power was bounded with the Walls of Rome, and extended no farther than the gates of the City. Their doors were never shut, but stood open night and day, for a refuge to such as should fly to them for succor: neither was it lawful for them to be absent from Rome, a whole day together. The robes of their Magistracy were of Purple, as Cicero intimates in his oration *Pro Cluentio*. This Tribunitian power began about the year of Rome 660, was suppressed by Sylla, restored by Pompey, and utterly taken away by the Emperors Constantine.

If it be demanded what kind of Common-wealth this Roman Government was; it is to be understood, that upon the expulsion of their Kings, the Sovereignty rested in their Consuls. For as a *Little* faith, there was nothing diminished of Kingly Govern-ment, save only for the better establishing of liberty, that the Consular dignity was made annual. But that held not long, for *Publius* impared this Sovereignty to the Community, making it lawful to appeal from the Consuls to the people. Whereby the consular authority was dissolved, and the people took occasion to oppose themselves against the Fathers. Hence grew the reciprocal invectives between the Senate and the Tribunes: and when the Consul sent a *de* Sergeant to the Tribune, the Tribune would send a *de* Pursuivant to the Consul. And so the Common-wealth halted between an Aristocracy and a Democracy, until at length the vogue of the Community drew it to a perfect Democracy, and made their Acts of Senate of no value, unless they were ratified by the people. Howbeit, the Senate at ordered always many famous and eminent men, such as having enlarged the bounds of their Empire, and kept on foot their ancient valor, and were the flower of that people, which *Cynæas* called a Town of Kings, were consequently engaged in the businesses of the State, that matters were for the most part carried as they stood affected, as appeareth by this passage of Cæsar.

The Third OBSERVATION.

THIRDLY we may observe, that violence and partiality are the bane of all consultations: especially, when the common good is shad-owed with private respects. And albeit the gravity of the Roman Senate far exceeded all that can be spoken of other Councils of State, rectifying the inordinate affect of any of *Cassius*, that would lift his head higher than his fellows: yet here it suffered a duty and indifference to be suppressed with faction, giving way to violence, and which governeth all things untowardly, and with cords of private hate: oftentimes draweth the Common-wealth into utter defolation. For prevention whereof, the Athenians swore their Senators to make the common good the chiefest scope of all their Counsels: implying thereby, that private respects always offensive to public ends; and the State ever suffereth, when favor prevaileth against the common profit.

Thus going about to direct a Counsellor in this behalf, only witheth a Man to deliver sincerely what he thinketh of any matter, although he happen to stand alone in his own conceit: for the issue of a business doth not so much concern a Counsellor, as to speak truly his opinion thereof. And to

that end, the custom of the Roman Senate was, that the youngest, and such as came last in place, should declare themselves first, that they might not be foretold in their opinions, nor put besides that they would have spoken, together with the equality which it made of their voices: for things first spoken, do always stick fast in our apprehensions. And for that cause, *Theodorus*, a Greek Tragedian would never shew himself on the stage after any other Actor: as holding the first passage to affect most the spectators. Notwithstanding which custom, it is reported that Cæsar, in favor of Pompey, after their new-made alliance, would take his voice first, thereby to anticipate the opinion of others that should follow.

The Emperors (as it cometh) took what place they pleased: for *Tiberius* in *Marcellus* cause said, that he would sentence openly, and upon oath, that other Men might do the like. Whereunto *C. N. P.* replied, what place wilt thou take to declare thyself, Cæsar? for if thou speak first, I know how to follow; if last, I am afraid I shall dissent from thy opinion. But that which his most blameable in matter of council is, when they come to the Senate house as to a place of strategy. Wherein *L. P.* is defectively commended, for that he never willingly shewed himself of a fervid opinion: but when necessity forced him, he compassed it with wildome. Neither is it the least mischief, that the condition of Sovereignty is such as will hardly endure reproof, but must be dignified, as *Apollonius* corrected Lyons, by beating Dogs before them.

CHAP. II.

The Senate proceed against Cæsar with all eagerness.

THE Senate rising a little before night, were all sent for unto Pompey. He commended the forward for what they had done, and confirmed them for as resolutions; & reprehended such as shewed themselves indifferent, and stirred them up to more forwardness. Many which were of Pompey's former Enemies were sent for, upon hope of reward and advancement: many of the two Legions which lately came from Cæsar, were commanded to attend in the City, against the election of new Magistrats. C. Curio called out the Tribunes of the people. All the Consuls friends, the kinsfolks and allies of Pompey, and such others as had any former enmity with Cæsar, were compelled into the Senate. By the presence and votes of these Men, the weakest were terrified, the doubtful confirmed, and the most part were cut off, from giving absolute and free voices. L. Pilo the Centurion, and L. Rofcius the Pretor, offered themselves to go to Cæsar, to advise him of the things requiring but six days space to return an answer. Others thought it fit, that Embassadors should be

Arist. 7.
polit. 17.

Surron, in
vita Julia
Cæsar.

Tacit. 1.
Annal.

Tacit. 6.
Annal.

Plutarch.

Cæsar.

be sent to Cæsar, to give him notice of the pleasure of the Senate. To all these was opposed what the Consul Scipio and Cato thought fit. Cato was incited through former enmity, and specially by the repulse of the Pretorship. Lentulus out of a consideration of his great debts, hoping to command an Army, to govern Provinces, and to receive the liberal acknowledgments of Kings, whom he should thereby procure to be styled with the title of friends to the people of Rome; insomuch, as he would not stick to boast in private, that he was like to prove a second Sylla, on whom the sovereign command of the Empire would be conferred. Scipio was drawn on by the same hope, of having the Government of a Province, or the command of an Army, which by reason of his alliance, he thought to share with Pompey, being otherwise afraid to be called into justices, as also through flattery and ostentation, both of himself, and other great friends, which were able to sway much, as well in the course of justice, as in the Commonwealth.

Pompey in his particular was much provoked by Cæsar's enemies, and specially for that he could endure no Man to be his equals; he was alienated altogether from Cæsar's friendship, and had reconciled himself to their common enemies; the greatest part of whom were by his means gained to Cæsar, in the time of their alliance. He was also moved by the dishonour which he had gotten by taking those two Legions from their journey towards Asia and Syria, and using them for the advancement of his own particular. Which things moved him to draw the matter to Arms. For these respects, all things were carried impetuously and confusedly; neither was their leisure given to Cæsar's friends to advertise him thereof, nor yet to the Tribunes, to avoid the danger which was falling upon them, or to use their right of opposition which L. Sylla left unto them: but within seven days after, they were entered into their office, they were forced to justify their safety; notwithstanding that the most turbulent and seditious Tribunes of former times, were never put to look into their affairs, or to give account of their actions, before the eighth Month. In the end, they betook themselves to that extreme and last Act of Senate, which was never thought upon, but when the City was upon the point of burning, or in the most desperate estate of the Commonwealth; That the Consuls, Pretors, Tribunes of the people, and such as had been Consuls, and

were residents near about the City, should endeavor that the Commonwealth might not be endangered. This Act was made the seventh of the Ides of January, so that the five first days in which the Senate might sit, after that Lentulus was entered into the Consulship (excepting only two days for the general assembly of the people) most heavy and cruel Decrees were made against the authority of Cæsar, and against the Tribunes of the people, famous and worthy Men, who thereupon fled presently out of the City, and came to Cæsar: who being then at Ravenna, attended an answer to his easy and modest demands, if by any reasonable course matters might be drawn to a peaceable end.

The first OBSERVATION.

It is the condition of humane nature, to make good that which once it hath avouched, although the matter be of small consequence in particular and tendeth rather to infamy than to profit; neither will it easily be reclaimed by motives of reason, but is rather incited thereby (per Antipræstas) to persist in wilfulness, then to hearken to that which is more convenient, especially when either jealousy or revenge do implay an advantage: for then partiality keepeth no measure; but to justify an error, runs headlong into all extremities, and flyeth to the last refuge of desperate and deplorable cases, to make disordered passions seem good discretion. Which evidently appears by Pompey's faction, in resolving of that desperate Act of Senate, which was never thought of but in most eminent danger. For as in foul weather at sea, when a ship rideth in a dangerous road, and through the violence of the tempest, is upon the point of shipwreck, the Mariners are wont to cast out a sheet Anchor, as their last refuge: so had Rome anciently recourse to this Decree, at such times as the Commonwealth was in imminent and extreme calamity, whether it were by Enemies abroad, or by serpents in their bosom at home. Livie speaking of the War of the Æqui, faith, the Senators were so affrighted, that following the form of the Decree which was always reserved for cases of extremity, they ordained that Posthumus (one of the Consuls) should take care that the Commonwealth might not be endangered. The like was used in civil and intestine seditions: as when Manlius Capitolinus aspired to a Tyranny; and as likewise in the tumults of the Gracchi, the conspiracy of Catiline, and other times of like danger. For albeit the Consuls had all sovereign authority, as well in War as in peace, yet nevertheless there were certain reserved cases wherein they had no power, without express order from the Senate, and assent from the people, as to levy an Army to make War, to take Money out of the Treasury, whereas upon such a Decree, they were enabled to dispose of all business of State, without farther moving of the Senate or people, which Tully noteth in his Orations against Antonie. I think it fit, (saith he) that the whole state of the Common-

Ne quid
republic
detrimenti
capere
Conseui
sunt dies
Comitiarum,
per quos
legatus
haberi
non potuit.
Cic. L. l. it.
tit.

Urgentia
onem, sic
ultra in
quæstio la-
betur, Tac.

Suprema
legis Salus
reipub.

Lib. 5.

Lentulus.

Scipio.

Marcellus.

M. Anton.

Plutarch in
the life of
Cicero.
s. Phil.
Consulibus
totam Rem-
pub. com-
mendanda
censu il-
legis pen-
tendium ut
rempub.
defendant,
provident-
que requir-
detrimenti
reipub. ac-
cipiat.

weal be left unto the Consuls, and that they be suffered to defend the same; and to take care that the Commonwealth be not endangered

The second OBSERVATION.

It may not omit (for the better understanding of this noble History) to say somewhat of the Persons here mentioned. And first of Fabius, as defended of the noblest and most ancient Family of the Patrician Order; being able of themselves to maintain war a long time against the Pœii, a strong and warlike Town, until, at length, they were all unfortunately slain, by an Ambushment: which Ovid mentioneth, where he saith:

Hæc sua illa dies, in qua, Vientibus arvis,
Tercentum Fabii ter cecidere duo.

This was that black day, when in Pœian Field Three hundred and six Fabii were kill'd.

Only there remained of that house a Child, then kept at Rome; which, in tract of time, multiplied into six great Families, all which had their turn in the highest charges and dignities of the Commonwealth: amongst whom, he that supplanted Hannibal by temporizing, and got thereby the Surname of Maximus, was most famous, as Ennius witnesseth;

Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem;
Non ponbat enim rumores ante salutem.
Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria clares.

One man, by wise delay, hath sav'd our State;
Whom rumours after publick safety let. (great.
For which his fame grows every day more

But C. Fabius, here mentioned, never attained to any place of Magistracy, other then such Commands as he held in the wars under Cæsar.

Lentulus the Consul was of the house of the Corneliæ, from whom are said to come sixteen Consuls. He was, from the beginning, a mortal Enemy to Cæsar, and so continued to his death, which fell unto him in Egypt, by commandment of King Ptolemy, after Pompey was slain.

Scipio was Father in Law to Pompey, after the death of Julia, Cæsar's daughter; and, by that means, obtained the Government of Asia. In the beginning of the Civil war, he brought good Succors to assist his son in law, as it follows in the third Commentary: and, upon the overthrow at Pharsalia he fled into Africa, where he renewed the war, and became chief Commander of the remaining party against Cæsar; but, being in the end defeated, he came towards Spain: and, fearing by the way least he should fall into his Enemies hands, he slew himself.

Marcellus was of the ancient Family of the Claudii, which came originally from the Sabines; On his behalf there is an Oration extant of Tullius, intitled, Pro Marcello. He was afterwards slain by one Chilo.

M. Antonius is famous in all the Roman Histories, for attaining, in a small time, to so great a height in that Government. For, in all the wars of Gallia, he was but a Treasurer under Cæsar, which

was the least of all publick places of charge. In the beginning of the Civil wars he was made Tribune of the people; and, within less then eight years after, came to be fellow-partner with Octavius Cæsar, in the Government of the Empire. And, if Cleopatra's beauty had not blinded him, he might have easily, through the favour of the soldiers, supplanted his Competitor, and seized upon the Monarchy.

The name of Cælius was ominous for trouble to the State of Rome, and their ends were as unfortunate. This L. Cælius, for his part, after the great troubles he had stirred up in Spain, was drowned in the mouth of the River Eber.

Piso was made Censor in the Consulship of L. Paulus and Claudius Marcellus, having himself been Censor eight years before, in the year of Rome 699, succeeding Cæsar and Bibulus; and was the man against whom Tullie penned that Oration, which is extant in Pisonem. Touching the Office of Censor, it is to be understood, that about the year of Rome 370, the Consuls being distracted with multiplicity of foreign business, omitted the Censorship or Assessment of the City for some years together: whereupon it was afterwards thought fit, that there should be a peculiar Officer appointed for that service, and to be called Censor; for as much as every man was to be taxed, rankt and valued, according to his opinion and censure. The first part of their Office consisted, in an account or valuation of the number, age, order, dignity, and possession of the Roman Citizens: for, it was very material for the State, to know the number of their People, to the end they might be informed of their own strength, and so shape their course accordingly, either in undertaking Wars, Transplanting Colonies, or in making provision of victuals in time of Peace. It was also as requisite to know every mans age, whereby they grew capable of honour and offices, according to that of Ovid;

—fratque cœvis
Legibus est ætas, unde petatur honor.

—In certain Laws
Age is defin'd, and thence is honor had.

M. Antonius commanded, that the names of the Roman children should be brought into the Treasury within thirty dayes after they were born; according to which custome, Francis the French King published an Edict, Anno 1539, that every Parish should keep a Register of Burials and Christenings: which, since that time is used in England.

The distinction of conditions and states, ranging every man in his proper order, is as necessary in the Commonwealth, and as worthy of the Censors notice, as any thing besides. Neither may the assessment of mens abilities be omitted: which was ordained, that every man might bear a part in the Service of the State. In which respect, Servilius Tullius is commended, for rating men according to their wealth; whereas, before that time, every man paid alike: for men are taken to be interested in the Commonwealth according to their Meanes. The last and basest sort of Citizens were named Capite censi, and were set in the Subsidy at Three hundred seventy five pieces of Money. Such

Callius.

Piso.

To know
the number
of Citizens.

Their age.

De Fast.

Halicarnassus, lib. 4.
Getoffred ad
L. ætatem;
S. De Cens.

Their calling.
Majorum
primus quis
quis fuit ille
tuorum. Aut
Paterfuit,
aut filius
quod dicere
nolo.
Their ability
ty.
Florus, l.
1. cap. 6.
Gell. lib.
16 cap. 10.
Ætia.

as were not assisted, had no voice in the Commonwealth.

The second and chiefest part of this Office was in reforming manners, as the ground-plot and foundation of every Commonwealth; to which end they had power to enquire into every man's life. If any one had plaid the ill husband, and neglected his Farme, or left his Vine untrimmed, the Censors took notice of it. If a Roman Knight kept his Horse lean, it was a matter for them to look into. They deposted, or brought in new Senators. They reviewed all degrees and conditions of men: advanced this man from a mean Tribe to a more honourable, and pulled another down. They had the care of buildings, repairing of High-ways, with other publick works; and were reputed of the best rank of Magistrats in Rome. *L. Rofcius* had formerly been one of Cæsar's Legates in Gallia: as appeareth in the Fifth Commentary, *Terentius in Effusis*, *L. Rofcio*, the third Legion amongst the *Rufii*, under *L. Rofcius*. The Prætor was Judge in causes of Controverfie, and differences between party and party; and was as the Caddy amongst the Turks.

CHAP. III.

The Senate prepareth for War.

He next day after the Senate assembled out of the City: where Pompey (according to such instructions as he had formerly given to Scipio) extolled their constancy and magnanimity; acquainted them with his Forces, consisting of Ten Legions in Armes; and further assured them, he knew of a certain that Cæsar's soldiers were alienated from him, and would not be drawn either to defend or follow him. And, upon the assurance of these remonstrances, other motions were entertained. As first, that a Levy should be made throughout all Italy. That Faustus Sulla should forthwith be sent as Proprietor into Mauritania. That money should be delivered out of the Treasury to Pompey. That King Juba might have the Title of Friend and Confederate to the People of Rome. Which Marcellus contradicting, stopp'd the passage thereof for that time. Philippus, Tribune of the People, countermanded Faustus Commission. Other matters were passed by AG. The two Consular, and the other Prætorian Provinces, were given to private men that had no Office of Magistracy. Syria fell to Scipio, and Gallia to L. Domitius. Philippus and Marcellus were purposely omitted, and no Lots cast for their employment. Into the other Provinces were sent Prætors, without any consent or approbation of the People, as formerly had been accustomed: who having performed their ordinary vower, put on their Military Garments, and so took

their Journey. The Consuls (which before that time was never seen) went out of the City, and had their Serjants privately with-in the City, and in the Capitol, against all Order and Antient Custome. A Levy was made over all Italy: Armes and Furniture was Commanded: Money was required from Municipal Towns, and taken out of Temples and Religious places. All Divine and Humane Rights were confounded.

The first OBSERVATION.

The neglect of Ceremonies and Formes in matter of State, is the ruine and abolishment of a Commonwealth. For, if it hold generally true, which Philosophers say, That the form giveth being to whatsoever fabricketh, and that every thing hath his name from his fashion; and making: then it must necessarily follow, that the life and perfection of a State dependeth wholly on the form; which cannot be neglected but with hazard of confusion. For Compliments and Solemnities are neither *Nimia* nor *Minima* (as some have imagined) either superfluities, which may be spared, or trifles of small consequence. But, as the flesh covereth the hollow deformity of the bones, and beautifieth the Body with Natural graces: so are Ceremonies, which ancient custome hath made reverent, the perfection and life of any Commonwealth; and do cover the nakedness of publick actions, which otherwise would not be distinguished from private humilities. And therefore the neglect of such Ceremonies, as were usually observed to ennoble their actions, was as injurious to the safety of the Empire, and as evident a demonstration of faction and disloyalty, as the allotment of Provinces to private persons, or whatsoever else they broached, contrary to the fundamental rights of the publick Weal.

Concerning which, it is to be understood, that no man was capable of those Governments, but such as had born the chiefest offices and places of charge. For their manner was, that commonly, upon the expiration of their offices, the Consuls and Prætors did either cast Lots for the Provinces, which they called *Sortiri provincias*; or did otherwise agree amongst themselves, how they should be disposed, and that they termed *Comparare Provincias*. *Livie* toucheth both the one and the other; *Principio iniquissimi anni cum Consulibus novi de Provinciis retulissent, primo quaque tempore, aut comparare inter eos Italiam & Macedoniam, aut Sortiri placuit*: in the entrance of the next year, when the new Consuls had proposed the business of the Provinces, it was forthwith embraced, that they should either divide, by agreement, Italy and Macedonia betwixt them, or take them as their Lots fell. Howbeit, sometimes the People (whose affet was always necessary) interpreted their authority, and disposed the same as they thought expedient. But, such as had never born office of charge in the State, were no way capable of those dignities, nor thought fit to command abroad, having never shewed their sufficiency at home.

For the manner of their setting forward out of Rome, after they were assigned to employments, it appeareth by infinite examples of Histories, that they

The use of Ceremonies. Forma dat nomines & esse Anni.

Nimia nec Minima.

Civitas le-gibus con-servata, sibi va-queque populi do-minatio, &c. in Cæsaribus.

The manner of disposing of the Provinces and Governments.

Sortiri Provincias, Comparare Provincias. Liv. 43.

The manner of their setting forward to their Governments.

Vota nuncupare.

Voti reus.

Macrobi. li. 3. cap. 2. Saturni.

Paludati

Lib. 4. de Lingua Lat.

Valerius, li. 1. cap. 6.

Civitas le-gibus con-servata, sibi va-queque populi do-minatio, &c. in Cæsaribus.

Raptores orbis, postquam consti-tutum vultu defecit Terra & Mare servatus: quos Metoens nec occidit, nec fugavit. Tac. * Nemine sed Regem solum & amicum a Senatu Populique Romæ appellatum, nil qui apud de Rep. meritis esset, lib. 1. de cad. 4.

Sequitur dies, &c. lib. 1. de cad. 3.

Lib. 1. de bel. Gal.

they first went into the Capitol, and there made publick Sacrifices and solemn Vows, either to build a Temple, or to do some other work worthy good fortune, if their designs were happily achieved; which they called *Vota nuncupare*, the solemn making of vows. And he that had made such a vow, stood *voti reus*, tied by vow, until his business afforded to an issue: and after he had attained his desire, he was *voti damnatus*, bound to perform his vow, until he had acquitted himself of his promise.

Touching their habit expressed in this phrase, *Paludati exeurs*, it appeareth, as well by Antient Sculptures, as Medals, that *Paludamentum* was a cloak used and worn by men of War, whether they commanded in Chief, or as Lieutenants and Centurions; and was tied with a knot upon their left shoulder. *Fellus* calleth all military garments, *Paludamenta*. And *Varro*, giving a reason of that name, saith: *Paluda à paludemis, sunt hæc insignia & ornamenta Militaria. Ideo ad bellum cum exis imperator, ac Littores mutant vestem, & signa incutunt. Paludatus dicitur profectus: que, propterea quod conspiciuntur qui ea habent, & Palam sunt, Paludamenta dicta. Paludamenta are Military ornaments. So, when the Emperor removes, and the Sergeants change their garment, he is then said to March *Paludatus*. Which garments, in regard they are conspicuous which wear them, and to are taken notice of, are called thence *Paludamenta*. The colour of this Cloak was either purple or white. And therefore it was held a pre-lage of ill fortune, when at *Carre*, a City in *Ætolia*, some gave *Cæsar* a black Cloak in stead of a white, as he went to lofe the Battell to the *Parthians*.*

The second OBSERVATION.

The Romans, not contented with the spacious circuit of the Sun, bounding their Empire with the East and the West, but for want of Regions and Countreys, fatching the vastness and depth of the Seas, did seldom acknowledge any other Sovereignty, or leave a party worthy their amity, of any remote Angle of the then known World. But, if any Prince had been so fortunate, as to gain the favour and elimination of a friend, or a confederate to the State, it was upon special and deserved respects, or at the instance of their Generals abroad, informing the worthiness of such Potentates, and the advantage they might bring to the service of the Empire. Which appeareth by that of *Livie*, concerning *Perminia* King *Syphax*'s son; that * no man was at any time acknowledged, either a King or a Friend, by the Senate and People of Rome, unless first he had right well deserved of the Commonwealth.

The manner of this acknowledgment is likewise particularly expressed by *Livie* in another place, speaking of *Scipio*. The day following (saith he) to put King *Mastinissa* out of his grief and melancholy, he ascended up to his Tribunal, and having called an Assembly of the Soldiers, presented him before them; where he first honoured him with the appellation of King, accompanied with many fair praises; and then gave him a Crown of Gold, a Cup of Gold, a Chair of State, a Scepter of Ivory, and a long Robe of Purple. To which agreeth that of *Cæsar*: That *Atrovisus* was by the

Senate, stiled by the name of King and Friend, and presented with great rich gifts; which happened but to few, and was only given by the Romans to men of great desert. Howbeit, such as had Governments and Employments abroad, did oftentimes make profit of giving this honour: whereof *Cæsar* taxeth *Leptulus* in the former chapter. And in this sense was King *Juba* brought in question, to be called by the Senate a Friend and Associate to the State of Rome.

The third OBSERVATION.

Touching the Franchises and Liberties of the Towns of Italy, and others in the Dominions of the Roman Empire, called *Municipia*; it is to be noted, that, according to *Gellius*, those were called *Municipes*, that being Governed by their own Laws, and their own Magistrats, were nevertheless endowed with the freedom of Rome. And therefore *Adrianus* marvelled, that the *Italicienses* and *Uicesenses* did rather desire to be *Coloni*, and to be tied to the obedience of Foreign and strange Laws, than to live in a Municipal State, under their own Rights and Customes; and as *Fellus* addeth, with the use of their peculiar rights, for matter of Religion, such as they antiently loved, before they were privileged with the Immunities of Rome.

For the better understanding whereof, we are to observe, that there were sundry differences of Municipal Towns: for some had voices with the Roman People in all their Elections and Suffrages; and some others had none at all. For *Gellius*, in the same place, saith, that the *Cerites* obtained the freedom of the City, for preferring the holy things of Rome in the time of the war with the *Gallies*, but without voice in elections. And thence grew the name of *Cerites Tabule*, wherein the Censors inscribed such as were by them, for some just cause, deprived of their voices. And the *Tusculani*, being at first received into the Liberties of the City, according to the admission of the *Cerites*, were afterward, by the free grace of the People, made capable of giving voices.

The means of obtaining this freedom, was first and specially by Birth: wherein it was required (as may be gathered by *Appian's* Oration) that both the Parents, as well the Mother as the Father, should be free themselves. Howbeit, *Ulpian* writeth, that the Son may challenge the Freedom of the State, wherein his Father lived and was Free. So that the Father being of *Campania*, and the Mother of *Puteolis*, he judgeth the Son to belong to *Campania*: according to that of *Cæsar*, that the children inherit the condition of the Father, as the head of the Family, and the better rule to direct in this behalf. Nevertheless *Adrianus* made an Act of Senate in favour of issue: That if the Wife were a Citizen of Rome, and the Husband a *Latine*, the children should be Roman Citizens. And the Emperor *Fustinian* caused it likewise to be decreed, that the Mother being a free-woman, and the Father a Bond-man, the son should be free. Such as were thus born free, were called *Cives originarii*.

The second means of obtaining this freedom, was by Manumission, or setting bond-men at liberty: for in Rome, all men freed from bondage

Et spe appellationem Regum Rex Juba, socius & amicus.

Municipes, lib. 6. cap. 11.

Lib. 11.

Cum (ful-fratio-nis) sum-fu- (fra-ctio) Cerites Tabule Livie, lib. 6.

Livie, lib. 1.

Livie, lib. 3.

Cives originarii.

were taken for Citizens; and yet rank in the last and meanest order of the People.

The third means was by gift, or cooptation: and to *Romulus* at first enlarged and augmented *Rome*; *Thelus*, *Athen*; *Alexander Magnus*, *Alexandria*, fitted at the out-falls of *Nilus*; and *Richard* the First, *London*; by taking all such strangers into the freedom of the City, as had inhabited there for ten years together. The Emperors were profuse in giving this honour. *Cicero* flouts *Cæsar*, for taking whole Nations into the freedom of the City; and *Antony* gave it to all that lived in the *Roman* Empire. Whereupon, as *Ulpian* witnesseth, *Rome* was called *Communis Patria*. Popular States were more sparing in this kind; as may be deemed by the answer of one of the *Corinthian* Embassadors to *Alexander*: We never gave the freedom of our City (saith he) to any man but to thyself and *Hercules*. And until *Alerodius* time, the *Lacedæmonians* had never admitted any, but only *Trifamius* and his brother.

Polylor.
Virg.

s. Philip.

Seneca t.
de benefici.
cap. 13.
Herod. lib. 9.

An quif-
quam am-
pliffimus
Galliz, cum
infimo Cive
Romano
compara-
tus est?
Cicero pro
M. Fnat. De
exipite Civi-
aifi per
maximum
committa-
tum, piliore
quos cenfo-
res in parti-
bus populi
locantur, ne
fructu.
Cic. 3. de
legib.

The privileges of this freedom were great; for the Citizens of *Rome* were held to be *Magiftræ pletos*. Is the best man of *Gallia* (saith *Tully*) to be compared with the meanest Citizen of *Rome*? And hence came that Law, requiring, that a Citizen should not be brought in question, but by the general assembly of the People. *Ferres* having condemned one *Coffanus*, a *Roman* Citizen in *Scitilia*, *Tully* ureth it as a matter unfufferable: *Facinus est* (inquit) *vinciri Civem Romanum, scelus verberari, prope patricidum necari, quid dicam in crucem agi*? It is a great crime to bind a *Roman* Citizen, an hainous wickedness to beat him, little less than Parricide to kill him; What then shall I call the hanging of him; with many the like examples. Besides the possibility they were in, if their sufficiency were answerable accordingly, to become great in the State; and consequently, Commanders of the Empire.

CHAP. IV.

Cæsar tasteth the affection of the Soldiers.

Bellorum O
focci, qui
mille peri-
culis mori-
tis mecum,
ait, exopto,
decimo jam
vincitis.
Anno 66.
Luc. lib. 1.

Cæsar understanding of these things, called the Soldiers together, and acquainted them with all the injuries which his Enemies from time to time had done unto him; complaining, that Pompey was by their practice and means, alienated from him; and drawn, through envy of his good fortune, to partialize against him; notwithstanding, that he had always affected his honour, and endeavoured the advancement of his renown and dignity: Lamenting likewise the precedent which this time had brought into the State, that the Tribunes Authority should be opposed and suppressed by Armes, which former ages had, by force of Armes, re-established. For, *Sylla* having strips the Tribuneship naked of all rights and prerogatives, yet left in the freedom of opposition: But Pompey, who would seem to restore it to the dignity from which it was fallen, did take away that

power, which was only left unto it. The Senate never resolved of that Act, That the Magistrates should take a course for the safety of the Commonwealth, whereby the People were necessarily summoned to Armes, but in times of pernicious Laws, upon the violence of the Tribunes, and the mutiny and secession of the People, when the Temples and high places of the City were taken and held against the State: which dysloyalties of former ages were expiated and purged by the fortune and disaster of *Saturninus* and the *Gracchi*. But, at this present, there was no such matter attempted, so much as in thought; no Law published; no practice with the People; no tumult; no departure out of the City. And therefore he adorted them, that for as much as under his leading and command, for nine years together, they had most happily carried the Government, fought many prosperous and victorious Battels, settled all *Gallia* and *Germany* in peace; they would now, in the end, take his honor into their protection, and defend it against the malice of his Adversaries. The Soldiers of the Thirteenth Legion which were present (for they only had been called out in the beginning of the Troubles, and the other Legions were not as yet come) cried out instantly, That they were ready to undertake his defence against such wrongs, and to keep the Tribunes of the People from injury.

Whereif
Lex Agri-
ria was
the chief.

Plutarch
saith he had
then but
5000 foot,
and 300
Horse on
that file
the Alps
which a-
mounted to
the just
number of
a Legion.

Cic. 1. offic.

Nihil iuli
us quam
propellere
injuria.
Xenophon
Cyro 3. lib.
10. iulius
gritum
murus est
ne cui quis
noceret. Cic.
lib. 1. de
officiis.

Qui non de-
fendit ne-
que offitit
est fidei in-
juriam. tam
et in viti-
um, quam
fidei pater-
rentes, aut
amicos, aut
patrem aut
socium de-
fendit. Cic.
lib. 1. de
officiis.

The

The Second OBSERVATION.

Opulencia
civitatibus
venumum
solitudo
magna im-
petia mor-
talia reddi-
dit.
Liv. lib. 2.
Non Exer-
citus neque
Thefauri
preidia
regis sunt,
venum ami-
ci salutis in-
belli. Jacu-
bit. 2. lib. de
amici.
Ut quique
maxime
opibus,
pompasque,
& putetate
excellentia
amicis max-
ime valget.
Aul. lib. 8.

Cæsar.

Minim.

L. Cæsar.

Secondly we may observe, that as difficult and difficult, tending after the bonds of civil community, are the bands of flourishing and opulent Cities, and make the greatest Empires examples of Mortality: (so by the same rule of discourse, it is also true, that the mutual respects of well qualified friendship, are as expedient, both for the salting of the joints of a publick State, and for keeping the particular parts in due temper and proportion, as either treasure, of Armies, or any other thing required thereunto. Hence it is that * *Cicero* saith, that we have as much use of friendship, as of fire and water: and that he that should go about to take it from among men, did endeavor (as it were) to take the sun out of the heaven; which by heat, light, and influence, giveth life unto the World. And as men are eminent in place and authority; and have use of many wheels for the motion of their several occasions; so have they the more need of amity and correspondency, to second the multiplicity of their desires, and to put on their businesses to their wished ends.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar taketh Ariminum, receiveth and answereth messages from Pompey.

Cæsar having sounded the minds of the Souldiers, went directly with that Legion to Ariminum, and there met with the Tribunes of the people that were fled unto him; sent for the rest of the Legions from their wintering Camps, and gave order that they should follow him. Thither came young *L. Cæsar*, whose Father was a Legate in *Cæsar's* Camp. And after some speech of the occasion of his coming, acquainted *Cæsar* that Pompey had given him a message in charge to be delivered unto him: which was, that he desired to clear himself to *Cæsar*, lest he might peradventure take those things to be done in scorn of him, which were commanded only for the service of the State; the good whereof he always preferred before any private respect: and that *Cæsar* likewise was tied in honor to lay aside his indignation and affection for the Commonwealths sake; and not to be so transported with anger and disdain of his Adversaries, as he seemed to be, left in hoping to be avenged of them, he should hurt the publick weal of his Countrey. He added somewhat more of the same subject, together with excuse on Pompeys behalf. Almost the self-same discourse, and of the self-same things, *Roscius* the Pretor dealt with *Cæsar*, and said that he had received them in charge from Pompey. Which although they seemed no way to satisfy or remove the injuries and wrongs

complained of; yet having got fit men, by whom that which he wished might be imparted to Pompey; he prayed them both, for that they had brought unto him what Pompey required, they would not think it much to return his desires to Pompey, if happily with so little labor they might accord so great a difference, and free all Italy from fear and danger. That he had ever held the dignity of the Commonwealth in high regard, and dearer than his own life. He grieved much that a benefit given him by the people of *Rome*, should be spitefully wrested from him by his adversaries; that six months of his government were to be cut off, and so he to be called home to the City: notwithstanding the people had commanded at the last Creation of Magistrates, that there should regard be had of him, although absent. Nevertheless, for the Commonwealths sake he could be content to undergo the loss of that honor. And having writ to the Senate, that all men might quit their Armes, he was so far from gaining the same, that contrarywise a levy was thereupon made throughout all Italy; and the two Legions which were drawn from him under a pretence of the Parthian War, were still retained about the City, which was likewise in Arms. And to what tended all this, but his destruction? and yet notwithstanding he was content to condescend to all things, and to endure all inconveniences for the cause of the publick weal. Let Pompey go to his Government and Provinces; let both the Armes be discharged; let all men in Italy lay down their Arms; let the City be freed of fear; let the assemblies of the people be left to their ancient liberty; and the whole Government of the State remitted to the Senate and people of *Rome*. For the better accomplishment whereof, under well-advised and secure conditions, let an oath be taken for due keeping of the same, or otherwise, let Pompey approach nearer unto him, or suffer *Cæsar* to come nearer to him, that these controversies might happily receive an end by conference.

Roscius having this message, went to *Capua*, accompanied with *L. Cæsar*, where finding the Consuls and Pompey, he delivered unto them *Cæsar's* propositions. They having consulted of the matter, made an answer in writing, and returned it by them to *Cæsar*, whereof this was the effect; that he should return into *Gallia*, quit Ariminum, and dismiss his Army, which if he did, Pompey would then go into Spain: in the mean time, until assurance were given that *Cæsar* would perform as much as he promised, the Consuls

Capua.
Cicero lib.
9. ad Atti-
cum, Epist.
11. saith.
That this
answer was
made at
Tiburum
in the terri-
tories of
L'avour,
the 23 of
January.

and

and Pompey would not forbear to levy *Souldiers*. The condition was too unequal, to require Cæsar to leave Ariminum, and to return into his Province; and Pompey to hold Provinces and Legions belonging to other men, to have Cæsar dismiss his Army, and be to raise new Troops: to promise simply to go to his Government, but to assign no day for his departure: inasmuch, that if he had not gone until Cæsar's time of Government had expired, he could not have been blamed for falsifying his promise. But forasmuch as they appointed no time for a conference, nor made any show of coming nearer, there could no hope be conceived of peace.

The First OBSERVATION.

Cæsar lying at *Revena*, within his Government of *Gallia*, and understanding how matters palt at *Rome*, according as *Plutarch* reports, commanded divers of his Centurions to go before to *Ariminum*, without any other Armor than their Swords, and to possess themselves thereof, with as little tumult as they could. And then leaving the Troops about him to be commanded by *Hortensius*, he continued a whole day together in public fight of all Men, to behold the fencing of the Sword-players. At night he bathed his body, and then kept company with such as he had bidden to supper; and after a while rose from the table, wishing every Man to keep his place, for he would instantly come again. Howbeit, having secretly commanded some of his followers to attend him, in such a manner as might give least suspicion, he himself took a Coach which he had hired, and making heed of going a contrary way, turned suddenly towards *Ariminum*. When he came to the little River *Rubicon*, which divided his Government from the rest of *Italy*, he stood confounded through remorse of his desperate design, and wist not whether it were better to return or go on, but in the end, laying aside all doubtful cogitations, he resolved upon a desperate Adage, importing as much as *Fall back, fall edge*: and passing over the River, never flayd running with his coach, until he came within the City of *Ariminum*; where he met *Curio* and *Antonius*, Tribunes of the people, and shewed them to the Souldiers, as they were driven to fly out of *Rome*, disguised like slaves in a Carriers cart.

Let it lie upon the Dice.
Doom oft dum ad hoc fiat navis in portu, præcavere tempestatem formæ & non eo tempore, quo in media luctuâ procidit, trepidare. Joseph de bello jud. l. 2.

IUSSU. MANDATU-VE. P. R. COS. IMP. MILI. TIRO. COMMILITO. MANIPULARI-VE. CENT. TURMÆ VE. LEGIONARI-VE. ARMAT. QUIQUIS.

ES. HIC. SISTITO. VEXILLUM. SIN-
NITO. NEC. CITRA. HUNC. AMNEM.
RUBICONEM. DUCTUM. COMMEA-
TUM. EXERCITUM-VE. TRADUCITO.
SI. QVIS. HUIUSCÆJUSSIONIS.
ERGO. ADVERSUS. FECIT. FECERIT-
VE. ADJUDICATUS. ESTO. HOSTIS.
P. R. AC. SI. CONTRA. PATRIAM. AR-
MA. TULERIT. SACROSQUE. PENAS.
TE. SE. PE. NETRALIBUS. ASPORTA-
VERIT. SANCIO. PLEBISCI. SENAT-
US-VE. CONSULT. ULTRA. HOS.
FINES. ARMA. PROFERRE. LICEAT.
NEMINI. S. P. Q. R.

The substance whereof is; that it should be unlawful for any man to come over the said River armed, under penalty of being adjudged an Enemy to the Commonwealth, and an invader of his own Country.

The Second OBSERVATION.

IF this manner of proceeding be brought into dispiure, and the reason required why Cæsar kept not himself in the Province of *Gallia* where he might have held his Government, according to his own desire, or otherwise: have drawn his adversaries to buckle with the strength of those conquering Legions, and so brought the business to a short end, with as great probability of good success, as by any hazard of undertaking. It is to be understood, that in cases of this nature, which seldom admit any treaty of accord, he that striketh first, and hath the advantage of the forehead, is well entered into the way of victory. For the rule is of old, that if an Enemy hath a design in hand, it is far more safe to begin first, and by way of prevention to give the onset on him, rather than to shew a readiness of resisting his assaults. For if blows (of necessity) must be way-makers to peace, it were a mistaking to be either wanting or behind hand therein; besides the gain which attendeth this advantage. For he that stands affected to deny what is just, and of right due, doth nevertheless grant all things which the sword requireth: and will not tick to supply all unjust refusals, with as great an over-plus of what may be demanded. For which cause Cæsar flaid not the coming of his whole Army, but began with those forces which were ready at hand: and so preventing all intendments, he put his adversaries to such a flight, that they quitted *Italy* for fear, and left *Rome* (with whatsoever was feared or precious therein) to the mercy of them whom they had adjudged enemies to their Country.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar taketh divers Municipal Towns.

FOr which regard, be sent M. Antonius with five Cohorts to *Aretium*: but he himself stayed at *Ariminum* with two Legions, and there intended to enrol new Troops,

Magis ut. totum inca-
re, ut inva-
dere prior oc-
casus, quam
ut se recipi-
naturum
significet.
Thucyd.
lib. 2.
Armate
menti. On-
nia dicit, quod
iusta regis
Lucan. lib. 1.

Cæsar.
Hælia legi-
on being
about 3500
men.

Pisaurum,
Pefaro Ital.
Fanum.
Ancona
Tignium.

Troops; and with several Cohorts took *Pisaurum*, *Fanum*, and *Ancona*. In the mean while being advertised that *Thermus* the *Pætor* did hold *Tignium* with five Cohorts, and fortified the place, and that all the Inhabitants were well inclined towards him; he sent *Curio* thither with three Cohorts, which he had at *Pisaurum* and *Ariminum*. Upon notice of his going coming, *Thermus* (doubting of the affection of the Town) drew his Cohorts forth of the City, and fled. The Souldiers by the way went from him, and repaired homeward. *Curio* was there received with the great contentment and satisfaction of all men. Upon notice whereof, Cæsar conceiving hope of the favorable affections of the Municipal Towns, brought the cohorts of the thirteenth Legion out of their Garrisons, and marched towards *Auximum*; a Town held by *Actius*, with certain cohorts which he had brought thither with him, who having sent out divers Senators, made a levy of men throughout all the Country of *Picenum*.

Auximum,
Actius Va-
rus.

Picenum.

Cæsar coming being known, the Decuriones of *Auximum* repaired to *Actius Varus*, accompanied with great Troops of people, and told him, that the matter concerned not him at all, for neither themselves, nor the rest of the Municipal Towns, would shut their gates against such a Commander as Cæsar was, that by great and worthy service had so well deserved of the Commonwealth: and therefore advised him to consider what might ensue thereof, and the danger which might befall him in particular. *Varus* being thoroughly awakened at this warning, drew out the Garrison which he had brought in, and so fled away: and being overtaken by a few of Cæsar's first Troops, was compelled to make a stand, and there giving battel, was forsaken of his Men. Some of the Souldiers went home, and the rest came to Cæsar. Amongst them was taken *L. Pupius*, Centurion of a *Prinipile* order, which place he had formerly held in Pompey's Army. Cæsar commended *Actius* souldiers; sent *Pupius* away; gave thanks to them of *Auximum*, and assured them of a mindfull acknowledgment on his behalf for this service.

The first OBSERVATION.

AMongst other things which serve to enable our judgments, and do make men wise to good fortune; that which is gathered from similitude or likeness of quality, is not the unfrequent ground of our discourse, but oftentimes giveth more light to guide our passage through the doubtfulness of great enterprises, than any other help of

reason. For he that will attend an overture from every particular, and tarry for circumstances to accomplish all his purposes, and make no use of instances to better his advantage, shall never wade far in buifness of moment, nor achieve that which he desireth, which Cæsar well observed: for upon the accidental discovery of the disposition of one Town, he thereby took occasion to material how the rest should affected; and either found them or made them answerable to his hopes.

Concerning these places taken by Cæsar, it is to be understood, that *Pisaurum* is sited on the *Adriatick* sea, and belongeth to the Dutchy of *Urbine*, a Town famous of old, by reason of the prodigious opening of the earth, and swallowing up the Inhabitants before the battel of *Allium*, some few years after it was thus taken by Cæsar.

Pefaro Ital.
Plat. Anso.

Fanum was so called of a fair Temple which was there built to fortune. *Tacit. Annal. 10. Exercitus Pæpæstant Fanum Fortunæ iter sibi.* The Army of *Pæpæstant* made a halt at the Temple of Fortune. It is a small Town on the same sea, and belonging to the Pope.

Fano Ital.

Ancona is a famous Town upon the *Adriatick* sea, sited upon a bow-like promontory, which taketh in the sea between two fore-lands; and so maketh one of the fairest Havens of all *Italy*, as well for largeness as for safety. From whence richest that common saying, expressing the rareness and singularity of three things, *Unus Petrus in Roma*, one Peter in *Rome*, noting the beauty of *Saint Peters Church*, *Una Turris in Cremona*; One Tower in *Cremona*; the excellent workmanship of a Steeple there; and *unus Petrus in Ancona* one haven in *Ancona*; which is this Haven. The Emperor *Trajan*, to give it more shelter, and to keep it from the fury of the wind, raised the top of the Promontory in fashion of a half Moon, with a Mount made of great Marble stones, and made it Theatre-wise, with descents and degrees to go to the sea, together with an Ark triumphal in memory thereof. The Town is now under the Pope.

Ancona.

The Second OBSERVATION.

THis word *Decurio* hath a double understanding, for *Remulus* having three thousand foot and three hundred horse, divided them into three Tribes, and every Tribe into ten Curies, containing a hundred footmen and ten horsemen. Whereby *Marcellinus* concludeth, that *Decuriones* & Centuriones a numero ut in *Militia* præcant dicuntur; they were called *Decurions* and Centurions from the number they commanded in the wars. But *Vergilius* is more particular in this point. A Company of footmen (which he) was called a Century or Maniple; and a Troop of Horse was called *Turma* of *Ter-dens*, containing thirty men, whereof of the Captain was named *Decurio*. In which sense Cæsar speaketh; *Eæres per fugitivos L. Aemilius Decurionis equum Gallorum hostibus nunciatur*. This business was bewrayed to the Enemy by the fugitives of *L. Aemilius* a Decurion of the French horse. But in this place it hath another signification; for the Romans when they sent any Citizens to people and inhabit a place, choote out every tenth Man, such as were found most able, and of best wisdom to make and establish a publick Council, whom they called *Decuriones*, according as *Pompo-*

Decuriones.

Lib. 2. cap. 14.

Lib. 1. de bell. Gall.

nus and other Civilians understand it. So that these Decuriones were the Senate of that place.

CHAP. VII.

Lentulus flyeth in great fear out of Rome. Cæsar cometh to Corfinium.

Cæsar.

Sindior
Ætatio.

Capua.

Lex Julia.

Picenum.

Cingulum.

Afulum.

These things being reported at Rome, the City was suddenly struck into such a Terror, that when Lentulus the Consul came to open the Treasury, to deliver out Money to Pompey, according to the Act of Senate, he fled out of the City, and left the inner chamber of the Treasury open. For it was reported (although untrue) that Cæsar was near approaching, and that his Cavalry was hard at hand. Marcellus, the other Consul, together with most of the other Magistrates, followed after. Pompey departing the day before, was gone to those legions which he had taken from Cæsar, and had left in Apulia to winter. In the mean while the inrolment of souldiers ceased within the City. No place seemed secure between that and Capua. There they began first to assemble and assure themselves; impropit for souldiers such as by Julius law were sent thither to inhabit. And the Fencers which were trained and exercised by Cæsar, for the entertainment of the people of Rome, were by Lentulus brought out, set at liberty, mounted upon horse, and commanded to follow him. But afterwards, upon advice of his friends, (every mans judgment disallowing thereof) he dispersed them here and there throughout Campania for their better safety and keeping.

Cæsar dislodging from Auximum, marched throughout all the Countrey of Picenum, and was most willingly received by all the Prefectures of those Regions, and relieved with all necessities which his souldiers stood in need of. Inasmuch, as Commissioners were sent unto him from Cingulum, a Town which Labienus had founded, and built from the ground at his own charges, promising to obey whatsoever he commanded. Whereupon he required souldiers, and they sent him accordingly. In the mean time the twelfth Legion overtook Cæsar; and with these two he marched directly to Afulum, a Town which Lentulus Spinther held with ten Cohorts: who understanding of Cæsar's approach, left the place; and labouring to carry the Troops with him was forsaken by the greatest part of the souldiers: and so marching with a few, happened by chance upon Vibullius Rufus, sent of purpose by Pompey into the Countrey of Picenum, to

confirm and settle the people. Vibullius being advertised how matters went there, took the souldiers, and so dismissed him of his charge: gathering likewise from the confining Regions, what Cohorts he could get from Pompeys former inrolments; and amongst others, entertained Ullicles Hirus, flying with six cohorts out of Camerinum: whereof he had the keeping. These being all put together, made thirteen Cohorts; with which by long marches he made towards Domitius Ænobarbus, who was at Corfinium, telling him that Cæsar was at hand with two Legions. Domitius had raised twenty Cohorts out of Albania, Marfia, and Pelignia, adjacent Countreies. Afulum being taken in, and Lentulus driven out, Cæsar made inquiry after the souldiers that had left Lentulus, and commanded them to be inrolled for him. And after one days aboad, for the provision of Corn, he marched towards Corfinium. Upon his approach thither, Domitius sent five Cohorts out of the Town, to break down the bridge of the River, which was about three miles off. The vanguard of Cæsars Army encountering with Domitius souldiers, drove them from the bridge, and forced them to retreat into the Town: whereby Cæsar past over his Legions, made a stand before the Town, and incamped himself under the walls.

The first OBSERVATION.

It is well observed by Guicciardine. That Insolency and Timidity are never found afunder, but do always accompany one other in the same subject: for the mind being the centre of all such motions, doth according to every Mans nature, give the like scope to passions of contrariety, and extend them both to an equidistant circumference: as if Courage shall happen to dilate it self to Insolency, then is Doubtfulness in like mann enlarged to Cowardice; and will imbaine Mans thoughts as low, as they did rise in height by insulting. For which cause it is advised by such as treat of Morality, that Men be well wary in admitting dilation of passions, or in insuffering them to flout beyond the compass of Reason, which containeth the measure of Equability, commanded by Cicero, to be observed throughout the whole course of mans life. Lentulus the Consul may be an instance of this weakness, and learn others moderation by shunning his intemperary. For in question of qualifying the rage of these broils, and forcing of things to a peaceable end, his arrogancy was incompatible with terms of agreement, and over-swayed the Senate with heedless impetuosity. And again, when his authority and Consular gravity should have settled the distracted Commons, and made good his first resolution, his over-hasty flying out of the City did rather induce the people to believe, that there was no safety within those walls not for so small a time as might serve to have shut the

Ullici Hirus,
CamerinumDomitius
Ænobarbus
Corfinian.Albania.
Marfia.
Pelignia.

2500. men.

Libri Ele-
phantini.Signa Ex
Ætatio
prompta fe-
runt ad
didicere.
Liv. lib. 4.Lib. 3. cap.
31.Sempiternum
congruunt
in unum
fimo fignat
to Timiditas
Lib. 2.Aurum vi-
ticulatum.

De cæditi.

Lib. 24.

The second OBSERVATION.

the Treasury at his heels; and so he became as abject, as before he shewed himself insolent.

Concerning their words *Aperio sanctioris*, *Ætatio*, readed, the inner Chamber of the Treasury left open: it is to be noted, that *Ætatio* was their publick Treasury; and, by the appointment of *Patricius Publicola*, was made within the Temple of *Saturnus*: whereof divers men make divers conjectures. *Macrobis* saith, that as long as *Saturnus* continued in Italy, there was no theft committed in all the Country: and therefore his Temple was thought the safest place to keep money in. *Plutarch* thinketh rather, that the making of the Treasury in that place, did allude to the integrity of the time wherein *Saturnus* reigned; for *Avarice* and *Deceit* was not then known amongst them. *S. Cyprian* is of an opinion, that *Saturnus* first taught Italy the usefull Coinage of Money; and therefore they gave the keeping thereof to his Deity. However, it is manifest, that not only the publick Treasury was there kept, but also their Records, Charters, Ordinances and Edicts: together with such Books as were, for their immeasurable greatness, called *Libri Elephantini*, containing all their Acts of Senate, and Deeds of Armes achieved by the Commanders abroad, as also their military Ensigns which they fetched always from thence when they went into the Field: and there likewise did such Embassadors as came to Rome carelessly their names, as *Plutarch* affirmeth.

It was called *Ætatio* of *Æs*, signifying Brass; for that the first Money, used by the Romans, was of that metal, until the year of Rome 485, as *Pliny* witnesseth; when they began first to coin pieces of Silver marked with the Letter X, whereof they took the appellation of *Denarius*, as valuing Ten asses of Brass, which before they used for their Coin; and every of the said asses weighed 12 ounces. Touching their order, in laying up of their Treasury, for their disposing and laying up of their Monneys, we must understand, that, as Bodies Politick, require necessary and ordinary Treasure, to be employed in such manner, as may best concur with the publick honour and weal of the same; so there must be special care to provide against unusual and extraordinary casualties, which are not removed but by speedy and effectual remedies. According to which providence the Romans disposed of their Treasury, and took the twentieth part of their receipt, which they called *Aurum viciesimarium*, and reserved it apart in an inner Chamber; where it lay so privileged, that it was a Capital Crime to touch it, but in extremum and desperate necessity: as in time of War with the *Gallæ*, or in a sedition and tumult of the People. *Lævi* affirmeth as much, where he saith, *Cæsars expedientes quæ ad bellum opus erant consilium, aurum viciesimarium, quod in sanctiore Ætatio ad ultimum casus servaverat, promissa: promissa ad quatuor milia pondo auri*. The Consuls furnishing all other things needful for the War, it was resolved, that the *viciesimarium* Gold should be brought forth and employed; which Gold was reserved in the inner Treasury, till such time as affairs happened to be in a desperate condition. Accordingly, there was 4000 pound of Gold taken out.

SUCH as affect Offices and Dignities in a State, must ever have means to court Sovereignty, according as may best lute with her *Politica*, either as she is espoused to a Monarch, or left in truit to a multitude. Hence it was, that the Romans, to gain the favour of the People, and to make way for their own ends, were very sumptuous in setting forth shewes and spectacles, of divers sorts and fashions; and especially of Gladiators or Fencers, as best fitting a Roman disposition, and more pleasing than others of any kind. *Equidem* (saith *Tully*) *existimo, nullum tempus esse frequentioris populi, quam illud Gladiatorum, neque concionis ullius, neque vero ullorum Comitiorum*; I verily believe, that there is at no time a greater concourse of people, then is at the fencing-plays; neither at an Oration, nor at an Assembly of the State. And, in another place, *Id autem spectaculi generis erat, quod omni frequentia, atque omni hominum genere celebratur, quo multitudo maximè delectatur*; That is a kind of shew, which is celebrated with the flocking together of all sorts of people; it being a thing the multitude are extremely delighted with.

For their manner was, to keep great numbers of these Fencers, in some convenient and healthfull Towns of Italy, as those of *Ætatio* and *Capua* (which were as Seminaries of these People) and there to train them up in the feat of Fencing, until they had occasion to use them in their shewes, either at their Triumphal Entries into the City upon their Victories, or at the Funeral Solemnity of some personage of memory, or otherwise at their Feasts and Jollities.

*Quinetiam exilarare viris convivio cade
Mos olim, et miscere epulis spectacula dira.*

The death of men made mirth at Feasts of old, And banquets then were grac'd with Fencers (bold).

They fought commonly man to man, at all advantage, and were seldom excused, until one of the two lay dead upon the place. Neither was he then quitted that had slain his Companion, but stood liable to undertake another, and so a third, until he had killed six or seven Combatants. And if his hap were to prevail too often, he was then honoured with a Garland, wound about with Ribands of Wool, which they called *Lemmici*, and received of the Prætor a great knotted staff, called *Rudis*; which he afterwards carried about with him as an ensign of liberty. This bloody spectacles continued unto the time of *Constantine* the Great, and were by him prohibited, as likewise also by *Arcadius* and *Honorius*; and utterly abolished after the Reign of *Theodorick*, King of the *Goths*. Let him that would look further into the fashion of these shewes, read what *Lipsius* hath written concerning the same. That which I observe herein, is the use which the State made hereof: for, howsoever these fights and solemnities were set forth for the compasing of private ends; yet nevertheless, the Common weal drew benefit from the same. For a multitude being of a fickle and mutable nature, are no way so well settled with contentment of the time, or kept

Pro Rofcio.

And there-
fore they
were called
Bullarii, &
Bullis.

Sil Ital.

Lemmici.

Spectaculum
fatis & do-
natum jam
rudem. Hor.
de Hor.
The Ro-
mans never
used these
Gladiators
in any mili-
tary service,
but only in
civil wars.
Cicero
auferit,
duo milia
Gladiatorum
sed per civis
arma severis
fuitibus no-
torum.
Tac. Hist. 1.

D d from

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar goes on with the Siege of Corfinium, and takes it.

Domitius being thus engaged, sent out skilful men of the Country, with promise of great reward, to carry Letters to Pompey, intreating and praying, that he would come and relieve him; for Cæsar, by reason of the straightness of the passage, might, with two Armies, be easily shut up: which opportunity, if he neglected, himself, with above Thirty Cohorts of Soldiers, besides a great number of Senators and Roman Knights, were in danger of running a hard fortune. In the mean time, he exhorted his men to courage and resolution; plac'd his * Artillery on the Walls, assign'd every man his quarter to be made good; promis'd, in publick Assembly of the Soldiers, four Acres apiece to each man out of his own Lands and Possessions, and the like rateable parts to the Centurions and Evocati. Mean-while, it was told Cæsar, that the inhabitants of Sulmo, a Town distant seven miles from Corfinium, were desirous to receive his Commanders, that they were restrained by Q. Lucretius a Senator, and Actius Felignus, that kept the Town with a Garrison of seven Cohorts. Whereupon he sent thither M. Antonius, with five Cohorts of the Seventh Legion: whose Ensigns were no sooner discovered by those of the Town, but the Gates were opened, and the inhabitants and soldiers came all out, to gratulate and welcome Antonius. Lucretius and Actius conveyed themselves over the wall. Actius being taken and brought to Antony, desired to be sent to Cæsar. Antonius returning the same day, brought Actius and the Soldiers that were found in Sulmo, to Cæsar: whom he took to his Army, and sent Actius away in safety.

Cæsar, the three first days, made great Works to Fortifie his Camp, caus'd store of Corn to be brought from the Towns next about him; and there determin'd to stay the coming of the rest of his Forces. Within the space of those three days the Eighth Legion came unto him, with 22 Cohorts newly inrolled in Gallia, together with three hundred Horse, which the King of Noricum had sent unto him. Upon the arrival of which Forces, he made a second Camp on the other side of the Town, and appointed Curio to command it. The rest of

15000. men
or thereabout.
* Torment.

Sulmo.

the time was spent in compassing the Town to receive his Commandments, and to deliver Domitius alive into his hands. Upon advertisement whereof (albeit Cæsar found it a matter of great consequence, to gain the Town with as much speed as he could, and to take the Soldiers into his Camp, lest either by large promises and gifts, or by entertaining other purposes, or otherwise through false bruits, or devised messages, their minds might happily be altered, as oftentimes in the course of War, great and eminent chances and alterations do happen in a small moment of time; yet, for that he feared, lest the night-time might give occasion to the Soldiers, upon their entrance, to sack and pilfer the Town, he commending those that came unto him, sent them back, again, and willed, that the Gates and the Walls should be kept with a good guard. He himself dispos'd the Soldiers, upon the Work, which he had begun; not by certain spaces and distances, as he had accustomed in former times, but by continual matches and Stations, one touching another round about all the Fortifications. Moreover, he sent the Tribunes and Captains of the Horse about, and willed them to have a care, that there might be no eruptions or sallies, and that they should look to the private stepping out of particular men. Neither was there any man so heavy or dull, that suffer'd his eyes to be shut that night: for, so great was the expectation of what would ensue, that no man thought of any other thing, then of what would happen to the Corfinians, to Domitius, to Lentulus and the rest. About the fourth Watch of the night, Lentulus Splinter spake from the Wall to our Soldiers that had the watch, and signified, that he would willingly have leave to come to Cæsar. Which being granted, he was sent out of the Town, attended with some of Domitius his Soldiers, who left him not until he came within sight of Cæsar. With him he dealt concerning his life, and prayed him to pardon him; put him in mind of their former familiarity; acknowledged the favours received from Cæsar, which were very great; namely, that by his means, he was chosen into the College of Priests, that upon the going out of his Prætorship, he obtained the Province of Spain, and in his suit to be Consul, he was much assisted by him.

Cæsar, interrupting his Speech, told him, That he came not from his Government to hurt any man; but to defend himself from the injuries

Lentulus Splinter.

Collegium Pontificum.

D d 2

ries

from novelties and innovations, as with publick shews and entertainments; which are as flutes to their affections, that they swerve not from the government, by which they live in Civil Sociation. So we read how the Grecians instituted, as popular entertainments, their Olympian, Nemean, Isthmian, and Pythian Games; The Romans, their Apollinary, Secular, Gladiatory, and Fanning shews, with Tragedies and Comedies: and all for the satisfaction of the People. Wherein, howsoever the Grecians seem more judicious, for inventing such Games, as might both exercise and entertain the People; yet the Romans failed not of the end aimed at in these spectacles, which was, to inure them to blood and slaughter, and to make them dreadless in cases of horror.

But, to leave all shews of this nature, as either too little for earnest, or too much for past-time; it shall suffice to note, that these publick entertainments are so far expedient, as they consist of pleasure and comelines: for, as their chief end is, to please and content the People; so their manner must be directed by lawfulness and honesty. In which respect, a Tragedy is more commendable than a Comedy; for as much as few comical arguments do sympathize with honesty.

The third OBSERVATION.

To be great, and of a large proportion, doth not take away casualties of inconvenience; nor can it give a privilege, to free things from dilapidation: Tall men are as subject to Fevers, as others of lesser stature; and great Empires as easily disturbed, as the States of petty Princes.

O faciles dare summa Deos, cademque tueri, Difficiles! —

O gods, ease to grant, but to preserve Your gifts, are hard! —

It is easier to attain the end of high desires, then to keep it being got; and better is the assurance of seeking, then of possessing. The Roman People, that had over-aw'd the World with Arms, and left no Kingdom unfoiled with the fear of their Legions, were as much dismay'd at a Subjects disloyalty, as was possible for a man State to be amus'd upon an alarm of any danger. And, that City, which suffer'd no Enemy to approach near her Confines, but in the condition of a Captive, was not trustful as able to give her own people safety.

—sic urbs per Urbem
Precipiti lymbata gradu, velis unica rebus
Spes foret assiduis patrios excedere muros,
Inconspicua vultu. —

—So through the streets,
With headlong madnes ran the multitude,
As if their cause no other hope had left
Of safety, then to quit their Native Walls,

The advantage is, that Kingdoms of great command, have great helps, in cases of disturbance; but are otherwise as subject to apprehensions of distrust, as those of lesser power to resist.

Lucan.
lib. 1.
Parare, &
quætere ac-
cum tu-
eri diffi-
ci-
li-
us. Livie,
lib. 37.

Ducet rebus
affiduis hi-
laritatem de
industria
simulant.
Seneca ad
Poly.

vies of his adversaries: to restore the Tribunes of the People to their dignity, that were thrust out and expelled the City; and to put himself and the People of Rome into liberty, which were oppressed with the partialities of a few seditious persons. Lentulus, being reassured upon this answer, prayed leave to return into the Town; and the rather, that this which he had obtained touching his own safety, might give hope to the rest: amongst whom some were so affrighted, that he doubted they would fall into some desperate course. And, having obtained leave, he departed. Cæsar, as soon as it was day, commanded all the Senators and Senators children, together with the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and the Roman Knights, to be brought out unto him. Of Senators there were L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, Vibullius Rufus, Sex. Quintilius Varus, the Treasurer, L. Rubrius; besides Domitius his son, and many other young men; with a great number of Roman Knights and Decurions, whom Domitius had called out of the Municipal Towns. These being all brought forth unto him, were protected from the insolences and injuries of the soldiers. Moreover, he spake a few words unto them, concerning the ill requital on their behalf, for the great benefits he had done unto them; and so sent them all away in peace.

Daumier.

The Sixty Sestertia of Gold which Domitius had laid up in the Publick Treasury, being brought unto him by the two Chief Magistrates or Bailiffs of Cornifinium, he redelivered to Domitius; lest he should seem more content in taking away mens lives, then their moneys: although he knew, that this money was part of the publick treasure, and delivered out by Pompey to pay soldiers. He commanded Domitius his party to be sworn his soldiers. And that day removing his Camp, went a full dayes march (after a stay of seven dayes about Cornifinium) through the confines of the Marrucini, Frentani, and Lariates, and came into Apulia.

The first OBSERVATION.

AS it is true, that a Friend is not solely tied to the respects of right, but doth give more advantage by Offices of good endeavour, then by that which duty requirith: so is it dangerous for a man to put his sickle further into a harvest, then haply may deserve thanks of the owner. Neither can it be cleared from imputation of folly, to care another mans business, with hazard and peril of our own fortune. Howbeit, the current and drift of things doth oftentimes lo ingage both our persons and affections, either in the main action it self, or in some circumstances of the fame, that we cannot avoid the hazard of rebuke, if our endeavours do not fort with his liking, that is to approve them. Whereof Domitius may be an instance; who, taking Cornifinium on the behalf of the State, was nevertheless disapproved in his merits, and consequently brought into extremity of danger, for his over-forwardness in the service of his Country. Such liberty hath Sovereignty, either to take or leave, when the event shall not rise answerable to a good meaning.

The second OBSERVATION.

WHEN a party is fallen into an exigence, it hath no better remedy for relief, then that of the Comick, *Redimas te captum quem quæsis minime*; redeem your self at as cheap a rate as you can. Which is not understood, that we should clear the head, and leave the rest of the members to misfortune: for that were to draw a double mischief on the whole body. But, the head is to escape with as little prejudice to the other parts, as by wisdom and virtue may be gained; and so much the rather, least in seeking to purchase safety, with hazard of the other members, it draw the whole destruction upon it self; as it fell out with Domitius: who, going about to fly out of the Town, and to leave such Forces, as by his means were imbarcked in that cause, was justly made the Sacrifice of their peace. Sulla deserved better to be followed by men of adventure: for, being moved to escape himself away by night, and to leave his Troops to such fortune as fugurib, upon advantage, should put upon them; he answered, *Etiam si certa pennis desset, manurum potius, quam prodis quos decedebat, turpi fuga, incerte, et forsitan nullo post moris interituere vite necessest*. Although the plague were never so near and certain to befall him, yet he would stay by it, rather then by a base flight betray those under his Command, thereby to save his sickle life for a time, which, it may be, some disease or other would, immediately after, deprive him of. And therefore, if a Commander shall, at any time, go about to betray his Forces, with hope of his own safety, the issue will bring out, either his dishonour, or his confusion.

Latus patii officiorum quam jura Regula.

Stultitiz videtur, alioquin rem suo periculo curare. Salust. de bello Jugurth.

The Third OBSERVATION.

SUCH as undertake great designs, do likewise project the means of achieving the same, and do propound unto themselves such principles to be observed, as they take to be special way-makers to the fortune they reach at: from which grounds they seldom or never swerve. As appeareth by this of Cæsar: who aiming at the sovereignty of that Empire, and knowing no way to direct to lead him thereunto, as to climb up by the steps of Mildness, and to make his Adversaries debtors to his Clemency, he left aside his Maxims of War, to hold firm that principle; and did forbear to gain a Town of great importance, with that speed which occasion and opportunity did afford him, and to take the Troops into his Camp, for the prevention of such chances and changes, as do happen in a small moment of time, lest his soldiers entering into the Town, after the shutting of the evening, might take leave of the night time to make forfeiture of his mercy.

It shall therefore be well becoming the wisdom of a Leader, to have always respect to the principles of his means, and to distinguish between that which is fit and that which is more fit, in the native carriage of his business.

The Fourth OBSERVATION.

CONCERNING this *Collegium Pontificum*, the College of Priests, we are to note, that *Numa* the founder of the Roman Commonwealth, for the preventing of partialities and factions in that State, which at that time consisted of two Nations or Tribes, did break the whole body into many small parts and fractions, making his division by Arts and Occupations; whereby he ordained, that all Minstrels or Trumpeters should be incorporated into one Brotherhood; and that in like manner, Goldsmiths, Carpenters, Diers, Shoemakers, Corriers, Tanners, Brl-founders, Potters, and all other Trades and Sciences, should have their peculiar body or Fraternity, appointing them fests, assemblies, and services, according to the worthiness of each myltery, as *Plutarch* hath observed in the life of *Numa*.

Valerius Maximus maketh mention of the College of Pipers or Minstrels. And *Plinius* in like manner, mentioneth the College of Copper-smiths. *Cicero* taketh notice of the College or Company of Merchants, which he calleth *Collegium Mercatorum*: for that of old time, the nimble tongued *Mercury* was believed in, as the Guide and protector of Merchants. The privileges and Customs wherewith these Fraternities were endowed, are set down by *Caius* the Civilian.

In which sense, a C. Pontius the *Samnite* wherein the Gods had reserved him to times whereth the Romans would have been corrupted with gifts: for then he would soon have been an end of their Commonwealth. And certainly that Empire could never have towered so high, nor continued firm so many ages, had not her foundation been laid by men of admirable temper in this kind: such as was *Paulus Amilius*; who having sacked *Macedonia* and brought as much wealth into the publick Treasury as gave an end to Tributes and Subsidies, was no way the richer (but in honor) for all that he had

cian families, unto the year of Rome 454, at what time there were four of the Commons chosen, and added to the former number; whom *Sulla* increased to fifteen, as *Dio* witnesseth. And these were called *Collegium Pontificum*, wherof this *Pontifex Maximus* was president: one of the absolute dignities of Rome, as being for term of life, and of greatest and divine authority. Which general distribution of the Romans into Trades and Myltries, doth not unfrequently bring into remembrance, that which is usual amongst the *Turks*, who by their law are bound to be of an occupation, not excepting the Grand Signior himself. For he that now upholds the *Ottoman* family, by the name of *Sultan Acmes*, is a professed maker of Rings, which the *Turks* do wear on their Thumb when they shoot, to let the string go easily without hurting them: and his Father *Mahomes* was a Fletcher, and made arrows. In like manner, all his Courtiers are of Trades and Occupations; and every man is called by the title of his Art; as he that was lately *Visier Baffa* to the present Sultan, was called by the name of *Nasrallah Baffa*, the Visier. Painter being indeed the Sultans Painter, Neither are they ashamed to acknowledge as much: for opening Letters which were sent into Turkey out of Christendome, that were limned about the Margin, he said, he could paint as well as that himself.

The Fifth OBSERVATION.

THE fifth thing which I observe out of these passages at *Cornifinium*, is the relloring back of such Moneys to Domitius as were brought unto Cæsar, by the Officers of the Town, and which he knew to be of the publick treasure of the State. Which howsoever it may seem admirable to the hearers of these times, wherein there is but this one rule for matter of money, *Unde habes quæris nummum, sed oportet habere*. No body asks how you come by it, but it must be had; Yet such as will lay a sure foundation of honor, and thrive in the courses which they follow, must not be ignorant, that there is nothing more requisite to gain opinion and reputation in the carriage of any publick business, then to be clear of the least suspicion of covetousness. Neither is there any means that will sooner win a multitude, to believe in those things which are set abroad by publick authority, then those two virgin Vertues; Abstinence and Contincency; especially when they are found in Princes and chief Commanders, that can otherwise justify their actions with sovereignty and unconformity. Nor on the other side, did ever *Apollo* give out truer Oracle then that, which said, that there was no means to ruine *Sparta*, but by Avarice.

In which sense, a C. Pontius the *Samnite* wherein the Gods had reserved him to times whereth the Romans would have been corrupted with gifts: for then he would soon have been an end of their Commonwealth. And certainly that Empire could never have towered so high, nor continued firm so many ages, had not her foundation been laid by men of admirable temper in this kind: such as was *Paulus Amilius*; who having sacked *Macedonia* and brought as much wealth into the publick Treasury as gave an end to Tributes and Subsidies, was no way the richer (but in honor) for all that he had

Lib. 16.

A comendat the great Turk. Fraterer Baffa, Nalier of name Builangi Baffa, Gar.

Caput autem est in omni procreatione negotiorum, & unicuique publici, ut avaritie pellatur etiam minima suspicio. Nulla autem re continere facilius benevolentiam multitudine possunt, quam qui reipublice sunt. primum avaritia & continencia. Cicero. de Cic. lib. 16. Offic.

taken. And such also was *Scipio Africanus*, that of all the wealth of *Carthage*, brought nothing into his private house, but a high and triumphant name, as a merit of his virtues and deeds of Arms; leaving behind him this Oracle, as a document to following times; That covetous Captains are good to none but to the Enemy. And to conclude, such was *M. Curius*, who having triumphed of the *Saminites*, the *Volturni* and *Pyrrhus*, refused a great mass of gold, which was offered him by the *Saminites*; esteeming it more honourable to command them that had Gold, than to have Gold of his own. Howbeit, such is the frailty of humane nature, that for the most part, men have always suffered their desire of Money to increase with their wealth, although it were to their ruine and destruction. Which *Cæsar* well discerned, as appeareth by that which he writ to *Oppius*, touching this accident: *Hæc nova sit vincendi ratio, ut misericordia & liberalitate nos maximus* It is a new way of conquering, to strengthen our selves by mercifulness and liberality.

The Sixth OBSERVATION.

UPON occasion of *Cæsar*s calling unto him, out of the Town, *Senatores*, *Senatorumque filios*, *Equitesque Romanos*, the Senators, sons of Senators, and Roman Knights, it shall not seem impertinent, to note the degrees and conditions of state whereof the Roman people consisted. For the better clearing whereof, it is to be understood, that by that notable translation at *Comitium*, between *Romulus* and *Tatius*, it was agreed, That both those Nations should dwell together at *Romulus* Town, which after his name, should be called *Rome*, and that the Inhabitants thereof should be named *Quirites*, after the name of *Tatius* City. Howbeit, specially they were divided into three Tribes, whereof they which were of *Romulus* party, were called after his name *Romulei*; those that came with *Tatius*, *Tatienſes*; and the third Tribe *Lucerences*, of *Lucus*, a Grove: forasmuch as they being neither of *Romulus* retinue, nor yet of the *Sabines*, were nevertheless met together at that place, from divers parts, as at a Grove, where commonly assemblies were made to offer sacrifice, and to perform their heathenish solemnities.

Each of these Tribes were divided by *Romulus* into ten *Curia*, and so made the number of thirty *Curia*. And out of each of these *Curia*, he chooseth three persons, such as by their presence and sufficiency seemed fittest, and most worthy; which amounted to ninety. To whom out of every Tribe, he farther added three, and one more of his own choosing, to make the number up a hundred, whom he established as his Council or Senate: by whose advice he resolved of all matters of consequence, either concerning Peace or War, as *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* saith. Howbeit *Plutarch* saith, they were seldom assembled but to understand the Kings pleasure; and had no other pre-eminence in the Commonweal, saving they were the first that did know what was purposed. Howsoever, they were styled by the name of *Senatores*, *quasi seniores*, as thereby qualified to be admitted to Council: and in the same sense they were called *Patres*. The Senate being thus established *Romulus* selected out of every of those *Curia* ten young men, and so made up the number of three hundred, for

a guard to his person, who for their readiness and nimbleness were called *Celeres*, all mounted on horseback; whence grew their *Ordo Equestris* or band of *Roman* Knights, which were the mean between the Senate and the people, and as a Secondary to supply the Senate, for out of them were the Senators taken. The rest that were not of the two Orders, were comprehended under the name of the Commons, or poplacy. Whereby it appeareth that *Rome* consisted of three estates, Senators, Knights, and the Commons, according to that of *Ausonius*;

Maria Roma triplex; Equitatu, Plebe Senatu.

Of three sorts *Rome* consists, Knights, Commons, Senate.

Touching the number of Senators, it is farther to be noted, that *Tarquinius Priscus*, to gain the favor of the people, took an hundred of the Commons, and added them to the Senate, who were called *Senatores minorum Gentium*. And *Brutus* having reduced it to a Commonweal, made them up three hundred out of the band of Knights, and from that time they were called *Patres conscripti*. Neither were they at all times limited in that number, for the feditious *Gracchi* added three hundred more unto them; and *Fulvius Cæsar* admitted unto the Senate all manner of persons. In which regard *Augustus* (as *Suetonius* saith) *Senatum affluente numerum deformi & incondita turba (erant enim super mille, & quidam indignissimi) ad modum pristinum & splendorem redegit*; Reduced the excessive number of Senators, which was become a deformed and shapeless company, (for they were above a thousand, and divers of them unworthy fellows) to their ancient way and splendor.

Concerning a competency of wealth to make a man capable of the place of a Senator, we may observe, that in the Reign of *Servius* the King, he that was worth a thousand *asses* (which are about 300 pound Sterling) was eligible. But the riches of the Empire increasing, a Senators wealth was rated at nine thousand pound, according to *Suetonius*; *Senatorum census amplatus, ac pro oligentorum millium summa duodecies H. S. taxavit, suppletque non habentibus*. The wealth of a Roman Knight was rated at three hundred three score or therabouts.

This *Corinium* was the chief Town of the *Pelignians*, and stood in the Centre of *Italy*, where all the confederate people assembled when they consulted of War against the *Romans*, for their right of Burgeship, or freedom of the City, which was then denied them, which War was called, *Bellum sociale Asiaticum*, and *Italicum*. There is now nothing remaining of that Town but the ruins, as a mark of the place, where it anciently stood upon a Plain, commonly called *Pentina*, or *Sant Peligno*.

Celeres or
Equites
sive Eques-
tres.

Plebs, or
populus.

Senatores
minorum
Gentium.

Patres con-
scripti.

Sueton. 33.

Sueton. 41.

Corinium.
Strabo. lib. 6.


Imperato-
res munici-
bus nantes.
Hostibus
sunt perati-
les, Appian.
de bello
Hispan.
Cic. Cato
Major.

Platareth in
vici Romuli

Senatus.
Lib. 1.

THE BATTEL, WHICH CÆSAR HAD

WITH THE HELVETIANS. folio. 207.



CHAP. IX.

Pompey goeth to Brundisium: Cæsar maketh means to treat with him.

Cæsar.
Lucetia.

Pompey understanding of these things which had past at Corfinium, departed from Lucetia, and went to Canusium, and from thence to Brundisium; causing all the power he could to be raised by new masters and involments, arming shepherds and slaves, and mounting them on horseback; of whom he made some three hundred horse. In the mean time L. Manlius the Pretor, fled from Alba with six Cohorts, and Rutilius Lupus, Pretor, fled from Tarracina, with three cohorts: who desiring afar off the Cavalry of Cæsar, commanded by Bivius Curius, forsaking the Pretor, turned their Ensigns towards Curius, and joined with him. In like manner the days following, divers other cohorts came in as they marched, some to the foot Troops, and some to the horse.

Cn. Magius of Cremona, master of the works, and of the munition in Pompeys Army, was taken on the way, and brought back to Cæsar, whom he sent back again to Pompey, with commission to treat with him to this effect: Forasmuch as there had yet happened no opportunity of meeting or conference, he was now determined to seek him at Brundisium; for it much imported the Commonwealth, and every mans safety in particular, that they two might confer together. Neither could things be so well banded upon so great a distance of way, where the Articles of Treaty must be carried to and fro by a third party, as when they met face to face to conclude of the conditions.

This message being first given, he came to Brundisium with six Legions; four legions of old Souldiers, and the other raised by new involments, or made up as he came along the Countrey; for he had presently dispatched Domitius his Cohorts from Corfinium into Sicily. At his coming he found the Consuls gone over to Dyrrachium with the greatest part of the Army, and Pompey remaining at Brundisium with twenty Cohorts. Neither could he certainly be informed, whether he remained at Brundisium to make good the Town, whereby he might the easier be master of the Adriatick sea, and command both the utter parts of Italy, and the Regions of Greece, and so to keep the War on foot on the one side and on the other; or whether he stayd there for want of shipping. Howsoever, he would not

endure that Pompey should think he could not be forced to quit Italy; and therefore resolved to stop up the mouth of the Haven, and to take away the use thereof, which he went about in this manner. Where the mouth of the Haven was narrowest, he raised great Mounts of earth on either side near unto the shore; for there the Sea was shallow, but going farther into the deep, where no such mounts could be raised, he placed double flots of wood, right against the same mounts, of thirty foot square, and at the corners cast one four Anchors to fasten them, that they might not be tossed up and down by the waves. These flots being thus placed, he then added other flots of the same scantling, and covered them with bavin and earth, to the end men might come readily upon them to defend them. He armed them in front and on each side with burdles and gabions; and on every fourth flot, made a Tower of two stories high, the better to defend them from violence of shipping, and from burning.

Against this work Pompey sent out great ships of burthen, which he found in the Haven armed with Towers of three stories high, full of munition, and all sort of weapons, to hinder and disturb the same. So that every day they fought afar off with each other, with slings, arrows, and other casting weapons. Which business Cæsar so carried, as being willing not to let fall the conditions of peace, if happily it might be effected. And albeit he greatly wondered that Magius whom he had sent to Pompey, did not return again; and that this Treaty so often attempted, did hinder much his design, yet he thought it fit by all means to persevere therein; and therefore sent Caninius Rebilus, one of his Legates, an inward friend of, and near allied to Scribonius Libo, to speak with him, commanding him to persuade Libo to mediate a reconciliation, and add that Cæsar himself might speak with Pompey. It might be, that thereupon both of them would yield to lay down their Arms upon equal conditions: the greatest part of which honor would redound to Libo, if by his intercession the War might take an end.

Libo having heard Caninius, went straight to Pompey; and within a while returning, told him, that forasmuch as the Consuls were absent, there could be nothing done touching an agreement. Whereupon Cæsar resolved to let fall the matter of Treaty, which he had so often attempted, and to prepare for War.

Cæsar being
sighted Pompey
at Brundisium, the
21 day of
February
anno ur bis
cond. 704.

Pompeys
son married
Libo his
daughter.

The First OBSERVATION.

Præfatus
Fabrum.Lib. 2.
cap. 11.Plutarch in
the life of
Cicero.

THIS accident of taking *Cn. Magius*, hath made known an officer of great place and use in the *Roman Army*, of whom otherwise their Histories make little mention. For, howsoever, there is found in these Commentaries many particular descriptions of admirable and incredible works, such as may seem to be made rather by Giants and Cyclopes, than any labor of Man, yet there is no mention of any *Præfatus Fabrum*, or Master of the works in any of *Cæsar's* Armies. Howbeit *Vegesius*, expressing their singular care to have in abundance all manner of provisions requisite for an Army, saith; That to every Legion did belong Carpenters, Bricklayers, Smiths, Painters, and other Artizans, skilful and fit to build lodgings for their wintering Camps; to make Engines and devices for War, such as were their portative, or ambulatory towers, targets, morions, corselets, bows, arrows, darts and pikes, or whatsoever else might serve, either for offence or defence. Which Artificers were all known, by the name of *Fabri* and he that was Chief, and had the command of them, was called *Præfatus Fabrum*. And in like manner *Plutarch* sheweth, that there was such an officer, as also that the place was given by the Generals; where he saith, that *Vibius a Sicilian* refused to lodge *Cicero*, as he passed to exile through *Lucania*; although that in his Consulship he had bestowed upon him the place of *Præfatus Fabrum*. And albeit *Cæsar* maketh no mention of any such officer; yet *Catullus* doth it for him, in such biting Trimetres as will not be forgotten:

*Quis hoc potest videre, quis potest pati,
Nisi impudicus, & vorax & Helio,
Mamurram habere, quod Comata Gallia
habebat & ultima Britannia?*

Who can this endure to see,
But must a wanton glutton be,
That *Mamurra* should have all
Fetch'd from *Britain* and from *Gall*.

Lib. 36.
cap. 6.Epist. ad
Artic. lib.
2. Epist. 8.

Of which *Mamurra Pinnius* thus writeth; *Cornelius Nepos*, saith he, writeth that *Mamurra* a *Roman Knight*, born at *Fernia*, and Master of the works under *Cæsar* in *Gallia*, was the first that covered all the walls of his house, which he built in *Mount Cælius*, with leaves of Marble. Neither let any man disdain the Author as a mean person; for this is that *Mamurra* whom *Catullus* doth note in his Verses; whose house was far more stately then *Catullus* did express, by saying he had gotten all the wealth of *Gallia Comata*. For the said *Cornelius* affirmeth, that he was the first in *Rome* that made the pillars of his house of solid Marble, even lewened out of the quarries of *Caristius* or *Luna*. Thus far goeth *Pliny*; out of which may be noted, that exorbitancy in gaining doth produce the like course in spending; and howsoever such comings in may be close and secret, yet the issuing out will proclaim it in profuse and lavishing manner; and therefore such as command in these places, and have such means to enrich themselves, had need to be clean-fingered. *Cæsar* writing to *Oppius*, mentioneth the taking of this Man, as a thing of some

note. *Cn. Magium, Pompeii Præfatum deprehendi scilicet, meo instituto usus sum, & cum statim missum feci: jam duo Præfati fabrum in meam potestatem venerunt, & à me missi sunt: when I had taken Cn. Magius, a master of the works to Pompey, according to my usual manner, I let him go. So that there have two masters of the works fallen into my hands, and I have let them both freely go. Concerning the use of these manual Arts, and the prerogative they have in well ordered States; it is to be noted, that without these, no City can conveniently be built, fortified, or furnished with Arms. And thereupon such Artizans have always challenged a place of chief regard in the Commonwealth. Whence it was, that *Ulysses* scorned not *se fabrum profiteri*, to profess himself such an Artizan.*

Homer.
Odys. 21.

The Second OBSERVATION.

THE *maxime proprium*, or most proper part of War is opposition; and that universal, rather than any other kind of repugnancy: for there is no sympathizing condition between two enemy Armies, otherwise then by mutual exchange of *vellè & wolle*, throughout the whole course of their intendments; as may be here observed upon *Cæsar's* arrival at *Brundisium*. For finding *Pompey* to remain there after the departure of the Consuls, and not certainly informed of the reason of his stay; lest he should think he could not be forced to quit *Italy*, *Cæsar* went about to thrust him out headlong; or otherwise, if his purpose were to follow after the Consuls to *Dyrrachium*, *Cæsar's* design then was to shut him in, and so to have followed the rule of contradiction, by which soul-dirs are directed in their achievements.

Concerning the site of *Brundisium*, which hath ever been famous for the commodiousness of the Haven, and the usual Port where the *Romans* took shipping for *Greece*, being but a hundred *Italian* miles distant from *Apollonia* in *Epirus*; we are to note, that the Town standeth upon a *Langue* of earth, extended into the Haven Peninsula-like from the main land, resembling the neck and head of a Stag, and in that regard is called *Brundisium*, of *Brutus*, which signifyeth a stag: which *Langue* hath many crooked guts, or inlets of the sea, capable of great shipping; besides the two main Ports, on either side of the Town, which with the rest of the Haven, make the safest and fairest road of that part of the World. The mouth of the Haven where *Cæsar* made his flots, is very straight; and opposite thereunto, some three miles distant into the Sea, standeth a small Island, to abate the violence and rage of the waves. Now to besiege *Brundisium*, it was requisite to take away the use and benefit of the Haven: which *Cæsar* attempted with such rare and artificial works of mounts where the Sea was shallow, and of flots where the water was deep; and those made firm with earth, and fenced with hurdles and cyprets, that the Reader may discern it, by the description, to be a Master-piece of excellent invention.

Brundisium
guidam Po-
etæ brevitatis
causa
Brundisium
dicunt,
Fellus.

The



• The third OBSERVATION.

It is truly said of old, That Peace is not dear at any rate. Which Antiochus well understood, when he bought it of the Romans for Twelve Thousand Asclei Talents, and 540000 bushels of Wheat. Esteeming it as the sovereign hapiness of mans fortune, and an extraordinary effect of these intelligent Spirits, which guide the motions of the Celestial Spheres, to keep the elements in a disagreeing concord, and the feet of men in the paths of tranquillity. Hence it is, that such as are instruments of so great a good, and shall thereby happen to redeem a Nation from horror and confusion, have, in all ages, been crowned with honour and renown, as the due reward of a Mediator of Peace. And therefore Cæsar, periwading Libo to negotiate a cessation of Armes, and to work in Pompey a disposition to an agreement, propounded the honour which attended this service, and the merit of that endeavour which brought back peace into the Empire.

Livie, lib. 4. Dec. 4.

CHAP. X.

Pompey leaveth Brundisium, and shippeth himself for Greece.

Cæsar.

THE work being half perfected, and nine dayes labour bestowed upon it, the Ships that had transported the Consuls and the other part of the Army, returned from Dyrrachium to Brundisium: and thereupon Pompey began to fit himself for a departure; being induced thereto either by the works which Cæsar had begun, or by a resolution formerly taken to quit Italy. And, the better to retard Cæsar's prosecution (lest upon his issuing out, the Soldiers should enter the Town) he mured up the gates, and stopp'd the entrances of the Streets and passages, sunk Ditches and Trenches cross the wayes, and therein stuck sharp piles and stakes, and covering the same with slight burdles, levelled it with thin and light earth: leaving onely two wayes free, which went unto the Haven, which he hedged in with a strong Palisado of huge sharp Piles.

These things being thus prepared, he commanded the soldiers to get a shipboard, without noise or tumult; and left upon the Walls and in the Towers, here and there, some of the readiest Slingers and Archers, to be called away upon a warning-signe, when the rest of the Soldiers were all shipped, appointing Gallies to take them in at an easie and safe place. The inhabitants of Brundisium, oppressed with the injuries and contumelies of Pompey and his soldiers, did favour Cæsar's party; and, understanding of this departure, whilst they were running up and down, and busied

about getting aboard, gave notice thereof from the tops of their Houses, Which being perceived, Cæsar (not to omit any opportunity of achieving his purpose) commanded Leaders to be prepared, and the Soldiers to take Arms. Pompey, a little before night, weighed Anchours, and the Soldiers keeping Guard on the wall, upon the watch-word given, were all called from their stations, and by known passages, repaired to the ships. Cæsar's soldiers, with Ladders, got upon the walls: but, being admonished by them of Brundisium, to take heed of the blind ditch, they stood still. At last, they were brought a great compass about, and so came to the Haven; and with Skiffes and Boates, seized two Ships with soldiers, which stuck, by chance, upon the Mounts which Cæsar had made.

Cæcum Vallum.

OBSERVATION.

FOR as much as this manner of Pompey's departure from Brundisium, and the slight he used to imbarke himself and his Army without danger of Cæsar's entering the Town, is commended for one of the best stratagems of War that ever he used; let us a little consider the parts thereof, which present themselves of two sorts: the one consisting of the works he made, to hinder and retard Cæsar's entrance, if happily he should have knowledge of his departure; and the other, in the cleanly conveyance of his men aboard, without noise or tumult, and the semblance he made of keeping the Town, by continuing the watch upon the Walls, to the end there might be no knowledge taken thereof. The Works were of three sorts. For, first he mured and stopp'd up the ends and entrances of Streets and Lanes, which might give access to a pursuing Enemy. And, to that end also, he sunk ditches, or trenches, cross the wayes and passages: which he stuck full of sharp stakes and galliethops, and covered them with light and thin hurdles, that the Enemy might not clyp them. And thirdly, hedged in the wayes leading to the Port, with a strong Palisado of huge sharp piles. And so used both the Lions and the Foxes skin, to avoid the danger which might have fallen upon him, if Cæsar happily had found means to attach them, as they were incumbered in getting to their ships, and disposing themselves to flee away. Which being an occasion that might have given him great advantage, was, in this manner, carefully prevented by Pompey. Howbeit, this his quitting Brundisium is censured but for a faulty resolution handomely carried: for Cicero doth much blame him for abandoning Italy; calling it a Themistoclean policy, to periwade his party to forsake their Country, and to leave the beif of their pleasures, and the weakest of each sex, to such misery and desolation, as moved pity in those that considered but the condition of the dogs and brute beasts; as it fell out at Athens, when Themistocles periwaded the Athenians to leave their Town and Country, and betake themselves wholly to Sea, to fight against Xerxes.

Platarch in the life of Pompey.

Cicero Epist. ad Atticum.

CHAP. XI.

*Cæsar dispatcheth Forces into Sardinia and Sicilie.
Cato's endeavour to keep Sicily for Pompey.*

Cæsar.

Albeit Cæsar well knew, that it much imported a speedy end of the business, to get ships, and pass the Seas after Pompey, before he could join himself with the Forces of the transmarine parts; yet doubting the less, and the long time before it could be effected, for that Pompey had taken with him all the shipping he could get, and thereby left him, for the present, no means to follow after: it remained, that he attended shipping, to be brought from remote parts, at out of Gallia, from Ancona and the Straights; which, at that time of the year, would require a long and troublesome passage. In the mean time, he thought it no way fit, that Pompey's old Army, and the two Provinces of Spain should be seised and assured; (one of them being deeply engaged to Pompey for many great and ample benefits;) or that they should have time to raise new Troops, especially of Horse; or that Gallia or Italy should be solicited or wrought from him in his absence. And therefore for the present, he refused to desist from making any further pursuit after Pompey, and to go into Spain; giving order to the Duumviri of all the Municipal Towns, to provide shipping, and send it to Brundisium. He sent Valerius, a Legate, into Sardinia with one Legion; and Curio, the Propretor, into Sicily with three Legions; commanding him, after he had possessed Sicily, to transport his Army into Africa. Marcus Cotta governed Sardinia, and M. Cato Sicily. Tubero should, by lot, have held Africa.

The Caralitani understanding, that Valerius was to be sent unto them, before he had left Italy, of their own accord thrust Cotta out of the Town. Cotta amused thereat, and perceiving withal that the whole Province gave consent unto it, fled presently out of Sardinia into Africa. Cato prepared and new trimmed the Gallies in Sicily, giving order to the Towns to build new, and prosecuted his direction with great diligence. Moreover, by his Legates, he mustered and inrolled Citizens of Rome in Lucania and Brutia, requiring rateable numbers of Horse and Foot from the Towns in Sicily. Which things being almost accomplished, understanding of Curio his coming, he complained, in publick, how he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey; who,

without any providence or preparation, had engaged himself in an unnecessary War: and yet, being demanded by himself and the rest, in the Senate, answered confidently, that he was provided of all necessities fit for War. And, after he had thus publicly complained, he fled out of the Province. By which means, Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio Sicily, void of Government, and thither brought their Armies.

Tubero arriving in Africa, found Aëtius Varus commanding the Province: who (as we have formerly shewed) having lost his Cohorts at Auximum, fled forthwith into Africa, and of his own authority possessed himself of the Province, which he found without a Governor. He got together, by new Inrolments, two complete Legions, which he raised by his knowledge and experience of the People of that Country, by reason he had governed that Province as Prætor some few years before. Tubero arriving with his Fleet at Utica, war, by Varus, kept out of the Town and the Haven; neither would he suffer him to set his foot ashore, which was sick, but compelled him to weigh Anchor and depart.

The first OBSERVATION.

THis Chapter maketh the first period of this War, as it is taken from the beginning of these Civil Broiles, unto Pompey's forsaking Italy, which was begun and ended in the space of 60 dayes: and also openeth the Gate to second resolutions, which are profecuted, as the sequel of the History will manifest: Containing likewise the reasons, why Cæsar made not present pursuit after Pompey, as the hinges of the succeeding War, and the true causes of the consequents of the same. In the consideration whereof, albeit Cæsar understood the advantage of him that profecuted a receding enemy, and the hopes which might be thereby conceived of a speedy end of that War; yet, having no ready means to accomplish his desire, he thought it better to prevent such inconveniences as might happily have fallen out upon the same; and so to keep his Party in a progress of their active thoughts, by clearing and assuring that Western part of the Empire, which Pompey had left unto him by his departure: rather then to leave an enemy on his back, or to admit a cooling and languishment of their resolutions, through expectation of Shipping, to follow that course which otherwise had been without exception.

In the carriage whereof we may observe, that as upon the first breaking out of these troubles, they scambled for the Towns of Italie, and sought to strengthen their parties by such as had no voice in the grand Chapter of the Senate, but only enjoyed the benefit of Municipal rights: so now being parted asunder, and the contagion of this intestine civil spread abroad, and grown to more ripe

Plutarch in
the Life of
Pompey.

Europa prima & generalissima mundi pars, Applan, Europa altera videtur omnium generum, aliis, longequa terrarum pulcherrima, Plin. lib. 3. c. 11.

ness, they made like haste to falten upon the remote Provinces, wherein Cæsar had the better portion. For, in his share, were contained Italia, Gaetia, Britannia, Hispania, Sicilia; which being the prime Countreys of Europe, where consequently the flour of that Empire, for that Europe hath ever been taken for the principal and chief part of the World,

The second OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe in Cato, the effects of a Stoical or formal spirit, which are more valuable in the case of peace, then in the difficulties of war. For, howsoever he made head of bettering himself, in rigging and trimming up the Gallies of his Province, commanding more to be built, raising new Troops of Horse and Foot, and profecuting his Commands with purpose of an exact account: yet, in the end, understanding of Curio his coming, he spent his fury in complaining of his Friends, and laying the cause of those garboiles upon him, whom, by election and consent, he had formerly set up, to make head against such, as otherwise may be supposed would have contained themselves in a better measure of moderation.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar goeth to Rome; and, calling a Senate, complaineth of the injuries done unto him.

Cæsar.

These things being ended, that the soldiers might, for the residue of the time, be a little eased and refreshed, Cæsar brought them back into the next Municipal Towns; he himself went directly to the City: and, having called a Senate, he layeth open the injuries and wrongs offered unto him by his Adversaries; sheweth them, that he never sought honor in the State, by extraordinary means, onely he looked to have enjoyed the full time of his Consulship, and therewith to have been contented: which was no more then any Citizen might stand for. The Tribunes of the People had requir'd, that consideration might be had of him in his absence, notwithstanding the opposition of his Enemies, and Cato his bitter resistance spending the time, after his old manner, with long and tedious speeches: which, if Pompey (being Consul) had disliked, Why did he suffer that to pass which was enacted? But, if then he did allow, and like of it, What reason had he to binder him from enjoying a benefit, which the People of Rome had bestowed upon him. From that, he fell to speak of his patience: which appeared, in that of his own accord he moved, that either party might quit their Forces; which might have been very prejudicial to his honour and dignity: Declared, what had been the malice and bitterness of his ad-

versaries, who refused to do that themselves; which they required of another man; choosing rather to imbroile, and confound the noble State, then to forgo the Command of an Army: Spake at large, as well of the wrong done unto him, by taking the two Legions from him, as also for their hard and insolent dealing, in putting the Tribunes of the People by their place and Authority.

He forgot not likewise, to relate the conditions which he propounded; the conference which he desired, and would not be granted, in regard whereof, he prayed and required, that they would take the charge of the Commonwealth, and give a helping hand to him for the government thereof. But, if they should, upon any doubt or mistrust, refuse to joyn with him, he would not much importune them, but would take it into his own hands, and in the mean time, let Commissioners be sent to Pompey to treat of Peace. Neither did he respect what Pompey a little before had said in the Senate, That to whomsoever Embassadors were sent, to such seemed to be ascribed Authority and Preeminence; as, on the contrary part, such as sent them, manifested an apprehension of fear; for these were arguments of pusillanimity. For his part, as he had gone beyond him in deeds of Armes and noble acts, so would be, in like manner, endeavour to excell him in Justice and Equity.

The Senators were well pleased that Embassadors should be sent: but there was no man found that would go; every man refusing in particular, for fear of Pompey; who, upon his departure from Rome, had said in the Senate, That he would hold him that stayed at Rome, in the same condition with them that were in Cæsar's Camps. So that three dayes were spent in debate and excuses; L. Metellus, Tribune of the People, being drawn, by Cæsar's adversaries, to protract the time; and to binder any matter which Cæsar should propound unto them.

L. Metellus.

The First OBSERVATION.

FIRST, we may observe, how irksome it is to humane nature, for him that hath tasted the sweetness of Authority, to forgo the reins of Command, and again to inroll his Name in the list of common duty; descending from the Throne of Sovereignty, to the condition of obedience; and to lose his eminency in respectless equality; especially if the honor be Military, and of Martial Nature. For, that fastness on us with a stronger hold, then any other power: being less capable of moderation, and waited on with the eyes and expectation of present and future ages. Whereby men grow desperately jealous of the opinion of

Fallicitas & moderatiois dividuum Contentum.

E c a the

the World, and cannot indure to quit themselves of that care, although they have attained to the full time of their deliverance: but, to be supplanted in the midst of so glorious a race, or to be pulled out of the seat of Magistracy by an abortive miscarriage, is able to irritate an ambitious spirit so far beyond the bounds of modesty, that it will not spare any endeavour to confound the greatest Empire, with irrecoverable calamities.

The second OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe the disposition of those Senators, that by their staying at Rome, became neutral in that Faction; and thereupon refused, either to take *Cæsar's* Commands, or to present themselves to *Pompey*, as Mediators of peace. *Plutarch* hath two reasons, why the Senators would undertake no such matter of Commission, as was required by *Cæsar*. The first is this, which is here expressed; every man fearing the displeasure of *Pompey*, who, at his departure from Rome, had protested, to hold them for Enemies, that went not along with him: whereas *Cæsar* censured their forbearance with better advantage to himself, and took their Neutrality as an argument of becoming his followers. The other reason which *Plutarch* avoucheth, is the opinion which the Senators had of *Cæsar's* double dealing; as not carrying his heart in his mouth, but pretending that which he never meant. For they could not be persuaded that this end was a cessation of Arms, or such a Peace with *Pompey* as should have kept on foot their ancient Liberty; but sought rather pretexts of good meaning, to colour his design of making Rome his servant. Howsoever, we may not blurt what is reported to have happened between him and *Metellus*, more than he himself speaketh of. For, going about to take Money out of the Treasury, he was there stoutly resisted by this *Metellus*, of whom he complaineth; allcading the Lawes and Acts of the State, forbidding any man to touch that Money, but in such times of extremity as were therein expressed.

To which *Cæsar* answered; That those Lawes were only made for time of peace: but now, Arms and War required another course of proceeding. Nevertheless *Metellus* * would not suffer him to break open the doors, until *Cæsar* advised him to be gone if he loved his life: for it was easier for him to dispatch him, then to speak it: and lo entered and carried away the Treasure, Whereupon groweth that of *Florus*, *Censum* & *patrimonium populi Romani ante rapuit quam Imperium*: He carried away the Treasure and Patrimony of the People of Rome, before he got the Empire.

And *Appian*, deriding the scrupulosity of the ancient Romans, that would not touch that Treasure but in extremity of War against the *Celtæ* or *Gallæ*, saith, that *Cæsar* might lawfully take it, for that he had vanquished and subdued the *Gallæ*; whereby the Romans had no further cause to fear them.

CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar leaveth the City, goeth into Gallia, and treateth with the Marcellians.

Cæsar perceiving their resolution, after he had spent there in vain some few dayes (that he might not lose any more time, and leave those things undone which he purposely intended) he left the City, and went into the further Gallia. Upon his arrival there, he understood that *Pompey* had sent into Spain *Vibullius Rufus*, whom *Cæsar* had a little before taken at *Corfinium*, and dismissed him: and that *Domitius* likewise was gone to take *Marfeilles*, with Eight Gallies, which he set out from *Sicilia* and *Sardinia*, and manned them with slaves, men infranchised, and his own Husbandmen: sending, as messengers before, certain young Noblemen of *Marfeilles*, with whom *Pompey*, upon his departure from the City, had earnestly dealt, that *Cæsar's* new favours might not put out of their remembrance the old benefits which he had done unto them. Those of *Marfeilles* having received this message, sent their Gates against *Cæsar*, called into the City the Albicans, barbarous and mountainous people (who, of antient time, had held amity with them, and dwelt upon the Hills above *Marfeilles*) brought Corn from all the adjacent Regions and Castles into the Town, set up offices and forges to make Armes, repaired both their Walls, their Navie, and their Gates.


Cæsar called out unto him some Fifteen of the chiefest men of *Marfeilles*, and treated with them, that the beginning of the War might not grow from that Town; who should rather follow the example of all Italy, then apply themselves to the will of any one man: not omitting such other persuasions as he thought pertinent to a sound resolution. These men reported at *Marfeilles* what *Cæsar* had delivered, and, by the common consent of the Town, returned this answer; That they understood, that the People of Rome was divided into two parts; neither was it in them to judge, or could they discern, which of the two was in the right. The Leaders of these two Factions were *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, both special Patrons and Benefactors to their City: of whom, one had augmented the publick Revenues of the State, and endowed it with the Lands and Territories of the *Volcæ Arrecomici*, and the *Helvii*; the other, having conquered and subdued * Gallias, gave it unto them, whereby their tributary Incomes were much

Cæsar.

* By this Gallias, is understood some place near to *Marfeilles*.

Denuncian-
te Pompeio
pro hostibus
se habitu-
rum qui
reipub. de-
ficient; ipse
medius &
neutrius
partis, suo-
rum finum
meto futu-
ros pronun-
ciavit. Suc-
tonius 75.
Cicero 10.
Epist. ad At-
ticum.
Plutarch.
Lucan.
Appian.
Florus.

* Non nisi
per nostrum
vobis per-
cussa pax-
ebat. Tem-
pla latius,
nullaque
fecer, sine
sanguine sa-
cro, Sparas,
vaporis,
opes.
Lucan, lib.
3. Dignum
te Cæsaris
ira, Nullus
honor faci-
et. Idem
eodem.



much augmented, and therefore, as they were equally bound to both for their favours, so would they carry to both an equal respect, not aiding either of them against the other, or receiving them within their gates.

Whilst these things were in handling, Domitius arrived at Marseilles with his shipping, and being received in, was made Governor of the City, and had the whole direction of the War committed unto him. By his appointment the fleet was sent out into all Coasts; and such Ships of burthen as they found, they brought in: the nails, timber, and tackling whereof, they took to mend and rig out other Ships. What Corn sower was found in the City, was brought in publick keeping; reserving the surplus of victual and provision for a Siege, as occasion should require.

Cæsar provoked with these injuries, brought three Legions to Marseilles, determined to make towers and mantelets ready for an assault, and to build twelve new Gallies at Arles, which were armed, rigged, finished, and brought to Marseilles, within thirty days after the timber was cut down. Of these he made D. Brutus Admiral, and left C. Trebonius to follow the Siege.

OBSERVATION.

From the Marseillians we may learn, that it is far easier to lay well than to do well: for howsoever they were able to discern the truth, and to give an answer to Cæsar, well-befitting the fame and opinion of their literature and knowledge, (being an Academy little inferior to the best, and in latter times more frequented by the Romans, for the study of Oratory and Philosophy, than Athens, or any other such chief seat of the Muses;) yet in their actions they disavowed all: taking upon them most unseasonably to arbitrate those differences, and to shew their opinion of the quarrel, by taking part with one faction. Wherein their error the more appeared, in that the party grieved was not lyable to their award; but rather had occasion to gain thereby a double honor to himself; first, by forcing them, and then by pardoning their rashness. And yet some Writers do think, they did no more than they were tied unto by former Treaties and Leagues with the Empire. (which they took to commit in Pompey's party) whereof they were loyal and zealous confederates, as appeareth by their love, when Rome was taken by the Gallies, for having news thereof, and understanding of the composition, which was to be made to raise the Siege from the Capitol, they provided all the gold and silver they could get, and sent it to Rome for that service. In regard whereof they were endowed with many Priviledges and immunities, both in the City, and elsewhere in the Empire. Howsoever, their hap being to respect more an exact observance of what had passed, than the fatal succeeding course of things,

drew upon them a sharp and bitter War; whereas they could not be freed, but by submitting themselves to his mercy, whom they had rejected. And thus we see verified that of the Poet;

Quicquid delirant Reges plebs autur Achivi.
Kings play the fools, and the poor people suffer.

Horace.

Which implyeth also how dangerous it is for men of authority and employment to be subject to wilful ambition. For as their service is of great importance to Government, when it is attended with well qualified affections; so are their motions as fearful, which are carried with the violence of exorbitant passions; especially, considering the means they have, either to misemploy the power of the State, or to give way to such inconveniences as may necessarily pervert all things but the ends they aim at: besides the aptness of a high spirit, not to doubt the truth of that saying, which is attributed to Cæsar, *si violandum est jus, regnandi gratia violandum est*; If a man would violate all right and law, he would do it for a Kingdom.

CHAP. XIV.

Cæsar hasteth into Spain.

Whilst these things were prepared and put in order, he sent C. Fabius, one of his Legates, with three Legions, that had wintered about Narbonne, before him into Spain; commanding him with all speed and diligence to take the passage of the Pyrenean hills, which were kept at that time with the forces of L. Afranius: and gave order for the other Legions which mint red farther off, to follow after. Fabius according to his directions, made hast, put the Garrison from the passage, and by great journeys marched towards Afranius Army.

Upon the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, who (as it is formerly related,) was sent by Pompey into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, Pompey's Legates (of whom the one governed the nearest Province of Spain with three Legions; the other held the Country from the * forest of Castile, to the River * Ana, with two Legions, and the third commanded the Vectones and Lusitania, with the like number of Legions) did so dispose and divide their charges, that Petreius was appointed to bring his Legions out of Lusitania, through the Territories of the Vectones, and join himself with Afranius; and that Varro with his power, should keep the farther Province of Spain. Which being so resolved and determined, Petreius having commanded the Lusitanians to levy horsemen and other Auxiliary Forces; and Afranius likewise having made the like levy in the Territories of the * Celtiberi, * Cantabri, and the rest

Cæsar,

Afranius,

Petreius

Varro.

* Salus
Castulorum
is
* Guadiana
Jure parti
redon, cas
thos Afrani
nium illis
Ac Petreius
erat—
Lucan. l. 3.
* Nos Celti
genti, &
ex Iberis
Martial lib.
4.

* A valiant
people descended
from Lacba
demon, of
whom Sil.
ital. i. 14.
Dionysius
vivere pasc
of.

Agellodan
bus vena
dissima
post Maffi
ham bona
m artium
fide. Vacit
g. Annal.
Strabo.
lib. 4.
Cumque
alii famæ
Populi ter
rore pavore
rem. Dis
catis in du
bis aucta est
ferare ju
ventus. Non
Graia levi
tate fidem
spontaque
lura. Et cau
de non facta
sequi. —
Lucan. l. 3.

of the barbarous Nations bordering upon the Ocean, Petreius came speedily through the Vætones to Afranius; and induced by the opportunity of the place, by mutual consent, they resolved to keep the War on foot near about Ilorda.

There were with Afranius (as formerly hath been shewed) three Legions, with Petreius two, besides * Targetiers of the nearer Province, and * Buckler-bearers of the farther Province, some eighty Cohorts, and of both Provinces about 5000 horse. Cæsar had sent his Legions into Spain, accompanied only with six thousand Auxiliary Forces, and three thousand horse, which had been with him in the former Wars. And the Gallæ at his request furnished him with the like number; besides the noblest and valiantest amongst them, of whom he had made particular choice to follow him in that War. To these were added the better sort of the Aquitani, and highlanders, borderers upon the Province in Gallia. He was advertised that Pompey was on his journey, coming through Mauritania into Spain, and that he would speedily be there with his Legions: and thereupon he borrowed Money of the Centurions and Tribunes of the Souldiers, and gave it to his Army, whereby he gained two points; for first he engaged the Captains by that loan, to endeavor his good success; and secondly bought the good affections of the Souldiers by largess and distribution. Fabius omitted no opportunity to get the favor of the Cities near about him; which he laboured as well by Letters as Messengers: and had already made two bridges over the River Sicoris, distant one from another about four miles, and over these bridges sent out his men to forrage; for he had spent all that was to be found on this side the River. The same thing, and upon the same occasion, did the Leaders of Pompey's Army; and oftentimes their Cavalry met and encountered together. And as it happened, that two of Fabius Legions going out to forrage according to their daily custom, and had passed the River, the carriage and the Cavalry following after, upon a sudden (by the over-petting of horses, and swelling of the water) the bridge brake, and the rest of the Cavalry was secluded and cut off from the Legions. Which Petreius and Afranius perceiving, by the burdels and planks that came down the River; Afranius presently by the bridge which was adjoining to the Town and his Camp, put over four Legions, and all his Cavalry, and went to meet with Fabius his two Legions, Upon whose ap-

proach, L. Plancus, that commanded the legions, being constrained by necessity, took the upper ground, dividing his Men into two Battalions, and making their fronts to stand two contrary ways, to the end they might not be circumvented by the horsemen. And although the number were very far unequal, yet he valiantly withstood very violent charges of the enemy. The Cavalry being thus engaged, the Ensigns of two Legions were desired afar off, which Fabius had sent by way of the farther bridge, to second those other two; suspecting that which was come to pass, that the Commanders of the adverse Army would take the occasion and benefit of this accident, to cut off our party. Upon whose approach the battle ceased; and the legions on either side were brought back into their Camp.

The first OBSERVATION.

The first observation may be taken from this design of Cæsar upon Spain, being at that time under the Government and command of Pompey; the standing or falling whereof, did much import the success of that War: for which respect it was, that when Cæsar could not buckle with the person of his Enemy, he used all means to beat down his authority, as the next in degree to his defence and being, and most concerning his honor and reputation. For if he took from him those Provinces, which the State had commended to his charge, and left him no interest in the obedience of such, whom he might in a sort challenge for his own people; what assurance could the other parts of the Empire have in his protection? or what could he elsewhere expect of that which they refused him?

The excellency of a General, is that perfection of judgment commended by Aristotle, enabling him to discern, *quid primum*, or what is most material in that variety of undertaking, which falleth out in following a War. And if that cannot with any convenience be attained, then to know the next point of importance; and so consequently to distinguish the degrees of difference, as they stand ranked in the order of judicious proceeding.

For the effectual prosecuting of which design, let us take a short view of their forces on each side, according as we find them mustered in this Chapter, that by the inequality of their Troops, we may judge of the want or sufficiency of their directions. Afranius, as it is said in the story, had three Legions, and Petreius two Legions, together with eighty cohorts of Auxiliary forces, supplied unto them by the two Provinces of Spain, which cohorts equalled the number of eight Legions, and so in all made thirteen legions, and according to the usual rate at that time of 5000 in a Legion, amounted to 65000 men, together with 5000 horse, which came to seventy thousand men, or thereabouts.

To confront to great an Enemy, Cæsar had five Legions, 12000 Auxiliary Troopers from the Gallæ, and peradventure 1000 Evocati; which according to the former rate of a Legion, did rise to 35000, or 40000 men at the most.

Whereby

Cæsar, 35000.

Whereby the one exceeding the other well near in a double proportion of strength, and yet failing in correspondency of success, calleth the variety of that proverb in question, *Ne Hercules contra duos*, Hercules himself cannot deal with two. Besides the inequality of the place where the trial was to be made, being wholly devoted to the greater party, was a matter of no small consequence. For he that maketh War in a Country absolutely favoring the Enemy, and confronting his purposes, had need of more forces than the adverse party, or better fortune in his proceedings. And therefore Fabius to prevent such mischiefs as might grow by that advantage, fought all means to draw some of the Towns to his faction, and to make himself friends for his better support and security; according to that which was said of old, That War cannot be made without some peace.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe the means he used to secure himself of the loyalty of his Army, and wholly to engage the Souldier in his fortune. For the money he borrowed of the Tribunes and Centurions, was a special Tye of their affections to his service: forasmuch as no Man witheth ill to him, by whose welfare and prosperity he hopeth to thrive; for so (wounding himself through another man's body) the hurt would fall upon his own head: but rather desireth such an accomplishment of his hopes, as may make himself partaker thereof. And on the other side, the largess he made unto the Souldiers, did so oblige their endeavor to his purposes, that they were thereby ready to perform as much as warlike Lælius had promised in his own person, on the behalf of the rest.

Babais faith, that the Creditor witheth all good to his debtor.

Lælius.

Lucan. l. 1.

Pectore si fratris gladium, juguloque Parentis Condere me jubeas, pleneque in viscera partu Conjungi, invita peragam tamen omnia dextra.

Bid me to stab my brother, cut My fathers throat, or rip the gut Of my big-bellied wife, (though loath) I'll do't.

The Third OBSERVATION.

Thirdly, let us consider the effects of diligence and provident foresight, which do oftentimes redeem an Army from a dishonourable overthrow; as may be learned from two circumstances in Fabius directions. First, in that he trulied not to one passage over the River Sicoris, but made two several bridges, as well for the convenience as the better security of his people. Secondly, upon the occasion which the Enemy might take by the breaking of the bridge, to distress the Legions on the other side of the water, he presently sent out succors to prevent such a casualty; which albeit it might seem to have proceeded out of curious suspicion, or idle fear, yet it fell out to be no more then was requisite and expedient. Which may teach a General to be careful even of possibilities, and to prevent contingencies, with the certainty of industrious directions, accounting always that which may happen, to be as certain as any thing we most expect.

Un altro non fidit noi.

Qu'è quel ben, potest, quasi tutto, tam ogie, mut Senec, Epist. 24.

Petreius & Afranius had 70.000 men, thereabouts Cæsar 35000.

The Fourth OBSERVATION.

Concerning Spain; we are to note that the Romans at first divided it into two Provinces, which they called the nearer and the farther; according to Strabo, the Ulterior and the Inner; and they were separated asunder by the River Iberus, now Ebro, and thence also were they called *Cis Iberum*, & *Ultra Iberum*. Spain on this side Ebro, and Spain beyond. The nearer Province being the lesser, continued without alteration during the Romans Government, and was sometimes called *Tarracensis Provincia*, of Tarraco, the principal Town of the same. But the further, in process of time, was divided into two parts, the one called *Beitica*, and the other *Lusitania*; and so the whole Region of Spain came to be divided into three Provinces. It was first entered by the Romans, by occasion of the notable Siege of Saguntum; upon which, P. Scipio having subdued the Carthaginians, reduced Spain into a Province, and left it governed by Proconuls, unto the time of Cornelius Lentulus and Lucius Stertinius. Afterwards it was governed by Proceptors, and sometimes by Praetors, according as the Empire came to be enlarged; and had thereby many Governors, for the pre-ferment of such as had supplied the better places of dignity in the State. Nevertheless, in the times of trouble, the Governors had always consular power; as in the War against Sertorius, Quintus Metellus Proconul, and Cn. Pompeius Quæstor, cum Consulari potestate missi sunt, were sent with consular power. And at this time, Pompey governed it by two Deputies or Legates. Touching the form and figure of the Country, Strabo liketh it to an Ox's hide; the neck whereof joyneth to the Pyrenean hills, which rise in towers from one Sea to another, as limits and bounds between France and Spain; taking their name (as some think) from Pyrene, the Maid that Hercules de-flowered, whom Sil. Ital. mentioneth, lib. 3.

Spain, Citerior, & Ulterior, Interior, lib. 3.

Anno V. C. 555.

Livie.

Pyrene ce sa nimbo sortent les arces Divisés Celtis late prope deas Iberos; Atque aternat tunc magnis divortia terris. Nomen Bebrycis duxere à virgine colles. Hæpiis Alcida crimen: qui forte laborum Gerionis peteres cum longa tricornis ardua, Possessus Baccho, sævis Bebrycis in aula Lugendam forma sine virginiate reliquit Pyrenen ——— and a little after, Defleuntque venem Nemes per secula nomen.

The lofty tower of Pyren's cloudy head O'looks th' Iberi, whom it parts from Celtis, For aye dividing thence two spacious lands, From Bebrys daughter first these hills took name, Ravish'd by Hercules: who as he went The triple-bodied Gerion's land to seize Drunk at the time, and lodg'd in Bebrys Court, Pyrene left to be bewail'd by beauty, No more a Virgin— And her lamented name the Hills still keep.

But according to the opinion more generally received, they are so called of the Greek word *Πύρεν*; for that Shepherds and Herdsmen let them once on fire, as witnesseth Diodorus Siculus. And Aristotle, in *Hiberia inquis combustis aliquando pastoribus*.

Lib. 5. In libro de mirandis auscultationibus.

* Scutarii, * Cetrarii, Nonnii, Cetrarii, scutum breve. Quis vocantur dam facere nequeat? Evocati.

Hæpiis inter Sicoris non ultimi amnes, Sævis ingenti quem p. in amplexu arcu. Hyberus passus aquas— Lucan. lib. 4.

Plancus five Plancius, a Plancie pedum, Splayfooted

bus Syriis, calenteque ignibus terra, manifestum argenti-
um de fluxu: cunctis postmodum terra motus se-
prevenit, cunctis hinc, magnam copiam argenti
colleam, atque inde Massiliensibus proventus non vul-
gares obisist: he saith, that on a time in Spain,
the Shepherds having fire on the Woods, the
ground was so heated thereby, that plain hills of
Silver bowed from the hills, and that afterwards,
by reason of earthquakes, several gapings being
made in the said place, they gathered great plenty
of Silver, which the Massilians made no small
benefit of. The Country of Spain is commended
for many things, as may appear by divers Elegies,
amongst which that of Claudians the Poet is
written, as though the Author had been a Pen-
sioner to the Kingdom.

Quid dignum memorare tuis Hispania terris
Fœdus humana vales: primo lavas aequore solem
India: tu fossas, exalta luce, jugale
Proletis, inque tuo respirant sidera sudu.
Divos equis, frugum facili, pretiosa metallis,
Principibus succunda pili

What noted thing in Spain can Man commend?
As Indian (east) drench the morning Sun,
So his t'ir'd steeds, walk here when day is done;
In Spanish wares the wearied stars take breath,
Spain store of horse, fruits, precious metals hath;
Breeds pious Princes.

CHAP. XV.

Cæsar coming to his Army, advanceth forward, and
incampeth near unto the Enemy.

Cæsar.

Within two days after Cæsar came
into the Camp, with nine hun-
dred horse, which he had kept
with him for a Convoy. The bridge broken
by the Tempest, was almost re-edified, and
that which remained undone, he commanded
to be finished in the night. And having seen
the nature and situation of the place, he left
six Cohorts to keep the Camp and the bridge,
with all the carriages of the Army. And the
next day, putting all his Forces into a triple
battel, he marched towards Ilerda: and there
standing a while in Armes, offered battel in
an equal and indifferent place. Afranius
brought out his forces, and made a stand in
the midst of the bill, under his Camp. Cæ-
sar perceiving that Afranius at that time was
not disposed to fight, determined to incamp
himself some four hundred paces from the foot
of the bill. And least the Soldiers should be
interrupted in their works, by the sudden
assaults and incursion of the Enemy, he for-
bid them to fortify it with a Rampier or wall,
which must necessarily be discovered and seen
afar off; but caused a ditch to be made of fif-
teen foot in breadth, in the front of the Camp
next unto the Enemy. The first and second

Frontum
Cæsar O-
lympo, in
noctem lu-
bita cir-
cumcidit
agmina fol-
sa, Dum
præ præ-
stant acies,
hostemque
sefellit.
Luc. l. 4.

battel (according as was directed) contin-
ued in Armes; and the third battel performed
the work behind them unseen, before it was
understood by Afranius that Cæsar would in-
camp in that place. Which being finished, he
drew his Legions within the ditch, and so
stood in Armes all night.

The next day he kept all his Army within
the ditch. And forasmuch as the matter to
make the Rampier was to be fetched far off,
he kept the like course for the finishing of the
rest; allowing each side of the Camp to be for-
tified by a several legion; with a ditch to be
sunk about of the same scantling; and in the
mean time, made the other Legions to stand
ready in Armes against the enemy.

Afranius and Petreius, to the end they might
amuse the souldier, and hinder the work,
brought down their forces to the foot of the bill,
and provoked them to fight. Howbeit, Cæsar
intermitted not the work, trusting to three Le-
gions in Armes, and the munition of the ditch.
The Enemy not making any long stay, or
advancing farther then the foot of the bill, led
back their Troops into the Camp. The third
day Cæsar fortified his Camp with a Rampier,
and commanded the rest of the Cohorts and the
carriages which were left in the other Camps,
to be brought unto him.

OBSERVATION.

It may be observed for Cæsars custom through-
out the whole course of his Wars, to approach
as near the Enemy as conveniently he could;
that so he might the better observe his passages,
and be ready to take the favor of any opportunity,
which either the nature of the place, or the mo-
tions of the adversary would afford him. Which
was the rather his advantage, in regard of his dex-
terity, and superlative knowledge in the use of
Armes, together with the experience of his old
Legions, whereby he was able not only to improve
his own designs to the utmost of an honorable suc-
cess, but to return the disgrace of any attempt
made upon his Army, upon the heads of them that
were Authors of the same. For otherwise, his
accepting so near an Enemy, might have turned to
his own loss; as being full of hazard, and subject
to more casualties then he that standeth farther off.
And therefore the rule is, That he that desireth to sit
near his adversary, must be exceeding circumspect
and sure of some advantage, either from the place,
or the over-awing power of his forces, or else out
of his own virtue, or by some other means, to
overway the inconveniences which attend such in-
gagements. As may appear by that which Fronti-
nus observeth hence, touching the streight where-
into Cæsar was fallen; being either to give battel,
which the enemy refused; or to make good that
place, from whence he could not retreat but with
danger. Whereupon, a little before night, he
sle the making of a ditch on the back of his Ar-
my,

my; and retiring himself within the same, stood
in Armes all night, for his better safety.

The use of such Ditches are of great im-
portance, and have oftentimes redeemed an Army
from great extremities: and were so frequently
used on all occasions with the Romans, that he that
shall deny them to be good ditchers, shall do
them wrong. And not only they, but other Na-
tions could tell how to make use of the Spade.

Pericles of Athens, being forced by them of Pe-
loponnesus into a place that had but two outlets of
escape, sunk a ditch of a great latitude thwart one
of the passages (as though he meant to keep out
the Enemy) and let his souldiers to break out the
other way. The Peloponnesians thinking he could
no way escape by the passage where the Trench
was cut, applied themselves wholly to the other
place, where the Soldiers made shift of breaking
out: whereby (through the help of Bridges,
which he had formerly provided) he escaped over
the ditch without resistance. Sometimes they
added other helps to these Trenches, especially
when they fought handiome means to get them-
selves away: whereof Scervius may be an instance;
who, having the Enemy pressing him in the rear,
and being to pass a River, drew a Ditch and a
Rampier at his back, in the fashion of a half-
moon: which Rampier he heaped with Wood and
combustible matter, and so setting it on fire,
kept off the Enemy, and passed with ease over the
Water.

In like manner, Herculesius, one of Scervius his
Legates, having rashly entered with a small
power into a long and narrow passage, between
two Hills, and finding himself pursued by great
Forces of the Enemy, sunk a cross Trench be-
tween the two Mountains; and piling the Ran-
pierz with Wood, set it on Fire, and so cut off the
Enemy.

CHAP. XVI.

Cæsar's attempt to possess himself of a small Hill:
what disadvantage he ran into, by missing of his
purpose; what means he used to recover him-
self.

Between the town of Ilerda, and the
next Hill where Petreius and Afranius
were incamped, there was a Plain
of about three hundred paces; in the midst
whereof stood a little Mole, rising higher then
the rest: which if Cæsar could get and for-
tifie, he hoped to cut off the Enemy from the
Town and the Bridge, and from such Vi-
tuals and Provisions as were brought to
the town. Hereupon he took three Legions out
of the Camp; and having put them into or-
der of Battel, he commanded the Antesignani
of one Legion to run before, and possess the
place. Which being perceived, the Cohorts
that kept watch before Afranius Camp, were
presently sent a nearer way to take that
Mount. The matter came to blows; but, for
as much as Afranius party came first to the
place, our men were beaten back; and, by

reason of new supplies sent against them, were
constrained to turn their backs, and retire to
the Legions.

The manner of fight which those souldiers
used, was, first to run furiously upon an Ene-
my, to seize any place boldly, and with great
courage; not much respecting their orders or
ranks, but fighting in a scattered and disper-
sed fashion. If they chanced to be thoroughly
charged, they thought it no shame to give way
and retire; accustomed therunto by frequent-
ing the Lulitarians, and other barbarous peo-
ple, using that kind of fight: as it commonly
faileth out, that where the souldiers have long
lived, they get much of the usage and condi-
tion of those places. Notwithstanding, our
men were much troubled thereat, as unaccus-
tomed to that kind of fight: for, seeing every
man leave his rank, and run up and down,
they feared least they should be circumvented,
and set upon in flank, and on their bare and
open side; whereas themselves were to keep
their order, and not to leave their places, but
upon extraordinary occasion.

Upon the routing of the Antesignani, the
Legion that stood in the corner left the place,
and retreated to the next Hill; almost all the
Army being affrighted, upon that which had
happened beyond every mans opinion, contrary
to former use.

Cæsar encouraging his Men, brought out the
ninth Legion to second them; by that means
compelling the Enemy (insolent of good suc-
cess, and shrewdly pursuing our men) to turn
their backs, and to retire to the Town of Iler-
da, and there to make a stand under the Walls.
But, the souldiers of the Ninth Legion, carried
on with endeavour, and going about to repair
their loss, rashly followed the Enemy into a
place of disadvantage, and came under the
Hill whereon the Town stood: and, as they
would have made their retreat, they were
charged afresh from the upper ground. The
front of the place had an uneven broken as-
pect, and was on each side steep; extended
only so much in breadth, as would serve
three Cohorts to imbattel in: neither could the
Cavalry come to help them. The Hill declined
easily from the Town about four hundred
paces in length: and that way our men had
some conveniency of retreat, from the disadvan-
tage to which their desire had unadvisedly led
them. The fight continued in this place:
which was very unequal, both in regard of the
straightness thereof, as also for that they stood
under the foot of the Hill, whereby no weapon
fell in vain amongst them. Notwithstanding,

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by prowess and valour, they patiently endured all the wounds they received. The Enemies Forces were supplied and renewed, by such Cohorts as were often sent out of the Camp through the Town, that fresh men might take the place of such as were wearied out. And the like was Cæsar fain to do, sending fresh Cohorts to that place to relieve the wearied.

After they had thus continually fought for the space of five days together, and that our men were much over-charged with an unequal multitude; having spent all their weapons, they drew their swords, and ascended up the hill, to charge and assault the Enemy: and, having slain a few of them, the rest were driven to make retreat. The Cohorts being thus put back to the Walls, and some of them for fear having taken the Town, our men found an easy retreat. Our Cavalry did from a low ground get up unto the top of the Hill; and riding up and down between the two Armies, made our soldiers to retreat with better ease: and so the Fight succeeded diversely.

About seventy of our men were slain in the first onset. And, amongst these was slain Q. Fulginius, Captain of the first Hastate Centurie of the Fourteenth Legion; who, for his exceeding valour, was preferred to that place from the lower orders. Six hundred at least were wounded. And of Afranius party were slain T. Cæcilius, Centurion of a Primipile order, and four Centurions more, besides two hundred soldiers. But, such was the opinion of that day's business, that either side believed they left with the better.

Afranius party was so persuaded, for that they long stood to bandy-blowers, and resisted the violence of our soldiers, although, in all mens judgment, they were the weaker: as also, for that they at first took and held the place which gave occasion of that fight; and, in the first encounter, compelled our men to turn their backs. Our men, in like manner, thought they had the better, in regard they had maintained fight for five bowes together, in a place of disadvantage, and with an unequal multitude; that they ascended up the Hill with their Swords drawn, and compelled their adversaries to turn their backs, and to retreat into the Town, mangle the disadvantage of the place.

The first OBSERVATION.

IN this direction which Cæsar gave, to take the little Hill between Ilerda and Afranius Camp, we may observe the danger depending upon the mischieving of an action. For, the failing of a purpose, in seeking to obtain that which would prove of great advantage, doth oftentimes draw men into as great inconveniences. And, as the end in every design pretendeth gain, so the means thereof do give way to hazard: from whence it consequently followeth, that such as are employed in execution, had need to use all endeavour, not to falsifie the grounds of good directions, by negligent or inconsiderate carriage; but rather to make good any want or defect, by serious and wary prosecution of the same.

And the rather, for that it specially concerneth their good that have the charge and handling of Commands: for they first are like to feel the smart of any error committed therein; or otherwise, to have the honour of any fortunate success, for as much as virtue hath all her praise from Action.

Concerning the use of running, we are to understand, that the Romans (amongst other their Exercises of Armes) had special practise of this, as available: in four respects, according as Pegasus hath noted. First, to the end they might charge the Enemy with greater force and violence. Secondly, that they might poise themselves with speed, in places of advantage. Thirdly, that they might readily discover, as should be found expedient upon all occasions. And lastly, to prosecute a flying Enemy to better purpose and effect. And this, as Seneca saith, they practised in peace: that being accustomed to needles labour, they might be able to discharge necessary duties. And Livy, amongst the Military exercises used by Scipio, to fit his men for those glorious exploits which he afterwards achieved, saith; That the first day, the Legions ran four miles in Armes, And Suetonius affirmeth, that Nero, having appointed a race for the Prætorian Cohorts, carried a Target lifted up before them with his own hand. And that Galba did more admirably; for, being fured of purpose to make himself eminent, he directed a Field-race with a Target, himself running as fast as the Emperors Chariot, for Twenty miles together.

The second OBSERVATION.

THE second thing to be noted in these specialities, is the bold enterprise of Cæsar's men, in charging the Enemy with their swords drawn, against the Hill; whereby, making them to give back, they had an easy and safe retreat from the danger wherein they were engaged. Whereby we may observe, that difficulties of extremity are never better cleared, then by adventurous and desperate undertakings: According to the condition of diseases and distemperatures of the body, which being light and easy, are cured with mild and easy potions; but, being grievous and doubtful, do require sharp and strong remedies. Which doth also in like manner appear through-

Omnis in virtutis actione consistit. Arist. Eth.

Lib. 1. cap. 9. The art of running.

Miles in media pugna decurrit, & ne ullo loco vacet, libere lassum, ut sufficit necessitas possit. Suet. Ca. Epist. 18. * Lib. 14.

Mediciliter agnoscitur, leviter curantur, graviter citius, temeritatis periculosis curantur, & animum acerbiter coguntur. Cic. lib. 1. de officiis.

out the whole course of Nature, and particularly in Weights: for, as ponderous and heavy bodies are not moved, but with a counterpoise of greater force; no more can extremities of hazard be avoided, but by like perilous enforcements.

And hence groweth the difference between true valour and fool-hardy rashness; being but one and the same thing, if they were not distinguished by the subject wherein they are shewed. For, to run headlong into strange adventures, upon no justification, were to shew more levity than discretion: And again, to use the like boldness in cases of extremity, doth deserve the opinion of vertuous endeavour. As is well observed by Homer, in the person of Hector, periswading the Trojans that fled away, to stand and make a head against the Grecians: This is the time, saith he, considering the danger wherein we are, to use that prowess and courage which we boast of.

And accordingly, Diomedes censured Glaucus in the same place, for offering himself to the fury of the Grecians: Either thou art some god, saith he, or else thou a lost and forlorn man. Which may serve to learn us the true use of courage; that ordinarily is never more shewed then in misemployment.

The third OBSERVATION.

I Have already, in the observations of the second Commentary of the Wars of Gallia, discoursed particularly of the parts of a Legion: Where it appeareth, that in Cæsar's time a Legion consisted of Five thousand men, or thereabouts; and according to the sufficiency and experience of the soldiers, was divided into three parts. The first and meanest of such as followed an Ensign, were called *Hastati*; the second, *Principes*; and the third and chief fort, *Triarii*; and, according to this division, had their place and precedence in the Army.

Again, each of these three kinds was divided into Ten Companies, which they called *Maniples*; and every Manipule was subdivided into two Centuries or Orders; and in every Order there was a Centurion or Captain. These Orders were distinguished by the numbers of the first, second, third, and so consequently unto the tenth orders, which were the last and lowest of each of these three kinds. So that this Q. Fulginius, here mentioned, was Centurion of the first and prime order of the *Hastati*; and T. Cæcilius, Centurion of the first order of the *Triarii*, which, by excellency, was called *Primipilus*, or the Leader of the first Company of a Legion.

Now concerning their imbattement, we are to note, that, according to this former division of *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, upon occasion of fight, they made a triple battell, one standing in front to another; which we call the Vanguard, Battell and Rere-ward. Whereof the *Hastati* were called *Antesignani*: not for that they had no Ensigns of their own, for every Manipule had an Ensign; but because they stood imbatteled before the Eagle, and other the chief Ensigns of the Legion. To which purpose is that of Livy, *Pugna oris est, non illa ordinata per Hastatos, Principesque & Triarios, nec ut pro signis Antesignanos, post signa alia pugnaret Acies*: The fight began, not a regular fight by *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, nor in

that orderliness that the *Antesignani* fought before the Ensigns, and another battell behind the Ensigns. And again, *Cadunt Antesignani: & ne videmus propugnatoribus signa, sit ex secunda prima Acies*: The *Antesignani* were cut down: so that least the Ensigns should be left naked of Defendants, the second Battell was made the first. Wherby it appeareth, that most of the chiefest Ensigns were with the *Principes*, which were called *Antesignani*, as the *Triarii* Possession.

Amongst other benefits of theft: so particular divisions of an Army, that is not the least which is noted by Thucydides, *Ut iussa imperatoris brevi spacio ad singulos milites deferri possent*: the commands of the General are thereby suddenly transmitted to every particular soldier.

CHAP. XVII.

Cæsar brought into great extremity by overflowing of two Rivers.

THE Enemy fortified the Mount for which they contended, with great and strong Works, and there put a Garrison. In the space of those two dayes that these things were in doing, there fell out upon a sudden a great inconvenience: for such a tempest happened, that the like waters were never seen in those places. And further besides, the Snow came down so abundantly from the Hills, that it overflowed the banks of the River, and in one day brake down both the bridges which Fabius had made: and thereby brought Cæsar into great extremity. For, as it is formerly related, the Camp lay between two Rivers, Sicoris and Cinga; and, within thirty miles, neither of these Rivers were passable, so that all the Army were of necessity cooped up in that straightness: neither could the Cities which had formerly ranged themselves with Cæsar's party, furnish any supplies of victual and provision; nor such of the Army as had gone far for forage, being hindered by the Rivers, could return to the Camp; nor yet the great convoys and reinforcements, coming to him out of Italy and Gallia, could get to the Camp.

The time of year was very hard; for there was neither old corn left of their winter provisions, nor that on the ground was as yet ripe. The Cities and Towns near about were all emptied: for Afranius, before Cæsar's coming, had caused all the Corn to be brought into Ilerda; and that which remained, was since Cæsar's coming all spent. And for Cattel (which might have relieved this necessity) by reason of the War, they were removed by the bordering Towns, and carried farther off. Such as were gone out to forage, and to seek Corn, were

Lib. 9.

Lib. 5.

Cæsar.

Cinga rapidus magis quam magnus.

Et videtur subdistingui Martem pendit. Lucas, lib. 4.

Antesignani.

Lib. 22.

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were

were by the light-armed Portugalls, and the Buckler-bearers of the hisber Spain, much troubled and molested: for these men could easily pass the River, for as much as none of them used to go to War, without bladders for that purpose. On the contrary part, Afranius abounded with all necessary provisions: great quantity of Corn was formerly provided and stored up, much was brought in from all the Provinces round about, there was also great plenty of forage in his Camp: for the Bridge at Merda afforded means of all these things without danger, and the Country beyond the River was whole and untouched, which Cæsar could not come unto by any means. The Waters continued for many dayes together. Cæsar used all means to re-edifie the Bridges; but neither the swelling of the River would permit him, nor yet the Coborts of the Enemy, placed on the banks of the other side, suffer him to go forwards with it: which they might easily hinder, both in regard of the nature of the River, and the greatness of the water, as also for that they might easily cast their weapons from along the bank, unto one place or point. Whereby it was very hard, at one and the same time (the River running so violently as it did) to do the work, and to shun the weapons.

The first OBSERVATION.

First, we may observe, that the strength of a multitude is not privileged from such casualties as betide the weaknesses of particular persons; but doth oftentimes undergo extremities, which can neither, by providence, be prevented, nor removed by industry: and are such, as proceed not from the endeavour of an Enemy, but out of the circumstances of time and place; together with such accidents as are interlaced with the same. In respect whereof it was, that Cambyles told Cyrus, That in the course of War he should meet with some occasions, wherein he was not to labour and contend with men, but with chances and dangers; which were not to be overcome with less difficulty than an Enemy; and are the more dangerous, as according as they give way to scarcity and lack of Victual. For, as it is said in the same place; *Scis brevi fruem habiturum imperium, si comesatus exercitus careat*. You know that if your Army be once starved, your Empire can be but short-lived.

The remedies whereof are, first Patience; which is as requisite in a soldier, as either courage or any other ability; and in such cases keepeth an Army from discontentment and disorder, until means of better fortune. And secondly, Good endeavour, which availeth much in such chances; the effect whereof will appear by that which Cæsar wrought, to redeem his Army from these inconveniences.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Concerning that which is here noted of the Spaniards, that made nothing of passing a River with the help of bladders, which the Romans were readier to wonder at than to imitate; it is observed, that as people exquisitely fashioned to a civil life, by a firm and settled policy of Government, are firm and real in the whole course of their proceedings, and accordingly do shew their punctuality, as well in their solemnities and private carriages, as in their magnificent and stately buildings: so on the other side, barbarous and rude Nations, that live under general and slight Lawes, are as slight and rude in their actions; as amongst other things may appear, in that the Spaniards thought it no scorn to use the help of bladders in passing over a River, as a device coming next to hand; which the People of a wife and potent State would not have done, but by a sure and substantial bridge.

The use of which bladders, as it hath been ancient among the people of that nature, so it is continued in the same manner by the Savages inhabiting Greenland, and the North parts of America; as appeareth by discoveries made of late by the Moscovy Merchants, about the North-west passage: from whence such as are employed in those voyages, have brought great and large bladders or bags, made of Seal-skins, ingeniously devised to be filled and blown with wind, and tied behind at their girdle, and at their collar, to help themselves in swimming. And after the same case fashion, the Indians of Peru, as Josephus Acosta writeth (in stead of wood and stone) made their bridges over great Rivers of plaited Reeds, which they fastened to the banks on each side with flukes: or otherwise of bundles of straw and weeds, by which, men and beasts (if there be any credit in his story) pass over with ease. Howbeit, as when the ancient Greeks would note a man of extreme insufficiency, they would say, he could neither read nor swim: so Cæsar seemed of the same opinion, by commending the skill of swimming, as a thing of much consequence in the use of Armes. Whereof he made good experience in Egypt: where he cast himself into a small boat, for his better safety; and finding it over-charged, and ready to sink, he leapt into the Sea, and swam to his Fleet, which was two hundred paces off, holding certain papers in his left hand above the water, and trailing his Coat of Armes in his teeth, that it might not be left to the Enemy.

CHAP. XVIII.

Afranius marcheth with three Legions, to cut off a party. The scarcity of victual in Cæsar's Army.

It was told Afranius, of great Troops and Convoys that were coming to Cæsar, but were hindered by the waters, and abroad there by the Rivers side: for thither were come Archers out of Ruthenia, and horsemen out of Gallia, with many Carries and Carriages, according to the Custome of the Gallers. There were

were besides of all sorts, about six thousand men, with their Servants and attendants; but without order, or any known command: for every Man was at his own liberty, travelling the Country without fear, according to the former freedom and safety of the ways. There were likewise many young Men of good rank, Senators sons, and Knights of Rome, besides Embassadors from sundry States, and divers of Cæsar's Legates. All these were kept back by the River.

Afranius went out in the night time with three Legions, and all his horse, to cut off this party; and sending his Cavalry before for upon them unawares. Howbeit, the Cavalry of the Gallers put themselves speedily in order, and buckled with them. And as long as it stood upon indifferent terms, they being but a few, did withstand a great number of the Enemy; but as soon as they had discovered the Ensigns of the Legions coming towards them, some few of them being slain, the rest betook themselves to the next hill.

This small time of encounter was of great consequence for the safety of our Men: for by this means they had opportunity to take the upper ground. There were lost that day, two hundred Archers, a few horsemen, and no great number of the Souldiers boys, together with the baggage. Victuals by reason of all these things waxed very dear, as well in regard of the present want, as also for fear of future penury, as commonly it happeneth in such cases, inasmuch as a bushel of Corn was worth fifty pence. Whereby the Souldiers grew weak for want of sustenance; and the inconveniences thereof daily more and more increased. For so great was the alteration which hapned in a few days, that our men were much afflicted with the extreme want of all necessary provisions; whereas they on the other side, having all things in abundance, were beld for Victors. Cæsar sent unto those States which were of his party, and instead of Corn, gave them order to furnish him with Cattel; dismissed Souldiers, boys, and sent them to Towns farther off; relieving the present scarcity by all means he could.

Afranius and Petreius, together with their friends, enlarged these things in their Letters to Rome, rumor and report added much hereunto: as that the War was even almost at an end. These Messengers and Letters being come to Rome, there was great concourse from all parts to Afranius house, much congratulation and rejoicing for these things; and thereupon many went out of Italy to Pom-

pey, some to be the first messengers of the news; others; that they might not seem to expect the event of the War, and so prove the last that came to that party.

When the matter was brought to these difficulties and extremities, and all the ways were kept by Afranius Souldiers and Horsemen, and no bridges could be made: Cæsar gave order to the Souldiers, to make such Boats and Barks as he had in former years taught them the use of in the War of Britain; the keels whereof were built of light stuffe, and small timber, and the upper parts made with wicker, and covered with hides: Which being finished, he laded them upon Carrs, and carried them in the night some twenty two miles from the Camp. And in those Barks transporting his Souldiers over the River, upon a sudden he posset himself of a little hill, which lay near unto the water side: which hill he speedily fortified, before the enemy had notice thereof. Afterwards he brought over a Legion to that place, and made a bridge from side to side in two days space: and so the convoys, which had gone forth for provisions and forage, returned back in safety; whereby he began to settle a course for provision of Corn.

The same day he passed over the River a great part of his Cavalry, who falling unlooked for upon the foragers (scattered here and there without fear or suspicion) got off a great number of men and cattel. Whereupon the Enemy sending certain Spanish Troops, bearing little round bucklers, to second and relieve the foragers, they divided themselves of purpose into two parts; the one to keep and defend the booty which they had got, and the other to resist and beat back the forces sent to charge them. One of our Coborts, which had easily run out before the Army, was intercepted and cut off: the rest returned by the bridge into the Camp in safety with a great booty.

The first OBSERVATION.

These Rutheni inhabited that part of Provence, where Rhodes now standeth: amongst whom Cæsar had ordinarily a Legion or two in Garrison, for the better keeping of the Country in obedience, being a stout and warlike people, and using archery, as appeareth in this place. Which howsoever the course of time hath brought into utter contempt, yet let us not forget to take notice, that anciently it hath been used by such as performed the greatest feats of Arms: for Hercules had but two sorts of weapons, to achieve labors of so much variety, a Club for such Monsters as would contest with his Valor; and Bow and Arrows for others that kept farther off. And in the old war

Bladders, used by the Spaniards, in swimming over Rivers.

Item comes imperator magnorum primum malorum, seve famis acie: nulli: obsequi ab helle Miles age toto corpore proleus emi fatigatus Cæsar Lucan. l. 4.

Lib. 6. cap. 14.

Sunt quædam in quibus non adversus homines certamen est, sed cum ipsis rebus: quas superare perdifficile est. Xenoph. lib. 1. de Ind. Cyl.

Diligentia in omnibus rebus plurimum valet.

* Primus cavale madafo vimine parvam Teatrum in puppiem, cæque induta juvenecoris patiens tumidum succum amem. Lucan. l. 4.

Rutheni, Solvuntur flavi longi Rutheni. Lucan. l. 11.

Stymphalides. lib. 9.

of Troy (if Homer may be believed) *Pindarus* Duke of *Lyca*, having a stable of gallant Couriers, left them all at home, lest he should not find means at Troy to give them their ordinary keeping; and came on foot with his bow and arrows, with such reputation of his deeds of Arms, that *Aeneas* sought him out in a conflict, to refute the rage and extremest pressures of *Diomedes*. And on the contrary part, *Teucer* relieved the distressed *Grecians*, from a hot and desperate pursuit, by slaying with his bow eight valiant Trojans before he stirred his foot.

Concerning the use of which weapon, howsoever it may seem ridiculous, (to such as understand nothing but the course of the present age) to recall the long bow to the service of a battle; yet they may remember, that the Grey-goose wing gave our fore-fathers such advantage, that they wrought wonders amongst all Nations for deeds of Arms; which we should imitate with as much hope of success, if we could handle our bowmen in any measure as they did. Of this I have already formerly treated.

The Second OBSERVATION.

It is a saying as true as it is old, That an ill habit cometh not alone, but is always attended with such consequences, as will enforce other inconveniences; as may be observed by this extremity here mentioned. For the mischief was not bounded with the affliction which *Cæsar* suffered for want of needful provision, notwithstanding the weight was such as could not be born by ordinary patience: but the Enemy enlarged it to his farther advantage, vaunting of it as a helpless remedy, and making out dispatches to send Victory to Rome. Which gave him yet farther prejudice in the opinion of the World; and made those his Enemies, that formerly shewed no dislike of his proceedings. And thus every ill chance hath a tail of many other misfortunes; which if either providence or endeavor may prevent, it shall much import a Commander to avoid them.

The Third OBSERVATION.

As Necessity maketh men constant in their sufferings, so custom giveth easiness and means of deliverance: according as may appear by this direction of *Cæsar*, which was wholly drawn from our former experience. For first the boats here prescribed, were such as he used in the War of *Britany*; and as far as may be gathered out of the former Commentaries, were those he commanded to be built for his second journey: which he would now imitate in regard of the safety of their bottoms, and not otherwise. For it is not to be supposed, that those Barks were covered with skins: unless peradventure he used some such as these upon occasion in that War, not expressed in the story.

Herodorus in his *Clio*, describeth the like, the boats (saith he) which come from *Babylon*, down the River *Euphrates*, are made by the Herdmen of *Armenia*, of light Timber, in a round fashion, without beak or prow, and are covered with skin, the hairy side inward; and in these they take their passage. Such as fish for Salmon in the River of *Severne*, use the like boats in all respects, which

they call *Cortaces* of *Corium*, being all covered with horse-skins tanned.

Secondly the means he used to pass over without impeachment from the Enemy, by carrying those boats in the night-time up the River to a place of security, was such, the like whereof he had formerly practised in *Gallia*, to pass the River *Loire*, being then guarded on the other side by the Enemy. Whereby we see how much use and continuance doth inable men, beyond others of smaller experience: according to that *Dies Diem docet*, one day teacheth another; or, older and wiser.

CHAP. XIX.

The Massilians encounter with Brutus at Sea, and are beaten.

While these things were done at *Ilerda*, the Massilians (by the direction of *L. Domitius*) rigged and set out seventeen Gallies, whereof eleven were covered, besides many lesser Vessels, which went along with them, to make the Navy seem the greater for the astonishment of the Enemy. In these they put a great number of Archers, and many Albicks, of whom we have formerly made mention; encouraging them both by rewards and promises. *Domitius* required certain Ships for himself, and them be filled with Shepherds and Country men, which he had brought thither with him. The Navy being thus furnished, set forward with great confidence towards our shipping, whereof *D. Brutus* was Admiral, and lay at Anchor at an Island right over against *Marcellæ*. Brutus was far inferior to the Enemy in shipping; but *Cæsar* having pickt the chiefest and valiantest men out of all the Legions, as well of the *Antesignani* as *Centurions*, put them aboard the Fleet, they themselves requiring to be employed in that service. These men had prepared hooks and grapples of Iron, and had likewise furnished themselves with many Piles and Darts, and other sorts of weapons; and understanding of the Enemies coming, put to sea, and encountered with the Massilians. They fought on either side very valiantly and fiercely: neither were the Albicks much inferior to our Men in prowess, being rough mountainous people, exercised in Arms, and having a little before fallen off from the Massilians, did now remember the late contract and league they had made with them. The Shepherds in like manner (a rude and unarmed kind of people, stirred up with hope of liberty) did strive to shew their valor in the presence of their Master.

The Massilians (trusting to the nimbleness of their shipping, and in the skill and dexterity of

of their Pilots, did frustrate (in a deluding manner) the shock of our ships, when they came violently to stemme them. And forasmuch as they had sea-room enough, they drew out their Navy at length, to compass and inclose our men about: and sometimes they would single out one of our ships, and set upon them with divers of theirs together, or wipe off a side of their oars in their passage along by them.

When they came to deal at hand (leaving aside the art and skill of the Pilots) they took themselves to the stoutness and valor of the Highlanders. Our Men were fain to wrestle with our-men, and more unskilful Pilots; who being lately taken out of ships of burden, did not well know the true names of the tackling, and were much troubled with the heaviness and sluggishness of the shipping; which being made built in of unseasoned timber, was not so nimble or ready for use. But as the matter came to handy-blows, every single ship did willingly undertake two at once; and having grappled with either of them, fought on each side, entering valiantly the Enemies ships, killing a great number of the Highlanders and Shepherds. Part of the Ships they sunk, some they took with the men, and the rest they beat back into the Haven. That day the Massilians lost nine ships, with those that were taken. This news was brought to *Cæsar* at *Ilerda*.

The First OBSERVATION.

I Have formerly observed the manner of their sea-fight, consisting of three parts. The first was, their nimble and skilful managing of their ships, either forcibly to assault, or to laviere and bear off, as might fall for their best advantage; wherein the Massilians, by reason of the skilfulness of their Pilots had great confidence. The second was, their fight before they came to grappling, as well with great Engines, such as were their *Balists* and *Catapultæ*, casting stones and logs of wood one against another, as also with slings, arrows, and darts, resembling our great Artillery, and small shot; for which purposes their ships were built with fore-Castles and Turrets, and other advantages of height, for their casting weapons. The third was, their grappling and forcible entry, wherein, forasmuch as the matter was referred to the arbitrement of valor, the legionary Soldier carried the caufe. Whence we may observe, that their Legions were the nurseries of their valiant and worthy Men as well for the sea as the land; being fitted by the discipline of their Military exercises, to undertake any service subject to humane industry; whereof they gave an account worthy the School wherein they were instructed.

Neither is it seen at any time, but that such Kingdoms as make care to train up their Men in

Academies of vertuous Actualty, do always keep their honor at a high price; affording at all times men of absolute and compleat carriage, both for designment and performance.

The Second OBSERVATION.

I Have a little before shewed out of *Livie*, that the *Antesignani* were ordinarily taken for the *Hastati*; which being the chiefest sort of Souldiers, according to the general division of a Legion, doth seem to contradict the passage in this Chapter, *Sed delectos ex omnibus legitimos fortissimos viros Antesignanos, Centuriones Cæsar ei classis attribuerat*: but *Cæsar* having pickt the valiantest of the *Antesignani*, out of all the Legions, put them into this select as *Centurions*. For the better clearing whereof, we are to note, that as the *Hastati*, or first battell of a Legion, were generally taken for the *Antesignani*, (standing before the Eagle and other the chiefest Ensigns, which were always amongst the *Principes* or second battell) so every Maniple having an Ensign in the midst of the Troop, the Souldiers that stood in front before the Ensign, were likewise called *Antesignani*, and were the best Souldiers in the Company: for the *Centurion* standing always in the head of the Troop, was accompanied with the valiantest and worthiest men; the rest filling up the reere, comforted with the *Centurion*, who thereupon was called *Tertiaditor*.

Whence we may admire the temperance and disposition of a Roman Army, being first generally divided into three battels; whereof the meanest were in the vanguard, to make trial of their strength, and to spend the heat of their young blood in the first affront of an Enemy: the *Veterani* or old Souldiers, being left in the reeward to repair any loss, which either force or casualty should call upon their Leaders. And again, to counterpoise themselves, in such a manner as the weakest might not always go to the wall, their private Companies were so ordered, that the best Men were always in front. Whereby they made such an exquisite temper, as kept every part of the Army in their full strength.

CHAP. XX.

Upon the making of the bridge at *Ilerda*, the Enemy resolveth to transfer the War into Celtiberia.

Upon *Cæsar*'s making of his bridge, Fortune suddenly changed. The enemy fearing the courage and valor of our Cavalry, did not so freely range abroad as they had wont to do; sometimes seeking forage within a small distance of the Camp, to the end they might find a safe and easy retreat if occasion required; sometimes fetching a great compass about, to avoid the guards and stations of our forsmen. And if they had received but the least check, or had but deserted the Cavalry afar off, they would have cast down their burdens and fled away.

At last they omitted foraging for many days together, and (which was never used by any

Ilia lib. 7.

An ill chance cometh not alone.

Necessitas fortiter ferre docet, confectudo facile. Sen. de tranquill. cap. 10.

Lib. 5.

Cæsar.

Ofca.
Calaguris.

any Nation) sent out to seek it in the night. In the mean time those of Ofca and Calaguris being in league together, sent Embassadors to Cæsar, with offer of their service, in such sort as he should please to command it. Within a few days the Tarraconenses, Lacetani, and Aufetani, together with the Illurgavonenses, which border upon the River Ebrus followed after. Of all these he desired supplies of Corn and provision, which they promised to furnish, and accordingly got horses from all quarters, and brought grain into the Camp. In like manner the Regiment of the Illurgavonenses, understanding the resolution of their State, left the Enemy, and came unto him with their Colours; and suddenly a great alteration of things appeared.

The bridge being perfected, five great Cities and States being come in unto him, a course settled for provision of Corn, and the rumour blown over of the succors and legions, which Pompey was said to come withal by the way of Mauritania, many other Towns farther off revolted from Afranius, and came to Cæsar's party.

The Enemy being much affrighted and abashed at these things, Cæsar (to avoid the great circuit by which he continually sent his horsemen about by the bridge having got a convenient place, resolved to make many Trenches of thirty foot in breadth, by which he might drain some part of the River Sicoris, and make it passable by a ford. These Trenches being almost made, Afranius and Petreius did thereupon conceive a great fear, lest they should be cut off altogether from victual and forrage, forasmuch as Cæsar was very strong in Horse, and therefore they determined to leave that place, and transfer the War into Celtiberia, being the rather thereunto induced, for that of those two contrary Factions, which in the former War had stood for L. Sertorius, such Cities as were subdued by Pompey, did yet stand in awe of his Name and Authority, and such as from the beginning had continued firm unto him, did intirely love him for the great benefits they had received from him; amongst whom Cæsar's name was not known. There they expected great succors both of horse and foot, and made no doubt but to keep the War on foot until winter.

Odogetia.

This advice being agreed upon, they gave order to take up all the boats that were on the River Iberus, and to bring them to Odogetia, a Town situate upon Iberus, twenty miles from the Camp. There they commanded a

bridge of boats to be made; and transporting two Legions over Sicoris, fortified their Camp with a rampier of twelve foot in height. Which being known by the Discoverers, Cæsar by the extreme labor of the Soldiers, continued day and night in turning the course of the water; and at length brought the matter to that pass, that the horsemen (with some difficulty) durst adventure over; but the foot Troops, having nothing above the water but their heads, were so hindered, as well by the depth of the River, as the swiftness of the stream, that they could not well get over. Notwithstanding at the same instant of time, news was brought of the making of the bridge over the River Iberus, and a sward was found in the River Sicoris.

The first OBSERVATION.

First, concerning the places here mentioned, the Reader may take notice, that Ilerda (now known by the name of Lerida) standeth upon the River Sicoris, in the Province of Catalonia, and being situate upon a hill, is inclosed round with a wall of hewn stone, in a pleasant and fertile Country, both for Corn, Wine, Oyl, and Fruit, as it is graphically described by Lucan;

Colles tumet modico, levique exerevit in altum
Pingue solum tumulo, super hunc fundata vetusta
Surgit Ilerda manu; placidis prælabitur undis
Hesperius inter Sicoris non ultimus amnes:
Saxeus ingenti quem pons amplexitur arcu,
Hybernas pelagus aquas.---

With a light rising to a pretty height
The rich ground swells, on which by ancient hand
Ilerda's plac'd: with gentle waves slides by
The Sicoris, none of Spain's meanest streams.
O'er it a bridge of stone with noble Arch,
Subject to suffer by the winter floods.

It was formerly a University, and at all times famous for salt meats and pickled fish. Whereunto Horace alludeth, when he tells his Book. That although it fell out that no Man would regard it, nevertheless it might serve at Ilerda to wrap salt fish in.

Aus fugies U ticam, aus undus miteris Ilerdam.

Either to Utiaca thou'lt pass,
Or to Ilerda in an oily cafe.

Ofca, now called Huesca, a Town likewise of Catalonia, in former time lurnamed Vidrix, where Sertorius kept the Sons of the grandees of Spain, as pledges of their loyalty, under pretext of learning the Greek and Latine Tongue, which he had there caused to be taught, in form of an Academy.

In this Town his hap was to be slain by Perperna, as Paternulus recordeth the story, Tum. 4. Perperna prætorius, et proscriptis, generis clariorum quam animi, Sertorium inter canam Ætosa interemisse Romanis.

manisque certam victoriam, paribus suis excidium, sibi turpissimum nocem, pessimo autoravit facinore; Then M. Perperna a prætorian, one of the proscripted parties, of a more noble stock then mind, flew Sertorius at Ætosa as he was at supper; occasioning, by this wicked deed of his, certain victory to the Romans, ruin to his own party, and a shameful death to himself. Which Ætosa is by all men taken for this Ofca.

The inhabitants boast of nothing more at this day, then that S. Laurence was a Citizen of their Town.

Calaguris.

Calaguris, now Calaborra, is seated upon a hill on the banks of Iberus; the People whereof are famous for their constancy and faithfulness to their Commanders, and specially to Sertorius: as appeareth by that of Valerius Maximus; Quo perseverantius interempti Sertorii cineribus, obsequium Cn. Pompeii frustrantes, fidem præstarent; quæ nullum jam aliud in urbe eorum superaret animal, uxores iustis, matroque ad hunc nefarie dapas verterunt: quoque divinus armatus juvenis viscerum sua visceribus suis akeret, infelices cadaverum reliquias salire non dubitavit. That they might demonstrate their fidelity to the ashes of Sertorius, to the very last, by defeating Pompey's siege, in regard there was no live thing else left in the City, they most inhumanely made their wives and children serve them for food; and that those which were in Arms might so much the longer; with their own bowels, feed their bowels; they stuck not to salt up the pitiful remainders of the dead carcasses.

Nevertheless Afranius took them in the end by continual siege: amongst whom, that Antiquity of Belricius is very remarkable, which is yet extant near to Logrono.

DIIS. MANIBUS.
Q. SERTORII.
ME. BEBRICIUS. CALAGURITANUS.
DEVOI.

ARBITRATUS.
RELIGIONEM. ESSE.
EO. SUBLATO.
QUI. OMNIA.
CUM. DIIS. IMMORTALIBUS.
COMMUNIA. HABEBAT.
ME. INCOLUMEM.

RETINERE. ANIMAM.
VALE. VIATOR. QUI. HÆC. LEGIS.
ET. MEO. DISCE. EXEMPLO.
FIDEM. SERVARE.
IPSA. FIDES.
ETIAM. MORTUIS. PLACET.
CORPORA. HUMANO. EXUTIS.

In English thus: To the Dij Manes (or Divine Ghost) of Q. Sertorius, I Bebricius of Calaguris devote my self; supposing it a business of Conscience, he being gone, who had all things in common with the immortal Gods, for me to seek to save my own life. Farewell Traveller, who readest this, and learn of me to be faithful. Faithfulness is a thing pleasurable

even the dead, when they have put off their humane bodies.

In memory of whose fidelity, Augustus Cæsar took a band of these People for a Guard to his person. In this Town was Quintilian the Rhetorician born; and being brought from thence to Rome, in Nero his time, was the first that taught a publick School for salary: as witnesseth Saint Hierome; Quintilianus ex Hispania Calaguritana primus Rome publicam Scholam tenuit, & Galario cobonestas publico claruit. Quintilian, a Spaniard of Calaguris, first taught a publick School at Rome and had a stipend allowed him.

Celtiberia was the Countrey lying along the River Iberus, inhabited by People coming out of Gallia Celtica: wherupon Lucan saith,

Profigue a gente vetusta
Gallorum Celtæ, miscentes nomen Iberis.

Some Celtick fugitives from Gallia came,
And with th' Iberi made a compound name.

Florus calleth them Hispania Robur. And, Valerius Maximus affirmeth, That they were always glad of War, as being, to end their life in happiness and honour; and lamented their ill fortune to die in their beds, as a miserable and shameful end.

Hic pugna cecidit decus, corpusque cremari
Tale nefas: cæd credunt, superisque referri,
Impulsus carpat si membra jacentia vultus.

To die in Fight (rite).
They count great honour, know no Funeral
Heaven's their's, they think, and the celestial seats
Whose scattered limbs the ravenous Vulture
cats.

Their Armes and weapons were of singular rarity: for besides the water of Bilbao, which gave them an invincible temper, they had also a peculiar fashion of working them, as witnesseth Dioscorus Siculus; hiding their Plates of Iron in the earth, until the worst and weakest part were eaten out with rust, and of that which remained, they made very hard swords.

The Second OBSERVATION.

The sudden alterations of War, are like the changings of many minds upon small accidents; which are so forceable to shake our resolutions, as made a great Philosopher to describe a man by the property of mutable Animal, or a changeable living creature. And it is notably seen in this: That Afranius, in the compass of a few days, triumphed of Cæsar's overthrow, and fled away for fear of his power. Whence we may note the advantage coming to a party, when they shake off any eminent difficulties: for, as the extremity thereof threateneth ruine and destruction, so the alteration bringeth with it an opinion of victory. And surely, such is the condition of all sorts of Misery, that when the storm is over, and the bitterns of the affliction alaid, good times come redoubled upon the Patients; as though the vicissitude

Suetonius
in Augusto.
Cohors Ca-
laguritana-
rum.Ad Esclibii
Chronicon.

Celtiberia.

Lib. 4.

Lib. 2. c. 17.
Lib. 2. c. 6.Sil. Ital.
Lib. 3.

Lib. 6. cap.

G g as though the vicissitude

tude of things did enforce contrary effects. And therefore a Commander, knowing the advantage of such an opportunity, must endeavour to improve the same, as may best serve to a speedy end.

CHAP. XXI.

The Enemy sent forward, and is stayed by Cæsar.

Cæsar.

THe Enemy thereupon thought it expedient for him to make the more haste; and therefore leaving two Auxiliary Cohorts for the safe keeping of Ilerda, he transported all his Forces over the River Sicoris, and incamped himself with the two Legions, which formerly he had carried over. There remained nothing for Cæsar to do, but with his Cavalry to impeach and trouble the Enemy in their March. And for as much as it was a great compass about to go by the bridge (whereby it would come to pass, that the Enemy would get to Iberus, a far nearer way) he passed over his horsemen by the Ford. About the third watch, as Petreius and Afranius had raised their Camp, upon a sudden the Cavalry shewed themselves in the rear; and swarming about them in great multitudes, began to slay and binder their passage. As soon as it began to be day-light, from the upper ground where Cæsar lay incamped, it was perceived, how the Rearward of the Enemy was hard laid to by our Cavalry, and how sometimes they turned head again, and were nevertheless broken and routed: sometimes their Ensigns stood suddenly still, and all their Foot Troops charged our Horse, and for't them to give way; and then turning back, went on their way again. The Soldiers walking up and down the Camp, were grieved that the Enemy should so escape their hands, whereby the matter would consequently be spun out into a long War: and went unto the Centurions and Tribunes of the Soldiers, praying them to beseech Cæsar not to spare them for any danger or labour; for they were ready and willing to pass the River where the Horse went over. Cæsar, moved through their desire and importunity, almost he feared to expose his Army to a River of that greatness, yet he thought it expedient to put it to trial. And therefore commanded, that the weakest Soldiers of all the Centurions should be taken out, whose courage or strength shewed a disability to undertake that service: and these he left in the Camp, with one Legion to defend the same, bringing out the other Legions without carriage or burden:

and having set a great number of Horses and Cattel both above and below in the River, he transported his Army over. Some few of the Soldiers, being carried away with the stream, were succoured and taken up by the Horsemen; inasmuch as not one man perished.

The Army carried thus over in safety, he ranged them in order, and marched forward with a three-fold battel. Such was the endeavour of the Soldier, that albeit they had set a circuit of six miles to the Ford, and had spent much time in passing the River, yet by the Ninth hour they did overtake the Enemy that rose about the third hour of the Night.

As soon as Afranius and Petreius had discovered the Legions afar off (being terrified with the novelty of that pursuit) they betook themselves to the upper ground, and there imbatelled their Troops. In the mean time Cæsar refreshed his Army in the field, and would not suffer them (being weary) to give battel: and, as the Enemy tried again to go on in their march, he followed after and stayed them; whereby they were forced to incamp (sooner then was purposed: for there were Hills a little before them, and for five miles together, the passages were difficult and narrow).

By which means (being advanced between the Hills) they hoped to be free from Cæsar's Cavalry, and by keeping the passages, to binder the Army from following after; to the end, they themselves might, without peril or fear, put their Forces over the River Iberus: which, by all means, was to be effected. Nevertheless, being wearied with travelling and fighting all day, they put off the business to the next morning.

Cæsar also incamped himself on the next hill, and, about midnight, some of their party being gone out from the Camp, somewhat far off, to fetch water, were taken by the Horsemen. By them Cæsar was advertised, that the Enemy with silence began to remove, and to lead their Troops out of their Camp. Whereupon he commanded the sign of rising to be given, and the cry (dislodging and trusting up their baggage) to be taken up, according to the Discipline and use of soldiers.

The Enemy hearing the cry, fearing lest they should be impeached in the night, and forced to fight with their burdens on their backs, or to be shut up in those straight passages by Cæsar's Horsemen, stayed their journey, and kept their Forces within their Camp.

OBSER-

OBSERVATION.

THis passage over Sicoris, was in the same manner as he carried his Army over the River Loire, in the seventh Commentary of the War of Gallie, *Pado per Equites invento, pro rei necessitate oportuno, ut brachia modo atque flumini, ad sustinenda arma liberi ab aqua esse possent, disposita equitatu, qui vim fluminis frangerent, incolumiter exercitum tranduxit.* The Horsemen having found a Ford, indifferent convenient, in regard of the necessity they were put to, to the end that the Soldiery might have their armes and shoulders at liberty, and not be hindered by the Water from carrying their Weapons, he so disposed his Horse, that he broke the force of the River with them, and so carried his Army over in safety.

The Horse that stood above brake the force of the Water, and those that were below took up such as were overcome with the stream, and withal, gave courage to the soldier to venture with better assurance, seeing the passage impaled in on each side, to keep them from misfarrying. His attempt upon Sicoris, to abate the swelling pride of that River, by dividing it into many streams, was in imitation of the first Cyrus, who, taking displeasure at the River Cynde, next unto Euphrates, the greatest River of Affrica, drew it into three hundred and threescore channels.

Cæsar not finding the River Halis passable by a ford, and having no means to make a bridge, sunk a great trench behind the Camp, from the upper part of the River, and so drew all the water behind his Army.

Petreius hath a particular discourse of passing an Army over a River, whether it be by Bridge or Boat, or by wading or swimming, or any other way: to which I refer the Reader.

CHAP. XXII.

Afranius seeketh to take the Straights between certain Mountains; but is prevented by Cæsar.

THe next day following, Petreius went out secretly with a few Horse, to discover the Country; and, for the same purpose, some went likewise out of Cæsar's Camp: L. Decidius Saxa was sent with a small Troop to view the site of the Place. And either party returned with the same report: that for five miles the way was open and champaign, and afterwards very rough and mountainous, and, whosoever first took those straights, might easily impeach the Enemy from going further. The matter was disputed in the Council of War, by Petreius and Afranius; the time of their setting forward was debated. Most of them thought it fit to take their journey in the night; for, by that means they might come to those straights before it were perceived. Others were of opinion, that it was not possible to steal out in the night; as appeared by the cry of rising ta-

ken up the night before in Cæsar's Camp, upon their removing: and Cæsar's Horsemen did so range abroad in the night, that all places and passages were kept and shut up. Neither were they to give occasion of Night Fight; but to avoid the same by all the means they could; for as much as in civil dissension, the ordinary soldier would rather suffer himself to be over-mastered by fear, then continue firm in the allegiance which he had sworn unto: whereat, in the day-time, every man bath shame and dishonour before his eyes, together with the presence of the Centurions and Tribunes; with which respects a Soldier is restrained, and kept within the bounds of duty, and therefore the attempt was, by all means to be undertaken in the day time: and although it fell out to some loss, yet nevertheless the body of the Army might pass in safety, and possess that place which they sought for.

This opinion prevailing in their consultation, they determined by break of day the next morning to set forward. Cæsar, having diligently viewed the Country, as soon as day began to appear, drew all his forces out of his Camp, and marched forward in a great circuit, keeping no direct way. For the wayes which led to Iberus and Octogela, were taken up with the Enemy's Camp; in so much as they were to pass over great and difficult Valleys. And, in many places, broken Rocks and Stones did so binder them, that they were necessarily forced to give their weapons from hand to hand, the Soldiers lifting up one another; and so they passed most part of the way. Howsoever, no man thought much of the labour, for that they hoped to give an end to all their travel, if they could keep the Enemy from passing over the River Iberus, and cut off their Victuals.

At the first, Afranius soldiers ran joyfully out of their Camp to see the Army, casting out words of derision and reproach, that for want of victual they fled and returned to Ilerda; for the way they held was quite contrary to that they intended, whereby they seemed to go back again: and the Commanders themselves did much approve their own Counsel, that they had kept their Troops within the Camp. For that which confirmed them in their opinion, was, that they perceived they were come out without their Carriages: whereby they hoped, necessity would not suffer them to continue long there. But, when they saw the Troops by little and little to wind to the right hand, and that they perceived, how those that were in

G g 2

front

Hannibal
per Ilerda-
ra Pado va-
da exerci-
tum trans-
iens, ele-
phantos in
ordinem op-
posit ad
aquam, qui
vim fluminis
frangerent,
incolumiter
exercitum
tranduxit.
Livie.
Ac ne quid
diceretur, re-
petit ad
aquam, qui
vim fluminis
frangerent,
incolumiter
exercitum
tranduxit.
Livie.
Ac ne quid
diceretur, re-
petit ad
aquam, qui
vim fluminis
frangerent,
incolumiter
exercitum
tranduxit.
Livie.

Three of
the Clock
in the day
noon.

lib. 3. cap.
7.

* Attollunt
campum ge-
minis jugis
fissa rupes
Vallis cavæ
media: tel-
lus hinc ar-
duis celsis
Continuat
colles, tutæ
quos inter
quæ An-
fidia latur-
etivia:
quibus hoc
he positio
Fucibus re-
mitti terra-
rum in de-
vix Mar-
tum, inque
fissa gen-
to Cæsar
dece-
Lucan. lib.
4.

Vafa com-
clamat.

Ita sine ullo
Ordine, alio
taptumque
fuge con-
vertit bel-
lum, Et fa-
ciem pug-
næ, vultus-
que interse
minas.
Lucan. lib.
4.

front had fallen backward beyond their Camp, there was no man so dull, but thought it expedient presently to march out, and make head against them. Whereupon they cried to Arms; and all their Forces, excepting some few Cohorts, which were left to keep the Camp, went out, and marched directly towards Iberus.

The whole business consisted in speed and celerity, which of the two should first take the straight, and possess the Hills. Cæsar's Army was hindered by the difficulty of the way: and Afranius party was retarded by Cæsar's Cavalry. The matter was come to that upset, that if Afranius party did first get the hills, they might haply quit themselves of danger; but the baggage of the whole Army, and the Cohorts left in the Camp could not be saved: for, being intercepted and secluded by Cæsar's Army, there was no means to relieve them.

It fell out, that Cæsar first attained the place; and being come out from among those great Rocks into a champaign, put his Army in order of Battel against the Enemy.

Afranius seeing the Enemy in front, and his Rearward hardly charged by Cæsar's Cavalry, got the advantage of a small Hill, and there made his stand: and from thence sent four Cohorts, bearing round bucklers unto a Mountain, which, in all mens sight, was higher then the rest; commanding them to run as fast as they could, and possess that hill, intending to follow after with all his Forces, and altering his course, to get along the ridges and tops of the Mountains to Octogesa.

As the Cohorts were advanced forward by an oblique circuit, Cæsar's Cavalry perceiving their intentment, set upon them with such violence, that they were not able any time to bear their charge, but were surrounded by them, and all cut in pieces in the sight of both Armies.

The first OBSERVATION.

Petereius and Afranius, in their Council of War, resolved, by all means, to shun night encounters, as a thing full of hazard and uncertainty, and apt for looseness and disobedience: for the night, being neither a discoverer of errors, nor yet a distinguisher either of actions or persons, nor yet wrapping up both the virtuous and the faulty in her mantle of obscurity, doth not admit of directions, to follow an opportunity, or to help a mistake; but, rather giving way to impunity and licentious confusion, leaveth no hope of what is wished: Whereas the light is a witness of every mans demeanour, and hath both honour and rebuke to make duty respected.

For which causes, Curio (as it followeth in the next Commentary) in his harangue before that untimely expedition against King Juba, thus rejected their advice that would have him set forward in the night: At etiamus medio nocte proficiscamur addunt: quo majorem credo licentiam habent qui peccare conantur: namque huiusmodi res aut pudore aut metu tenentur, quibus rebus nox maxime adversaria est. Further then this, they advise us to set out in the middle of the night: that so (I think) those men who have a mind to do mischief may take the greater liberty: for in the day-time they would be restrained, either through shame or fear, to both of which the darkness of the night is a great adversary.

And that the danger may appear, as well by effect as by discourse, let the Reader take notice of that Battel by night, between Antonius Primus, on the b. half of Vespasian, and the Vitellian Legions, near unto Cremona; whereof Tacitus hath this description: Præiūm tota nocte varium, anceps, atrox; his, rursus illis, exitiabile. Nihil animus aut manus, ne oculi quidem provisi juvabant. C. The fight was doubtful and bloody the whole night, now this party going to the worse, by and by that. A stout heart or a valiant hand avail'd little, neither could the eyes see before them either advantage or disadvantage. And thus are all night-works condemned, wherein either order or honor are of any moment.

The Second OBSERVATION.

I Have already noted, in the former Commentaries the use of exact and particular discovery of the Country, where a party is engaged: then which nothing doth more advantage a Commander to exp. dite the happy issue of a War. For by that means he is not only able to judge of any motion which the Enemy shall offer, and to give sure directions to frustrate and make void the same; but also to dispose himself according as shall seem expedient for his safety. Wherein, if a place of such consequence, as is here mentioned, shall by design be aimed at, this History sheweth how much it importeth either party to obtain it: and therefore Cæsar had reason to make his passage through Vallies and Rocks, rather then to lose Victory, for want of labouring in an uneasy way.

This Lucius Decidius Saxa, or Didius Saxa, employed in this discovery, was afterward advanced by Cæsar to be Tribune of the People; whereas Tullie was so much offended. How can I omit (saith he) this Decidius Saxa, a man brought from the furthest end of the World; whom we see Tribune of the People, before we ever saw him a Citizen?

CHAP. XXIII.

Cæsar refused to fight upon an advantage offered, contrary to the opinion and desire of all men.

There was an opportunity then offered of doing something to purpose; neither was Cæsar ignorant thereof. Such an overthrow given before their faces, did consequently so discourage them, that it was thought

thought they would not endure a charge, especially being compassed about with the Cavalry, in an indifferent and open place, where the matter was to be decided by Battel. Which was on all sides instantly desired as Cæsar's hands; for the Legates, Centurions, and Tribunes of the Soldiers, came jointly unto him, desiring him to make no doubt of giving battel, for all the Soldiers were very ready and forward towards; whereas the contrary party had shewed many arguments of fear and discouragement. First, in that they did not succor their fellows. Secondly, inasmuch as they had not bouged from the hill, which they had took for a retreat. Neither had they withstood the charge and incursion of the Cavalry, but had thronged pell-mell together, and confusedly mingled their Ensigns one with another, no Man either keeping his place or his Colours. And if be feared the inequality and disadvantage of the place, he might take some other of more indifference; for certainly Afranius could not long stay where he was, but must depart from thence for want of water.

Cæsar was in hope to the end the matter without either blow or wound of his men's; forasmuch as he had cut the Enemy from victual. And why then should he lose a man, although it were to gain a victory? Why should he suffer his valiant and well deserving Soldiers, to be so much as hurt or wounded? Or why should he put the matter to the hazard of fortune? Especially, when it no less concerned the honour and reputation of a Commander, to vanquish an Enemy by direction and advice, then to subdue them by force of Arms; being moved withall with a tender commiseration of such Citizens of Rome, as were consequently to be hazarded or slain in the fight; whereas he desired to work out his own ends with their safety.

This opinion of Cæsar's was disallowed by most men: and the Soldiers would not stick to speak plainly amongst themselves, forasmuch as such an occasion of Victory was oversift, that when Cæsar would have them, they would not fight. He notwithstanding continued firm in his opinion, and fell a little off from the Enemy, to lessen and abate their fear and amazement. Petreius and Afranius, upon the opportunity given them, withdrew themselves into their Camp. Cæsar having possist the Hills, with Garrisons of Soldiers, and shut up all the passes leading to Iberus, incamped himself as near as he could to the Enemy.

The Commanders of the adverse party being much afflicted that they had absolutely lost all means of provision of victual, and of gaining the River Iberus, consulted together of other courses. There were two ways left open; the one to return to Ilorda, and the other to Tarracon. And while they were considering of these, it was told them; that such as went out for water, were very much pressed by our Cavalry. Whereupon they placed many cohorts of Guard, as well of horse, as Auxiliary footmen, interlacing the legionary Cohorts amongst them; and began also to raise a Rampir from the Camp to the watering place, that the Soldiers might safely without fear, fetch water within the bounds of their fortification. Which work Petreius and Afranius divided between themselves and for the perfecting of the same, had occasion to go far off from the Camp: by means of whose absence the Soldiers taking liberty of free speech one with another, went out, and as any man had an acquaintance or neighbour in each others Camp, they sought him out. And first, they all gave thanks to all our party, that they had spared them when they were terrified and amazed the day before: in regard whereof, they acknowledged to hold their lives by their favor: and afterwards, inquired how they might safely yield themselves to their General, complaining that they had not done it in the beginning, and so have joined their forces with their ancient friends and kinsmen.

And having proceeded thus far in their communication, they require assurance for the lives of Afranius and Petreius; lest they should seem to conceive mischief against their Generals, or betray them in seeking their own safety. Which things being agreed upon, they promised to come with their Ensigns to Cæsar's Camp; and thereupon sent to Cæsar some of the Centurions of the first Orders, as Deputies to treat of Peace.

In the mean time, they invited their friends on either side into the Camps; inasmuch as both their lodging seemed but one Camp. Many of the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and Centurions came to Cæsar, recommending themselves to his favor: and the like did the great deeds and chief Princes of Spain, whom they had commanded out to take party in this War, and is remaind with them as Hostages and Pledges. These inquired after their old acquaintances and ancient hosts, by whom each might have access to Cæsar with some commendation. In like manner, Afranius his Son dealt with Cæsar, by the mediation of Sul-

Et quemvis bello maculatus fuisse miles que potius scilicet, timet. Lucan. lib. 4.

Hospitibus illis ceteris hominibus, vocis ille propinquas Admonuit hunc studiis is confertis periculis atque Nec Romanos erat qui non agnosceret hostem. Lucan. lib. 4.

Sigues of fear in the Camp.

a. Hilom.

Oratio. lib. Philip.

Nocturna prælia esse vitanda, quod perterritus miles in civili diffentione, timore magis quam religioni confidere consuevit; at laetitia delectus, nec in fuga fugiunt. Tacit. Hist. lib. 2.

pitius a Legate, touching his own and his fathers life. All things sounded of joy and mutual congratulation; and of them that had escaped such imminent dangers, and of us that seemed to have effected such great matters without bloodshed. Inasmuch as Cæsar (in all mens judgment) reaped great fruit of his accustomed clemency and mildness; and his Counsel was generally approved of by all Men.

THE OBSERVATION.

THIS Chapter containeth a passage of that note and eminency; as the like is not read in any story. For if we search the Records of all Nations, from the very birth of Hellena, unto times of later memory, it will no where else appear that a General spared an advantage to purchase a victorious name, by the bloodshed and ruine of his enemy, especially contrary to the will and desire of his Army, that had undergone such difficulties and hazards, to give an end to that War; contrary to his knowledge, and late experience of the mutability and change of time and fortune, contrary to the surest rule of War.

----Doins an virtus, quæ in hoste requirit?

Valor or Craft, who cares which in a foe?

And contrary to the use of Arms, which are always bent against an enemy to subdue him.

This is the fruit of that other part of Military knowledge, which Men do rather admire than attain unto, no less concerning the honor of a Commander, * *Confilio superare quam gladio*, to overcome by counsel and good direction, rather than by the Sword, and was a main step to raise him to the Empire. For howsoever the Souldier, (to prevent farther labour) stood hard for blood, not respecting that of the * *Comice*, *Omnia prius experiri verbis, quam armis sapientem docet*, a wife man should try all fair ways before he brings the bullets to blows: yet if Cæsar had been so injurious to Nature, as to have left them to their own desires, and suffered their fury to have violated the law of humanity, more then was requisite for victory; they would have afterwards have loathed themselves, and cursed their Swords for such uncalonable execution; and may be doubted, would have revenged it upon his head, before the time came to strike the fatal stroke of the eversion of that State. Cæsar esteemed it also apart of divine power, to have men by Troops, according to that of Seneca; *Hæc divina potestas, et gratia, ac publica fœvere*: It is a divine power that saves men by Troops and all at once. And therefore he chose rather to displease the Souldier for the present; than to lose that honour which attendeth the sparing of home-bred blood: whereof foreign Enemies are not altogether so capable.

Petereius breaketh off the Treaty, and newswears to the Souldiers to the Party.

FRANIUS being advertised of these passages, left the work which he had begun, and withdrew himself into the Camp; (prepared as it seemed) to take patiently whatsoever should befall him. But Petereius was no way dismayed thereat: for having armed his household Family, he went flying with them, and a Prætorian cohort of Buckler-bearers, together with some few ppendary Horse of the barbarous people, whom he was wont to keep about him, as a guard to his person, and came suddenly and unlooked for to the Rampire, brake off the Souldiers Treaty; thrust our Men off from the Camp; killing such as he could apprehend. The rest got together, and affrighted at the suddenness of the danger, wrapt their coats about their left arms, and with their swords drawn, defended themselves from the buckler-bearers and horsemen; and trusting to the nearness and propinquity of their Camp they took courage and got safely thither, being protected by the Cohorts that had the guard at the Camp gates.

This being done, Petereius went weeping about to the Maniples, calling the Souldiers, and beseeching them not to leave and forsake him, nor yet Pompey their General, that was absent, nor to deliver them over to the cruelty of their adversaries. Presently thereupon, a great concourse of Souldiers was about the Prætor, requiring that every man might take an Oath, not to abandon or betray the Army or their Generals, nor yet to enter into private consultation thereof, without consent of the rest. He himself first took an oath to this effect, and caused Afranius to take the same. The Tribunes of the Souldiers and Centurions followed in order; and after them, the Souldiers were brought out according to their Centuries, and were sworn the same oath.

They caused also to be proclaimed, that whoever had any of Cæsar's Souldiers, should cause them to be brought out; and being brought forth, they flew them publicly before the Prætorian Pavilion. But most men concealed such as were with them, and in the night time sent them out over the Rampire. Whereby it came to pass, that the terror wherewith the Generals had affrighted them, the cruelty they had shewed in punishment, together with the vain Religion of the new oath, had taken away all hope of yielding for the present; and quite changing

changing the Souldiers minds, had reduced the matter to the former course of War.

Cæsar for his part, caused diligent inquiry to be made of such Souldiers as came into his Camp, during the time of the Treaty, and sent them away in safety. But of the Tribunes of the Souldiers and Centurions, many of their voluntary accord remained with him; whom afterwards he held in great honour; and advanced the Centurions, and such Roman Knights as were of the better rank, to the place and dignity of Tribunes.

The Afranians were solely laid unto in their foraging, and watered likewise with great difficulty. Many of the legionary Souldiers had store of Corn, being commanded to take provision with them from Nerda for twenty two days. But the buckler-bearers and Auxiliary forces had none at all, having but small means to provide and furnish themselves, and their bodies not being used to carry burthens, for which cause, a great number fled daily to Cæsar.

The first OBSERVATION.

THAT every Man is the maker of his own fortune, is evidently seen in the several changes of these two Generals. For Afranius gave way to the Souldiers treaty, and refused to suffer whatsoever transaction should cast upon him. But Petereius, opposing himself to their desires, raised new troubles, had farther designs, and another fortune. Wherein, forasmuch as the event of things riseth according as they are first directed either by weak or strong resolutions; it better success the temper of a Souldier, (howsoever the success fall out with our desires) rather to be stiff in what he willeth, then to make his own easiness the ready means of his adversaries happiness.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Virtue at all times hath had this privilege in the difference and degrees of State and condition, to make a Noble mans word equal to a Common mans Oath: but the integrity of former ages, had a more general prerogative, avouching every Mans promise for the strictness of an oath. Hence it was, that the Romans upon their enrolment for a War, gave but their promise to the Tribune of the Souldiers, to keep such ordinances as the *Militia* required: until at length, that the corruption of time (falsifying the simplicity and truth of words) did enforce them to give an * Oath, as the surest bond of faith and obedience; as is noted by Livie at large; the Souldiers (faithful) which was never before that time practised, were sworn by the Tribunes, to appear upon summons from the Consuls, and not to depart without leave. For until then, there was nothing required of them but a solemn promise (which the horsemen made by their Decuries, and the foot Troops by their Centuries) not to leave their Colours by flight, or through fear, not to forsake their rank, unless it

were either to assault an enemy, to take up an offensive weapon, or to save a Citizen, which being at first but the offer of a free mind, was now by the Tribunes required by obligation of an oath.

The form of this Oath was diversely varied, as appeared by *Aul. Gel.* and more specially in the times of the Emperors: for *Calpurnia* made this addition to the Souldiers oath, That they should hold neither their lives nor their children dearer unto them then the Emperor *Caius* and his sisters. Concerning the respect had of this Military oath, that which *Tully* reporteth of *Cato* is of excellent note, *Popilius* having charge of the Province of *Macedonia*, had (amongst other Roman youths) *Cato*'s son, a young souldier in his Army; and being occasioned to diminish a Legion, discharged likewise young *Cato*, being one of that legion. But he desirous to bear Arms in that War continued still in the Army: whereupon *Cato* writ from Rome to *Popilius*, requiring him, that if he suffered his son to remain in that War, he would by any means swear him again, for being discharged of his first oath, he could not lawfully fight against the Enemy.

Ever since *Constantine* the great, the Souldiers were sworn by a Christian Oath, as *Festus* noteth, to obey all things the Emperor should command them, not to leave their warfare without licence nor to shun death for the service of the publick weal. And at this day, amongst other Nations, an oath is given to the souldier upon his enrolment, to this effect; Well and lawfully to serve the King, towards all men, and against all, without exception of person; and if they know any thing concerning his service, to reveal the same incontinently; not to leave their Colours, without leave either of the General or his Lieutenant.

The ancient Romans did charge their solemn and publick oaths with many ceremonies: as appeareth by that form which was used in ratifying Treaties and Transactions; their Heralds killed a hog, and cried out wital, that the like would happen to him that first falsified his faith.

*Polibi*us reporteth, that he that read the Oath, wherby the Romans and Carthaginians swore their accord, had the hair of his head tied up in an extraordinary manner: the parties invoking their *Jupiter*, to grant all prosperity to him that without fraud or deceit did enter into that agreement. But if (said he that took the oath) I shall either do, or purpose otherwise, all the rest being safe and sound, let me alone (in the midst of the laws and justice of my Country, in my own habitation and dwelling, and within my proper Temples and Sepulchers) perish most unfortunately, even as if I should slish out of my hand. And (as he spake these words) he cast away a stone.

I do not find the use of a Military oath in our Nation. Howbeit, the common form of our Oath, is as ceremonious and significative as any other whatsoever, which may be observed by the three parts it containeth, as I have seen them allegorized in some Antiquities. For first, the Book being always part of holy Writ, implies a renunciation of all the promises therein contained. Secondly, the touching it with our hands, signifies the like dependence of our works, never to be successful or helping unto us. Thirdly, the kissing of the Book, importeth a vain mispending of our vows and Prayers, if we falsify any thing thereby avowed.

CHAP.

Neque enim ibi major in arvis. Machitis fortis et Lucan.

* Non minus est imperatoris, confilio superare quam gladio. Cæsar. Comment. de bel. Gal. * Tenentis Enucho.

Nature in juram facit & humanitatis legem violat, qui ultra videtur viam iustitiae, cupiditate diligit. De clemencia Lib. 16. Ingenium quædam deus, quædam domesticum sanguinem bellum. Tacit. Agricola.

Cæsar.

Hoc siquidem folio civilis certamine telli Dux caule melioris eris. Luc. lib. 4.

Iunbos anpiculur enis. Sæpæ & molis di furbat. Iungunt pacem, Luc.

Anno Urb. cond. 558.

* Nullum viculum ut vint. gendam. G. dem. Jure Junando arduus esse vult. Lib. 22.

Inter mensasque torquet, Quæ modo complexa forent pedora cadunt. Luc. lib. 4.

Lib. 16. cap. 4.

Lib. 1. offic. M. Popilius.

Lib. 2. cap. 5.

Lib. 3. Histor.

CHAP. XXV.

The endeavor which Afranius used to return to Ilerda, but failed in his design.

Cæsar.

THe matter being in this extremity, of two means which were left unto them, it was thought the readier and more expedient, to return to Ilerda. For having left there behind them a little Corn, they hoped to take some good course for the sequel. Tarraco was farther off, and thereby subject to more casualties concerning their passage. In regard whereof, they resolved of the former course, and so dislodged themselves.

Cæsar having sent his Cavalry before, to incumber and retard the re-re-guard, followed after himself with the Legions. The hindmost Troops of their Army were constrained (without any intermission of time) to fight with our horsemen. And their manner of fight was thus. Certain expedite Cohorts, free of carriages, marched in the rear of their Army, and in open and champain places, many of these Cohorts made a stand, to confront our Cavalry. If they were to ascend up a hill, the nature of the place did easily repel the danger wherewith they were threatened; forasmuch as such as went before, might easily from the higher ground, protect them that followed after; but when they came to a valley or descent, that those that were in the former ranks could not help them in the rear, the horsemen from the upper ground, did cast their weapons with great ease and facility upon the Enemy. And then continually they were in great hazard and danger: and still as they approached near unto such places, they called to the Legions, and willed them to make a stand with their Ensigns, and so by great force and violence repelled our Cavalry.

Who being retired back, they would suddenly take a running, and get all down into the Valley. And presently again, being to ascend into higher ground, they would there make a stand, for they were so far from having help of their own Cavalry (whereof they had a great number,) that they were glad to take them between their Troops, (being much affrighted with former encounters) and so to shelter and protect them: of whom if any chanced (upon occasion) to stray aside out of the rout the Army held, they were presently attacked by Cæsar's horsemen.

The fight continuing in this manner, they proceeded slowly on their way, advancing for-


ward, but by little and little; and oftentimes stood still, to succor and relieve their party, as then it fell out. For having gone but four miles on their way (being very hardly laid to, and much pressed by our Cavalry) they took to an exceeding high hill, and there putting themselves into one front of a battel, fortified their Camp, keeping their carriages laden upon their horses. As soon as they perceived that Cæsar's Camp was set, and that the tents were up, and their horses put to grass, they rose suddenly about mid-day, upon hope of some respite, by reason of our horse put out to feeding, and went on their journey.

Which Cæsar perceiving rose and followed after, leaving a few Cohorts to keep the carriages, and about the tenth hour, commanding the forragers and horsemen to be called back, and to follow after, instantly the Cavalry returned, and betook themselves to their accustomed charge.

The fight was very sharp in the rear, inasmuch as they were ready to turn their backs. Many Souldiers, and some of the Centurions were slain. Cæsar's Troops pressed hard upon them, and threatened the overthrow of their whole Army; inasmuch, as they had neither means to choose a fit place to incamp in, nor to proceed forward in their march. Whereby they were necessarily enforced to make a stand and to pitch their Camp far from any water, in an unequal and disadvantageous place. But Cæsar forbore to meddle with them, for the same reasons that have been formerly declared, and for that day, would not suffer the Souldiers to set up their Tents, that they might be the readier to follow after, at what time soever, by night or by day, they should offer to break away.

The Enemy having observed the defect of our Camp, employed all that night in advancing their works, and in casting their Camp with an opposite front to our Army. The like they did all the next day: but so it fell out, that by how much their camp was brought farther on, and the fortification grew nearer to finishing, by so much farther off they were from water: and so remedied one evil with a worse mischief. The first night, none of them went out of their Camp to fetch water: and the next day, they led out all their Troops together to water, but sent no man out to forrage. Whereby Cæsar finding them oppressed with many inconveniences, chose rather to force them to a composition, then to fight with them.

The



THE OBSERVATION.

IN this troublesome and confused retreat, which these Commanders undertook, to regain the advantages that formerly they had quitted at *Ilerda*, we may observe the difficulties attending a weaker party, when they would free themselves from the pressures of a strong confronting Enemy. For the frailty of humane fortune is always lo-yoked with incumbrances, and hath so many lets from the native weaknesses of its own endeavour; that if the opposition of foreign malice shall there-withall unhappily concur, to stop the current of our desires, there is little hope of better success, then that which the ordinary condition of extre-mity doth afford: which is, to hazard the peril of a wound, in seeking to avoid the smart of a rod; and to fall into *Scylla*, upon a desire we have to shun *Charybdis*: according as it befell this party. Wherein, let us farther note the advantage which a Commander hath, either to take or leave, when he is able to overmaster the Enemy in Cavalry: for the Horsemen serving an Army Royal, by making discoveries, by foraging, by giving rescue upon a sudden, by doing execution, and retarding an Enemy in his March, if (over-awed by the Cavalry of the Enemy) they cannot perform these services as is requisite; the contrary part is the stronger by so many advantages.

CHAP. XXVI.

Cæsar goes about to inclose the Enemy, and be to hinder Cæsar.

Cæsar.

Howbeit, *Cæsar* laboured to inclose them about with a Ditch and a Ram-pier, to the end he might with bet-ter ease hinder their sudden sallies and eruptions, to which he thought the Enemy would necessarily betake themselves.

The Enemy being streightened for want of forrage, and, to the end also they might be the readier to escape away, caused all their hostes of carriage to be killed: and, in these Works and consultations were two dayes spent. The third day, a great part of *Cæsar's* Works being already perfected, the Enemy (to hinder the business, intended concerning the for-tifications) about two of the clock in the af-ternoon made the Alarme, brought out the Le-gions, and imbatelled themselves under their Camp. *Cæsar* calleth back the Legions from their Work, and commanding all his Horse to troop together, putteth his Army in Battel. For, having made such a shew of unwilling-ness to buckle with the Enemy, against the will of the soldier, and opinion of all men, he found himself subject thereupon to much inconvenience: howbeit, he was resolved (for the reasons already specified) not to strike a Battel; and the rather at this time, for that

the space between his Camp and the Enemies was so little, that if he had put them to flight, it could not have much availed him, for the gaining of a perfect and absolute victory. For their Camps were not above Two thousand foot asunder; whereof the Armies took up two parts, and the third was left for incursion and assault. So that if he had given Battel in that nearest of the Camp, they would have found a speedy retreat upon their overthrow. For which cause he resolved to stand upon his defence, and not to give the onset, and charge them first.

Afranius had put his Army in a double Battel: the first consisting of five Legions; and the Auxiliary Cohorts, which usually served in the Wings, were now placed for Suc-cors, and made the second Battel.

Cæsar's Army was ordered in a triple Bat-tel: the first was of four Cohorts, a piece of the five Legions: the second, of three; and the third again of three of each Legion, following in order. The Archers and Slings were in the midst, and the Cavalry on the sides. Being thus both imbatelled, they seemed to ob-tain their several ends: *Cæsar*, not to fight unless he were forced to it; and the Enemy, to hinder *Cæsar's* Fortification. But the matter being drawn out in length, they stood imbatelled until sun-setting: and then re-turned both into their Camps.

The First OBSERVATION.

Contra opinionem enim militum, famamque omni-um, videri prælio diffugisse, magnum detrimen-tum afferbat. Having made a shew of un-willingness to buckle with the Enemy, against the will of the soldier, and the opinion of all men, he found himself subject to much inconvenience, saith the History. Whence we may observe two points. First, that a Commander in striking a field, must partly be directed by his Army: for he may neither fight against the liking of the soldier, nor withhold them from fighting when they are willing to embrace it, if other circumstances so in-differently concur therewithal. For when men are commanded to do what they would do, the matter is thoroughly undertaken, and the issue is commonly answerable to the readines of their de-sires: but, being restrained in their affections, and put besides their aptness of their voluntary dispo-sition, there groweth such a contrariety be-tween the Generals order and the soldiers obedi-ence, as will hardly sympathize to beget good for-tune.

And, if a Leader of that same and opinion, and so well known to his Army, as *Cæsar* was, grew in-to dislike with his soldiers, upon so good causes which he had to shew a Battel; what hazard that Commander runneth into, who seldom or never gave argument of his resolution in this kind, may be conceived by this passage. The second thing

H h which

inclose in Scyllam, cupiens vi-tare Charybdis.

Hora odis-sa, signo da-to.

Tela tene-jan miles, ait, ferrum-que ruenti subtrahit, non illo conserit mi-hi sang uine bellum. Vnde itur haud gratis jugulo qui provocat hostem. Lucan. l. 4.

It is hard catching Hares which unwilling Hounds.

* Cæsaris
mortalitas
in eo fiant
confilia quid
fili consue-
cere parentis
Principum
diverſa fore
eſt, quibus
præcipua
rerum ad
famam di-
rigenda
Tactis.
* L' univer-
ſale de gli
huomini fi
puiſco, coſi
di quello
che paſſe,
come di
quello che
è anzi mol-
to veſte fi
muovono
piu per le
coſe che
paſſano, che
per quelle
che ſono.
Lib. 1. Sop.
Tit. Liv.
cap. 35.
Omnia æ-
quale pec-
nabilis.

Their man-
ner of im-
battelling.

Lib. 4. de
militia Ro-
mana.

which I note, is, that a General must learn especially to disguise his intentions; by making them of that which he meaneth not. For albeit the more judicious sort of men are not so well satisfied with preferences as with deeds: yet, for as much as the condition of Princes, contrary to the manner of private persons, requireth such a direction of business, as may rather suit with fame and opinion, than with particular ends: it behooveth them to use such glosses, as may take away all petulant and sinister interpretations, howsoever their courses may aim at other purposes. And certainly, * the generality of People are better paid with appearances than with truth: according as *Machiavili* hath observed. But concerning *Cæsar*, that which *Epiliates* said of himself, having imbattelled his Army to fight, That he feared nothing more, than that his Enemy knew not his valour; may more properly be said here. For there was nothing abused the Enemy more, or for made them take up so many Bravadoes, or use so much delay before they came to composition, but that they knew not *Cæsar*. For, as the Eagle is able to mount aloft in all seasons and temperatures of the air; so was his sword steered to make way through all resistance.

The Second OBSERVATION.

IN the next place, the manner of their imbattelling cometh to be observed: which generally in all Editions runneth thus; *Acies erat Afranius duplex, legio V. & III. in subsidii locum alaria cohortes obtinebant: Cæsaris triplex, sed prima aciem quaterne cohortes ex V. legione tenebant. Hæc subsidiiæ ternæ, & rursus alia totidem, sive quæque legionis, subsequerentur: sagittarii funditoresque: media continebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat: And needeth the help of some excellent Critick, to make it have an answerable sense to the other parts of this History. For first, How shall we understand those words? *Acies Afranius duplex, legio V. & III. in subsidii locum alaria cohortes obtinebant*; the fifth Legion and the third for succors. Shall we take the meaning to be, that the first Legion stood in front, and the other stood for succors behind? Or shall we take it with *Færmus*; *Acies Afranius duplex: ex legione prima, & tertia, in subsidii locum alaria cohortes obtinebant*; *Afranius*, &c. out of the first Legion and the third, the Cohorts which use to be in the Wings were put in place of the succors. But neither by the one or by other, is there found more than two Legions: whereas there is express mention of five, besides the Cohorts of the Country. And therefore, as not knowing other more probable, I have translated it according to *Lisius* correction, and made the Text thus; *Acies erat Afranius duplex, Legionum quinque: & in subsidii locum alaria cohortes obtinebant*: *Afranius* had put his Army in a double Battel: the first consisting of five Legions; and the Auxiliary Cohorts, which usually served in the Wings, were now placed for succors, and made the second Battel. The first Battel consisted of five Legions; and the second, of the Spanish and Auxiliary Forces.*

The like help must be lent to *Cæsar*: for otherwise the Text doth afford him but few Cohorts, standing thus, *Prima aciem quaterne cohortes, ex quinta Legione, tenebant. Hæc ternæ, & rursus alia,*

&c. The first Battel was of four Cohorts out of the fifth Legion: then followed three, and then as many others, &c. For, undoubtedly *Cæsar* had five Legions equal to *Afranius*; but, being far inferior to him in Auxiliary Troops, was driven to a more artificial division, to help his weakness in that point. And therefore, as the same Critick hath mended it, we are to read, *Quaterne cohortes ex quinque Legionibus*, four Cohorts out of the five Legions: which bringeth forth this sense; In the first Battel were five times four Cohorts; in the second, five times three Cohorts; and as many in the third Battel. And, by the addition of *sive quæque Legionis*, of every one of the Legions, it appeareth, that every Legion was to be divided into three parts, that it had four Cohorts in the first Battel, three in the second, and three in the last.

Concerning the space which their armies imbattelled, took up, it appeareth, that the whole distance between their Camps, contained Two thousand foot; whereof either army took one third, being 666 foot, or a hundred and eleven paces, a little more than a furlong: but that altered more or less, as place and occasion required.

CHAP. XXVII.

The Treaty of Peace.

THE next day, *Cæsar* went about to finish and end the Fortification which he had begun; and the Enemy, to try whether they might find a Ford in the River *Sicoris*, and so get over. Which being perceived, *Cæsar* carried over the light-Armed Germans, and part of the Cavalry, and disposed them in Guard along the River bank. At length, being besieged and shut up on all sides, and having kept their Horses without meat four days together, besides their extreme want of Water, Wood and Corn, they required a Parley, and that (if it might be) in some place out of the presence of the soldier. Which *Cæsar* denied, unless it were in publick. Whereupon *Afranius* his son was given in hostage to *Cæsar*; and so they presented themselves in a place of *Cæsar's* appointing.

And, in the hearing of both the Armies, *Afranius* spake to this effect; That he was not to be offended, neither with him nor with the soldier for being faithful and obedient to the General *Cn. Pompeius*, but now, having made sufficient proof of their duty, they had also thoroughly suffered for the same, having endured the extremity of want in all necessary provisions: In so much, as now they were shut up as Women, kept from Water, kept from going out, oppressed with a greater weight of grief in body, and of dishonour in their reputation than they were able to bear; and therefore did confess themselves to be vanquished and overcome: praying and beseeching, that if

Cæsar,

there were any mercy left, they might not undergo the extremity of fortune. And this he delivered as humbly and demissively as was possible.

To which *Cæsar* answered; That these terms of complaint and compassion could be used to no man more unproperly than himself: for whereas every man else did his duty, he only, upon fit conditions of time and place, refused to fight with them, to the end all circumstances might concur to a peace: Albeit his Army had suffered much wrong, in the death and slaughter of their fellows, yet he had kept and preserved such of their party as were in his power, and came, of their own accord, to move a peace; wherein they thought they went about to procure the safety of all their fellows. So that the whole course of his proceeding with them consisted of clemency. Howbeit their Commanders abhorred the name of Peace, and had not kept the Laws either of Treaty or Truce: for they had caused many simple men to be massacred and slain, that were deceived by a shew of Treaty. And therefore it had befallen them, as it happeneth for the most part to perverse and arrogant persons, to seek, and earnestly to desire that, which a little before they had foolishly contemned.

Neither would he take the advantage of their submission, or of any other opportunity of time, either to augment his power, or to strengthen his party: but he onely required, that those Armies might be discharged, which for many years together had been maintained against him. For, neither were those few Legions for any other cause sent into Spain, nor the seventh inrolled there, nor so many and so great Navies prepared, nor such experienced and skilful Commanders selected and appointed, (for none of these needed to keep Spain in quiet,) nothing hereof was prepared for the use and behoof of the Province, which (by reason of their long continuance of peace) needed not any such assistance. All these things were long ago provided in a readiness against him: New forms of Government were made and ordained against him; that one and the same man, should be resident at the gates of Rome, have the whole superintendency and direction of the City business; and yet notwithstanding, hold two Warlike Provinces for so many years together, being absent from both of them.

Against him, and for his ruine, were changed the ancient Rights and Customes of Magistracy, in sending men at the end of

their Pretorship or Consulship, to the Government of Provinces, as was always accustomed; but, in lieu of them, were chosen some that were allowed and authorized by a few. Against him the prerogative of age did nothing prevail: but, whosoever they were that in former Wars had made good proof of their valour, were now called out to Command Armies. To him onely was denied that which was granted to all other Generals; that when they had happily brought things to an end, they might dismiss their Army, and return home with honour, or at the least without dishonour.

All which things he notwithstanding both had, and would suffer patiently: neither did he now go about to take their Army from them, and retain them in pay for himself, which he might easily do; but that they should not have means to make head against him. And therefore, as it was said before, they should go out of the Provinces, and discharge their Army; if they did so, he would hurt no man: But that was the onely and last means of Peace.

OBSERVATION.

HERE is not any one virtue that can challenge a greater measure of honour, or hath more prerogative, either amongst Friends or Enemies, than Fidelity. For which cause it is, that men are more strict, in matters committed to their trust, for the behoof of others, than they can well be, if the same things concerned themselves. And yet, nevertheless, there is a *Quærens* in all endeavours, and seemeth to be limited with such appearance, as true affection may make of a good meaning: and was the ground which *Afranius* took to move *Cæsar* for a Pardon: Now esse aut ipsi aut militibus succedendum, quod fidem erga Imperatorem *Cn. Pompeium* conservare voluerint; sed satis jam fecisse officio, satisque supplicii tulisse, &c. That he was not to be angry, either with him or the soldiery, for being faithful to their General *Cn. Pompeius*; but that now they had sufficiently done their duty, and as thoroughly flattered for the same, &c. which he delivered in a file suiting his fortune. For, as *Comineus* hath observed, Men in fear give reverent and humble words; and the tongue is ever conditioned to be the chieftest witness of our Fortune.

On the other side, *Cæsar* produced nothing for his part, but such wrongs as might seem valuable to make good those counsels which he prosecuted. As first, injuries done by them, and that in the highest degree of blame against his soldiers, that went but to seek for Peace. Injuries done by their General, in such a fashion, as spared not to exert the fundamental rights of the State, to bring him to ruine and confusion. Whereby he was moved to endeavour that which Nature teach every man to do, *Prophlere injuriam*, to repel an injury from himself: and, having brought it to

H h 2

Multa, quæ
nostre cau-
sas nunquam
faciemus,
facimus
causâ ami-
corum. Ci-
cero Lali-
us.

Qui vincen-
tur victum
habent in-
guam. Plut.

Bellum ita
fufcipiatur,
ut nihil ali-
ud nifi pax
quæfitæ vi-
deatur. Cic.
lib. 1. de
offic.

these terms wherein it now stood, he would give assurance to the World, by the revenge he there took, that he entred into that War for this only end, that he might live in peace: and so required no more but that the Army should be dismissed.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The execution of the Articles agreed upon.

Cæsar:

THe conditions propounded were most acceptable and pleasing to the soldiers, as might appear by them: for being in the condition of Vanquished persons, and thereupon expecting a hard measure of fortune, to be rewarded with liberty and exemption of Armes, was more then they could expect: in so much, as where there grew a controversy of the time and place of their dismissal, they all generally standing upon the Rampier, signified, both by their Speeches and by their hands, that their desire was it might be done instantly; for it could not be provided by any assurance, that it would continue firm, if it were deferred until another time. After some dispute on each side, the matter was in the end brought to this issue; that such as had Houses and possessions in Spain, should be discharged presently, and the rest at the River Varus. It was conditioned, that no man should be injured, that no man should be forced against his will to be sworn under Cæsar's Command.

Varus fluvius. Hoc pe-
tinuit, vide-
os nec tecum
co-gas. Luc.

Cæsar promised to furnish them with Corn, until they came to the River Varus: adding whereto, that whatsoever any one had lost in the time of the War, which should be found with any of his soldiers, should be restored to such as lost it; and to his soldiers be paid the value thereof in money. If any controversy afterward grew amongst the soldiers, of their own accord they brought the matter from time to time before Cæsar. As when the soldiers

grew almost into a mutiny for want of pay, the Commanders affirming the Pay-day was not yet come, Petreius and Afranius required, that Cæsar might understand the cause: and both parties were contented with his Arbitrement.

A third part of the Army being dismissed in those two dayes, he commanded two of his Legions to march before their Army, and the rest to follow after, and continually to incamp themselves not far from them; and appointed Q. Fufius Calenus, a Legate, to take the charge of that business. This course being taken, they marched out of Spain to the River Varus, and there dismissed the rest of their Army.

OBSERVATION.

THe River Varus divideth Gallia Narbonensis from Italy; and was thought an indifferent place to discharge the Army, whereby there might be an end made of that War. Wherein, if any man desire to see a parallel drawn between Cæsar and the other Leaders for matter of War, it shall suffice to take the issue for a square of their directions; being drawn to this head within forty dayes after Cæsar came within sight of the Enemy, as Curio noteth in his speech to the soldiers.

Cato seeing the prosperous success of Cæsar against Pompey, said, There was a great uncertainty in the government of their gods: alluding per adventure to that of Plato in his Politicks, where he saith, That there are ages, wherein the gods do govern the World in their own persons; and there are other times, wherein they altogether neglect the same; the world taking a course quite contrary to that which the gods directed. But Lucan spake from a surer ground, where he saith,

Vixit causa Diis placuit, sed vieta Cato.

The conquering cause pleas'd Jove, the conquer'd Cato.

And thus endeth the first Commentary.

THE

THE
Second Commentary
OF THE
CIVIL WARS.

The ARGUMENT.

THis Commentary hath three special parts. The first containeth the Siege of Marseilles: the strange Works, and extream Endeavors, to take and to keep the Town. The second expresseth the vain labor which Varro, Pompeys Lieutenant undertook, after that Afranius and Petreius were defeated, to keep the Province of Andalusia out of Cæsars power and command. And the third part consisteth of the expedition Curio made into Africa, and endeth with his overthrow.

CHAP. I.

The preparations for the Siege, as well within as without the Town.

Cæsar.



Hith these things were doing in Spain, C. Trebonius the Legate being left to besiege Marseilles, had began in two places to raise Mounds, to make Mantlets and Towers against the Town: one next unto the Port where the Ships lay; and the other in the way leading from Gallia and Spain into the Town, just upon the creek of the sea, near unto the mouth of the Rhodane. For three parts of Marseilles are in a manner washed with the sea: and the fourth is that which giveth passage by Land; whereof that part which belongeth to the Castle (by reason of the nature of the place, and fortified with a deep ditch) would require a long and difficult Siege. For the perfecting of those works Trebonius had commanded out of all the Province, great store of horses for carriage, and a multitude of men; requiring them to bring

rods to make hurdles, and other materials for the work: which being prepared and brought together, he raised a Mount of fourscore foot high.

But such was the provision, which of ancient time they had stored up in the Town, of all equipage and necessaries for the War, with such provision of munition and engines, that no hurdles made of Rods or Officers, were able to bear out the force thereof. For out of their great Balista, they shot beams of twelve foot long, pointed with Iron, with such force, as they would pierce through four courses of hurdles, and stick in the earth. Whereby they were forced to roof their * Gallery with timber of a foot square, and to bring matter that way by hand to make the * Mount. A Toldo of sixty foot in length was always carried before, for the levelling of the ground, made of mighty strong timber, covered and armed with all things which might defend it from fire and stones, or what else should be cast upon it. But the greatness of the work, the height of the wall, and towers, together with the multitude of Engines, did retard and hinder the proceeding thereof.

* Porticus.

* Agger. Toldo.

More-

Observations upon CÆSARS

Moreover the Albici did make often sallies out of the Town, setting fire to the mounts and to the murrers: which were kept by our Souldiers with great facility and ease, forcing such as sallied out, to return with great loss.

OBSERVATION.

HAVING described in the former Commentaries these Engines and work here mentioned the Reader may please, (for his better satisfaction) to review those places; as also farther to note, that the word Artillery was brought down to these ages from the use of ancient Engines, which consisted of those two Primitives, *Arcus* and *Telum*. And according as diversity of Art and Wit found means to fit these to use and occasions, so had they several and distinct names; whereof I find chiefly these *Balista*, *Catapulta*, *Tolonenæ*, *Scorpionæ*, *Onagri*. Of each of which there are divers and several sorts; as first, of the *Balista*, some were called *Centenariæ*, others *Talentariæ* according to the weight of the bullet or weapon they shot. Of the rate and proportion whereof, *Plinius*, and his learned interpreter *Daniel Barbarus*, have made accurate description. Again, some were made to shot stones, as appeareth by that of *Tacitus*, *Magnitudine oximæ, quarta decime legionis Balista ingentibus saxis hostium castris prorubat*; the *Balista* of the fourteenth Legion being an exceeding great one, beat down the Army of the Enemy with huge stones; and others, to shoot darts and piles of timber, headed with Iron; as is manifested by this place. Moreover, the manner of bending of these Engines made a difference: some being drawn up with a winch or screw, and some with a wheel; some having long armes, and others having short; but the strings were generally either all of linews, or of womens hair, as strongest and surest of any other kind. Of these *Vegetius* preferreth the *Balista* and the *Onagri*, as unsiftable when they were skillfully handled. The word *Onagri*, as *Ammianus Marcellinus* noteth, was of a later stamp, and imposed upon those Engines which former time called *Scorpionæ*; and was taken from the nature of wild Affes, that are fild to cast stones backward with their feet at the Hunters, with such violence, that oftentimes they dashed out their brains. In the time of barbarisme, all these Engines were generally called *Mangonella*: as appeareth by *Vigilius*, in his Annotations upon *Onofrius*. Which is likewise shewed by that which *Mr. Camden* hath inserted in the description of *Bedfordshire*, concerning the Siege of *Bedford Castle*, in the time of *Henry the Third*, out of an Author that was present: *Ex parte orientis fuit una Petraría, & duo Mangonella, quæ quoadie turrim infestabant; & ex parte occidentis duo Mangonella, quæ turrim veterem contriverunt; & unum Mangonellum ex parte Australi, &c.* On the East side was placed one Engine to cast stones, and two *Mangonels*, which continually played upon the tower; and on the west side two *Mangonels*, which beat down the old Tower; and one *Mangonell* on the South side, &c. but our powder having blown all these out of use, it were to no purpose to insit longer upon them.

CHAP. II.

The Marcellians prepare themselves for a Sea-fight.

IN the mean time, *L. Nasidius* being sent by *Cn. Pompeius* with a Navy of sixteen ships, (amongst which some few had their beak-head of Iron) to the succor and supply of *L. Domitius*, and the *Marcellians*, he passed the straits of *Sicilie*, before *Curio* had intelligence thereof: and putting into *Messina*, by reason of the suddain terror of the principal men, and the Senate that took themselves to flight, he surprised one Ship in the road, and carried her away, and so held on his course to *Marsilles*. And having sent a small Bark before, he certified *Domitius* and the rest of his coming, exhorting them by all means, that joining their forces with his supplies, they would once again give fight to *Brutus* Navy.

The *Marcellians* since their former overthrow, had taken the like number of Ships out of their Arenal, and new rigged and trimmed them, and with great industry furnished and manned them for that service: for they wanted neither Oar-men, Mariners, Sailers, nor Pilots, fit for that purpose. To these they added certain Fisher-boats, and fenced them with coverings, that the Oar-men might be safe from casting weapons: and these he filled with Archers and Enginiers. The Navy being thus furnished and prepared, the *Marcellians* (incited and stirred up with the prayers and tears of old men, women and maids, to give help and defence to their City, in time of extreame danger; and to fight with no less courage and confidence then formerly they had accustomed) went all aboard with great courage: as it cometh to pass through the common faults of nature, whereby we put more confidence in things unseen and unknown, or otherwise are more troubled thereat: according as it then hapned. For the coming of *Nasidius* had filled the City full of assured hope and courage: and thereupon, having a good wind, they left the Port, and came and found *Nasidius* at *Taurenta* (a Castle belonging to the *Marcellians*) and there fitted themselves for a fight, incouraging each other again to a valiant carriage of that service, and consulting how it might be best performed.

A bright Squadron was given to the *Marcellians*, and the left to *Nasidius*. And to the place repaired *Brutus*, having increased the number of his Ships: for those six which he took from the *Marcellians*, he had added un-

Artillery derived from Arcus and Telum

Lib. 10. c. 17

Lib. 3. Hist. Petrariz.

Lib. 4. c. 20.

And of Mangonellum, a battering breaker, cometh out of English word Mangle.

Cæsar;

Messina;

Tholosa.



as the other which Cæsar had caused to be made at Arclate, and had mended them since the last fight, and fitted them with all necessaries for men of War. And thereupon exhorting his Souldiers to contemn the Enemy, as a vanquished party, having already foyled and overbrowen them when they were in their strength, they set forward against them with great assurance and courage.

Out of the Camp of C. Trebonius, and from all those higher places they might easily perceive and see in the City, how all the youth which remained in the Town, and all the aged, with their wives and children, did from the publick places of guard, and from the Town walls, stretch out their hands towards Heaven, or otherwise run to their Churches and Temples, and there prostrating themselves before their Images, did desire Victory of their Gods. Neither was there any of them all, that did not think the event of all their fortunes to consist in that days service: for the chiefest of all their able men, and the best of all sorts and degrees, were by name called out, and intreated to go aboard, to the end that if any disaster or mischance should happen, they might see nothing farther to be endeavored for their safety; and if they overcame, they might rest in hope to save their City, either by their own valor, or by foreign help.

OBSERVATION.

Communi fit vitio natura, ut invisi, latitantibus, atque incognitis rebus, magis confidamus, vehementiusque exterrcamur, ut tum accidit: It cometh to pass through the common fault of nature, &c. in cases of hazard, things brought unto us by report, do more abuse our judgment, either in conceiving too great hopes, or yielding too much to distrust, then any matter present can move or enforce: for these perturbations attending upon our will, are enlarged more according to the quality of our desires, then as they are directed by discourse of reason; and so draw Men either easily to believe what their wishes do require, or otherwise to reject all as utterly lost.

The uncertainty whereof, and the disappointment ensuing those deceivable apprehensions, hath brought the hope of this life, into very slight account, being reckoned but as the dream of him that is awake; and as *Pisfranus*, or a charitable delusion, to support us through the hard chances of this World, and to keep Mans heart, from breaking: for every Mans help is hope; which never affordeth present relief, but allwageth the bitterness of extremities, by,

--- Dabit Deus his quoque finem,

God once will put an end to these things too.

CHAP. III.

The fight, and the Marcellians overbrowen.

The fight being begun, the Marcellians were wanting in no point of valor: but bearing in mind such exhortations as a little before had been given them by their friends, they fought so resolutely, as though they meant not to fight again, or as if any one should chance to miscarry in that battel, he should make account that he did but anticipate, for a small moment of time, the fatal end of his fellow-Citizens, who (upon taking of the Town) were to undergo the same fortune of War. Our Ships putting on by little, were glad to give way to the nimblest and mobility of their shipping, which by the skill of their Pilots were well managed. And if it hapned that our men had found means to grapple with any of their Ships, they presently came on all sides to their rescue. Neither did the Albici shew themselves backward, when the matter came to hands, or were they inferiour to our men in courage or valor. Moreover, out of the lesser Ships were cast infinite numbers of darts, and other weapons, wherewith our men busied in fight were suddenly wounded.

In this conflict, two of their Triremes having spied Brutus ship, (which by her flag might easily be discerned) came violently against him from two contrary parts: but the danger being foreseen, Brutus did so prevail through the swiftness of his Ship, that he a little outstrips them; whereby they coming with their full swing, did so encounter one another; that they were both very much shaken with the blow: for the beak-head of one being broken off, the water was ready to come in on all sides. Which being observed by some of Brutus party that were near about, they set upon them (being thus distressed) and quickly sunk them both.

The Ships that came with Nasidius were found of no use, and therefore quickly left the fight; for there was not offered there unto them either the sight of their Country, or the exhortations and prayers of their kinsfolks and allies, as motives to hazard their lives in that quarrel: so that of them there was none wanting. Of the Ships that came out from Marcellles, five were sunk, and four taken. One escaped with Nasidius fleet, which made towards the further Spain. On of them that remained was sent before to Marcellles; who coming as a Messenger before the rest, and approaching

Alles.

Cæsa.

Quod maxime volunt, id facile credunt.

Virgil lib. 3
Æneid.

approaching near unto the Town, all the multitude ran out to bear the news: which being once known, there was such a general mourning and desolation, as though the Town were instantly to be taken by the Enemy. Notwithstanding, they left not off to make ready such necessities as were requisite for defence of the same.

OBSERVATION.

This was the second fight the *Marsiliens* made to keep the Sea open for the aid and relief of the Town; being otherwise strictly besieged by land, and yet that was not so tenderly cared for as their shutting up by sea; the free passage whereof brought in all their profit in time of peace, and their succors in time of War; for which regard it was, that they commended to their gods the success of that enterprise, with as much devotion, as tears, vows, and prayers could express.

The benefit a Town besieged receiveth from an open Inlet by sea, cannot be better manifested then by the Siege of *Offend*; for by that occasion specially, it endured the most famous Siege that was in *Chirillendome* these many years. This *L. Nibis* was rather a constant friend to the cause, then a fortunate Admiral: for afterwards, he refused not to take the like overblow for *Pompey* the Son, at *Leucades*, as he did now for the father. And surely it falleth out (whether it be through the uncertainty of Sea-faring matters, or that men have farther pretences at sea, to avoid occasions of hazard, then are found at land, or that *Pausanias* is not in *Mari*, few things of value come from the sea, according to the proverb, or for what other cause; I know not) that there are few of those which fought honor in this kind, who have attained the least part of their desires. And yet nevertheless, some there are of famous memory: as * *Barbarissa*, a terror of the *Levant* Seas; *Andreas Avria* of *Genua*; renowned for his great exploits upon the *Turk*, together with divers of our own Nation; as namely *Sir Francis Drake*, who for skill and fortune at Sea, is held matchable with any other whatsoever; besides *Mr. Candish*, for voyages to the South, and *Sir Martin Frobiher*, for discoveries to the North.

Howbeit these latter times have advantage without comparison of former ages, through the invention of the Sea-compass with the Needle, which was found out little more then three hundred years ago, by one *Plamus*, born in the Kingdom of *Naples*; without which, no ship can shape a course in the Ocean, and to which nothing can be added, more then to find a perfect and ready direction for longitudes.

CHAP. IV.

The works which the legionary Soldiers made against the Town.

It was observed by the legionary Soldiers, that had the charge of the right part of the work, that it would much advantage them against the often eruptions and sallies of

the Enemy, if they built a Tower of Brick under the Town-wall, instead of a hold or receptacle: which at first they made low and little, only for the repelling of sudden assaults. Thither they usually retreated: and from thence, if they were over-charged, they made defence, either by beating back, or prosecuting an Enemy. This Tower was thirty foot square, and the walls thereof five foot thick: but afterwards (as use and experience is the master of all things) it was found by insight and industry of men, that this Tower might be of great use, if it were raised to any height; which was accordingly performed in this fashion.

When it was raised to the height of a story, they so framed the floor, that the ends of the joists did not jet out beyond the sides of the Tower; least anything might be thrust out, on which the fire which the Enemy should cast might take hold: and then paved that floor with as much brick as the Mantlets and Gables would suffer to be laid. Upon this *tarras* thus made, they laid cross beams along the sides, as a foundation to an upper story, for the top and covering of the Tower. And upon these beams they raised cross timbers, thwarting each other for the sides of the tower, and coupled them at the top with side beams.

These cross timbers were longer, and bare further out then the Square of the Tower; that there might be means to soften coverings and defences, against the blows and darts of the Enemy, whilst the workmen were finishing the walls and sides of that building. The top or upper story of this Tower, they likewise paved with brick and clay, that no fire might fasten on it; and laid *Mattresses* on the top thereof, to the end the floor might not be broken with any weapons shot out of Engines, nor the pavement shivered in pieces with stones cast out of *Catapults*.

Moreover they made three nettings or mats of bawfers, equal in length to the sides of the Tower, and four foot in breadth. And upon those three sides which confronted the Enemy, they fastened them upon poles to hang before the Tower: which kind of defence they had in other places tried to be of proof, and not to be pierced with any weapon or engine. And as one part of the Tower came to be covered, finished, and fortified, against any violence of the Enemy, they carried their Mantlets and defences to the rest unfinished. The top of which Tower, they framed upon the first story, and then raised it up with winches or screws, as far as the close netting would serve them for a defence.

fence. And so covered with these shelters and safeguards, they built up the sides with brick, and then again screwing up the top higher, they fitted the place to build the sides higher: and, as they came to the height of a Story, they laid the joists of the floor in such sort, as the ends thereof were hid and covered with the Wall or sides that were of brick, and so from that Story they proceeded to another, by screwing up the top, and raising their Netting: By which means they built very safely six Stories, without any wound or other danger at all, and left Windows and Loopholes in the sides, for the putting out of Engines in such places, as they thought convenient. When, by means of that Tower, they were in hope to defend the Works near about it, they then made a *Musculum* or *Mouffe* of sixty foot in length, and of two foot Timber square, to convey them safely from this Tower of Brick to another of the Enemy, and to the Town-Wall: whereof this was the form. They cut two side Groundsils of equal length, and made the space between them to contain four foot; upon them they erected little Columns of five foot high, and joyned them together, putting braces of an easie sloping in such distance, as the rafters were to be placed to bear up the roof: and upon those braces they laid Rafters of two foot square, fastening them both at the ridge, and at the eavings, with plates and bolts of Iron. They lathed the roof with lath of four fingers broad: and so the building being made with a gable-ridge handsomely fashioned, the top was laid all over with clay, to keep the *Mouffe* from burning; and then covered with Tiles, which were fenced with Leather, to the end they might not be washed away with pipes or gutters of Water, which might be laid to fall upon them. And least those sides should be spoiled, either with fire or great stones, they laid *Mattresses* upon them.

This work being wholly finished near unto the Tower, through the help and means of defensive mantlets and gabions; suddenly, before the Enemy was aware, with a ship-engine, and rollers put under it, they brought it so near a Tower of the Enemy, that it was joyned to the Wall thereof. The Townsmen being upon a sudden appalled thereof, brought the greatest stones they could get, and with levers tumbled them down from the wall upon the *mouffe*: but the strength of the Work did not shrink at the blows, and whatsoever fell upon it, slid down the sloping of the roof: Which when they perceived, they altered their

purpose, and got pairs of Ropes and Pitch, and setting them on fire, threw them down upon the *Mouffe*, which tumbled down from the roof, were removed away with long hooks, and poles. In the mean time, the soldiers that were within the *Mouffe*, pulled out the lower stones that were in the foundation of the Tower. This *Mouffe* or *Mantlet* was defended by our men out of the brick Tower, with weapons and engines: and by means thereof the Enemy was put from the Wall and the Towers, so that they could not well defend the same. Many of the stones being sapped out of the foundation of the Tower, part thereof suddenly fell, and the rest leaned as though it would not stand long after.

OBSERVATION.

For as much as it requirith the labour of an industrious pen to shadow out the effects of Industry; I will only produce the evidence of these Works, to shew the power it hath in humane actions, rather then by any maimed or shallow discourse, weaken the force of so great an Engine. Wherein first, it may be noted, how in these and the like attempting, endeavours, one thing draws on another, according as *Poetice* maketh overture to *maiores*: For our understanding growing by degrees, hath no intuitive faculty to discern perfection, but by little and little worketh out exactness; making every Morrow Yesterday scholar, as reason findeth means of discourse from causes to effects, or from effects to causes.

And so this Tower, made at first but for a retreat of defence, gave occasion to let them see the like or better use thereof in the offensive part, if it were raised to a height convenient for the same: which they performed with as much art as the wit of man could use in such a work. For having made the first story, they then made the roof, for the shelter and safety of the soldier: and screwing it up by little and little, they built the sides, having fenced the open space with netting, for avoiding of danger; arming it with brick and clay against fire, and with *Mattresses* against stones and weights. And then again they proceeded to the making of that Mantlet or *Mouffus*, which gave them passage to the Wall; building it with strong, or rather strange Timber, of two foot square, framed so artificially with braces, and ridging rafters, and those so fitted, as nother Fire, Water, Weapon, nor Weight, could prevail against it. And thus they laboured to gain their own ends, and bought Fortune with immeasurable endeavour.

Dispositio
prioris diei.
Anulus Cel-
lula.

CHAP. V.

The Marcellians get a Truce of the Romans, and break it deceitfully.

Cæsar.

Inermes cum inulit.

The Enemy being then much appalled at the sudden ruine and fall of the Tower, and greatly perplexed at so unexpected a mischiefe, and withall struck with a fear of the wrath and indignation of the gods; and of the sack and spoil of their City; they came all unarmed, thronging out of the Gates, wearing holy attire upon their heads, and stretching out their submissive hands to the Legates and the Army. Upon which novelty, all Hostility ceased for the time, and the Soldiers withdrawing themselves from the assault, were carried, with a desire of bearing and understanding what would pass at that time.

When they came to the Legates and to the Army, they cast themselves all down at their feet, praying and beseeching that things might be suspended until Cæsar's arrival. They saw plainly, that their Town was already taken, their Works were perished, their own Towers demolished; and therefore they desisted from making any further defence: there could be no let to hinder them from present spoil and sackings; upon Cæsar's arrival they should refuse to obey his Majestates. They shewed further; that if their Tower were absolutely overthrown, the Soldiers could not be kept from entering the Town in hope of pillage, and would thereby bring it to a final destruction.

These, and many the like things were uttered by them very movingly (as men learned and eloquent) with great lamentation and much weeping; whereby the Legates (moved with commiseration) withdrew the Soldiers from the Fortifications, put off the assault, and left a small guard to keep the Works. A kind of truce, being through pity and commiseration thus made and concluded, Cæsar's coming was expected; no weapon was cast, either from the Town-Wall; or from our side: in so much, as every man left off his care and diligence, as though all had been ended. For, Cæsar had by Letters given straight charge to Trebonius, not to suffer the Town to be taken by assault, least the Soldiers (moved through their rebellion and contempt, together with the long travel they had sustained) should put all above fourteen years of age to the sword: which they threatened to do, and were then hardly kept from breaking into the Town; taking the matter very grievously, that Trebo-

nus seemed to hinder them from effecting their purposes. But the Enemy, being people without faith, did onely watch for time and opportunity, to put in practice their fraud and deceit.

The first OBSERVATION.

It is a saying of an ancient Writer, that, As our attire doth cover the body, so it doth uncover the nakedness of the mind. Whereupon it is, that men have found means to sure themselves upon occasion, according to the disposition of their inward affections, as they are either dilated with joy, or contracted with sorrow, lifted up with weal, or humbled with affliction. And, accordingly, these Marcellians, in token of their humility and submission, came out, wearing an attire here called *Insula*, which *Jerovus* describeth to be a kind of Coat, made after the form of a Diamond, with two pendants on each side, called *Pitte*. Those which the Romans used of this kind, were fashioned like a Pyramid: the point whereof did signify the * Elements, ascending upwards in such a pointed fashion; and, by the two pendants or bands, were denoted the Water and the Earth. They were made wholly of Wool, as *Festus* Writeth, *Insula sunt filamenta lanæ, quibus Sacerdotes, hostiæ, et templa velabantur*; *Insula* are certain ornaments and tappings made of Wool, wherewith the Priests use to be clad, the Sacrifices to be covered, and the Temples to be hanged: to shew humbleness and simplicity, wherof Wool is Hieroglyphick; for no kind of beasts have more need of aid and succor than Sheep: and thereupon it was, that all Suppliants were attired with tresses of Wool. Or otherwise, as some will have it, that the habit of the Petitioner might call to remembrance the flexible disposition, which is well-becoming those that have power and means to give help and relief: according to the use of Heathen ages, wherein their Images of their Idols had their feet tied with cords of Wool; to shew the mildness and easiness, which, upon devout supplications, was found in divine Powers, wherof Wool was a Symbolum.

The second OBSERVATION.

The Marcellians being an ancient progeny of the Greeks, notwithstanding the long descent of time, and alteration of air, did keep a touch of the natural disposition of that Nation, as well in such strains of eloquence, as were familiar unto them above other People, as in (a) subtilty and duplicity of dealing. Which passage of the Marcellians is observed by (b) Tully, as a matter enforcing the due praises of Eloquence, and the use it hath upon all occasions to draw consent, with the sweetness of a well-tuned tongue, above that which may be attained, either by Engines or a strong harp. Wherein, if we should go about to compare the (c) force of Armes, with the power of a grave Discourse, and let a Soldier parallel to an Orator, there might hence be taken divers probable reasons to second that saying, *Tom enim is præferendus, quem presentia magis exigunt, sicut Valens et Valens statuunt. E. in civilibus. C. de offic. Vicar. Ut in civilibus causis vicariis comitibus militum antecesserunt, in militariis negotiis comitia vicariis.*

which

CHAP. VI.

which hath been thought to favour more of vain-glory, then of true judgment,

Cedant arma toga, concedat laurea lingue;

Let Armes to Gowns, the bay-leaf yield to th' tongue.

The Marcellians taking advantage of the Truce, consume with fire all the Roman Works: which are afterwards re-edified.

Or at least, to make a resemblance of *Plutarch's* two Wraithers; of whom, one being always cast, did nevertheless perwade the other, that he cast him; and so, howsoever he became foiled, yet left the place, with an opinion of Victory: And, is always more easily effected, when it is attended with cunning and deceit, according to that of *Valerius Maximus*, *Efficacissima vires perfidiæ, mentiri et fallere*. The main strength of perfidiousness is Lying and deceiving. But, as it is observed by *Philip de Commines*, The (d) example of one sole accident, is sufficient to make many men wise: so this may serve to teach succeeding times, not to trust to words, wherof there is no hold; but, to ratify such compositions with irrevocable performances.

The third OBSERVATION.

Thirdly, we may note, how far the anger of a Roman Army was extended, upon such provocations as are here mentioned, viz. *Ad interficiendos pueros*, to the slaying of all the males above fourteen years of age: for, from that stage of life, they accounted all in the rank of men; according to the institution of *Tarquinius Priscus*, who, in his Triumph of the *Sabines*, made a special Oration in the praise of his own son, that had assaulted and struck the Enemy in those Wars, being then but fourteen years of age; and thereupon gave him liberty to wear mans apparel, which was that *Toga prætexta* (edged or faced with Purple) wherof their Histories make so often mention.

But, to define precisely hereof, were to mistake the fury of the Soldier. For, howsoever the rule is certain from the Law of Nature, that no finite cause can be infinite in effect, or that a mortal hate should have a boundless revenge: yet occasion made it variable, and as irregular as that of *Alexander*; who sometimes spared all, and at other times (as at the taking of *Tyre*) spared none at all, but such as had taken the protection of the Temple. The inhumane cruelty of the Turks exceedeth all former hostility in this kind: for they never gave any out of commiseration, but for private use; and do rather chuse to destroy Man-kind, then suffer it to live for any other purpose then their own.

After a few days, when our men were grown remiss and careless, suddenly about high Noon, as some were gone one way, some another, and others wearied with continual labour, had given themselves to rest, the weapons being cased and laid up; they rushed out of their Gates, and coming with the Wind that then blew hard, they set our Works on fire: Which was so carried and dispersed with the Wind, that the Mount, the Mantlets, the Testudo, the Tower and the Engines, were all on fire at once, and were burned down and consumed, before it could be known how it came.

Our men, astonished at so sudden and unthought-of an accident, caught up such Weapons as were next at hand; and others running speedily from the Camp, set upon the Enemy, but were hindered from following them as they fled, by Engines and Arrows from the Town-Wall. They, on the other side, being retired under the protection of the Wall, did, at their ease, burn down the Mantlets and the Brick-Tower; and, so many more their labour was, through the perfidiousness of the Enemy, and the force of the tempest, consumed and brought to nothing in a moment of time. The Marcellians attempted the like the next day after, having opportunity of the like tempest; and with greater confidence sallied out, and threw much fire upon the other Mount and the Tower. But, as our men the day before (expecting nothing less then to be surprised in that sort) had neglected more then ordinary their usual Guards; so being now made wiser by that which had happened, they had made all things ready for defence: by which means, having slain a great number, they drove the rest back into the Town, without effecting any thing.

Trebonius began again to re-edify such Works as were ruined and consumed with fire, and that with greater alacrity of the soldier then before. For, when they saw their great labours and endeavours sort to no better success, and the Truce broke by the Treachery of the Enemy, it was a great gall unto them to have their valour thus derided. And, for as much as there was nothing left in all the Country, for the raising of a Mount, all the Trees being already cut down, and brought

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far

Est ita natura comparatum, ut homines motiles supra quàm dici possit, ferant et vicent rerum eventus virtutis non responderet. Paul. in Messie.

Vestitis, ut regit corpus, ita de tegit animam.

† Jeneid.

* The Fire and the Air.

Macro. lib. 1. Sator. cap. 6.

Macro. lib. 1. Sator. cap. 8.

Quintus. Car. lib. 5.

(a) Grecia fide omnia agere.
(b) Orazio Pro flacco.
(c) Equus est utrumque dignus, nisi præfens necessarius consilium nobiliorum efficiat. Tom

far and near to make the first Mount, they began a Mount of a strange and unheard-of fashion, raised from two side Walls of Brick, being six foot thick, a piece, and joyned together with floors. The Walls were of equal distance, to the Latitude of the former Mount, which was all of solid matter: and where the space between the Walls, or the weakness of the Work did require it, there were Piles driven between, and Beames and Planks laid athwart for the strengthening thereof. The Floors, made between those Walls, were laid with Hurdles, and the Hurdles were covered with Clay.

The Soldiers being thus sheltered on both sides with a Wall, and defended in front by Mantlets and Gabions, did safely, without danger, bring whatsoever was necessary for that building; whereby the Work was carried on with great speed: and the loss of their former continual labour was in a short time recovered again, through the admirable dexterity and valour of the Soldier. To conclude, they left Gates in the Walls, in such places as were fittest for Sallies.

When the Enemy perceived, that what they hoped could not be repaired again in a long time, was, with a few dayes labour, re-edified and finished, whereby there was no place left to practise deceit, or to sally out with advantage, neither was there any means left by which they could prevail, either by force of Armes to hurt our Soldiers, or by fire to consume our Works; and understanding likewise, that by the same manner of Fortification, all that part of the Town which had passage and access from the firm land, might be encompassed with a Wall and with Towers, that their Soldiers should not be able to stand upon their Works, and perceiving withall, that our Army had raised a counter-mine, against the Wall of their Town, and that Weapons might be cast by hand unto them; that the use of their Engines (wherein they much trusted) was, by the narrowness of space, quite taken away; and lastly, that they were not able to confront our men (upon equal terms) from their Walls, and from their Towers; they descended to the same Articles of rendry and submission, as were formerly agreed upon.

The first OBSERVATION.

Hence we may observe, that a General cannot be too secure of an Enemy, that stands upon terms to render up a place. For the action being but voluntary by constraint, if haply the

constraining force be removed, then that doth cease which is voluntary; and so it cometh by consequence to a refusal. As appeareth by this passage of the *Marcellians*; who, being brought into hard terms, as well by their two overthrow at Sea (whence they expected no further success) as also by the siege laid to close by land (where they were so violently assaulted, that their Towers of defence made passage for the Romans to enter upon them) did nevertheless (upon cessation of those enforcements) alter their purpose, and entertained new hopes: which maketh good that saying;

—Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes,

I fear the Greeks, even when they bring their gifts.

The second OBSERVATION.

Secondly, we may observe, that a will, forward to undergo labour, doth never stick at any difficulty, nor is at all dismayed with the loss of any pains; but is rather redoubled in courage and industry; especially being edged on with a desire of revenge. Which (if *Homer* may have credit) doth always add a third part to a mans strength; as appeared by *Dionides*, being hurt in the shoulder with one of *Pindarus* Arrows: for revenge whereof, he exceeded himself in a sequetice proportion of valour, and slew more *Trojans* by a third part then otherwise he could.

Howsoever, as there is nothing so hard, but is subject to the endeavour of the mind: so there is nothing so ease, as to dispossess our selves of that intent care which is requisite in these employments. For these *Romans*, that through the greatness of their spirits had made such first and second Works, as the memory thereof will last with the World, were surprised when they lay in the interim, as it were unbent, in as great idleness and neglect (howsoever drawn unto it by deceit) as if they had been able to do no such matter as is here reported. And therefore it behoveth a Commander, to keep his Army always seasoned with labour; for as much as *Exercitus laboro proficit, otio confesctur*. An Army thrives by employment, but grows old by idleness.

CHAP. VII.

Varro raiseth great Troops to maintain Pompey's Party in Spain; but to no purpose.

MARCUS Varro, in the further Province of Spain, having, from the beginning, understood how things had passed in Italy, and distrusting how matters would succeed with Pompey, did oftentimes give out very friendly speeches of Cæsar: That Pompey had, by way of prevention, gained him to his party, and honoured him with a Lieutenantcy, whereby he was obliged in duty to him; howbeit, in his particular disposition he stood no less affected to Cæsar:

Qui filium
citium o-
peram obli-
viscit.

Cæsar: neither was he ignorant of the duty of a Legate, to whose trust and fidelity the government of the Province was left, as in depositum, upon condition to be rendered up at all times and seasons, as he that commanded in chief should require it: He likewise knew very well what his forces were, and what was the affection and disposition of all the Country towards Cæsar.

This was the subject of all his speeches, without any shew of inclining either to the one or the other. But afterwards, when he heard that Cæsar was engaged at *Marcellis*, that *Petrcius* Forces were joined with *Africanus* Army, that great aids were come unto them, that every man was in great hope and expectation of good success, and that all the *hither Province* had agreed together to undertake Pompey's cause, as also what had after happened concerning the want of vittuals at *Ilerda*, (all which things were writ with advantage unto him by *Africanus*) he then upon that alteration changed his mind according to the times, and levied Soldiers in all parts of the Province: and having raised two complete Legions, he added unto them some thirty cohorts of the Country Soldiers, to serve for wings to the Army, and gathered together great quantity of corn, as well for the supply of the *Marcellians*, as for the provision of *Petrcius* and *Africanus*.

Moreover, he commanded them of *Gades* to build and provide ten Gallies; and ordered farther, that many other should be made at *Hispalis*. He took all the Money and Ornaments out of *Hercules* Temple, and brought the same into the Town of *Gades*, and in lieu thereof sent six Cohorts out of the Province to keep the Temple. He made *Caius Gallonius* (a Roman Knight, and a familiar friend of *Domitius*, and sent by him thither to recover some matter of inheritance) Governor of the Town. All the Arms, (as well private as publick) were brought into *Gallonius* house. He himself made many bitter invectives against Cæsar, affirming in publick, that Cæsar had been several times worsted, and that a great number of the Soldiers were revolted from him, and were come to *Africanus*; which he knew to be true, by certain and approved Messengers.

The Roman Citizens residing in that Province, being much perplexed and affrighted thereat, were thereupon constrained to promise him 190 thousand *Sesterces*, for the service of the Common-weal, besides twenty thousand weight of Silver, together with one hundred

and twenty thousand bushels of Wheat. Upon those Cities and States which favored Cæsar's party, he laid greater impositions: for such as had led fallen Speeches, or declared themselves against the Common-weal, he confiscated all their goods, and put a Garrison upon them, giving judgment himself upon private persons, and constraining all the Province to swear allegiance to him and to Pompey.

And being in the end advertised what had happened in the *hither Province*, he prepared for War, with a purpose to dispose thereof in this manner: His resolution was to keep two Legions with him at *Gades*, with all the Shipping and the Corn: for knowing that the whole Province did intirely affect Cæsar's Cause, he thought it best and easiest for him (having made good provision of shipping and Corn) to keep the Island.

The first OBSERVATION.

Observe first how dangerous it is for such as stand neutral between two parties (bearing no affection but to their own ends) to declare themselves, upon such appearances as commonly happen in the flux and reflux of a War: for if their judgment fail, as *Parricid* did, they are then forced to redress their error with more offices of partiality, than can afterwards be excused; and for as much as a further degree of enmity, then the party for whom they suffer. And certainly, whether it be that neutrality refuseth to take part with the right, (which in matter of controvercie must needs stand on one side) or whether it favoureth of an ill nature, to shew no sympathizing affections with such as otherwise have correspondence with them, or for what other cause I know not; but sure it is, that Neutrals, attending nothing but their own advantage, are of no better election than the bird whereof *Leo Africanus* writeth; which when the King of Birds demanded tribute, would always rank himself amongst the fish, and when the King of Fishes required his service, would always be with the Birds; or then the Weather-cock, whereof there is no other use, then *indicare regnatum*, to shew what wind rules.

The second OBSERVATION.

The Island of *Gades* was known to the Romans by the name of *Tartessus*.

Here *Gades* urbs est dicta *Tartessus* prius. Here *Gades* stands, of old *Tartessus* call'd.

Festus Aul. cxxv.

The Town of *Gades* was endowed, as *Diow* writeth, with the liberties and privileges of Rome. To which effect *Plinius* writeth, *Oppidum habet Civitum Romanorum, quod appellatur Augustia urbs Julia Gaditana*. This Island hath a Town of Roman Citizens, which is called *Augustia Julia Gaditana*. It was a Town of great fame, as appeareth by that of *Fuba*; King of *Mauritania*, who

Lib. xli.

who made ambitious fate, to have the Title of *Duumvir*, or Two-men of the Town, as *Festus* noteth, is his Description of the Sea-coast.

*At vis in illis tanta, vel tantum decus
Ætate præfata, sub fide rerum fuit;
Rex ut superbus, omniumque præpositus
Quos gens habebat forte tum Maurusius,
Octavianus principi acceptissimus,
Et literarum temper in studio, Iuba,
Interfuoque separatus aequore,
Illustriorem semet ubi istius
Duumviratu crederet* —

Such was their power, such their grace
Of old, while faith was yet in place;
King *Fubas* he most powerful Prince
The Moors had either then or since,
In favor with *Octavian*.
And every way a learned Man,
Divided from this place by Sea,
Though it would greater glory be
To be *Duum-vir* of the Town.

In this Island stood *Hercules Temple*, to which
as well *Romans*, as other noble adventurers of all
Nations, made often repair to perform their vows,
upon achievements of deeds of Arms: which
fame they was not omitted by *Hannibal*, before his ex-
pedition into *Italy*.

Amongst other Altars in this Temple, there was
one dedicated to *Penury* and *Art*; signifying that
Art driveth away *Penury*, as *Hercules* put to flight
and subdued Monsters. Those of *Asia*, and the
Mediterranean parts, took this Island to be the farthest
end of Navigation: for the *Atlantic* Sea admitted
no farther passage, for want of a load-stone to di-
rect them in that vastness. And therefore *Pindarus*
saith, that it is not lawful for wife men nor fools
to know what is beyond the freight of *Gibraltar*,
the way in the Ocean being a thousand Leagues
abroad. In this Town of *Gades* was born *L. Cor-
nelius Balbus*, who at his death gave a Legacy to the
Roman people, twenty five pence per Pole, to-
gether with *Funius Brutus Columella*, that writ ex-
cellently *Dere Rustica*.

Et mea quæ generat Tariffi littore Gades.
And which my *Gades* yields on *Tariff's* shoar.

It is now called *Cales*, and was sacked by our
English, *An. 1596*.

Hispalis, furnished *Romulensis*, from the *Roman*
Colony that was planted there, is seated upon the
River *Betis*, in a very pleasant and fertile Coun-
try, and especially for oiles. The Town is now
the Staple for the West *Indies*, and a very Nur-
rery of Merchants. *Arias Montanus*, that great Theo-
logian, was born in this City.

The Third OBSERVATION.

Concerning these hundred and ninety thousand
Selfless, the learned cannot satisfy them-
selves with any congruent interpretation
thereof. For if we take them in the Neuter,
for seven pound ten shillings apiece, it amounteth
to 1420000 pound, which is thought too much;
if in the Masculine it will rise not to above 1400
pound, which is deemed too little. And therefore
the Critics do mend the place, and read *H-s*.
centies nonagies, a hundred times ninety *H-s*.

which bringeth out 142500 pound: and is thought
agreeable to the meaning of the Author.

CHAP. VIII.

The Province and the Legions revolt from Varro, Cæsar
joins Spain, and returns to Marcellus.

Albeit Cæsar was called back into Ita-
ly, for many great and important cau-
ses, yet he was resolved to leave no
spark or appearance of War remaining behind
him in Spain; for that he knew Pompey's
deserts to be such, as had gained him many
followers and dependants in the hither Pro-
vince. And therefore having sent two Legi-
ons into the farther Spain, under the con-
duct of *Q. Calpurnius*, Tribune of the people, he
himself made forward by great journeys, with
six hundred horse, sending an *Edict* before him
to summon the Magistrates and chief men of
the Cities and Towns, to appear before him
by a day at Corduba. Upon publication of
which *Edict*, there was no City in all that
Province, that sent not some of their Senate
by the day appointed to Corduba: neither was
there any Roman Citizen of note, that pre-
sented not himself there at that time.

The Princes and States being assembled,
of their own accord they shut the gates against
Varro, set watch and ward upon the walls and
in the Towers, and retained with them two
Cohorts, called by the name of *Colonicæ* (which
came thither by chance) for the safe keep-
ing of the Town. At the self same time,
the Inhabitants of *Carmona* (which is
the strongest Town of all the Province) cast
out three Cohorts that were by Varro put into
their Citadel, and shut them out of their Town.
Whereby Varro was the rather moved to make
hast to Gades with his Legions, lest he should
be hindered and cut off, either in the way, or
in his passage over from the Continent. Such and
so favorable was the general affection of the
whole Province towards Cæsar. And being
somewhat advanced on his journey, he receiv-
ed Letters from Gades, that as soon as it
was known there of the *Edict* which Cæsar
had published the chiefest of the *Gaditanæ* ac-
cording with the Tribunes of the Soldiers which
were in Garrison to expel Gallonius out of the
Town, and to keep the City and the Island
for Cæsar. Which being resolved upon, they
sent him word to leave the Town of his own
accord, while he might do it without danger,
and if he refused, they would then take such
farther order, as they should find expedient.
Gallonius moved with fear, dislodged him-
self, and went out of Gades. These

These things being divulged abroad, one of
the two Legions, known by the name of *Ver-
naculæ*, took up their Engines, went out of
Varro's Camp, (he himself standing by and
looking on) and retired themselves to *Hil-
palis*; and there sat down in the Market-place,
and in common porches, without hurting any
Man. Which the Roman Citizens of that
Convent did so well like of, that every man
was very desirous to entertain them in their
houses. Whereat Varro being much astoni-
shed, altered his journey towards *Ilipa* Ita-
lica, as he gave it out; but soon after was
advised by some of his friends, that the
gates were shut against him. Whereupon,
being circumvented and fore-closed from all
other addresses, he sent to Cæsar, to ad-
vertise him that he was ready to deliver up the
Legion, to whomsoever he should please to
appoint. To which purpose he sent him *Sex-
Cæsar* commanding the Legion to be delivered
to him.

Varro having given up his charge, came to
Cæsar at Corduba, and there gave him a true
account of the carriage of his office. The mo-
neys remaining in his hands he delivered up,
and gave an Inventory of the Corn and shipping
which were in any place provided. Cæsar, by
a public Oration made at Corduba, gave
thanks generally to all men. As first, to the
Roman Citizens, for the endeavor they used to
be Masters of the Town. Secondly, to the
Spaniards, for driving out the Garrison. To
them of Gades, that they traversed and pre-
vented the projects of the adversaries, and had
restored themselves to liberty. To the Tribunes
of the Soldiers and Centurions; that were
come thither to keep the Town, for that by their
valor and magnanimity, the resolution of the
Townsmen was assured and confirmed. He re-
mitted such levies of Money, as the Roman Ci-
zens had promised Varro for the publick ser-
vice. He restored the goods confiscated of such
as had spoken more freely than was pleasing,
and gave divers rewards, both publick and
private: the rest he satisfied with hope of good
time for the future. And having stayed there
two days, he went to Gades: where he gave
order that the Moneys and Monuments, which
were transferred from *Hercules Temple* to a
private house, should be carried back again
to the Temple. He made *Q. Calpurnius* Gov-
ernor of the Province, and left with him four
Legions. He himself in a few days space,
with those Ships which *M. Varro*, and those
of Gades (by his commandment) had made,
came to Tarraco; for there the Embassadors of

almost all the hither Province did attend his
coming. And after having received them with
private and publick honor, in the same fashion
as formerly he had used, he left Tarraco, and
came by land to Narbone, and from thence to
Marcellus, where he received first advertise-
ment of the law made at Rome, for creating
of a Dictator; and that himself was named
thereunto; by *M. Lepidus*, *Prætor*.

The first OBSERVATION.

It is one of Cæsar's peculiarities, recorded by *Suetonius*, that he never left behind him any spark
or suspicion of War, least it might be laid, he
did not thoroughly conquer where he came. For
he doth a business to halves, hath as much
more to do before it be done: and the remainder
in matter of War, groweth commonly to a greater
head, than that which first gave occasion of
Arms; like fire, which is smothered for a time,
to break out afterwards with greater fury. And
therefore, that he might not be thought to pro-
voke an Enemy, rather than subdue him, he ne-
glected all occasions how important soever, which
might draw him into Italy; to the end he might
settle Spain in peace, answerable to an absolute
victory. Which he easily effected, having over-
mastered the chiefest of the party, and turned
their Troops out of the Country; as *Mentagor*
the mistaken in the matter. The same whereof
he prevailed with the rest, that rather than they
would stand out, they forsook their Commanders.
And having thus removed all occasions of force, he
then proceeded to take away all doubtfulness, which
might accompany a new reconciliation, by bear-
ing such respects as well seemed ancient de-
fect.

For first, he made a publick acknowledgment of
their general love and affection towards him, and
then taking notice of particular services, engaged
them farther with honours and rewards; righted
such as were oppressed by the adverse party; re-
mitted all levies and taxations, (to show the dif-
ference between his and the Enemies favor) and
filed all Men with hope of good times; as know-
ing that fair words, accompanied with large prom-
ises, are powerful instruments to work out whatsoever
is desired. And so he took a little more time to
settle those Provinces, without farther trouble;
as believing in the Proverb, that what is well done,
is twice done.

The Second OBSERVATION.

M. Varro here mentioned, made more pro-
fession of Knowledge and Arts, than any
other of his Nation, being thereupon fil-
led by the name of *Bolus* or learned, and yet in the
judgment of learned Philosophers, was fitter to
perish than to teach. Truly being deprived of
publick offices, handled Philosophy a little in his
own language, *Pliny* and *Seneca*, left then *Varro* or
Tully. But what are these to *Aristotle* or *Plato*? or
rather what hath learning to do with a Roman General
whose knowledge consisted in their Military Disci-
pline, and in the powerful means of victorious en-
deavor.

Josephus A-
coffa hath
observed
that the Is-
land hath no
part above
and below
the sea.

Hispalis
Sevill.

Tamblich.
cap. 4.Cicero lib.
1. de officiis

Ilipe Itali-

ca.
Tarraco,
alter Julia
videtur.
Lib. 4. cap.
20.

Corduba,

deavor. Wherein Varro was as ignorant, as was Don Raimundus, the eleventh King of Arragon, in managing of Arms, who taking his Sword in one hand, and his buckler in the other, held the horrid bridle in his teeth. Howbeit, if *Qui minus facit, minus peccat*, he that does least offends least, were a good excuse, it were fitting to make him blameless, that deserved so well of learning above all others of that Empire. But forasmuch as his actions appear so far inferior to that which is conceived of his understanding, let that be acknowledged which is true, that *Considerate agere plurius est, quam cogitare prudenter*, considerate action is more worth, than wise thinking.

This Ilipe Italia was the chief Town of the Turdetani in Andalusia; and is conjectured by the ruins yet remaining, to stand over against Seville. Tarraco is that which is now called Tarragon, a Colony of Scipio his planting, whereof the Province taketh appellation; which is extended (as Plinie witnesseth) from Catalonia to Navarre and Castile, along the Alpes. Blaise de Vigenere reporteth, that in the year 516, there was counsel held at Tarraco by ten Bishops, wherein it was decreed, that Sunday should always begin presently after Evening Prayer (or their Vespers) on the Saturday. From whence it is, that the Spaniards do not work at all after that time; and do eat upon Saturdays at supper, the head, the feet, and the entrails of such fleas as is killed in the Shambles (together with other pretty bits which they call *Morsellas*) without prohibition or scruple of conscience. In this Town of Tarraco was born Paulus Olorius, that noble Orator.

Corduba, otherwise called Colonia Patricia, was held the next of worth and dignity to Seville, but for excellent Wits to be preferred above all the Towns of Spain: for here first were born the two Senecas, the Father the Rhetorician, and the Son the Philosopher; together with their Kinsman, Aeneas Lucanus, the Divine Poet, of whom Martial writeth;

*Duosque Senecas, unicunque Lucanum
Fecunda loquens Corduba.*

One Lucan and two Senecas
Brave Corduba doth fiew.

Besides of later times, Avenzoer, Avicenna, and Averrois, as excellent a Philosopher, as the other was a Physician: of whose works

— Fama loquens Amus.

— Fame when she's old will speak.

And from hence come those Cordovan skins, so much in request.

The Third OBSERVATION.

Concerning the office of a Dictator, whereunto Cæsar was named by the Prætor Lepidus, we are to observe, that the Dictatorship was the greatest office of dignity in their Government as Polybius noteth. The Consuls faith he, having each of them but twelve Lictors apiece, that carried bundles of Rods before them, as ensigns of Ma-

Lib. 3.

gistracy, the Dictator had always twenty four, to shew that the sovereign power divided between the two Consuls, was then reduced to one sole command. The occasions of establishing a Dictator were divers; howbeit it was commonly to take order in some great matter of consequence, which fell out to be extraordinary, and required the command of one man. And as it is in the Fables or Records of the Capitol, either *Respub. regendi causa*, to govern the Commonwealth, as was this first Dictatorship of Cæsar, or otherwise, *M. Fabius Ambulius Dicit. solvendo Islandæ causâ*; *M. Fab. Amb.* was created Dictator to quiet a seditious and at another time, *Cn. Quintus Varus Dictator. clavi figendi causa*, to strike in the nail, which was one of the superstitions they used in time of pestilence, and so divers the like. Of all which, there is this form expressed by Tully; *Si quando duellum gravius, discordiæve Civium crescent, unus ne amplius sex menses, nisi senatus decreverit, idem juris quod duo Consules teneto, igitur esse singulis diffusus Magister Populi esto*: If at any time either a great quarrel happen, or discord arise amongst the Citizens, then let one Man have the same power that the two Consuls have, for six months and no longer, unless the Senate shall otherwise decree, and let this Man (in an ill hour) be termed the Master of the People.

But forasmuch as the Magister Populi was a harsh and odious name to the people, they called him by a more modest name, *Dictator*, whereof Varro giveth this reason, *Dictator quod à Consule dicitur*, *capis dicto audientes omnes assensu*, He was called Dictator, because he was named to that office by the Consul, whose orders they were all to be obedient to. And as none could name a Dictator but the Consul, (for Cæsar was named by the Prætor in an extraordinary time) so none could be named to that place, but such as were or had been Consuls; *Consulares legere ita lex jubebat de Dictatore creando lata*; the law for the creating a Dictator commands to choose consular men only. To which may be added the circumstance of time, which was always in the night: *Nocte deinde sediti, ut mos est, Papirium Dictatorem dixit*, he named Papirius to the Dictatorship (as the custom is) in the dead of the night. The Dictator had sovereign power, but limited for time, which was commonly six Months; whereby they are specially distinguished from Monarchs; and thereupon Cicero adjudgeth Sylla's Dictatorship to be a mere Tyranny, and so doth Plutarch Cæsar's, because both were protracted beyond the time prescribed by the law. Cæsar held this Dictatorship place but eleven days, and then let it off; but afterwards had it for his life, and so came to be styled *Dictator perpetuus*, perpetual Dictator.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

The Marc'illians give up the Town.

Cæsar.

Veneris
pau-
sio.

De legibus.

Livie lib. 41.

1. Philippi.

The Marc'illians being much oppressed, and almost worn out with all sorts of inconveniences, brought to an extreme exigent of Vittual, defeated and overthrown in two Fights at Sea, broken and cut in pieces oftentimes in their sallies out, afflicted with a grievous Pestilence through long shutting up and alteration of diet (for they lived of nothing but of old Panick and musty Barley, which was long before laid up in publick for this purpose,) their Tower being overthrown, and a great part of their Wall down, out of hope of any succours from the Provincers, or of other Armies, which they knew were come into the hands and power of Cæsar; they strictly determined (without fraud) to give up the Town. But a few days before, L. Domitius understanding their resolution, having got three Ships (whereof two be assigned to his familiar friends, the third he took himself, and taking the opportunity of a troublefome storm) put to Sea: which being perceived by the ships that by Brutus commandment did continually guard the mouth of the Haven, they weighed their Anchors, and made after them. Notwithstanding, that wherein Domitius was held on her course, and by the help of the foul weather got out of sight. The other two being afraid of our ships, returned back into the Haven.

The Marc'illians, according as was commanded, brought their Armes and Engines out of the Town, drew forth their shipping, both out of their Haven and their Arcenalls, and delivered up their publick Treasure. Which things being accomplished and performed, Cæsar willing to save them, rather for the name and antiquity of the Town, than for any merit of theirs, left two Legions there for a Garrison, and then left it off: but afterwards he himself took his way towards Rome.

OBSERVATION.

Hence we may observe, that when men refuse to be led by reason, as the best means to guide them to convenient ends, they are commonly constrained by the commanding Warrant of Necessity, to undergo the same thing upon harder conditions. As it happened to the Marc'illians, who, not regarding the Army then present, and ready to take a strict account of their answers (which, with good excuse, doth command a neutral State) chose rather to be shut up with a Siege, that, of all miseries is accounted

the worst; and therein fo carried themselves, as they left no stone unremoved to make good their refusal: but for want of better helps, brought their Fraud to play a part, to their greater disadvantage. And, if the Conqueror had not took all occasions to shew his clemency, they might happily have paid dear for their contempt. But, where either desert, or other motives wanted, there comes in *venia*, their name and antiquity was sufficient to make Cæsar constant to his own ends: which, as near as the course wherein he was engaged would afford him, were always levelled at the general applause of his actions; taking that to be no little help to work himself into the favourability of the State: observing it the rather in cases of great and happy success, which are ever more restrained then lesser fortunes. Howsoever, it cannot be denied, but that Clemency is a property of excellent honour: which Cæsar shewed in saving the Town.

CHAP. X.

Curio transporteth two Legions into Africk.

About the same time, C. Curio set sail from Sicily to pass into Africk: and making no account at all of Aëtius Varus Forces, be carried with him but two Legions of the four which were delivered him by Cæsar, together with Five hundred horse. And, after he had been at Sea two dayes and three nights, be arrived at a place called Aquilaria, distant Twenty two miles from Clupea; where there is a very commodious Road for Ships in Summer, sheltered on each side with two large and eminent Promontories. L. Cæsar, the son, attended his coming at Clupea with Ten Gallies; which being taken from the Pirates in the late Wars, and laid aground at Utica, were repaired and new trimmed by Varus: but, being afraid of the great number of his Ships, he forsook the Sea, and ran his Gally on shore; and leaving her there, fled by land on foot to Adrumetum, a Town kept by Confidius Longus, having one Legion onely in Garrison.

The rest of Cæsar's Navy, seeing their Admiral flee away, put into Adrumetum. M. Rufus the Treasurer pursued him with twelve Ships, which Curio had brought with him out of Sicily, to waste the ships of burthen; and finding the Gally left upon the Sand, he towed her off, and returned to Curio with his Navy. Curio sent Marcus before with the Ships to Utica; and he himself set forward thither by Land with the Army, and in two dayes journey came to the River Bagrada; where he left C. Caninius Rebilus, the Legate, with the Legions, and went himself before with the Cavalry, to view a place called Cornelius Camp, which was held very fit and conveni-

K k

ens

Omnium
maxime
mirabile,
claudi obli-
vione.
Egipgius.In maxima
fortuna, mi-
serabile licen-
tia est.
Salust.
Servare
proprium
est excel-
lentis for-
tune. Seneca
de cle-
mentia. lib. 1.

Cæsar.

quod
se Bagrada
lenius agit
ficus fulca-
tor arces.
Lec. lib. 4.

ent to incamp in, being a direct ridge of a Hill, shooting out into the Sea, steep, and broken on each side, and yet shelving by a little more gentle descent on that side, which was next Utica, being distant from thence (if the nearest way were taken) a little more than a mile. But in that shortest cut there rose a spring in that part which was furthest off from the Sea, and so made a marsh or bog which, whosoever would avoid, must fetch a compass of six miles to go to the Town.

A view being taken of this place, Curio beheld a far off Varus's Camp, joyning to the Town-Wall, at the Gate called Bellica, marvellously fortified through the strong situation of the place, having the Town on the one side, and a Theatre, which stood before the Town on the other; and, by reason of the great circuit of building which it contained, made a narrow and difficult passage to the Camp. He observed further, great store of Carriages, which, by reason of this sudden alarm, were brought out of the Country towards the Town: for the intercepting whereof he sent the Cavalry. And, at the same instant, Varus likewise had sent out of the town, 600 Numidian Horse, and 400 Foot, which King Juba (a few days before) had sent to Utica, for the strengthening of that party. This Prince had acquaintance with Pompey, by reason that his Father lodged with him, and bare a spleen to Curio, for the Law which he preferred when he was Tribune of the People, for the confiscation of Juba his Kingdom. The Cavalry on either side met together, and the Numidians were not able to abide the charge of our men; but, about an hundred and twenty being slain, the rest betook themselves back to the Camp at the town.

In the mean time, upon the arrival of our Gallies, Curio commanded it to be proclaimed, that such Victuallers and ships of burthen as were in the Bay at Utica (being in number about two hundred) and would not presently come to the Cornelian Camp, should be held and taken for Enemies. At which Proclamation, upon an instant of time, they all weighed Anchor, and came to the place whether they were commanded: whereby the Army abounded with all necessary provisions. This being done, he returned to the Camp at Bagrada; and, by the Acclamation of the whole Army, was saluted by the name of Imperator.

The first OBSERVATION.

THIS Chapter beginneth with the third part of this Book, containing Curio his passage into Africk; concerning whom it is to be observed, that in the beginning of these breils, no man was more Enemy to Cæsar, nor made more bitter invectives to the people against him, then he did in his Tribuneship; but afterwards he fell off, and was gained by the voluptuous inticements of *Mr. Antony*, together with a huge Mass of Money which Cæsar sent him. Whereupon he played the turn-coat, and with might and main assisted that party; prevailing much with the Commonalty, by his eloquent and perswasive speeches; the lively force whereof is able to stir up affection in Rones. For which cause it is, that ** Pellicus Paternus* noteth, That no man brought a more burning or dangerous fire-brand to the kindling of those Civil Wars, then did Curio; being a man of an excellent discourse, audacious, prodigal of his own and of other mens, subtle, ingenious, extreme vicious, and always well-spoken, to the ruine of the Publick-Weal. Which sweetnets of Words came unto him by inheritance, as *Pliny* witnesseth; *Una familia Curionum, in qua tres continuæ serie oratores existerunt*. In the one family of the Curiones there were three noted Orators one after another. Of whose monstrous prodigality the same Author hath made a very large account. And out of these over-weening humours it was, that he became so unwary as to divide his Army; neglecting the Enemy, and the variableness of War, which altereth as the Moon, and keepeth no constant shape whereby it may be known. Concerning the dismembering of an Army lightly, and upon heedless rashness, *Cyrus* giveth grave advice, in the beginning of the Sixth Book of *Xenophon*. To which (for the present) I refer the Reader.

Clupea was a Town in Africk, named by *Pliny*, *Oppidum liberum*, or a free Town, and sited upon the Promontory of *Mercury*, in the territories of old Carthage. It was so called, because it carried the form of a Target retorted; and for the same cause: it was called *Aspis*:

In *Chelpei speciem curvatis turribus Aspis*.

Aspis with Turrets bowing like a shield.

This Promontory, which Curio chose to incamp in, was famous for three things. First, it was reputed the place where *Amias* the Giant dwelt, which *Hercules* slew, by strangling him in his Armes, that he might not touch the Earth, from which it is said he received fresh strength. Secondly, *P. Cornelius Scipio*, that subdued Africk, made that place his chief Camp of strength: and so it came to be called *Cornelius Camp*. And lastly, for this expedition which Curio made, to lose two Legions, and himself withal, as unwilling to see the morrow, after such a loss; for, *Vita est ævidus, quisquis non vult, mundo secum perire, mori*: He loves life indeed, that is not willing to die when the World falls.

CHAP.

CHAP. XL

Curio marcheth to Utica. His Cavalry put to flight great Troops coming from King Juba. His Army strangely possessed with an idle fear.

Cæsar.

THE next day he brought his Army to Utica, and incamped himself near unto the Town. But, before the fortification of his Camp was finished, the Horsemen that stood Sentinel, gave notice of great Forces of Horse and Foot, coming towards Utica, from King Juba: and, at the same time, a great dust was seen rise in the aire, and presently the first troops began to come in sight. Curio, astonished at the novelty of the thing, sent his Horse before, to sustain the first shock, and to stay them: he himself calling the Legions; with all speed, from their Work, imballled his Army. The Cavalry, encountering with the Enemy (before the Legions could be well unfolded and put in order) did put to flight all the Kings Forces, that came marching without fear or order; and slew a great number of the Foot troops: but the Horse, making haste, got almost all safe into the town, by the way of the Sea-shore. The next night after, two Centurions of the Nation of the Masli, fled from Curio, with twenty two of their Soldiers, to *Actius Varus*.

These Centurions, whether it were to please Varus, or otherwise, speaking as they thought (for what men will, they easily believe; and what they think, they hope others do think the same;) did confidently affirm, that the minds of the whole Army were altogether alienated from Curio; and that it was very expedient that the Armies should come in sight, and find means to speak together. Varus being persuaded to that opinion, the next day, early in the morning, drew his Legions out of the Camp: the like did Curio; either of them putting their Forces in order, upon a small Valley which lay between both their Armies.

There was in Varus Army, one *Sex. Quintilius Varus*, who (as it is formerly declared) was at *Corfinium*; and being let go by Cæsar, went into Africk. It fortuned, that Curio had carried over those Legions, which Cæsar had formerly taken at *Corfinium*: so that a few Centurions being slain, the Companies and Maniples remained the same. This occasion being so slyly offered, *Quintilius* (going about Curio his Army) began to beseech the Soldiers, that they

would not forget the first Oath they had taken to *Domitius*, and to him their treasurer; nor bear Arms against them, that had run the same fortune, and endured the same Siege nor fight for those, who (by way of reproach) had called them fugitives. To these he added some promises, to put them in hope of a good recompence, out of his own liberality, if they would follow him and *Actius*.

Having delivered this unto them, Curio his Army stood mute, and declared not themselves by any sign, either one way or other: and so either side drew back to their Camp. Notwithstanding, Curio his Camp was afterwards possessed with a great fear, and suspicion, which was quickly augmented by divers reports raised upon the Jacks. For every man forged opinions and conceits; and, out of his own fear, added something to that which he had heard of another. Which, when it was spread from one Author to many, and one had received it from another, it seemed there were many Authors of the same thing. For Civil War is alwayes compounded of such men, as hold it lawful to do and follow what and whom they please.

Those Legions, which a little before were in the service of the Enemy, did willingly embrace what was offered them: for old acquaintance had made them forget what benefits Cæsar had lately bestowed on them: being also of divers Countries and Nations, and not all of the Masli or Peligni, as those the night before, which were their Cabin-mates, and fellow-soldiers: whereupon they took occasion, to publish abroad in worse termes, that which others had vainly given out; and some things were coined by those that would seem most diligent in doing their duty.

The first OBSERVATION.

Observe first, from the revolt of these Centurions, that a fellow or two of rank and fashion falling from a Party, do gain ease credit to their Advertisements, by averring any thing which the Enemy desireth. Whence it is, that for as much as fugitives can little otherwise avail, (one man being but as no man,) they seek favour and reputation with the party they fly unto, by their advice and discovery, and consequently the remuneration of epial; which, according to the president made by *Fabius* to the Spies of *Cluſine*, is worth a mans labour.

And herein Revolters (specially those of judgment) are very dangerous instruments; not only in weakening or making frustrate such designs as may be contrived against an Adversary; but also in discovering the secrets of their own Party, and disclosing of that which is absolute and well, un-

K k 2

Nulla scia
pitaeque
viris qui ca-
stra sequun-
tur. Vena-
lesse, ma-
nus: ibi fas,
ubi maxima
metor, lib.
cap.

Libre, lib.
102

will it be made known. For there is no subtilizing thing so perfect, but hath always some part or other open, to give an easy passage to destruction: accordi'g to that of the Poet,

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendente filo.

All humane things hang by a slender thread.

And therefore, it is no small means of preserving each thing in being, to make shew of strength, and conceal weaknesses, as the Regiments of assured ruine. For which cause it is, that fidelity is commended, as the foundation of humane society: and perfidious treachery, divulging the secret imperfections thereof, is the plague and bane of the same.

The second OBSERVATION.

AS there is nothing more dangerous in an Army than fear: so there is nothing sooner bred to disturb a multitude, then this passion, which metamorphoseth a Troop of Men into a Heard of Deer. For hence it appeareth, that one *Thersites* is able to leave a whole Army; and an idle conceit bred in the weak thoughts of some *Trefantes*, begeth oftentimes a main cause of distrust throughout all the party: which, as it spreadeth abroad, is so delivered from one to another, as the Reporter (not believing what he telleth) addeth always somewhat to make the hearer believe what he could not himself. And so weak minds do multiply the vain apprehension of idle humours, in such a fashion, as there is more hurt in fearing, then in the thing which is feared.

Epinondas was more fortunate than all others in this kind: for * while he led the *Thebans*, as their Commander, they were never taken with any sudden affrightment, nor posselt with any panick terror, to bereave them of their senses, or falsifie the truth of their understanding; being all (as it seem'd) of the same mind with the General, who accounted no death so honourable, as that which came by War. Howbeit, such is the frailty of humane nature, and so strange are the convulsions of the mind, that a Commander must expect to meet with times, wherein his men will stand in danger of nothing so much as their own infirmity: being troubled rather with strong apprehensions, then for any danger of the thing feared.

CHAP. XIX.

Curio dissenteth the matter in a Council of war.

Cæsar.

FOR which causes a Council of War being called, they began to deliberate what course was to be taken. There were some opinions which thought, that it was very expedient to assault and take *Varus* Camp, for that there was nothing more dangerous then idleness, for the breeding and increase of such imaginations as the Soldiers had conceived. Others said, It were better to try the fortune of a Battel, and to free them-

selves by valorous endeavour, rather then to be forsaken and abandoned of their own Party, and left to undergo most grievous and extreme torments. There were others which thought it fit, to return about the third Watch of the night to *Cornelius* Camp; that, by interposing some respite of time, the Soldiers might be better settled, and confirmed in their opinions; and, if any mischance further happened, they might (by reason of their store of shipping) be with ease and safety return back to Sicily.

Curio mistaking both the one and the other, said, That there wanted as much good resolution in the one opinion, as abundance in the other: for these entered into a consideration of a dishonourable and unbecoming flight; and these were of an opinion, to fight in an unequal and disadvantageous place. For, with what hope (saith he) can we assault a Camp so fortified, both by Nature and Art? Or, What have we gained, if with great loss and damage, we shall go away and give it over? As though things well and happily achieved, did not get to the Commander great good will from the Soldier; and things ill carried, as much hate. Concerning the removing of our Camp, What doth it infer but a shameful retreat, a despair in all men, and an alienation of the Army? For, it is not fit, to give occasion to the prudent and well-advised, to imagine that they are distressed; nor on the other side, to the ill disposed, that they are redoubted or feared: and the rather, because fear in this kind will give them more liberty to do ill, and abate the endeavour of good men in well-deserving. And if (saith he) these things are well known unto us already, that are spoken of the revolt and alienation of the Army (which, for mine own part, I think either to be altogether false, or at least, less then in opinion they are thought to be) is it not better to dissemble and hide them, then that they should be strengthened and confirmed by us? Ought we not, as we do hide the wounds of our bodies, to cover the inconveniences of an Army, least we should minister hope or courage to the Adversaries? But some there are, that advise, to set forward at midnight; to the end (as I imagine) that such as are desirous to offend, may perform it with more scope and licentiousness. For such disorders are repressed and reformed either with shame or fear, to both which the night is an Enemy. And therefore, as I am not of that courage, to think, without hope or means, that the Enemies Camp is to be assaulted; so, on the other side, I am not so fearful, as to be wanting in that which is fitting: but am rather of opinion, that we try all things before we yield to that; and do assure

my

my self that for the most part, we are all of one mind concerning this point.

OBSERVATION.

AS in matter of Geometry, *Resum est Index sui & obliqui*, a straight line manifesteth both itself and a crooked line, being equal to all the parts of rectitude, and unequal to obliquity: so is it in reason and discourse. For a direct and well-grounded speech, carrieth such a native equality with all its parts, as it doth not only approve itself to be levelled; at that which is most fitting, but sheweth also what is indirect and crooked, concerning the same matter; and is of that consequence in the variety of projects and opinions, as it hardly hit upon, in the lame discourse of common reason, that *Plato* thought it a piece of divine power, to direct a path free from the crookedness of error, which might lead the freight and ready way to happy ends. And the rather, forasmuch as in matter of debate, there are no words too weighty, but do seem balanced with others of equal consideration: as here it happened, from thole that pointing at the cause of this distemperance, convicted idleness for the Author of their variable and unfixed minds; and as * *Xenophon* hath observed, very hard to be endured in one Man, much worse in a whole family, but no way sufferable in an Army, which the Romans called *Exercitus ab exercitio* from exercise. For remedy whereof, they propounded labor without hope of gain, and such services could bring forth nothing but loss. Others preferring security before all other courtes, (as believing with *Lucretius*, that Captains should never trust Fortune farther then necessity constrained them) perswaded a retreat to a place of safety, but upon dishonourable terms. Which unbecomness of opinions *Curio* made straight by an excellent Maxime in this kind; thinking it convenient to hold such a course, as might neither give honest men cause of distrust, nor wicked men to think they were feared. For so he should be sure (in good terms of honor) neither to discourage the better sort, nor give occasion to the ill affected to do worse. And thus winding himself out of the labyrinth of words (as knowing that to be true of *Annius* the Pretor, that * it more importeth occasions to do then to say; being an easy matter to fit words to things unfolded and resolved up) he brake up the Council.

CHAP. XIII.

Curio calleth a general assembly of the Soldiers, and speaks unto them, concerning their fear and resolution.

Cæsar.

THe Council being risen, he gave order for a Convocation of the Army, and there called to remembrance what they had done for Cæsar at *Corfinium*: how by their favor and furtherance, he had gained the greatest part of Italy to be on his side. For by you (saith he) and by your endeavour,

all the rest of the Municipal Towns were drawn to follow Cæsar; and therefore not without just cause did he at that time repose great assurance in your affections towards him, and the adverse party conceived as great indignation and spite against you. For Pompey was not forced away by any Battel, but being prejudiced by your act he quitted Italy. Cæsar hath recommended me, whom he held near unto himself, together with the Provinces of Sicily and Africa (without which he cannot defend the City and Italy) to my trust and fidelity. There are some which sollicite and perswade you to revolt from your command: for what can they wish or desire more, then to make it but one work, to bring us both to ruine and overthrow, and to engage you in a most detestable wickedness? Or what worse opinion can they conceive of you, when that you should betray those men, that profess themselves wholly yours; and that you might afterwards come into their power, who take themselves to be undone by your means?

Have not you understood what Cæsar hath done in Spain? two Armies beaten; two Generals defeated; two Provinces taken, and all within forty days, after he came in view of the Enemy? Those whose Forces were not able to make resistance when they were whole and entire, how is it possible they should hold out being beaten and discomfited? you that followed Cæsar when the victory stood doubtful; now Fortune hath adjudged the Cause, and determined of the issue of the War, will you follow the vanquished Party, when you are to receive the reward of your service? They gave out, that they were forsaken and betrayed by you, and do remember you of the former Oath you took. But did you forsake *L. Domitius*, or did he forsake you? Did not he thrust you out, and expose you to all extremity of fortune? Did he not seek to save himself by flight, without your knowledge or privacy? Were you not preserved and kept alive by Cæsar's clemency, when you were abandoned and betrayed by him?

How could he tie you with the oath of allegiance, when (having cast away his sheaf of Rads, and laid down his authority) he himself was made a private person, and became captivated to the command of another mans power? It were a strange and new Religion, that you should neglect that Oath, wherein you stand now engaged; and respect the other, which was taken away by the remedy of your General, and the * loss of your li-

Nemo is a micus esse potest; a quibus malum aliquod expectat. Demosth.

* Capituli diminutione. Diminutio capitis appellatur, qui civitate mutatus est, aut ex familia in aliam adoptatus & qui liber alteri mancipio datus est: qui in hostium potestate versatur & cui aqua ignique interdictum. Liv. In summo,

Fides functionem civitatis humane: perfidia vero ejusdem perficit. Plaut. l. 5. de legibus.

The Spectator called all cowardly Trefantes. * Plutarch.

Plus in metuendo est mali, quam in ipso illo quod timeatur. Cic. ad Torquatum. * Plutarch.

Turbant homines, non res: sed quas de rebus habent opiniones. Epict. Enchirid.

Confilium date, eorum que inter homines diffinimum. Omi oratio aequalis opponitur. Sent. Philof. Variam semper dant omnia mentes. Luc. lib. 4. * Lib. 1. Cypor.

Duces nullo loco, nisi quantum necessitas cogit, se committunt fortune debent. Lib. 2. * Ad firmum non pertinet, cogitare magis quid agendum, loquendum, faciem, facile erit, explicatus, confilium, accommodare rebus versabitur. Liv. 33.

Imperatore
quoniam ha
bitus res in
esse de conti
fententia rei
m. i. i. i. i.
Virtus, au
thoritas, re
licitas. Ci
cero pro
leg. oratione

liberty. But I believe you think well of Cæsar, and are offended at me, that am not to preach of my merits toward you; which are yet less than my will, and unworthy your expectation: and yet Souldiers have always asked to seek reward upon the finishing up of a War; which what event it will have, make you no doubt. And why should I omit the diligence which I have already used, and how the business hath hitherto proceeded? Doth it offend you, that I transported the Army over in safety, without loss of anyone ship? That at my coming, I beat and dispersed at the first onset the whole Fleet of the Adversaries? That twice into two days, I overcame them only with the Cavalry? That I drew two hundred Ships of burthen out of the Road and Port of the Enemy? and have brought them to that extremity, that they can be supplied by provision neither by sea nor by land? All this good fortune, and these Commanders rejected and forsaken, will you rather embrace again the ignominy you received at Corninium, or your flight out of Italy, or the rendering up of Spain, or the prejudicial success of the War of Africk? Truly for mine own part, I was desirous and content to be called Cæsar's Souldier: but you have styled me with the Title of Imperator. Which if I repent you, I do willingly quit myself of your grace, and return it back unto you: and do you in like manner, restore me to my name again, lest you should seem to give me honor which might turn to my reproach.

The First OBSERVATION.

Aulus Gell.
lib. 13. c. 17.

Cem. 5. bell.
Gall.

In the handling of this accident, the difference cometh to be observed between a Council of War, and a Concio, or convocation of the Souldiers. The first was more particular, consisting of some choice Men, and those the most eminent in the party. *Is qui non universum populum, sed partem aliquam adesse jubet, non comitia, sed concilium dicere debet:* He that calls together only a part of the people, and not the whole, calls a Council, not a general assembly. Their convocation or preaching was more general, the whole Army being convened together, to be fitted by perswasion and discourse to follow the resolution taken by a Council; and was properly called *Alloquutio*, and sometimes *Conventus*. *Cicero periculum Epistolam Cæsaris inconvenerunt militum recitat;* Cicero read the Letter from Cæsar in a conventus or general meeting of his Souldiers. The parties called to a Council, were according as the General valued the occasion: for sometimes the Legates and Tribunes were only consulted; and now and then the Centurions of the first Orders, together with the Captains of horse, were called to their assistance, and oftentimes all the Centurions. But howsoever,

Curio resolved out of his own judgment, as great Commanders commonly do, and is specially observed by *Pierre Mathieu*, of the French King, who ever loveth to hear the opinion of his Captains, but always finds his own the best.

Tom. 1.
lib. 4.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Amongst other strains of this discourse, it is acknowledged, that Rome could not stand without Sicily, and the reason was, for the plenty of Corn which it brought forth: for Sicily was always reputed as the Granary or Barn of Rome, and accordingly cared for by the Senate as a place without which their City could not continue. The Grain of that Island is hard like horn, and cannot well be broken or ground into Meal, until it be wet with water, and then dried in the shade, rather than in the sun; by means whereof it yieldeth so exceedingly, that it is accounted twenty in the hundred better than any Poent Wheat; especially, for that it will keep long in their vaults and caves under the earth, and seldom or never take heat, being of it self so hard and dry.

The gluttonous use of flesh hath made men ignorant of the vertue and strength of Corn, which the Romans better understood; for their Legions never fed on flesh, as long as they could get Corn. *Pecora, quod secundum poterat esse inopia subsidium,* they fetched in cattel, as the second way to help their want, saith Cæsar. And in another place; *Quæ complures dies milites frumento caruerint, Pecore et longioribus his addito extremam famem sustulerunt.* The Souldiers having for many days been without Corn, they were faine to sustain their extreme hunger with cattel, which they had fetched afar off. And in the same place, *Quod minor erat frumenti copia, Pecus imperabat;* because there was but little Corn, he gave order for Cattel. And again, *Non illi hordeum cedere audeant, non legumina recusant.* *Pecus vero, cuius rei summa erat in Epiro copia, magno in honore habebant.* They refused neither barley nor pulse when it was offered them; but cattel, whereof there was good store in Epirus, they prized at an high rate.

By which places it appeareth, that they never fell to flesh, but when they wanted Corn. Which is doubtless a firmer nutriment, less excremental, and of better strength, than any other food whatsoever; as containing the prime substance of Meat, and the spirit of Wine: for *Aqua vite* is as well made of Wheat, as of the lees of Wine. Flesh is good to make Warriers of a gross and heavy constitution, as *Plutarch* noteth; but the Roman Souldier stood in need of an effectual and sinewy vigour, able to undergo carriages, fitter for a Mule than a Man, together with such works, as laterages do rather hear than believe; and was attained by feeding only upon bread.

The Rabbits and Thalmudists do write, that the Giants of the old world first fell to the eating of flesh, making no difference between a Man and a beast, but grew so execrable, that they made Women cast their fruit before their time, to the end they might eat it with more tenderness and delicacy. Which is also said to be practised by the *Cambials*, upon the first discovery of the Indies.

Mull. Mari.
ani.

Sobrietas,
quasi sine
ebrietate.

Horat.
lib. 1.

Ellogentia
principibus
maxime or
namento est
Cic. 4. de
officiis.
lib. 1.
famul. epit.

Ælat.

Vigilare reporteth, that he knew some great Men in France so frigid, that they caused oftentimes Does ready to foan to be killed, and the young ones took out alive, to be made Meat for monstrous appetites. But there is no indifferent Parallel to be drawn, between the sobriety of the ancient Roman souldier, and the gluttony of these times; far exceeding that of Agamemnon, which Achilles noted with words of high reproach, calling him Hogs-head of Wine, eyes of a Dog, and heart of a Dear.

The Third OBSERVATION.

Hardly, from this elaborate and well couched speech, we may note, That Eloquence is a very beautiful ornament to Princes, and great Commanders; besides the use it hath to lead a multitude to such end as is wished: for smooth words prevail where force booteth not. According to that of Cicero, *Cum populum persuaderi posse didicimus, cogitasse non arbitramur;* If the people will not be perswaded, let us not think it fit to go about to compel them.

CHAP. XIV.

Curio bringeth out his Troops, and putteth Varus Army to flight.

The Souldiers moved with this Oration, did oftentimes interrupt him in his Speech; signifying with what grief they did endure the suspicion of infidelity. And as he departed from the assembly, every Man exhorted him to be of a good courage, and not to doubt of giving battel, or to make trial of their fidelity and valor. By which means the minds and disposition of all men being changed, Curio resolved (out of a general consent) as soon as any occasion was offered to give battel.

The next day, having brought out his former ade astand, and imballtelled them in the same place where he stood in Arms the day before. And Varus likewise drew out his Troops: whether it were to solicit the Souldier, or not to omit the opportunity of fighting, if it might be afforded in an indifferent place. There was a valley (as we have formerly declared) between the two Armies; of no very hard or difficult ascent; and either of them expected who should first come over it, to the end they might fight in a place of more advantage; when upon a sudden, all Varus Cavalry that stood in the left Corner of the Army, together with the light armed Souldiers that stood mingled amongst them; were seen descending into the Valley. To them Curio sent his Cavalry, together with two Cohorts of his Marrucini. The Enemies Horsemen were

not able to endure the first encounter of our Men; but having lost their horse, fled back to their party. The light-armed men that came out with them, being left and forsaken, were all slain by our Men, in the view and sight of Varus whole Army. Then Rebilus, Cæsar's Legate, (whom Curio for his knowledge and experience in matter of War, had brought with him out of Sicily) said; Curio thou seest the Enemy affrighted: why makest thou doubt to use the opportunity of time? Curio without making any other answer, then willing the Souldiers to remember what they had assured unto him the day before, commanded them to follow him, and ran foremost himself. The Valley was so cumbersome and difficult, that in gaining the ascent of the hill, the foremost could hardly get up, unless they were lifted up by their followers. Howbeit, the Enemy was so possessed with fear, for the flight and slaughter of their fellows, that they did not so much as think of resisting; for they took themselves all to be already surprised by the Cavalry: so that before any weapon could be cast, or that our Men could approach near unto them, all Varus Army turned their backs and fled into their Camp.

In this flight, Fabius Pelignus (a certain Souldier of one of the inferior Companies of Curio's Army) having overtaken the first Troop of them that fled, sought for Varus, calling after him with a loud voice; as though he had been one of his own Souldiers, and would either advise him, or say something else to him. And as he, being often called, looked back, and stood still (inquiring who he was, and what he would) he made at Varus's Souldier (which was unarmed) with his sword, and was very near killing him: howbeit he avoided the danger, by receiving the blow upon his Target. Fabius was instantly inclosed about by such Souldiers as were near at hand, and slain.

In the meantime, the gates of the Camp, were pestered and thronged with multitudes and Troops of such as fled away, and the passage was so stopped, that more died in that place without blow or wound, then perished either in the battel or in the flight. Neither wanted they much of taking the Camp; for many left not running until they came to the Town. But the nature of the place, and the fortification of the Camp, did hinder their access; and Curio his men coming out, prepared only for a Battel, wanted such necessities

as were of use for the taking of the Camp, And therefore Curio carried back his Army, with the loss of no one man but Fabius. Of the adversaries were slain about six hundred, and many more wounded, who all upon Curio his departure, besides many other that feigned themselves hurt, left the Camp for fear, and went into the Town. Which Varus perceiving, and knowing also the astonishment of the Army, leaving a Trumpeter in the Camp, and a few Tents for show, about the third watch, he carried his Army with silence out of the Camp into the Town.

OBSERVATION.

Loco facientie est, alienam salutem operiri.

It is a part of wisdom, and oftentimes a main help to Victory, to attend the advantage of an Enemies rashness, and to see if his folly will not make way for his overthrow. Whereof Curio made good use: for he kept his Army in the upper ground, until the Cavalry of the adversary were loosely fallen into the Valley; and then set upon them, and cut them all in pieces. The fight whereof, masked the whole Army, and kept Curio in safety, upon the like disadvantage, in the cumbersome passage of the same Vale: by means whereof he put to flight the whole forces of the Enemy, and made a great slaughter in the party. Wherein I may not forget that trick of a Roman spirit, whereby the Author becometh memorable to posterity, in calling after Varus by name, to make him the sacrifice for both the Hosts. Whence we may observe, that when a Battle is joined pell-mell, no Man can be assured in his own valor, nor share out his fortune by the length of his Sword; but is oftentimes subject to weaknesses of contempt, and vanquished by such as cannot be compared unto him but in scorn.

I have heard it reported, that at the Battle of Euxæ, Masrine (that known Woman in France) took Prisoner and disarmed a Cavalier of Spain: who being brought before the King, and by him demanded whole Prisoner he was, or whether he knew the party that had forced him; answered no; but that he knew him to be a gallant Man of Arms. Whereat the King smiled, and the Gentleman, understanding what fortune he had run, was as much dismayed as a Man possibly could be, that considered, *Quod ferrum aqnat, in bello, robustioribus imbecilliores.* The sword equalleth the weak to the strongest.

Curio leaveth Utica to meet with King Juba. His Cavalry overthroweth the Forces led by Sabura; which leadeth him on to his overthrow.

CHAP. XV.

The next day Curio prepared to besiege Utica, inclosing it about with a ditch and a Rampier. There were in the Town a multitude of people unacquainted with War, through the long peace they had enjoyed: and the Inhabitants stood very affectionate to Cæsar, for many benefits they had received from him. The rest of the multitude consisted of divers sorts of men, much terrified and affrighted by the former encounters: whereupon every man spoke plainly of giving up the Town, and dealt with Pub. Actius, that their fortunes and lives might not come in danger, through his pertinacy and wilfulness.

While these things were a doing, there came Messengers from King Juba, signifying, the King was at hand with great Forces, and would them to keep and defend the Town. Which news did much encourage and confirm the wavering and affrighted minds of the Enemy. The same was also reported to Curio: whereunto for a while he gave no credit; such was his confidence in the success of things. And now withal came Letters and Messengers into Africk, of that which Cæsar had so fortunately achieved in Spain: so that being absolutely assured with all these things, he was persuaded the King durst attempt nothing against him. But when he found by assured discovery, that his forces were within twenty five miles of Utica, leaving his works already begun, he withdrew himself into Cornelius Camp; and began there to fortify his Camp, to get Corn and other provisions; and to furnish it with all necessary material for a defence: and sent presently a dispatch into Sicily, that the two Legions, and the rest of the Cavalry might be sent unto him.

The Camp wherein he lay was suitably accommodated to hold out the war, as well by reason of the nature of the place, as the artificial fortifying thereof, the nearness of the sea, and the plenty of water and salt; whereof there was great quantity brought thither, from the Salt-pits near adjoining. No stuff could be wanting, through the great store of wood which was about the place, nor yet any Corn, for the plenty that was to be found in the confining fields:

Fields: and thereupon, by the advice and approbation of all men, Curio resolved to attend his other Forces, and to draw out the War in length.

These things being thus disposed by the consent and liking of all men, he heard by some that lately came out of the Town, that Juba was called back, by occasion of a War happened upon the Confines, and that by reason of the controversies and dissensions of the Leptitani, he was detained at home in his Kingdom, but that Sabura his Lieutenant was sent with some competent Forces, and was not far from Utica. To which reports, giving too light and easie credit, he altered his purpose, & resolved to put the matter to trial of Battle: whereunto his youthful heat, the greatness of his courage, the success of former time, and his confidence in the managing of that War, did violently lead him. Being carried on with these inducements, he sent the first night all the Cavalry to the River Bagrada, where the Enemy lay incamped under the Command of Sabura: but the King followed after with all his Forces, and lay continually within six miles, or thereabouts.

The foremost sent before, and making their journey in the night, set upon the Enemy at unawares, and not thinking of their approach: for the Numidians lodge, scattered here and there in a barbarous manner, without any government or order. And, surprizing them thus oppressed with sleep, and scattered upon the ground, they slew a great number of them: the rest, in great terror and amazement, escaped by flight. Which service being thus executed, the Cavalry returned to Curio, and brought the Captives unto him. Curio was gone out about the fourth watch of the night with all his Forces, having left five Cohorts for a Garrison to his Camp: and having marched six miles, he met with the Cavalry, understood what was done, and inquired of the Captives, who was General of the Camp at Bagrada. They answered, Sabura. He omitted, for haste of his way, to inform himself of the rest: but, turning himself to the next Ensigner, said, *Tu scis, soldiers, that the confession of the captives doth agree with that which was reported by the fugitives.* For, the King is not come; but hath sent some small Forces, which cannot make their party good with a few horsemen: and therefore hasten to take the spoil with honour and renown, that we may now, at length, begin to think of rewarding your merits.

OBSERVATION.

It is observed by Marcellinus, that when misfortune cometh upon a man, his spirit groweth dull and benumbed, as his senses seem to be dimmed of their charges. Which appeared here in Curio: who, having taken a provident and sure course, such as was approved in every mans judgement, and bestemled well the wisdom of a Commander, did nevertheless, contrary to all sense and discretion, forgo the same, and cast himself upon the hazard of that which fugitives had vainly reported. Concerning which, as it is noted, that Incredulity is hurtful only to the unbeliever; so this passage proveth, that for a Commander to be too light of belief, is a danger to the whole Party, and bringeth many to ruine, that had no part in that creed. Cæsar, in the relation hereof, noteth three special things in Curio, that carried him headlong to this disaster, and may serve as marks to avoid the like Syries.

The first was, *Juvenilis ardor*, his youthful courage and heat: which is always attended with frolic affections, suting the quality and temperature of the body, being then in the prime height of strength, and accordingly led on with violent motions; whereas age goeth slowly and coldly forward, and is always surer in undertaking, then hot-spr youth. And, albeit no man in cold blood could better advise then Curio, or fore-see with better providence; yet his youthful boldness over-swayed his discourse, and drew all to a mischief, in despite of his Wisdom.

The second was, *Superioris temporis proventus*, the happy issue of former proceedings; which, of all other conditions is to be suspected, and needeth Gods assistance more then any other fortune; for that no man sooner erreth, or is more incapable of order, then such as are in prosperity. And therefore Plato refused to make Laves for them of Cyrene: as a matter of great difficulty, to give ordinances to men that were in happiness. And doubtless, such is the exorbitancy of our nature, that nothing better informeth it then crosses; which are as instructions and warnings, for the preventing of ruining calamities. Wherein Curio was not beholding to Fortune at all; that dangled him in her lap for a while, to cast him out at length headlong to his ruine. It had been much better, the had exchanged a frown with favour, rather then to have given him much good together, and reserve an irrecoverable disgrace for the upshot.

The third was, *Fiducia rei bene gerende*: which favourit more of folly then any of the former; it being always an argument of an imprudent man, to assure himself of good fortune. For, Presumption, being ever accompanied with negligence, is subject to as many casualties, as those that go unarmed upon extremity of danger. And these were the three things that miscarried Curio. Out of which we may observe with Xenophon, that *Ingens & arduum opus esse recte imperare*, it is a weighty and difficult matter to command well.

Videtur ipsi quædam, manus injunctum, bus satis, beherari sensus hominum, obduri. Amm. Marcellin.

Solis incredulis nona res incredulitas. Philo de vit. Mofit.

Hebetiores quam accutiores ut platinum obduri. Pub. administrant. Thucydides

Rebus secundis maxime deus inoprandus. lib. 1. Cypriod. Felicitatis & moderations divitum contubernium. Seneca. quem blanda fatuit. Deceptum malis, bellum fortuna recepit. Luc. lib. 4.

Imprudens, fiducia rei bene gerende, est, fortissimum sibi sperare. Seneca de beneficiis. Incerta semper inopia præsumptio & fallaciæ. Ege. de lib. 1. de Instit. Cypri.

CHAP. XVI.

Curio pursueth the Enemy, with more haste than good success.

That which the Cavalry had exploited, was certainly a matter of great service; especially the small number of them, being compared with the great multitude of the Numidians: and yet notwithstanding, they spoke of these things with greater ostentation than the truth would bear; as men are willing to divulge their own praises. Besides, they shewed much spoil which they had taken; Captives and Horses were brought out; that whatsoever time was omitted, seemed to be a loss and hindrance to the Victory: by which means, the desires and endeavours of the Soldiers were no way short of the hope which Curio had conceived. Who, commanding the Cavalry to follow him, marched forward with as much haste as he could; to the end he might find the Enemy distracted and astonished, at the sight and overbrow of their fellows. But the Horsemen, having travelled all night, could by no means follow after. Whereby it happened, that some stayed in one place, some in another: yet this did not hinder or discourage Curio in his hopes.

Juba being advertised by Sabura of the conflict in the night, sent instantly two thousand Spanish and French Horses, which he kept about him for the safety of his Person, and such of the Foot-troops as he most trusted, to succour and relieve him: he himself, with the rest of the Forces, and Forty Elephants, followed softly after. Sabura, suspecting by the Horsemen coming before, that Curio himself was at hand, imbatallled all his Forces; commanding them, that under a pretence of counterfeit fear, they should retreat by little and little; himself, when occasion served, would give them the sign of Battel, with such other directions as should be expedient.

Curio was strengthened in his former hope, with the opinion of the present occasion. For, supposing the Enemy had fled, he drew his Forces from the upper ground into the Plain; wherein, after he had marched a good space (the Army having travelled sixteen miles) he made a stand. Sabura gave the sign to his men of beginning the Battel, led on his Army, went about his Troops, to exhort and encourage his soldiers. Himself, he used his Foot-men only for a show a far off, and sent the Cavalry to give the Charge. Curio was

not wanting to his men; but wished them to set all their confidence in their Valour. The Soldiers (howsoever harried and wearied) and the Horsemen (although but very few, and those spent with travel) yet wanted no courage or desire to fight. But these being but two hundred in number (for the rest stayed by the way) what part soever they charged, they forced the Enemy to give way: but they could neither follow them far as they fled, nor put their Horses to any round or long career.

At length, the Cavalry of the Enemy began from both the Wings to circumvent our Army, and to maul them down behind: and as our Cohorts issued out from the Battel towards them, the Numidians (through their nimbleness) did easily avoid the shock; and again, as they turned back to their ranks, inclosed them about, and cut them off from the Battel: so that it neither seemed safe to keep their order and place, nor to advance themselves out, and undergo the hazard of adventure.

OBSERVATION.

The Principles and Maxims of War are always to be held firm, when they are taken with their due circumstances: for every Rule hath a qualified place, and consisteth more in cautions and exceptions, then in authority of precept. It is true, that nothing doth more advantage a Victory, then the Counsel of Læmæus, the third Duke of the Athenians; which was, to set upon an Enemy when he is affrighted and distracted: for so there is nothing to be expected on his behalf but despair and confusion. But either to be mistaken therein, or otherwise to make such haste to observe this rule of War (as Curio did) that the best part of the Army shall lie by the way, and the rest that go on shall be so spent with labour, as they are altogether unfit for service, and yet (to make the matter worse) to bring them into a place of disadvantage, to encounter a strong and fresh Enemy, is to make the circumstances overway the Rule, and by a Maxime of War, to be directed to an overthrow: neglecting altogether that which is observed by Sextus Aurelius Pilius, *Satis celeriter fit, quicquid commode geritur*, that which is well done, is done soon enough.

CHAP. XVII.

Curio defeated and slain. Some few of the Army get passage to Sicily: the rest yield themselves to Varus.

The Enemy was oftentimes reinforced by succors from the King. Our men had spent their strength, and were fainting through weariness: such as were wounded

wounded, could neither leave the Battel, nor be conveyed into a place of safety. The whole Army being encompassed about with the Cavalry of the Enemy (whereby despairing of their safety, as men commonly do, when their life draws towards an end) they either lamented their own death, or recommended their Friends to good fortune, if it were possible that any might escape out of that danger: all parts were filled with fear and lamentation.

Curio, when he perceived the soldiers to be so affrighted, that they gave care neither to his exhortations nor intreaties, he commanded them (as the last hope they had of safety) that they should all flie unto the next Hills, and thither he commanded the Enginiers to be carried. But, the Cavalry sent by Sabura, had also possessed that place before, whereby our men began to fall into utter despair, and partly were slain as they fled by the Horsemen, or fell down without wounding. Cui Domitius, General of the Horse, standing with a few Horsemen about him, persuaded Curio to save himself by flight, and to get the Camp; promising, not to leave or forsake him. But Curio confidently replied, that he would never come in Cæsar's fight, having lost the Army committed unto him; and thereupon fighting valiantly was slain.

A few Horsemen saved themselves from the fury of the Battel; but such of the Reverend, as stayed by the way to refresh their Horses, perceiving a far off the rout and flight of the whole Army, returned safe into the Camp. The Footmen were all slain to a man. M. Rufus the Treasurer, being left by Curio in the Camp, exhorted his men not to be discouraged. They prayed and besought him, they might be transported into Sicily. He promised them they should; and, to that end gave order to the Masters of Ships, that the next evening they should bring all the Skiffes to the shore. But, such was the astonishment and terror of all men, that some gave out, that Juba his Forces were already come; others, that Varus was at hand with the Legions, and that they saw the dust of the Army marching towards them; whereas there was no such matter at all: others suspected the Enemies Navy would speedily make to them; in so much, as every man wished for himself: such as were already on Ship-board made haste to be gone. Their departure gave occasion to the ships of birthen to follow after.

A few small Barks were obedient to the Command: but the shore being thronged with Soldiers, such was the contention, which of all that multitude should get aboard, that some of the Barks were sunk with press of People, and the rest, for fear of the like casualty, durst not come near them. Whereby it happened, that a few Soldiers, and Masters of Families (that through favour or pity prevailed to be taken in, or could swim unto the Ships) were carried back safe into Sicily. The rest of the Forces, sending by night some of the Centurions as Embassadors to Varus, rendered themselves unto him.

The next day after, Juba seeing the Cohorts of these soldiers before the Town, cried out presently, that they were part of his booty: and thereupon gave order, that a great number of them should be slain, and selecting a few of the rest, sent them into his Kingdom: Varus complaining, in the mean while, that his faith and promise was violated, and yet durst not resist it. The King rode into the Town, attended with many Senators, amongst whom was Ser. Sulpitius, and Licinius Damippus: and remaining there a few days, gave such order for things as he thought fit, and then returned to his Kingdom, with all his Forces.

OBSERVATION.

And this was the period which Divine power made, to the hopeful beginning of Curio's design upon Africa; and happened so suddenly, as they were loth ere they were aware: Like a tempest at Sea, that swalloweth up Vessels in the same place, where a little before they swam most proudly, and in the like irrecoverable manner. For War is not capable of a second error; one fault being enough to ruine an Army, and to disable Curio for ever doing the like: of whom Lucan hath left this memorial;

*Haud alium tanta Civem tulit indole Roma,
Aut cui plus. leges deberent rella sequenti.
Perdita nunc primum nocuerunt secula,
postquam
Ambitus, & luxus, & opum metuenda fastidia,
Transversis mentem dubiam torrente tulerrunt;
Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum
Gallorum capnis spoliis & Caesaris Auspicio.*

So vertuous Citizen Rome never bred;
 Whilst right, the Laws a friend like him
 ne're had.
 But the bad times first took him from his
 hold:
 Ambition, Riot, and the force of Gold
 In a wrong stream soon drew his wavering
 mind,
 Of great concern which way to e're inclin'd,
 Fetch't off with Gallick spoils and Cæsar's gifts.

the Country) and of *Fuba's* particular revenge; for tendering an Edict to the people, to confiscate his Kingdom.

To conclude this Commentary; The loss either Party sustained unto this stage of the War, was in these particulars: *Pompey* was driven out of *Italy*, lost *Marseilles*, and both the Provinces of *Spain*; *Cæsar* received this loss in *Africa*, besides that in the *Africanick* sea, where *Antony* miscarried, whereof he maketh no mention in these Commentaries. And, as when *Jupiter* weighed the fortune of the *Greeks* and the *Trojans* in a pair of Balance, it fell out the *Greeks* had more ill luck than the *Trojans*; so the fortune of these Parties being weighed, by the relation made thereof, it falleth plainly out, that *Pompey* had the worse.

Homer.
Iliad. 2.

And thus endeth the Second Commentary.

His body lay unburied, as a Witness of *Nimidian* hate (which is alwayes extreme, like the heat of

Nullo consensu Curio
 bello, Luc.

THE

THE Third Commentary OF THE CIVIL WARS.

THE ARGUMENT.

THE former Books contain the drifts and designs which these famous Chiefs attempted and prosecuted; while they were asunder. And now cometh their buckling at hand to be related; together with the judgment which the War gave of the Cause in question, on *Cæsars* behalf.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar giveth order at Rome, for matter of credit and injury, and other things.

Caes.



That the Dictator holding the assembly for election of Magistrates, *Julius Cæsar* and *Pub. Servilius* were created Consuls, for in that year he was capable by law to be chosen, thereunto. These things being ended, forasmuch as he found that credit was very scant throughout all *Italy*, and that Money lent upon trust was not paid; he gave order that Arbitrators should be appointed, to make an estimation of possessions and goods, according as they were valued before the War; and that the Creditors should take them at that rate for their Moneys. For this course he thought to be fittest and most expedient, as well for the taking away of any fear of composition, or new assurances, for the quitting and abolishing of all debts (which do commonly fall out upon Wars and civil broils) as also for the keeping and preserving of the Debtors credit.

In like manner he restored the ancient course of appeal, made by the *Prætors* and *Tribunes*

to the people; as also certain courses used in suing for magistracy (which were taken away by a law made in *Pompeys* time, when he kept the Legions about him in the City) and likewise reformed such judgments in suits and trials of law, as were given in *Cæsar's* when the matter in controversy was heard by one Judge, and the Sentence pronounced the same day by another Judge. Last of all, whereas divers stood condemned, for offering their service unto him in the beginning of the Civil War, if he should think it fit to accept thereof, and holding himself as much obliged unto them, as if he had used it: he thought it best expedient for them; to be acquitted by the people, rather than by his commandment and authority; lest he should either seem ungrateful, in not acknowledging their desert, or arrogant, in assuming to himself that which belonged to the people.

The First OBSERVATION.

Cæsar as he was Dictator, holding the assembly for the choice of Magistrates, himself with *P. Servilius Isauricus*, were made Consuls in the year of Rome 705, which was just ten years after his first Consulship; whereby he became capable thereof, by the law published by *Sylla*, where-in it was provided, that no Man should be chosen

to

to an office, within ten years after he had supplied the fame. In this year hapned all these things which are contained in this third Commentary; as *Paterculus* noteth in these words; *C. Cæsar* and *P. Servilius* being Consuls, *Pompey* was miserably massacred, and was slain the day before his birthday, being aged 48 years. The choice day was regularly the first of January: and the Assembly, was called *Comitum Centuriarum*.

Touching the difference of these Assemblies, the parties present thereat, the manner of the choice, and other circumstances appertaining, the Reader may receive information at large by *Rogius*, only it is to be remembered, that *Comitia Centuriata*, were never holden without consent of the Senate. And forasmuch as the chief part of them were with *Pompey*, *Lucan* taketh exception at this Creation.

---mærentia tella

Cæsar habet, vacuæque domos legesque silentes;
Claustræ iussitâ virgini for, curia solas
Invalides d'atres, plena quos urbe fugavit.

Sad roofs and empty houses *Cæsar* found.
The Laws were silent, and the Courts shut up.
No Fathers met in Senate, only they,
Who when the Town was full were forced away.

The persons that were suitors for the Consulship, were called *Candidati*, who oftentimes used extraordinary means to attain the same. This moved *Pompey* to make a law, That no man should sue for public offices by bribes, or other corrupt courses, and it was called *Lex de Ambitu*, which indeed was but renewed: for the same was set on foot, *Anno Urb. 395*, by *Peisius*, Tribune of the people, and renewed again by *Pub. Cornelius Cethegus*, *Anno 572*, and within a while after made capital, as far as banishment concerned the party. *Coponius* was so condemned, having bought a voice with an *Amphora* of Wine. The law which *Pompey* now made, was very strict, as *Div* noteth: that it was ordained, That upon producing of witnesses, the Process should end in a day, giving the Accuser two hours to lay open the matter, and the Defender three to make answer; and the Judgment instantly followed. The rigour of which law *Cæsar* here reformed.

The Second OBSERVATION.

The second thing I observe, is the difficulty of taking up money upon credit, in time of trouble or Wars, which *Cæsar* expresth in these terms, *Cum fides sua Italia esse angustior*, in regard credit was very scant throughout all Italy. The word *Fides* hath ever been taken for a real performance of any promise or agreement, which *Tully* calleth the foundation of Justice, and the very prop of a Common-wealth: taking the Etymon to grow, *quia fiat quod alium*, because that which was spoken is done. According to that of *Nenius Marcellus*, *Fides solum ipsum videtur habere, cum sit quod dicitur*, *Fides* seems to have its appellation, when that's done which was spoken. And for that Men are commonly covenant-keepers, not so much by the

perfection of their nature, as out of strictness of Law it falleth out, that where there are no laws, there is no performance, and consequently little or no credit either given or kept in time of War, because *Silent leges inter arma*, Laws are silenced in time of War.

Cæsar to provide for this inconvenience, appointed Commissioners to rate every Mans Lands and Possessions, as they were valued before the Wars, and to satisfy the Creditors with the same, Which *Plutarch* explaineth in this manner; That the Creditors should take yearly two parts of the Revenue of their Debtors, until full time as they had paid themselves; and that the Debtors should have the other third to live withal. Whereof it seemed he had some light by a president in the Consulship of *Valerius Publicola*, which is extant in *Livy*, *Novi consules funebrium quoque rem levare aggressi, solutionem aris alieni in publicam curam venerant, quinque viris creatis, quos menfiores, ad distributionem pecunie appellaverunt*: The new Consuls intending to ease the people in point of Usury, made the payment of debts a part of the publick care, and created five men to that purpose, who were called *Menfarii*, from their disposal of those Monies.

This general acquittance for debts, the Romans called *Novæ Tabule*, in this respect, as *Cælius Rhodiginus* hath it, *Quod cum pecunie credite obesset condonantur, novæ mox cooruntur Tabule, quibus nomina continentur novæ*; in regard that when the debt, was remitted to the debtor, new Tables were made, wherein new names were put, and is nothing else, but what is ordinary amongst our Bankrupts, compounding for so much in the pound with their Creditors, upon new assurance and other security, which they called *Novæ Tabule*, agreeing to that of *Tully*: *Tabule vero novæ quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea pecunia fundum, cum tu habes, ego non habeam pecuniam*? What else mean these new Tables, but that you shall buy a piece of ground with my money, and keep it to your self, whilst I go without my money?

Concerning matter of Usury, which was the ground of this mischief, *Tacitus* noteth it, as an old and deadly disease, and the cause of many conditions in that Empire; and is never better likened, then to the biting of a Serpent, called an *Aspid*, which upon the infusion of her venom, putteth the Patient into a heavy slumber, and in a short time, bringeth all a Mans substance to death and destruction. And thereupon is called *Fœnus à Jussu*, from the fertile and ample increase of Money. For as *Esai* noteth, the Labourer loseth the seed, and contenteth himself with the fruit or increase; but the Usurer will have the fruit, and yet not loose the seed. Whereby there must needs grow great increase. The law of the twelve Tables was, *Ne quis unctario fenore amplius exerceat*, That no man for the future take upon Ullc one in the hundred.

The highest rate was *Centesima Usura*; when the hundredth part of the principal was paid every Month to the Creditor, and was twelve per Cent. The next was *Usura duæ*, when the Debtor paid eleven in the hundred for a year. The third *Dextens*, which was to per Cent, *Quadrans*, 5 per Cent, *Semis*, 6. *Quintus*, 5. *Triens*, 4. *Quadrans*, 3. *Sextans*, 2. *Uncia*, 1. one in the hundred. Howbeit, *Cato* condemned all kind of Usury

Tull. 1. offic.

Pecunie quantitate ratio naturæ re confinemæ omnia est, a indubius & animalibus de re pub. lib. 1. cap. 10.

In the life of Julius Cæsar.

Lib. 9.

(x'ar.

Lib. 7.

2. Offic.

Vt senecæ malum, & seditionum discordiarumque causa. Annal. 6.

Centella.

ry, for being demanded, *Quid maxime in re familiaris expedit? respondit, bene pascere: quod secundum? satis bene pascere: quid tertium? bene vestire: quid quartum? arare. Et cum ille qui quæstus discipulus, Quid faceretur? Quid hominem inquit occideret? What was the most expedient thing in householdry, answered good diet, what the second; enough good diet: what the third; good cloaths, what the fourth; ploughing. And when he that questioned him thus, said, what think you of taking up the he replied, What is it to kill a man? Allowing (as it seemeth) no means of getting Money, but those which *Aristotle* took to be most agreeing to nature, which is from the fruits of the earth, and the increase of our cattle; with such other courses as are answerable thereunto.*

CHAP. II.

A particular view of Pompey's Forces.

In so celebrating the Latine Holy-days, and holding the Assemblies of the people, having spent eleven days, he gave over his Dictatorship, left the City, and came to Brundisium. For he had commanded seven Legions, and all his Cavalry to repair thither. Howbeit he found no more shipping ready, then would barely transport fifteen thousand legionary Souldiers, and five hundred horse; the want of shipping seeming to hinder him from bringing the War to a speedy end. Moreover, those Forces which were shipped, were but weak in regard that many of them were left in the Wars of Gallia, and lessened likewise by their long journey out of Spain: besides that the unwholesome Autumn in Apulia, and about Brundisium, had made the whole Army ill disposed, being newly come out of the sweet air of Gallia and Spain.

Pompey having had a years space to provide himself of men and munition, and neither War nor Enemy to trouble him, had got together a great Navy out of Asia, from the Cyclade Isles, Coreicia, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnicia, and Egypt, and had caused another as great a fleet to be built in all places fit for that purpose; had raised great sums of Money out of Asia and Syria, and of all the Kings, Dynasties, Tetrarchs, and free States of Achæa; and had likewise compelled the Corporations of those Provinces to contribute the like summe. He had enrolled nine Legions of Roman Citizens: five which he had transported out of Italy; one old Legion out of Sicily, which being compounded and made of two, he called the Twin, one out of Crete and Macedonia, old Souldiers, who being discharged by former Generals, had resided in those Provinces, and two

out of Asia, which *Lentulus* the Consul had caused to be enrolled. Besides, he had distributed amongst those Legions, under the name of a supply, a great number of Thessaly, Bœotia, Achæa, and Epirus.

Amongst these he had mingled *Antonic's* Souldiers: and besides these, he expected to be brought by *Scipio* out of Syria, two legions. Of Archers out of Crete, Lacedæmon, Pontus, and Syria, and the rest of the Cities, he had 3000; six cohorts of Slingers, two Mercenary, and 7000 horse. Whereof *Deiotarus* had brought 600 Galles, *Ariobarzanes* 500 out of Cappadocia; *Cotus* out of Thracia had sent the like number, under the leading of his Son *Sadalis*. From Macedonia came 200, commanded by *Rafipolis*, a Captain of great fame and vertue. From Alexandria came 500, part Galles and part Germans, which *A. Gabinus* had left there with *King* *Probæ*, to defend the Town. *Pompey* the Son had brought with the Navy, 8000 of his Shepherds and Servants. *Tarcondarius*, *Caftor*, and *Donulus*, had sent three hundred out of Gallogrecia, of whom one came himself, and the other sent his Son. Two hundred were sent out of Syria by *Comagenus* of Antioch, whom *Pompey* had presented with great gifts: most of which were *Arbaletriers* on horseback.

To these were added *Dardans* and *Bessii*, partly for pay and entertainment, and partly got by command or favor; besides *Macedonians*, *Thessalians*, and of divers other Nations and Cities: inasmuch as he filled up the number formerly spoken of. He provided great quantity of Corn out of Thessaly, Asia, Crete, Cyrene, and the rest of those Regions. He determined to winter at *Dyrachium*, *Apollonia*, and all the maritime Towns, to keep *Cæsar* from passing the Sea: and to that end he had laid and disposed his Navy all along the Sea-Coast. *Pompey* the Son, was Admiral of the Egyptian ships; *D. Lælius* and *C. Triarius*, of those that came out of Asia, *C. Cassius* commanded them of Syria, and *C. Marcellus*, with *C. Pomponius*, the ships of Rhodes. *Scribonius Libo* and *M. Octavius* had charge of the Liburnian and Achæan Navy. Howbeit *M. Bibulus* commanded in chief in all sea causes; and to him was left the superintendency of the Admiralty.

The

The first OBSERVATION.

Latinæ Fe-
ria.

Concerning these *Latinæ Ferie*, it is to be noted, that the *Romans* had two sorts of *Feria* or Holy-days, the one called *Annales*, which came always to be kept on a certain day, and thereupon were called *Anniverſarii*, or yearly; the other *Conceptivæ*, which were arbitrary, and solemnized upon ſuch days, as the Magiſtrates and Prieſts thought moſt expedient, whereof theſe *Latinæ Ferie* were chief: and were kept on Mount *Albane*, to *Jupiter Latiar* or *Latia* is, for the health and preſervation of all the *Latinæ* people, in league and confederacy with the people of *Rome*, and were ſolemnized in remembrance of the truce between thoſe two Nations: during which ſeaſe, the *Romans* held it unlawful to make any War. The ſacrifice was a white Bull, killed and offered by the Conſuls, and the ſleſh diſtributed to the Inhabitants of *Latium*; according to an ancient Treaty of alliance between them, engraven for a perpetual memory, in a Column of braſs. The particulars whereof are expreſſed at large by *Diomysius Halicarnenſis*.

Lib. 4. de
Auriquit.
Rom.

The Second OBSERVATION.

The ſecond thing coming to be noted, is the view taken of *Pompey's* forces: which are nine complete Legions, beſides the ſupplies here particularly mentioned, ſent from ſuch a bare affection to that Party, and by indifferent calculation, might amount in all, to near about threeſcore thouſand men, together with the favour of the Country, where the trial waſto be made by the ſtroke of War.

In which Muſter were the ſouldiers of *C. Antonius*; whoſe miſfortune theſe Commentaries have either willingly forgot, or ſome other chance hath wip't it clean out. Howbeit *Florus* hath it recorded, that *Cæſar* having ſent *Dolabella* and *Antonius*, to ſeize upon the *Streights*, and entrance of the *Adriatick* ſea, the one took hold of the Coaſt of *Slavocia*, and the other near unto *Corſu*, when upon a ſuddain came *Octavius* and *Libo*, *Pompey's* Lieutenants, and with great forces (they had aboard their Ships) ſurprized both the one and the other, whereby *Antonius* was conſtrained to yield up fifteen Companies, which were theſe ſouldiers of *Antonius* here mentioned.

Agrippa or *Agrippa*, was *Thracian* of great fame, that followed *Pompey*, and his brother *Rafus* betook himſelf to *Cæſar*, upon appointment made between themſelves for hiding in the Country where they dwelt, two great Factions in oppoſition, and doubting which Party to take, they divided themſelves, as the beſt approved part of Neutrality: and held likewise the ſame courſe in the War between *Brutus* and *Octavius*, continuing unto the Battle of *Philippi*. Upon the iſſue whereof, *Rafus* demanded no other reward for his ſervice, than the life of his Brother, which was caſily granted.

This *Bibulus*, *Pompey's* high Admiral, was fellow-Conſul with *Cæſar*, in the year of *Rome*, 694, but *Cæſar* ſo out-ſtrip him in the managing of things, that he much ſuſpected himſelf, as inſufficient for the place, which made him keep his houſe all that year. Whereupon came this Dillich;

*Non Bibulo quicquam nuper, ſed Cæſare ſalium:
Nam Bibulo ſeri Conſule nil memini.*

Cæſar did all, nought *Bibulus* did to:
Of Conſul *Bibulus* no Act I know.

CHAP. III.

Cæſar paſſeth over into Greece, and returneth his ſhipping to Brundifum. *Octavius* beſiegeth *Salonæ*.

Cæſar.

Cæſar upon his arrival at Brundifum, called the ſouldiers together, and ſhewed them, that ſo far as they were almoſt come to an end of all their labors and dangers, they would now be content to leave willingly behind them their ſervants and carriages in Italy, and go aboard clear of thoſe incumberments, to the end, the great number of ſouldiers might be taken in; and that they ſhould expect the ſupply of all theſe things from victory, and his liberality. Every Man cryed out, That he ſhould command what he would, and they would willingly obey it.

The ſecond of the Nones of January, he weighed Anchor, having (as is formerly ſhewed) ſhipped ſeven Legions. The next day he came to land at the Promontory of *Ceranium*, having got a quiet road amongſt the Rocks and places of danger. For doubting how he might ſafely venture upon any of the known Ports of that Coaſt, (which he ſuſpected to be kept by the Enemy) he made choice of that place which is called *Pharſalus*; and there arriving in ſafety with all his Ships, he landed his ſouldiers.

At the ſame time, *Lucretius Veſpillo* and *Minutius Rufus* (by order from *Lælius*) were at *Oricum* with eighteen Ships of *Asia*, and *M. Bibulus* was likewiſe at *Corſu*, with one hundred and ten ſhips. But neither durſt thoſe come out of the Port, although *Cæſar* had not in all above twelve ſhips of War, to waſt him over; amongſt which he himſelf was imbarked: neither could *Bibulus* come ſoon enough, his ſhips being unwready, and his Mariners aſhoar; for that *Cæſar* was deſcired near the Continent, before there was any bruit of his coming in all thoſe Regions. The ſouldiers being landed, he ſent back the ſame night the ſhipping to Brundifum; that the other legions, and the Cavalry might be brought over.

Fulius Calenus, the Legate, had the charge of this ſervice, and was to uſe all celerity in tranſporting over the Legions: but ſetting out late, and omitting the opportunity of the night wind,

Wind, they failed of their purpoſe in returning back. For *Bibulus* being certified at *Corſu* of *Cæſar's* arrival, and hoping to meet with ſome of the Ships of burthen, met with the empty Ships going back to Brundifum: and having taken thirty of them, he wreaked his anger (conceived through grief and omiſſion) and ſet them all on fire, conſuming therein both the Maſters and the Mariners; hoping by the rigour of that puniſhment, to terrifie the reſt.

This being done, he poſſeſſed all the Coaſt, from *Salonæ* to *Oricum*, with ſhips and men of War; appointing guards with more diligence then formerly had been uſed. He himſelf, in the depth of Winter, kept watch a Ship-board, not reſuſing any labour or duty, nor expecting any ſuccour, if he happened to meet with *Cæſar*. But, after the departure of the *Liburnian Gallies*, *M. Octavius*, with ſuch Ships as he had with him, came from *Illyricum* to *Salonæ*; and there having incited the *Dalmatians*, and other barbarous people, drew *Hiſſia* from *Cæſar's* party. And, finding that he could not move them of *Salonæ*, neither with promiſe nor threatnings, he reſolved to beſiege the Town. The place was ſtrong by nature, through the advantage of a Hill; and the Roman Citizens (there inhabiting) had made Towers of Wood to fortiſie it within: but, finding themſelves too weak to make reſiſtance (being wearied out and ſpent with wounds) they ſell at length to the laſt refuge of all; which was, to enfranchise all their Bond-slaves, above the age of fourteen years; and cutting their womens hair, they made Engines thereof.

Their reſolution being known, *Octavius* incamped the Town about with five Camps: and at one inſtant of time began to force them by ſiege, and by aſſault. They being reſolved to undergo all extremities, were much preſſed through want of Corn, and thereupon ſending Meſſengers to *Cæſar*, ſought help of him. Other inconveniences they endured as they might.

And, after a long time, when the continuance of the ſiege had made the *Octavians* reſiſt and negligent (taking the opportunity of the noon time, when the Enemy was retired aſide, and placing their Children and Women on the Wall (that nothing might ſeem omitted of that which was uſual) they themſelves, together with ſuch as they had lately enfranchiſed, brake into the next Camp unto the Town. Which being taken, with the ſame violence

they ſet upon another; and then upon the third, and ſo upon the fourth; and in the end upon the fifth; driving the Enemy out of all the Camps; and having ſlain a great number, they forced *Octavius*, and the reſt remaining, to betake them to their Ships; and ſo the ſiege ended. For *Octavius* deſpairing to take the Town, the Winter approaching, and having received ſuch loſſes, retired to *Pompey* at *Dyrachium*.

The first OBSERVATION.

It hath been generally conceived, that there is little or no uſe of Women in times of War; but that they are a burthen to ſuch as ſeck honour by deeds of Armes; and do better ſue the ſicentiouſſies of Peace, then the dangers of Warfare. Whereof *Andromache* is made an inſtance; from that which *Homæ* reporteth of her Tears, Sighs, and Prayers, to withdraw *Ileſſor* from thoſe valorous exploits, which he undertook for the defence of *Troy*. And therefore they are by *Ovid* induced to handle the diſſaſe and the ſpindle, and leave the Wars, as ſitter for men, then the weakneſs of their Sex.

— columque
I cape cum calathis; & flamma pollice torque:
Bella reliquit viris

Iliad 5.

13 Metam.

Go take thy Basket on thy head,
And at the diſſalt twiſt thy thread.
Leave Wars to Men—

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied, that howſoever the tendernels of Women doth require a paſſive courſe of life, under the ſhelter of a ſafe roof, rather then in the bleak forms of active endeavour; yet there have been ſome Viragoes, that have over-topped the pride of men in points of War; amongſt whom, *Semiramis* may lead the reſt; together with *Tomyris*, *Cyru's* Miſtreſs by conqueſt. As alſo *Zenobia*, that ſubdued the *Perſians*; and *Helena* Queen of the *Ruſſes*.

Beſides other noble ſpirits, that could anſwer ſuch as told them news of the death of their ſons in battle, That they had brought them into the World for that only purpoſe. Which do prove, as well a real, as a potential aptneſs of that Sex, to the uſe and practice of Armes.

And if any man (as unwilling to afford them ſo much honeſty) will know wherein they avail the fortune of a War, he may take notice, that even in expeditions (wherein they are moſt ſubject to exceptions) they always give acceptable aſſiſtances to their Husbands, both in their provisions, and otherwiſe; and are ſuch Companions, as can hardly be left at home, without danger of greater hazard.

But, in places beſieged, Women do not only afford hair to make Ropes, if need require (as it fell out in this ſiege) but are able to cut pieces of Mill-ſtones upon the Enemy, with better fortune ſometimes then any other man; and have thereby

Juſt. lib. 12.
Hærodot. lib.
Trebelt.
Poll. Sigim.
Bar. in Mole
cov.

Quod bone-
ſtus quam
uxorium le-
vatumum?
Tac. l. 3.
Annal.
Vix præſen-
ti cullodia
manere illa-
fa conjugia,
coodem.

Juſt. 9.

M m thereby

Appian,
lib. 4.

Lib. 4. cap. 3.

thereby slain the General, to the raising of the siege, and saving of the City.

But, to take instances of later times: It is not to be forgotten, that when the Arch-Duke Matthias (after the death of Count Mansfield) commanded the Christian Army, at the Siege of Strigonia; while the Turks within the Castle, were making Works for a retreat, the Women (in the mean time) made good the breaches; and there bestowed such flood of Wild-fire, that the Italian Squadrons (commanded by Aldobrandine) being joyned poldron to poldron, to press into the breach, seemed all of a fire at once, and were forced to fall off with great terror and confusion.

The Second OBSERVATION.

A Town assaulted by a Warlike Enemy, is not kept or freed with Charms or Spells; nor by the Inhabitants of Tomy, in the East-Indies, drive away the Portuguese, with Hives of Bees, when they were possessed of the Walls: but with such valour as may over-master the Enemy, and extend it self to the taking of five Camps, if need require; which was performed by these Inhabitants of Salona.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar sends to Pompey, touching a Peace; seeks in Oricum, Apollonia, and other places.

Cæsar.

It is before declared, that Vibullius Rufus (one of Pompey's Lieutenants) was twice taken by Cæsar, and dismissed; once at Cornifium, and a second time in Spain. Him did Cæsar deem (in regard of the favours which he had shewed him) to be a fit person, to be sent with a message to Pompey; and the rather, for that he understood, that he was in good account and credit with him.

Qui sapienter bellum abdicant: celeriter; pace fruentur quam possunt diutissime. Ap. pian.

The sum of his Commission was, to tell him, that it befemed them both to give an end to their wilfulness, to lay down their Armes, and not to tempt Fortune any longer; either side had been sufficiently afflicted with loss and damages: which might serve for instruction and example to avoid other inconveniences. He for his part was driven out of Italy, with the loss of Sicily, Sardinia, and the two Provinces of Spain, as also of one hundred and thirty Cohorts of Roman Citizens in Spain and Italy. Himself was afflicted with the death of Curio, with the loss of the African Army, and with the ready of the Soldiers at Corfu. And therefore they should have regard of themselves, and of the Common-wealth.

They had good experience by their own loss, what Fortune could do in War. This was the only time to treat of peace, whilst either party stood confident in his own strength,

and seemed of equal might and power. But if Fortune should chance to sway to one side, be that thought he had the better end of the Staffe, would never hearken to any conditions of peace, nor content himself with a reasonable part, because his hope would give him all.

Concerning the Articles of Treaty, forasmuch as they could not agree thereof themselves, they ought to seek them from the Senate and People of Rome. In the mean while, it was fit that the Common-wealth and themselves should rest satisfied, if (without further delay) both of them did take an oath in the presence of their Armies, to dismiss their Forces within three dayes next following; to lay down Armes, and send away their Auxiliary Troops, wherein they so relied; and consequently, to depend upon the judgment and decree of the People of Rome. For assurance whereof on his behalf, he would presently discharge as well his Forces in the Field, as those in Garrison.

Vibullius, having received these instructions from Cæsar (thinking it no less requisite to advertise Pompey of Cæsar's arrival, that he might consult of that, before he delivered what he had in charge) posted night and day, taking at every stage fresh Horses: that he might certify Pompey, that Cæsar was at hand with all his Forces.

Pompey was at that time in Candavia, and went out of Macedonia to Winter in Apollonia, and at Dyrrachium. But being troubled at the news, he made towards Apollonia by great journeys, lest Cæsar should possess himself of the maritime Cities.

Cæsar having landed his forces, went the next day to Oricum. Upon his approach, L. Torquatus, who commanded the Town under Pompey, and had there a Garrison of Parthians, shutting the Gates, went about to defend the place, commanding the Grecians to take Armes, and make good the Walls. But they refusing to fight against the power and authority of the People of Rome, and the Townsmen endeavouring, of their own accord, to receive Cæsar in; he opened the Gates, despairing of all other succor, gave up both himself and the Town to Cæsar, and was entertained by him in safety. Oricum being taken in by Cæsar, without any further delay he went to Apollonia.

His coming being heard of, L. Straberius, the Governour, began to carry Water into the Citadel, to fortifie it, and to require pledges of the Inhabitants. They, on the other side, denied to give any, or to shut their Gates against

The

the Consul, or of themselves to take a resolution, contrary to that which all Italy and the People of Rome had thought convenient. Their affections being known, he secretly conveyed himself away. The Apollonians sent Commissioners to Cæsar, and received him into the Town. The Bellidenes followed their example, and the Amatini together with the rest of the confining Cities. And to conclude, all Epirus sent unto Cæsar, promising to do what he commanded. But Pompey understanding of these things, which were done at Oricum and Apollonia, fearing Dyrrachium, posted thither night and day. Howbeit, upon the report of Cæsar's approach, the Army was so astonished, that for haste on their way, they left almost all their Ensignes in Epirus, and the confining Regions: and many of them (casting away their Armes) seemed rather to flee, then to march as soldiers.

As they came near to Dyrrachium, Pompey made a stand, and caused the Camp to be intrenched; when as yet the Army was so affrighted, that Labienus stood out first, and took a solemn Oath, never to forsake Pompey, but to undergo what chance soever Fortune had allotted him. The same Oath took the Legates; being seconded by the Tribunes of the Soldiers, and Centurions, and by all the Army, that took the like Oath.

The first OBSERVATION.

Utrum est tempus (saith Cæsar) de pace agendi, dum uterque sibi confidit, & pares ambo videtur; The only time to treat of Peace is, whilst either party is confident of his strength, and both seem of equal might and power. Which may serve for an excellent Rule, to point out the fittest and seasonable time for composition between two opposite Parties. For, as in quantities, equality begetteth equality, and disparity a like unevenness of nature; so in other things, as namely in Treaties of Agreement, the conditions do commonly tie to either Party, according as they stand balanced in the scale of Equality; or otherwise, as the difference of their means shall allot them. For, if that be true in the Extremity, which Curius hath, That Lawes are given by Conquerors, and accepted upon all conditions, by them that are subdued; it doth consequently follow in the Mean, that men find dealing proportionable to their fortune. To which purpose let that of Plato, where he saith, That Peace and Quietness consist in equality; as Trouble and Motion are always in inequality.

Leges à victoribus dicuntur; accipiuntur à victis lib. 4. Quietem in æqualitate motum in inæqualitate semper constituitur. In Tit. mac.

The second OBSERVATION.

It appeareth here by the fright and astonishment of Pompey's Army, that the courie he took to abandon Italy, was out of no good advice or direction. For, whereas he might, with far more honour, and no less hope of success, have contended with Cæsar, in the place where the War broke out, and kept him to a task, which should have held him from the Conquest of Spain, or such other achievements as he easily wrought in the absence of his Adversaries: it fell out, that his departure into Greece forced to no other end, then by time to abate the edge of the forwardest courages, and to suffer a numerous Army to be daunted with noise and clamours of continual Victories, gotten upon a part of themselves; and then to give occasion to the Conqueror to come in the tail of Fame, and take them diarmed of expectation, to their great amazement.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar takes up his lodging for Winter. Bibulus dissuades at Sea for want of provisions, seems desirous of a Treaty: which being carried on the other side with good caution, breaketh off again.

Cæsar understanding that his passage to Dyrrachium was thus intercepted, did forbear his haste, and incamped himself upon the River Apus, in the confines of the Apollonians; that by the means of his Guards and Forts, such Cities as had well deserved of him, might be in safety: and there determined to Winter, in Tents of skin, and to attend the coming of his other Legions out of Italy. The like did Pompey, pitching his Camp on the other side of the River Apus; and there assembled all his Troops and Foreign aids. Calenus having (according to Cæsar's directions) imbarked the Legions and Cavalry at Brundisium, and taken in as many as his shipping would contain, he set sail: but being gone a little out of the Port, he received Letters of advice from Cæsar, that all the Havens and the Sea-coast was kept with the Enemies fleet. Whereupon he made again into the Haven, and called back all the ships: only one, bolding on her course, without regard of the Command, carrying no Soldiers, but belonging to private men, arrived at Oricum, and there was taken by Bibulus; who spared neither bond nor free, of as many as were of age, but put all to the sword. Whereby it happened, that in a moment of time, by great chance the whole Army was saved.

Bibulus, as it before declared, lay at Oricum with his Navy. And as he kept the Sea and the Ports from Cæsar; so was he kept

Mm 2 from

from Landing in any of those Countries: for all the Sea-coast was kept by Guards and Watches set along the shore, that he could neither Water, get Wood, nor bring his Ships to Land upon any occasion: In so much as he was brought into great straitsness and exigence, for want of all necessities; and was constrained (besides all other provisions) to fetch his Water and Wood from Corfu. And one time amongst the rest it happened, that the weather being foul, they were forced to relieve themselves with the dew which in the night time fell upon the skins, that covered the Decks of the Ships. All which extremities they patiently endured; and would by no means be brought to leave the Ports, or abandon the Sea-coast.

But, as they were in these difficulties, and that Libo and Bibulus were come together, they both of them spake from a Shipboard to M. Acilius and Statius Murcus, Legates (of whom one was Governor of the Town, and the other had the charge of such Guards as were along the shore) signifying, that they would willingly talk with Cæsar of matters of great consequence, if they might have leave. For a better show and assurance whereof, they intimated something concerning a Composition. In the mean time they earnestly desired there might be a Truce: for the thing they propounded imported matter of great weight, which they knew Cæsar exceedingly affected, and it was thought that Bibulus was able to work somewhat to that purpose.

Cæsar at that time was gone with one Legion to take in some Towns farther off, and to set a course for provision of Corn, which was brought sparingly unto him: and was then at Buthrotum, opposite to Corfu. Bring certified there by Letters from Acilius and Murcus, of that which Libo and Bibulus had required, he left the Legion, and returned himself to Oricum. At his arrival thither, they were called out to Treat. Libo came forth, and excused Bibulus, for that he was exceeding sickly, and had besides conceived a great anger at Cæsar, about the *Ædility* and *Prætorships*; and in regard of that, he did shun the Conference, lest a matter of that utility and importance should be disturbed by his intemperance. Pompey, he said, always was desirous that matters might be accorded, and that Armes might be laid aside: but they of themselves could do nothing therein, for as much as by the general resolution of a Council, the superintendency of the War, and the disposition of all things were referred to Pompey. Howbeit,

when they understood what Cæsar required, they could find instantly a dispatch unto Pompey, and be a means that he should accomplish all things with good satisfaction. In the mean time let there be a Truce; and until an answer might be returned from him, let neither party offend one another. To this he added somewhat concerning the Cause in question, the forces and aids. To which Cæsar did not think it fit at that time to make any answer: nor do we think there is cause now to make mention thereof.

Cæsar required, that it might be lawful for him to send Embassadors to Pompey without danger; and that they would undertake, that such as he sent, might be well intrusted, or take them into their charge, and bring them safely to Pompey. Concerning the Truce, the course of the War fell out to be so carried, that they, with their Navy, did keep his Ships and Succors from coming unto him; and be, on the other side, did prohibit them from landing, or taking in fresh Water: and if they would have that granted unto them, let them cease guarding of the Coast; but if they would continue that, then would he continue the other. Notwithstanding, he thought the Treaty of accord might go on, albeit these were not omitted; for he took them to be no impediment thereunto. They would neither receive Cæsar's Embassadors, nor undertake for their safety; but referred the whole matter to Pompey: only they instanced, and very vehemently urged for the Truce. But Cæsar perceiving that all this Speech tended only to avoid the present danger, and to supply themselves of such wants wherewith they were freighted, and that there was no condition of Peace to be expected, he began to think of prosecuting the War.

The first OBSERVATION.

AS in contracting with a Party, it is due to be cared, that War be not shrouded under the fair name of Peace; so a Truce demanded by an Enemy, is to be handled sparingly, and with suspicion: as a thing never commonly required, but when necessity doth move them thereto; and not to be granted, but as it may infer the like advantage. But, to yield to a suspension of Armes, advantageous to an Enemy, and no way gainful to them that consent unto it, is neither allowable by reason, nor Cæsar's example. And, if occasion prove it requisite, it must be for a little time: for a Prince armed in the field, that shall entertain a Truce for any long season, shall see his Army consumed both in courage, and in the parts thereof, which will fall under of themselves; and was the means, by which Lewis the Eleventh put by Edward the Fourth King of Eng-

Time enim ne sub pacis nomine in-joluntum bellum. Cicero, lib. 7.

The publication of their feare-ful Plays was cried in these words 3. Converte ad ludos spectandos, quos neque spectabit quicquam, nec spectaturus est. Sueton. in Claudio. Nolentem unicum ca-

Folius Pacis.

Folius Commercii.

Folius mu-ti Austrii. s. Reg. 12.

In Verrem.

The publication of their feare-ful Plays was cried in these words 3. Converte ad ludos spectandos, quos neque spectabit quicquam, nec spectaturus est. Sueton. in Claudio. Nolentem unicum ca-

land, from going on with a War that might have given him the possession of the Crown of France. Whence it is, that such as seek a Peace, desire no more than a Cessation of Armes; for some reasonable time, as an introduction enforcing the same.

Concerning leagues, we are to note, that there are found three differences. The first, a league of Peace, which by the Apostles rule should extend to all men, *Habete pacem cum omnibus*, have peace with all men, and by example of holy Patriarchs (*Isaac* with *Abimelech*, *Jacob* with *Laban*) may lawfully be made with Heathen Princes; being as the golden chain, that tyeth all the Nations of the earth in peaceable community. The second is a League of Entercourte, or Commerce; which is likewise by the same Patriarch, sending for *Corn* into *Egypt*, and *Solomon* entercourte with *Hiram* King of *Tyre*, together with divers other examples, allowed with Infidels. For nature being rich in variety of commodities, doth therefore divide her works amongst the Kingdoms of the earth, that there might be a mutual entercourte of exchange between the parts of the same. The third is, a league of mutual assistance; such as *Feboleph* made with *Achab*: and it is hardly safe with any Prince: but no way allowable with Infidels.

Touching the period to be offered in a Treaty, it isto be observed from *Bibulus* that no Man, whose presence may either give offence, or whose intemperance may any way interrupt a course tending to a happy issue, is fit for any such employment.

The Second OBSERVATION.

THERE were in Rome certain officers called, *Ædiles*, as having the care of houles and buildings, both publick and private, that they might be built and maintained in such manner as was agreeable to the ordinances of that State, together with other things whereof they had the charge. *Nunc sum designatus Ædilis* (saith *Cicero*) *habeo rationem quod a Populo Romano acceptum, mihi ludos spectandos, maxima cum cerimonia, Ceteri Liberique faciendos; mihi Floram Martem populo plebique Romanæ, ludorum celebritate placendam: mihi ludos antiquissimos, qui primi Romani sunt nominati, maxima cum dignitate ac religione. Frovi, Funoni, Mineræque esse faciendos: mihi sacrarum Ædium procuratorem, mihi utamurtem evocandam esse commissam: ab æsurumterum laborem et sollicitudinem fructus illos datos, antiquiorem in senatu sententia decidende locum, togam prætextam, sellam curulem, jus imaginis, ad memoriam posteritatemque prædessem.* Now that I am appointed to bear the office of *Ædility*, I reckon with my self what charge I have received from the people of Rome: viz. to see to the solemnizing with highest ceremony of the most holy Plays, consecrated to *Ceres* and *Bacchus*; to the pacifying of *Flora* towards the people, with celebration of *Plays* due to her; as likewise to the performing of those most ancient Plays, in honor of *Jupiter*, *Juno*, and *Pallas* with the greatest splendor and religion possible: to have a care of sacred houles, and in general of the whole City, &c. Wherein it isto be noted, that these shows and Plays, were always made and set forth at the charge and costs of the *Ædiles*: and thence it was, that the allowing or disallowing of all Play-books belonged unto them. Moreover, they had the charge of all the publick buildings and works of

the City, together with the provision of Victual and Corn. And for the misling of this office, was *Bibulus* angry with Cæsar, and would not be regained upon any contention.

CHAP. VI.

Bibulus died. Cæsar used means to procure a Treaty of Peace, but prevailed not.

Bibulus being kept from landing many days together, and fallen into a grievous sickness, through cold and extreme labor, (and having no means of help, nor yet willing to forego his charge) could no longer withstand the violence of the disease. He being dead, there was none appointed to take the whole charge, but every Man commanded his own fleet. The hurly burly being quieted which Cæsar's suddain arrival had moved, *Vibullius* with the assistance of *Libo*, together with *L. Lucius* and *Theophanes*, to whom Pompey was wont to communicate matters of greatest importance, refused to deliver what Cæsar had recommended unto him: and entering into the relation thereof, was interrupted by Pompey, forbidding him to speak any farther of that matter. What use or need have I, (saith he) either of my life, or of the City, when I shall be thought to enjoy it by Cæsar's favor? neither can the opinion thereof be removed, until the War be ended; that if my self I return back into Italy, from whence I am come.

Cæsar understood this, from those that were present when he spake it: and yet notwithstanding, he endeavored by other means, to procure a parlee of peace. For the two Camps of Pompey and Cæsar, were only separated by the River *Apulus*, that ran between them; where the souldiers had often colloquies, and by agreement amongst themselves, threw no weapon during the time of their Treaty. Whereupon he sent *P. Vatinius*, a Legate, to the River bank, to utter such things as he did chiefly concern a Peace; and to ask oftentimes with a loud voice, whether it were not lawful for Citizens to send to Citizens touching a treaty of peace, being a thing permitted to the Thieves of the *Pyrenean Mountains*: or at least, to move that Citizens should not in Arms contend with Citizens. And having spoken much very respectfully, as well concerning his own welfare, as the safety of all the rest, he was heard with silence by the Souldiers on both sides.

As length it was answered from the other Party, that *A. Varro* did offer himself for a conference the next day; so that the Commis-

pere diffusi-
le. Xenoph.
de facili-
didi. Sociat.

Caſti.

flowers on both sides might come and go in safety, and deliver freely their opinions: for which a certain time was then appointed. The next day, great multitudes of either side presented themselves at the place assigned; and great was the expectation thereof, every man seeming to incline to Peace. Out of which Troop stepped forth T. Labienus, and spoke softly touching the peace; and at last entered into altercation with Vatinius. In the middle of their Speech were weapons suddenly cast from all parts: which be avoided, being covered and defended with weapons. Notwithstanding, many were wounded; and amongst others, Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, Centurius, besides many other Souldiers: Then said Labienus, leave off therefore to speak of any composition; for unless Cæsar be brought, there can be no peace.

OBSERVATION.

THIS small piece of the Story containeth divers notable passages of extremity, in the carriage of Pompey, and others of his Party. As first, (to take them as they lye) that of wilfulness in Bibulus, whom neither sickness nor despair of help could move to intermit the task he had undertaken; but chose rather to suffer unto death, in approving his zeal to the cause, then to give himself a breathing time for the saving of his life; and may serve to admonish any other Bibulus, to value his life above that which a stiff and wilful opinion may lead him unto, beyond the measure of honorable endeavor, or what else many any way be justly expected; least in striving to do much, he happen to do nothing. For that cannot be understood to be well done in another mans behalf, that is not well done in his own.

The second is, Pompeys resolution, being to extrem, as no composition, or other thing whatsoever, could give him satisfaction, but only a victorious end of that War. Our Proverb saith, Better a lean agreement, then a fat remedy. And the casualties of War, may move an unexperienced Commander, to embrace a safe and quiet peace, as knowing, that he goeth that about to vex another, shall have his turn of suffering the like miseries; and as War beginneth when one party listeth, so it endeth when the other side pleaseth.

— facilis descensus Avernì:
Sed revocare gradum, superasque evadere ad auras:
Hic opus, hic labor est—

— The way to Hell is easy:
But to come back, and to recover life;
This is a task indeed—

And therefore let no Commander, how great soever, refuse all peace, but that which is bought by extremity of War; least the event (whereof there can be no assurance) fall out as it hapned to Pompey: but rather with the use, let him learn the end of Arms; which is to make straight that

which is crooked, and out of discord and dissension, to draw means of a happy peace.

To which may be added that other of Labienus, as far in extremity as either of the former, whom nothing would satisfy but Cæsar's head. It cannot be denied, but that he strook at the roof for his head was the head of that War. But to say it, rather then do it, was no argument of Labienus worthiness. For as Polybius noteth, it is common to most men to magnify themselves, with words full of wind; yea and more then that, to follow their designs with impetuous violence: but to direct their undertakings to a successful issue, and to remove by industry or providence, such hinderances as happen to travellur their hopes, is granted but to a few; and now denied to Labienus, notwithstanding this Bravado. And therefore, let such Commanders as are in good opinion and esteem with their General, be well-wary of imitating their party in any cause, farther then may become the wisdom and experience of judicious Leaders: as believing in that of Metellus to King Bochas: *Omne bellum lumbi facile, cæterum accipere deflexe: non in ejusdem potestate initium ejus & finem esse: incipere cuius etiam ignavo licere; deponi, cum virores velint.* Every War is easily begun, but hardly to soon ended: the beginning and the end of it are not in the same Mans power; any poor-spirited fellow may begin a War; but it shall end when the Conqueror pleaseth, and not before.

CHAP. VII.

Coelius Rufus moveth sedition in Italy, and is slain.

AT the same time M. Coelius Rufus, the Prætor at Rome, undertaking the business of debt, in the beginning of his Magistracy, placed his seat by the Chair of C. Trebonius Prætor of the Town; promising to be assisting to any man, that would appeal unto him, concerning valuation and payments to be performed by Arbitrators, according as Cæsar had ordained. But it came to pass, as well through the equity and indifference of the Decree, as through the lenity of Trebonius (who was of opinion, that those times required an easy and mild execution of justice) that none were found, from whom the beginning of the appeal might grow, for to pretend poverty, or to complain of particular misfortune, and of the calamity of those times, or otherwise to propound the difficulties of selling their goods by an out-ripe, was every mans practice; but for any man to acknowledge himself to be in debt, and yet to keep his possessions whole and untouched, was held to be a very strange impudency: so that there was no man found that would require it.

Moreover, Coelius carried a very hard hand, to such as should have received benefits thereby.

And

And having made this entrance (to the end he might not seem to have undertaken a shameful or dishonest cause) he published a Law, That there should be no Interest paid for any Monies let out upon consideration, for thirty six days of the time agreed on. But when he perceived that Servilius the Consul, and the rest of the Magistrates did oppose themselves against him therein, and finding it not so for with his expectation (to the end he might incite and stir up the humors and spirits of men) he abrogated that law, and instead thereof made two others. The one, which cut off the yearly rents that Tenants were accustomed to pay their Land-lords, for the houses they dwelt in: and the other, touching new assurances, and the abolishing of old debts. Whereupon the multitude ran violently upon C. Trebonius, and (having hurt divers that stood about him) pulled him out of his Chair.

Of these things Servilius the Consul made relation to the Senate: who thereupon decreed, that Coelius should be removed from his Prætorship. And by means of that decree, the Consul interdicted him the Senate, and also drew him from the * Speaking-place, as he went about to make a speech to the people. Coelius moved with shame and despair, made as though he would go to Cæsar; but sent messengers secretly to Milo, condemned to banishment for killing Clodius. And having recalled him into Italy, that by great gifts and rewards had gained to his party the remainder of the Company of Fencers, he joined himself with him: and then sent him before to Thurin, to excite and stir up the Shepherds to sedition; he himself going to Calline.

At the same instant, his Ensignes and Arms being stayd at Capua, besides his family suspected at Naples, and their attempt against the Town perceived, their other designs being discovered, and their Partizans shut out of Capua; fearing some danger, forasmuch as the Inhabitants had took Arms, and held him as an enemy, he let fall his former determination, and brake off his journey.

In the mean while, Milo having sent Letters to the Municipal Towns, that what he did, was by the authority and commandment of Pompey, according as he received it from Bibulus, he applied himself to, and solicited such as were in debt: with whom prevailing nothing, he brake up divers prisons and began to assault Cosa in Thurin: and there he was slain by Q. Pedius the Prætor,

with stones which he cast from the Wall. Coelius going on (as he gave out) towards Cæsar he came to Thurin; where when he had moved divers of the Inhabitants, and promised Money to the French and Spanish Cavalry, which Cæsar had put there for a Garrison; he was in the end slain by them. And so the beginning of great Matters, which put all Italy in fear and trouble, by the indirect practices of the Magistrates, and the iniquity of the times, had a speedy and easy end.

OBSERVATION.

IT is to be noted, that the better understanding these Passages, that of those which were chosen Prætors, the two chiefest remained at Rome. The one to administer justice to the Citizens, which was called Prætor Urbanus; who in the absence of the Consul, had the superintendency of the affairs of the State, assembled the Senate, received Packets, made dispatches, and gave order in all things, which place was now supplied by Trebonius. The other was called Prætor Peregrinus; whose office was to order the causes and suits of foreigners and strangers; whereunto Coelius was chosen, and being of a turbulent and unquiet spirit, took occasion upon this rent in the State, to raise new garbols, fit for his own purposes; as having learned what Aristotle teacheth. That all things which are already stirred are more easily moved, then other Natures that are yet in quiet. And therefore, having power by his office to decide causes of Controversy, he removed his Tribunal, and placed it hard by where Trebonius sat, to the end he might oppose the Decrees he made, for the prize of goods to satisfied Creditors, and draw the people to appeal unto him; publishing thith certain dangerous Edicts, on the behalf of those that were in debt.

This Coelius was Cicero's Scholar for Oratory; and in the opinion of Quintilian, was thought worthy to have lived longer, if he had been of a stayd and settled carriage: but now must stand for an example of a wilful Magistrate.

Touching Rejstra, which I have translated the Speaking-place, it was a part of their Forum, where the Consuls and other Magistrates spake unto the people: wherein, was built a Chair or Pulpit, of the break-heads of Ships, which the Romans took from the Antians; and thereupon took the name of Rejstra; memorable amongst other things, for that Antony set Tullies head between his two hands in the Chair, where he had often spoken most eloquently, and with as many good words, as were ever found in humane Oratory.

Omnia commora
facil' us
quam quiescentia
noventur. De
Mochanicis

Libre lib. 7.

Plutarch,

CHAP. VIII.

Libo takes an Island right over against the Haven of Brundisium, and is beaten off by a strange tempest.

Cæsar,

Libo departing from Oricum with his fleet of fifty ships, came to Brundisium, and took an Island, which lyeth over against the Haven, as a place of great importance, by which our Army must necessarily come forth; thereby shutting in all the Ports, and parts of that shore: as also surprising by his sudden coming, certain ships of burthen, he set all on fire, saving one laden with Corn, which he took along with him. Whereby he put our men into a great fear; and landing certain Soldiers and Horsemen in the night time, he dislodged the Cavalry, that were there in Garrison: and so prevailed, through the advantage of the place, as he writ to Pompey, that he might draw the other shipping on shore, and new trim them; for he would undertake with his fleet alone, to binder those forces from coming to Cæsar.

Antonius was then at Brundisium; who trusting to the valor of the Soldiers, armed out three score Skiffs belonging to great ships, and fencing them with hurdles and planks, put certain choice Soldiers in them, disposing them in several places along the shore: and farther commanded two Triremes (which he had caused to be made at Brundisium, for the exercise of the Soldiers in rowing) to go out to the mouth of the Haven.

Libo perceiving these to come out somewhat loosely, and hoping to intercept them, sent out five Quadriremes to attack them: which were no sooner come near unto our Ships, but the old soldiers that were aboard fled back into the Port.

The enemy, carried on with a desire of taking them, pressed after somewhat rashly, and unadvisedly; when at length, upon a signal given, the skiffs came suddenly out from all parts, set upon them, and at the first shock took one of the Quadriremes, with all the oar-men and soldiers in her; the rest they compelled to fly away shamefully. To which loss this was farther added, that they were kept from water, by the Cavalry which Antonius had disposed along the Coast: through necessity whereof (as also by reason of the ignominy received) Libo departed from Brundisium, and gave over the siege.

Many Months were now past, and the winter came hard on, and yet neither the shipping nor the Legions came from Brundisium to Cæsar. And some opportunities seemed to be omitted, for that the wind was good oftentimes; which Cæsar thought they would have taken. And the longer they lay there, the freighter was all the Coast guarded and kept, by such as commanded the Fleet, being now in great hope to binder their passage. Which they did the rather endeavor, because they were oftentimes reproved by Letters from Pompey, for that they did not impeach Cæsars coming at first: which he did to make them the more careful, to binder those supplies. And in attending so from day to day an opportunity of passage, it would wax worse and worse, the winds growing more easy and gentle.

OBSERVATION.

BY how much easier it is to keep the outlet of one Port, then to guard the Coast of a large Country: by so much was Libo more likely to prevail, in seeking to shut up the Haven of Brundisium, to hinder these supplies from coming unto Cæsar; then the other, that went about to guard all the Maritime parts of Epirus, to keep them from landing, after they were at Sea.

But such is the uncertainty of enterprises of war, that albeit our course be rightly shapen, yet it does often fail of leading us to that which is desired. For howsoever he was possessed of this Island, that lay thwart the mouth of the Haven, and had thrust out the guard of horsemen, and to become confident of blocking up the Port; yet there was means found by the adverse party, to give him such an affront, as made him quit the place with more dishonor, then could be recompensed by anything he got.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsars supplies pass over into Greece, and take landing.

Cæsar troubled at these things, writ very sharply to them at Brundisium, not to omit the opportunity of the next good wind but to put to Sea, and to shape their course to Oricum, or to the Coast of Apollonia; because there they might run their ships on ground: and these places were free from Guards; by reason they could not ride far from the Port.

They according to their accustomed courage, and valor (Marcus Antonius and Fulvius Calenus directing the business, and the Soldiers themselves being forward thereunto, as refusing no danger for Cæsars sake) having got

*Interce-
ptum res
hæc
Theophr.*

Cæsar,

got a South-wind, weighed Anchor, and the next day passed by Apollonia and Dyrrachium: but being discovered from the Continent, Quintus Coponius, Admiral of the Rhodian Navy, lying at Dyrrachium, brought his ships out of the Haven. And, as he had almost (upon a slack wind) overtaken our men, the same South-wind began at length to blow stiff, by which means they escaped. Yet did not be desist from pursuing them; but was in hope, by the labour and industry of the Mariners, to overweigh the force of the tempest, and followed them, notwithstanding they were past Dyrrachium, with a large wind. Our men using the favour of Fortune, were nevertheless afraid of the Enemies Navy, if the Wind should chance to slack; and having got the Port called Nymphæum, three miles beyond Lissus, they put in with their ships.

This Port lay sheltered from the South-west wind; but was not safe from a South-wind; howsoever, they accounted an ill road less dangerous than the Enemies Fleet; and yet they were no sooner put in, but the wind (which had blown Southerly for two dayes together) did now most happily come about to the South-west.

And here a man may see the sudden alteration of Fortune; for they which of late stood in fear of a dangerous Road, were now by that occasion, received into a safe harbour: and those which threatened danger to them, were forced to bethink themselves of their own safety. So that the time thus changing, the tempest saved our Party, and sunk theirs. Inasmuch as sixteen of the Rhodian Ships were all shaken in pieces, and perished with shipwrack; and of the great number of oar-men and Soldiers, part were dashed against the Rocks and slain, and part were taken up by our men: all which Cæsar sent home in safety. Two of our Ships coming short, and overtaken with the night, and not knowing where the rest had taken shore, stood at Anchor right over against Lissus. Them did Otacilius Crassus, Governor of Lissus, go about to take with Skiffs, and other little Ships, which he had prepared for that purpose; and withal, treated with them of yielding themselves, promising life and safety upon that condition.

One of the Ships carried Two hundred and twenty men, of the Legion made of young soldiers; in the other were left then Two hundred old Soldiers. And here a man may see, what assurance and safety consisteth in com-

rage and valour of mind; for the new-made Soldiers, terrified with the multitude of Ships that came against them, and spent with Sea-sickness, upon Oath made, and not to receive any hurt, did yield themselves to Otacilius; who being brought all unto him, were, contrary to his Oath, most cruelly slain in his sight. But the soldiers of the old Legions (howsoever afflicted with the inconvenience of the Tempest, and noisomeness of the Pump) did not slack any thing of their ancient valour: for, having drawn out the first part of the night in conditions of Treaty, as though they meant to yield themselves, they compelled the Master to run his Ship ashore; and, having got a convenient place, they there spent the rest of the night.

As soon as it was day, Otacilius sent four hundred Horse, which had the Guard of that part the Coast, with others of the Garrison, to assault and take them: but they valiantly defending themselves, slew divers of them; and so got to our men in safety. Whereupon, the Roman Citizens residing in Lissus, (which Town Cæsar had formerly given them to be kept and guarded) received in Antonius, and assisted him with all things needfull. Otacilius, fearing himself, fled out of the Town, and came to Pompey.

Antonius sent back the greatest part of the ships that had brought over his Troops (which were three Legions of old soldiers, one of new Soldiers, and Eight hundred Horse) to transport the rest of the soldiers and Horse, that remained at Brundisium: leaving the Pontones, which are a kind of French shipping, at Lissus; to this end, that if haply Pompey, thinking Italy to be empty and unfurnished, should carry over his Army thither, Cæsar might have means to follow him: and withal sent Messengers speedily to Cæsar, to let him know where the Army was landed, and what men he had brought over.

The first OBSERVATION.

Dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirit. It is no matter whether the Enemy does his business by Valour, or subtilty; is not so justifiable by the laws of true Veritas, as that of Achilles, who professed to hate that man more than the Gates of Hell, that promised one thing, and purposed another. Neither do the Jurists conclude otherwise; having, for the more appearance of truth, drawn it to a Question, *An perfidia in perfidum uti*. Jus fit. Whether it be lawful to break Faith with a Faith-breaker; alleging Labienus practise against Cæsius of Arras, together with that which admitteth no Answer, that their example

Æneid. ii.

Homer. 9. Iliad.

Hirtius lib. 8. de bello Gallico.

The Third OBSERVATION.

example standeth as a president, to deal with them as they deal with others. But, to falsify Religion, as *Octavius* did, and to make an Oath the Broker of unworthy ends, is abhorred by God and Man, and accordingly succeeded.

Madiarus.

The most remarkable instance in this kind, is that (which is to be withheld were forgotten) of *Levii* King of *Hungaria*; who having concluded the honourable Peace, that ever Christian Prince had before that time made with any of the *Turkish* Sultans, and confirmed the same by an Oath, taken upon the Holy Evangelist; did nevertheless, at the periwation of *Iulian*, a Cardinal (who took upon him, by Power from the Pope, to disannul the League, and absolve him from the Oath) break the Peace, and gave Battel to *Amurath* at *Parua* (where the Infidel took occasion impiously to Blaspheme, in calling for Vengeance on such, as in their deeds had denied the Godhead of their most sacred and blessed Lord) and was there slain, to the utter ruine of his Kingdom, and the reproach of Christian Name. Neither did the Cardinal escape the vengeance, which his Treachery had drawn upon that Royal Army: but being there wounded unto death, was found lying in the high way, by *Gregory Sanofe*, ready to give up the Ghost; and seemed but to slay to take with him the bitter curses of such as passed by, flying from the Battel, as the due reward of his perfidious absolution.

The second OBSERVATION.

Audaces fortuna juvat.
Virtus omnia potest.
Virtute faciemus omnia, quicquid in rebus bellis est eggerendum.
Plutarch.

IN case of difficulty and hazard (as *Cæsar* noteth) there is always great help in a good courage. For, whether it be that good had attendeth a valorous carriage, or that virtue be able to remove all opposition, or what other cause there is besides; but thus it falleth out, that such as entertain a noble resolution, are ever safest in extremity of peril; and, in stead of loss, get honour and renown.

Brasidas found a Mouse amongst dried Figs, which bit him lo, that he let her go, and thereupon said to those that stood by: That there was nothing lo little, that could not save it self, if it had a heart to defend it self against such as assaulted it.

Metamorp.

And herein we may observe that to be true, which the Poet hath delivered; *Seris venit usus ab avis*, Time and Practice do much avail to perfect this courage in the minds of Men of War; as knowing beforehand the weight of such labours, and having encountered the like dangers, even to the redeeming of themselves from the jaws of death. Whence it is that the Cornick faith, No man can possibly come lo well furnished to any course of life, but that time and experience do always teach him what he knew not before: whereas others that go rawly to work, are lo daunted with the unusual looks of War, as they (forgetting the profession of Armes) do run headlong into the danger they seek to avoid; being able to give no other account of their service, but that they marched many Bodies, and but a few Men.

Nunquam ita quicquam bene subditi: Quia ratione ad vitam fuit, quin res, ziti, ulas, semper aliquid ad portet: novi. Teren. Adip. Multi homines, pauci viri.
Herod. lib. 7.

Columnaria

Ostia:

Forces into *Asparagus* (which appertained to them of *Dyrachium*) and there, in a convenient place, pitched his Camp.

OBSERVATION.

WHEN two Armies are in a Country, and one of them hath succors coming to reinforce them, each of those Parties are, by the example of these glorious Commanders (*ceteris paribus*) to make towards those succors: the one, to cut them off; and the other, to keep them standing. And to that end, as it suited Pompey's condition to go secretly; howsoever *Cæsar*'s party, as a touch to his valour: lo on the other side, it stood not only well enough with *Cæsar*'s party to go openly, but also was an argument of his courage and magnanimity, and might raise him estimation in the opinion of the Greeks. The disadvantage which Pompey could take thereby, was the danger to be inclosed with Armies; which he foreseeing, avoided.

Little fish, that the Romans at the siege of Vienna, being out of humane hope, turned their eyes to Fate, and the hope they had in Delivery.

CHAP. X.

Cæsar hasteth to meet with *Antonius*, and preventeth Pompey.

Cæsar and Pompey had both intelligence almost at one instant of time, of *Antonius*'s Fleet; for they saw them pass by *Apollonia* and *Dyrachium*, and directed their Journeys along the Coast after them: but they understood not for a while where they were landed. Howbeit, having notice thereof, either of them took a contrary resolution. For *Cæsar* purposed to joyn with *Antonius*, as soon as possibly he might: and Pompey resolved to hinder their meeting, and by Ambushments (if he could) to set upon them at unawares.

The same day, either of them drew their Army out of their standing Camps, upon the River *Aplis*: Pompey secretly, and by night; *Cæsar* openly, and by day: but *Cæsar* had the greater circuit to fetch, and a longer journey to go up the River, to find a Ford. Pompey having a ready way, and no River to pass, made towards *Antonius* by great Journeys: and when he understood that he came near unto him, chose a convenient place, and there bestowed his Forces; keeping every man within the Camp, and forbidding fires to be made, that his coming might be the more hidden. Whereof *Antonius* being presently advertised by the Greeks, he dispatched Messengers to *Cæsar*, and kept himself one day within his Camp. The next day *Cæsar* came unto him. Upon notice thereof, Pompey left that place, lest he should be intrapped between two Armies, and came with all his Forces

Cæsar.

Cæsar.

A Hill separating Syria from Cilicia.

Scipio's preparation in Asia, to come into Greece, to assist Pompey.

CHAP. XI.

ABOUT this time, *Scipio*, having sustained divers losses near the Mount *Amannus*, did nevertheless call himself by the name of Imperator; and thereupon commanded great Sums of Money to be levied of the Cities and Potentates of those quarters: taking from the general Receivers of that Province, all the Monies that were in their hands for two years past, and commanding them to disburse (by way of loan) the receipt for the year to come; and required Horsemen to be levied throughout all the Province. Having gathered these together, he left the Parthians, being near Enemies unto him (who a little before had slain *M. Crassus*, the General, and besieged *M. Bibulus*) and drew the Legions out of Syria; being sent specially thither to keep and settle that Province, much annexed, through force of the Parthian War.

At his departure, some Speeches were given out by the Soldiers, that if they were led against an Enemy, they would go; but against a Citizen and Consul they would not bear Arms. The Army being brought to *Pergamus*, and there Garrisoned for that Winter in divers rich Cities, he distributed great largesse, and gifts; and for the better assuring of the Soldiers unto him, gave them certain Cities to rife.

In the mean time, he made Bitter and heavy exactions of Money throughout all the Province: for he put a Tribute upon slaves and

free-men by pole, set impositions upon the pillars and doors of houses, as also upon grain, oar-men, armer, engineer, and carriages; and whatsoever had a name, was thought fit to yield money by way of imposition; and that not only in Cities and Towns, but almost in every Village and Castle: wherein he that carried himself most cruelly, was held both the worstest man, and the best Citizen.

The Province was at that time full of Officers and Commanders, pestered with Over-seers and Exactors: who, besides the money levied by publick authority, made their particular profit by the like Exactions. For they gave out, they were thrust out of their Houses and their Country, and in want of all necessities, to the end they might, with such pretences, cover their wicked and hateful covisery. To this was added the hard and heavy Usury, which oftentimes doth accompany War, when all Monies are drawn and exacted to the Publick; wherein the forbearance of a day, was accounted a discharge for the whole. Whereby it happened, that in those two years, the whole Province was overgrown with Debts. And yet for all that, they stuck not to levy round Sums of Money, not only from the Citizens of Rome, inhabiting in that Province; but also upon every Corporation; and particular City: which they gave out, was by way of Loan, according to a Decree of Senate; commanding the Receivers to advance the like sum by way of Loan, for the year to come.

Moreover *Scipio* gave order, that the Monies which of old time had been Treasured up in the Temple of *Diana* at *Ephesus*, should be taken out, with other Images of that Goddess. But as he came into the Temple (having called unto him many of the Senators that were there present) he received a Dispatch from Pompey, That *Cæsar* had passed the Sea with his Legions; and that, setting all things apart, he should hasten to him with his Army. These Letters being received, he dismissed such as he had called unto him, and began to dispose of his journey into Macedonia, sitting forward within a few days after: by which accident the Treasure at *Ephesus* was saved.

OBSERVATION.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar sendeth Forces into Thessalia, Ætolia, and Macedonia. Scipio cometh into Greece.

Cæsar being joyned with Antonius, drew that Legion out of Oricum, which he had formerly lodged there to keep the Sea-coast; and thought it expedient to make trial of the Province, and to advance further into the Country. And whereas Embassadors came unto him out of Thessalia and Ætolia, assuring him, that if he would send Forces to protect them, the Cities of those Provinces would readily obey what he commanded: he sent L. Cassius Longinus, with the Legion of young soldiers, called the seven and twentieth, and Two hundred Horse, into Thessalia; and C. Calpurnius Sabinus, with five Cohorts, and a few Horse, into Ætolia; exhorting them specially, to take a course for provision of Corn in those two Provinces, which lay near at hand.

He sent likewise Cn. Domitius Calvinus with two Legions, the eleventh and the twelfth, and Five hundred horse into Macedonia: of which Province (for that part thereof which is called Frank or Free) Menedemus, a principal man of that Country, being sent as an Ambassador, had professed exceeding great forwardness on their behalf. Of these, Calpurnius upon his coming was entertained with great affection of the Ætolians: and having cast the Garrison of the Enemy out of Caledon and *Naupauctum, became Master of all Ætolia. Cassius arrived with the Legion in Thessalia; and finding there two Factions, was accordingly received with contrary affections.

Egefarctus, a man of ancient power and authority, favoured Pompey's party: and Petreius, a man of a most noble House, endeavoured by all Means to deserve well of Cæsar. At the same time also came Domitius into Macedonia: and as Embassadors began to come thick unto him from divers States of that Province, it was told him, that Scipio was at hand with the Legions, and came with great fame and opinion of all men: which is oftentimes a fire-runner of novelties. He, making no stay in any part of Macedonia, marched directly, with great fury, towards Domitius; and when he came within Twenty miles of him, turned his course suddenly to Cassius Longinus, in Thessalia: which he did so speedily, that news came together of his coming, and of his arrival. For, to the end

CHAP. XIII.

The Passages between Domitius and Scipio.

he might march with greater expedition, he left M. Favonius at the River Haliacmon (which divideth Macedonia from Thessalia) with eight Cohorts, to keep the Carriages of the Legions: where he commanded them to build a Fort.

At the same time, the Cavalry of King Cottus, which was wont to keep in the Confiner of Thessalia, came flying suddenly to Cassius Camp. Whereat he being astonished (understanding of Scipio's coming, and seeing the Horsemen whom he thought to be his) made towards the Hills which inclose Thessalia, and from thence marched towards Ambracia. And as Scipio made haste to follow after, Letters overtook him, sent from Favonius, that Domitius was at hand with the Legions, and that he could not hold the place wherein he was left, without Scipio's help.

Upon the receipt of which Letters, Scipio altered both his purpose and his journey: and leaving Cassius, made haste to help Favonius: so that continuing his journey night and day, he came unto him in very good time. For, as the dust of Domitius Army, approaching, was seen to rise, the fore-runners of Scipio's Army were likewise discovered. Whereby it happened, that as Domitius industry did help Cassius, so did Scipio his speed save Favonius.

OBSERVATION.

Cæsar being now ready with his Forces to proceed against Pompey, the first thing he did, was to make trial of the Provinces of Greece, and to get their favour and assistance, for his better furtherance in contesting his Adversary. For, as an Army standeth firm by two special means, first, in themselves, as they are able to resist any opposing force; and secondly, through the favour of the Country, wherein they are engaged: so on the other side, their overthrow either proceedeth from their own weakness; or otherwise, when the Provinces adjoining do refuse such mutual respects, as may relieve the wants of a confining multitude. And therefore, having got all the Forces together which he looked for, or could any way expect, he sent out to try the affection of the Country, and to alter that in a moment, which Pompey had been settling for a year together, and then resolved to attack him nearer.

And doubtless, if Scipio had not by chance interrupted their course, upon his coming out of Asia to aid Pompey, they had as easily got all Thessalia and Macedonia, as they did Ætolia: and were nevertheless so ordered and disposed, as they got more honour of Scipio, then he could win of them.

Scipio abode two dayes in his standing Camp, upon the River Haliacmon, which ran between him and Domitius's Camp. The third day, as soon as it began to be light, he passed his Army over the River by a Ford, and incamped himself. The next day in the morning, he imbatelled his Forces before the front of his Camp. Domitius in like manner, made no difficulty of bringing out his Legions, refusing to fight. And whereas there lay a field of six miles between both the Camps, he led his Troops imbatelled under Scipio's Camp; who nevertheless refused to move any jot from his standing: yet for all that, Domitius's Soldiers were hardly kept from giving Battel; but specially a River, lying under Scipio's Camp, with broken and uneasy banks, did binder them at that time.

Scipio understanding of their alacrity and desire to fight, suspecting it might happen, that the next day he should be forced to fight against his will, or with great dishonour keep himself within his Camp, having with great expectation in the beginning gone on rashly; and unadvisedly, was now dishonoured with a reproachful end. For in the night-time he rose, without any noise or warning for the trussing up of the Baggage, and passing the River, returned the same way he came: and in an eminent place, near unto the River, he pitched his Camp.

A few dayes after, he laid an ambushment of Horsemen in a place, where our men had formerly accustomed to forrage: And, as Q. Varus, General of the Horse in Domitius's Army, came out, according to his ordinary use, they set upon him at a sudden. But our men did valiantly sustain the onset; and every man betaking himself speedily to his rank, they all together of their own accord charged the Enemy: and having slain Four score, they put the rest to flight, with the loss only of two of their men.

OBSERVATION.

It appeareth here, that to shew a readiness and resolution to fight, upon such grounds as are justifiable by the Rules of War, is no small advantage to the prosperous carriage of the same. For albeit Scipio was great in his own strength, and as great in the opinion and expectation of Men: yet when he found such an alacrity in the Enemy

Propter Aurum & Argenti-
um, nunquam
pacem facit.
Fertur lib. 6.
Epist. 93.
Fertur omnis
artis in-
stitutum.
Aurum
& argentum
moris man-
cipia.
Epictetus.
Capitatio.

Ostia-
ria.

Colummaria
31. ad Acti-
onem. Epist.
7.

In the Pa-
tracy of
Sixt. Quin-
tius. Scipio
pub. licen;
quod eo
crefcent,
artus reli-
qui tace-
ant. Sext.
Aurelius
Victor.

In Paraceti.

2 de Offic.

Plutarch.

Bella susten-
tiantur pecu-
niam &
buntantia.
Dion. Hali-
car. lib. 6.
Annal. 13.

Cæsar.

Que libera
appellatur.

* Lepanto.

Calet.

Enemy

Enemy, to give and take blows, and a desire to entertain seriously all occasions of giving Battel; he was so far from prosecuting what he had pretended, as he rather chose the fortune of a safe retreat, and consequently, to turn the advantage which the World in opinion had given to his Army, to his own reproach and disadvantage. Whereas on the other side, to be found for the most part unwilling to hazard the trial of a Field, or indisposed to fight upon any occasion, doth invite an Enemy to attempt that, which otherwise he would not; and giveth them courage to beat him from all his purposes, as knowing the resolution of their Adversary, and the means they have, either to take or leave at their Pleasure.

CHAP. XIV.

Domitius draweth Scipio to a loss, by an Ambushment. Telling Pompey's attempt upon Oricum.

Cæsar,

After these things, Domitius hoping that Scipio might be drawn to fight, he made as though he were in great want and scarcity of Corn: and thereupon rising from the place wherein he was incamped, with the usual cry of removing, according to the customs of War, and having marched three miles, he lodged all his Army, with the Cavalry, in a convenient and secret place.

Scipio being ready to follow after, sent his Horsemen, and a great part of his Light-armed soldiers, to discover what way Domitius took: who marching forward, as the first Troops came within the Ambushment (suspecting somewhat by the neighing of the Horses) they fell back again. Those that followed after, seeing the former Troops so suddenly to retire, stood still.

Our men finding themselves discovered, and thinking it in vain to attend the rest, having got two Troops of Horse within their reach, they contented themselves with them; amongst whom was M. Opimius, the General of the Horse. The rest of those two Troops they either put to the sword, or took alive, and brought them to Domitius.

Cæsar, as it before shewed, having withdrawn the Garrisons from along all the Seacoast, left only three Cohorts at Oricum, for the defence of the Town: and to them he committed the custody and safe keeping of the Gallies, which he had brought out of Italy; whereof Acilius the Legate had the charge, being left Governor of the Town. He, for the better security of the Shipping, had drawn all the Fleet into a back angle, behind the Town, and there suffered them to the shore: and, in the mouth of the Haven had sunk a great ship, and set another by her, upon which he

built a Tower, to keep the entrance of the Port; and filled the same with Soldiers; to defend the Haven from any sudden attempt.

Upon notice whereof, Pompey's son, being Admiral of the Egyptian fleet, came to Oricum, and with many baulkers and books weighed up the sunk ship; and assaulted the other ship, set by Acilius for the defence of the Haven, with Ships wherein he had made Towers, which stood by counterpoise, that he might fight with advantage of height, supplying continually fresh men; and attempting also from the Land side, to take the Town by scaling Ladders, as by Sea with his Navy, to the end he might distract and dismember the forces within.


In the end, with extreme labour and multitude of Weapons, he overcame our Party, and took the Ship, having cast out such as had the Guard; who fled all away with Skiffs and Boats. At the same time, being likewise seized of a small height, on the other side of the Town, in the nature of a Peninsula, he conveyed over four small Gallies, with Rollers and Levers, into the inner part of the Harbor, lying behind the Town; in so much, as setting on each side upon the Gallies tied unto the shore, empty and unurnished, he carried four of them away, and burned the rest.

This being done, he left D. Lælius, whom he had taken from the Egyptian Fleet, to keep the passage, that no Victuals, or other provisions, might be brought into the Town, either from Bullis or Amantia: and he himself going to Lissus, found thirty ships of burthen, which Antonius had left within that Haven, and set them all on fire. And as he went about to take Lissus, the soldiers which Cæsar had put there for a Garrison to the Town, together with the Roman Citizens, and the Townsmen thereof, did so well defend the same, that after he had continued there three dayes, and lost a few men in the Siege, he left the place, without effecting any thing.

OBSERVATION.

AN Ambushment is easily at all times laid; but to do it so that it may not be suspected, and in such manner, that the Enemy may fall into the danger thereof, is that which is to be aimed at therein. And therefore, to give the better colour to such designs, the trick hath been to pretend fear (and so flight) or want of Corn, or somewhat else, to draw the Enemy to follow after with more boldness and resolution. And so to have

* Biscines.



Oportet
bellum
difficilius
semper
ful-
peditur.
cap. 5.

have it well done, there must be two deceits to assist each other; as in this of *Domitius*: to make shew of removing, through scarcity and want; and then to lye in way for an advantage: According to that of the *Spaniard, Antiochus, dei Alevisi*. For the prevention of such snares of deceit, the rule is generally given by *Onofander*, That the departure or falling away of an Enemy, is always to be suspected.

And for the more security therein, experienced Commanders have been careful before they stirred their Army, to make exact discovery, even to the place where they intended to lodge. For as in Physick, it is the greatest part of the cure to know the disease: so in matter of War, the danger is almost over, when it is perceived whence it may grow.

The manner observed in discoveries, hath usually been to send the Parties out in three Companies or Troops; The first, consisting of a small number, to beat the way at ease, and to range about from place to place, as shall be found convenient: the second Company, being somewhat stronger, to second and relieve the first, if there be occasion: and the third, able to engage a good number of the Enemy.

And after this manner *Cyrus* disposed of his fore-runners, as appeareth in *Xenophon*. But this being subject to the consideration of time and place, and other circumstances, may vary as shall seem expedient to the wisdom of the General.

¶ Cypriod.

CHAP. XV.

Cæsar marcheth towards Pompey; offereth him battle, and cutteth him off from Dyrrachium.

Cæsar.

After *Cæsar* understood that Pompey was at *Asparagus*, he marched thitherward with his Army: and taking by the way the Town of the Parthians, wherein Pompey had put a Garrison, the third day he came to Pompey in Macedonia, and lodged himself sight by him. The next day he drew out his forces, and putting them in order, presented him battle. But when he found that he would not accept thereof, he drew back his Army into the Camp, and bethought himself of some other course. For the next day, taking a difficult and narrow way, he set forward with all his forces towards Dyrrachium: hoping either to draw Pompey to fight or to force the Town, or at least to cut him off from all Convoys and munition, which was there stored up for the whole provision of the War; as afterwards it came to pass. For Pompey being ignorant at first of his purpose, inasmuch as he took a contrary way, thought he had been driven thence through scarcity and want of Corn. But being afterwards advertised by the discoverers what course he took, he rose the next day, in hope to meet him a nearer way. Which *Cæsar* suspecting, exhorted the Souldiers to endure a little labor with patience. And resting a small part of the night, in the

morning he came before Dyrrachium, even as the first Troop of Pompeys Army was discovered afar off, and there encamped himself.

Pompey being cut off from Dyrrachium, when he could not accomplish his purpose, fell to a second resolution, and fortified his Camp in an eminent place called *Petra*, from whence there was an indifferent passage to the Ships, and sheltered likewise the Haven from certain winds. Thither he commanded part of the ships to be brought, together with Corn and provision of victual from Asia, and such other Countries as were in his obedience.

Cæsar, doubting that the War would prove long and tedious, and despairing of any succor of Victuals from the Coast of Italy, for that all the shore was (with great diligence) kept by Pompeys party, and that the shipping which in Winter he had made in Sicilia, Gallia, and Italia, were stayd and came not to him, he dispatched *L. Canulcius* a Legate into Epirus, to make a provision of Corn.

And forasmuch as those Regions were far off, he appointed Storehouses and Magazines in certain places, and imposed carriage of Corn upon the Country bordering about them. In like manner, he commanded what grain soever should be found at *Lissus*, *Partheria*, or any other place, to be brought unto him, which was very little, forasmuch as the Country thereabouts was rough and mountainous, and afforded no Corn, but that which was brought in from other places; as also, that Pompey had taken order in that behalf, and a little before had ransacked the Parthians, and caused his horsemen to carry away all the Grain, which was found amongst them.

OBSERVATION.

The first thing that *Cæsar* did, after their approach near one unto another, was to offer battel; as the best Arbitrator of the Cause in question, and most fitting the useance of the ancient Romans. But forasmuch as the endeavors of such as are in action, are always ordered by him that is the sufferer; and that Pompey refused to accept thereof, knowing himself to be much stronger in forces, better accommodated, having a far greater party in the Country, and the Sea wholly at his command (which advantages were like to end the business, without hazard of a battle) *Cæsar* bethought himself of some other project, which might take away the scorn of that refusal, by undertaking such things as much imported the state of his Adversary. For in such cases, when an Enemy will not fight, somewhat must be done to cast dishonor, or greater in conveniences upon him; or at least, to make overtures of new opportunities. And therefore he took a course, either to draw Pompey to fight, or to force the Town wherein all his provisions of War were stored

Quemque
vocat Col-
lem Thau-
lancius in-
cola Petram
Lucan.

Adus ad-
vorum in
pactis
sunt dispo-
sitione. Aris-
Metaph.

stored up, or other to cut him off from the same. The least of which was a sufficient acquaintance of any difference, which the neglect of this offer might seem to infer; having thereby occasion to use that of the Poet, *Famulus ergo pater*, now we are even.

CHAP. XVI.

Cæsar goeth about to besiege Pompey.

Cæsar.

Cæsar being informed of these things, entered into a deliberation, which he first took from the very nature of the place wherein they were: for whereas Pompey's Camp was inclosed about with many high and steep Hills, he first took those Hills, and built Forts upon them, and then, as the condition of each place would bear, he made works of fortification from one Fort to another, and determined to inclose Pompey, about with a Ditch and a Rampier. And especially upon these considerations; for that he was greatly straightened through want of Corn, and that Pompey being strong in horse, he might with less danger supply his Army from all parts with provision: as also to the end he might keep Pompey from foraging, and so make his Cavalry unserviceable in that kind, and farther, that he might abate and weaken the exceeding great reputation, which Pompey had attained unto amongst foreign Nations, when it should be noised throughout the World, that he was besieged by Cæsar, and durst not fight.

Pompey would by no means be drawn to leave the commodity of the sea, and the Town of Dyrrachium, having there layd up all his provision of War, Arms, Weapons, Engines of what sort soever, besides Corn, which was brought from thence to his Army by shipping. Neither could he hinder Cæsar's fortifications, unless he would accept of battle, which for that time he was resolved not to do. Only it remained, as the last thing he could think of, to possess himself of as many Hills as he might, and to keep as much of the Country as he could with good and strong guard, and by that means, to distract, as much as possibly he might, Cæsar's forces: as accordingly it fell out. For having made twenty four Castles and Forts, he took in twenty five miles of the Country in circuit, and did forrage within that space, and there caused many things to be set and planted by hand, which in the interim served as food for horses.

And as our men perceived their fortifications to be carried and continued from one Castle to another, without intermission, they began to fear, lest they had left some places

to fall out, and so would come upon them behind, before they were aware.

And the reason they made their works thus perfect, throughout the whole inward circuit, was, that our Men might not enter in upon them, nor circumvent them behind. But they (abounding in number of men) exceeding in their works, having also on the inside a less compass to fortifie.

And as Cæsar went about to take any place, albeit Pompey was resolved not to fight, or interrupt him with all his forces: nevertheless he sent out his Archers and Slingers, of which he had great numbers; by whom many of our Men were wounded, and stood in great fear of the arrows: and almost all the Soldiers made them coats, either of quilt or stiffening, or of leather, to keep them from danger.

To conclude, either Party used all force and means to take places, and make fortifications: Cæsar to shoot up and straighten Pompey what he could; and Pompey to enlarge himself, and possess as many hills as conveniently he might; which gave occasion of many skirmishes and encounters.

OBSERVATION.

WE may here take notice of the strangest enterprise, that ever was undertaken by a judicious Souldier. For where else may it be read or understood, that a weaker Party went about to besiege a strong adversary, and to inclose a whole Country by Castles and Towers, and perpetual fortifications from hill to hill; to the end he might shut him up, as he lay incamped in the field? But herein appear the infinite and restless endeavors of a Roman spirit, and the works they wrought to achieve their own ends; and yet not besides the limits of reason. For if that of Seneca have any affinity with truth, That a man is but a common, or rather contemptible thing, unless he raise himself above ordinary courses: it is more specially verified in a Souldier; whose honor depending upon the superlative degree, must seek out projects beyond all equality; and the rather, upon such inducements as are here alledged; which these good reason he had to be so mad.

CHAP. XVII.

A passage that happened between both Parties, about the taking of a Place.

Amongst these fights and encounters, it happened, as Cæsar ninth Legion had taken a certain Place, and there began to fortify, Pompey had possessed himself of the Hill next adjoining therunto, and began to hinder our Men from their work. And having from one side an easy access unto it, first with Archers and Slingers, and afterwards with great Troops of light-armed men,

Exhibentis
adit & con-
tinentibus.

Contem-
perit bo-
no, nisi su-
pra humanam
se erexit.

Cum ratio-
nem infans.

OBSERVATION.

and engines of Battery, he began to disturb them in their business. Neither were our men able, at one and the same time to defend themselves, and go on with their fortifications.

Cæsar seeing his soldiers wounded and hurt from all parts, commanded them to fall off, and leave the Place. But, for as much as they were to make their retreat down the Hill, they did the more urge and press upon them; and would not suffer them to fall back, for that they seemed to forsake the Place for fear. It is reported, that Pompey should then, in a vain-glory, say to those that were about him, That he would be content to be taken for a General of no worth, if Cæsar's men could make any retreat from thence (where they were so rashly engaged) without great loss.

Cæsar fearing the retreat of his Soldiers, caused Hurdles to be brought, and set against the Enemy, in the brim of the Hill; and behind them sunk a Trench of an indifferent latitude, and incumbered the place as much as possibly he could. He lodged also Slingers in convenient places, to defend his men in their retreat.

These things being perfected, he caused the Legions to be drawn back. But Pompey's party began with greater boldness and insolvency to press our People: and putting by the Hurdles, which were set there as a barricado, they passed over the Ditch. Which when Cæsar perceived, fearing lest they should rather seem to be beaten off, then be brought back, whereby a greater scandal might consequently ensue, having almost from the midday encouraged his men by Antonius, who commanded that Legion, he willed, that the sign of charging the Enemy should be given by a Trumpet, and gave order to assault them.

The Soldiers of the ninth Legion, putting themselves suddenly into order, threw their Piles: and running furiously from the lower Ground, up the steep of the Hill, drove the Enemy headlong from them; who found the Hurdles, the long Poles, and the Ditches, to be a great hindrance unto them in their retreat. It contented our men to leave the place without loss: so that having slain many great and dangerous War. They remembered of them, they came away very quietly, with the loss of five of their fellows. And having stayed about that place a while, they took other Hills, and perfected the fortifications upon them.

THis Chapter sheweth, that advantage of place, and some such industrious courtesies as may be fitted to the occasion, are of great consequence in Extremities of War: but above all, there is nothing more available to clear a danger, then valour. Valour is the Hercules that overcometh so many Monsters: and verifieth that saying, which cannot be too often repeated, *Virtute faciendum est, quicquid in rebus bellis agendum*, What a man does in matter of War, must be done with Valour. But of this I have already treated.

CHAP. XVIII.

The scarcity which either party endured in this Siege.

THe carriage of that War was in a strange and unusual manner, as well in respect of the great number of Forts and Castles, containing such a circuit of Ground within one continued fortification, as also in regard of the whole Siege, and of other consequents depending thereupon. For whosoever goeth about to besiege another, doth either take occasion from the weakness of the Enemy, daunted or stricken with fear, or overcome in Battel, or otherwise being moved thereto by some injury offered; whereas now it happened, that they were far the stronger, both in Horse and Foot. And generally, the cause of almost all Sieges is, to keep an Enemy from provision of Corn: but Cæsar, being then far inferior in number of Soldiers, did nevertheless besiege an Army of entire and untouched Forces, especially at a time when they abounded with all necessary provisions; for every day came great store of Shipping from all parts, bringing plenty of all things needfull: neither could there any wind blow, which was not good from some part or other.

On the other side, Cæsar having spent all the Corn he could get, far or near, was in great want and scarcity: and yet notwithstanding, the soldiers did bear it with singular patience; for they remembered how they had suffered the like the year before in Spain, and yet with patience and labour had ended a place without loss: so that having slain many great and dangerous War. They remembered likewise the exceeding great want they endured at Alecia, and much greater at Avancum: and yet, for all that, they went away Conquerors of many great Nations. They refused neither Battle nor Peace, when it was given them in stead of Wheat. And

Cæsar.

of Cattel (whereof they were furnished With great store out of Epirus) they made great account.

There was also a kind of root, found out by them that were with Valerius, called Chara, which eaten with Milk did much relieve their want; and made milball a kind of Bread, whereof they had plenty. And, when Pompey's Party happened in their Colloquies, to cast in their teeth their scarcity and misery, they would commonly throw this kind of Bread at them, and scatter it in divers places, to discourage them in their hopes. And now Corn began to be ripe, and hope it self did relieve their want, for that they trusted to have plenty within a short time. And oftentimes the Soldiers, in their Watches and Conferences, were heard to let fall speeches, That they would rather eat the Bark of Trees, than suffer Pompey to escape out of their hands.

Besides, they understood by such a rumour from the Enemy, that their Horse of service could scarce be kept alive, and that the rest of their Cattel were all dead, and that the soldiers themselves were in no good health, as well through the narrowness of the place where they were pent, as also by means of the ill favour and multitude of dead Bodies, together with continual labour, being unaccustomed to Travel and Pains, but especially through the extreme want of Water; for all the Rivers and Brooks of that Quarter, Cæsar had either turned another way, or dammed up with great Works. And, as the places were Mountains, with some intermission and distinction of Valleys, in the form and fashion of a Cave or Den; so he stopped the same with great Piles beaten into the Ground, and interlaced with Faggots and Hurdles, and then strengthened with earth, to keep back the Water: inasmuch as they were constrained to seek low grounds, and Marshy places, and there to sink Wells. Which labour they were glad to undertake, besides their daily Works, albeit these Wells stood far distant from their Garrisons, and were quickly dried up with heat.

But Cæsar's Army was in exceeding good health, and had plenty of water, together with all kind of provisions, excepting Wheat; which the season of the year daily brought on, and gave them hope of store, Harvest being so near at hand.

In this new course of War, new policies and devices of Warfare were invented and put in practice by either Party. They, perceiving by the Fires, that our Cohorts in the night-time kept watch at the Works, came stealing out,

and discharged all their Arrows upon them, and then presently retreated. Wherewith our men being warned found out this remedy; that they made their Fires in one place, and kept their Watch in another.

The first OBSERVATION.

For as much as all matter of attempt doth much import the fortune of a War, we may not omit to take notice of the reasons here expressed by Cæsar, which are the true motives of undertaking a Siege. The first is drawn either from the weakness of an Enemy, or as he is daunted with fear, or overcome in Battle. For having thereupon no confidence in his own power, he reflecteth himself in the strength of the place which he holdeth and possesseth: which giveth his adversaries occasion to lay Siege unto his hold; and either to force them, or shut them up like Women.

The second is, when one State hath offered injury to another (which always importeth loss) beyond that which flood with the course of respect formerly held between them. For revenge whereof, the other side layeth Siege to some of their Towns, to repair themselves by taking in the same.

And thirdly, the final cause of all Sieges is, to keep an Enemy from victual, and other manner of Provisions; and so to take them by the belly, when they cannot take them by the ears: which is a part so violent, in requiring that which is due to Nature, as it hath made the Father and the Son fall out of a Mouse: as it happened at Athens, besieged by Demetrius.

The second OBSERVATION.

The second thing worthy our consideration is, the patience and deportment of Cæsar's soldiers, in their so great wants and necessities. As first, in helping themselves with this Root, called Chara, described by Dioscorides, to be a little Seed, tasting somewhat like Anise-seed, good to help digestion, and having such a Root as a Carrot, which being boiled, is very good meat; and is the same which our Physicians call Caraway-seed: wherewith they served their turn with such contentment, as they seemed to have been trained up in the School of Frugality; a virtue worthy of all regard, and the only means to make ease the difficulties of War, being as necessary for a Soldier, as the use of Arms; and is that which was aimed at in the answer of Cyrus, to shew the services in a Soldiers diet. For being demanded, what he would have made ready for supper; Bread, saith he, for we will sup at the Fountain.

Neither hath it been thought fit, to give way to the natural looseness of the stomachs appetite, upon any occasion; but to use the like moderation in the time of plenty. For Zeno took the answer of them, that would excuse their liberal expences by their ability of means, for no better payment, than they themselves would have taken the excuse of their Cooks, for putting too much salt on their meat, because they had fast enough.

Cæsar

Cæsar punished his Baker, for giving him better Bread than his soldiers had. And Scipio calthered a couple of Romans at the Siege of Carthage, for Feasting a Friend in their Tent, during an Assault. Which austerity of life raised the Romans to that height of honour, and made them Masters of the World, from the East to the Western Ocean.

Secondly, as a consequence of this contentment, we may note their resolution to hold on in their course of Siege; purposing rather to eat the bark of Trees, then to suffer Pompey to escape their hands. It is an excellent point in a General, to keep himself from irresolution; being a weakness of ill consequence, and not unlike the diffease of the Stagers, variable, uncertain, and without bottom or bound: whereas constancy for purposes, produceth noble and worthy ends.

An instance whereof is Fabius Maximus, who notwithstanding the reproach and scandal cast upon him, continued firm in his determination, to the saving of his Country. And if he be so well becoming a Leader, it is of much more regard in the Soldier; especially considering that of Xenophon: *Non facile in officio potest miles contineri ab eo, qui necessarius non lubministrat*; He cannot easily keep his soldiers in obedience, which does not provide them necessities. For, as the same Author observeth in another place, *Nulius est adeo fortis aut validus, qui possit adversus famem aut frigus fugando militare*; There is no man so stout and valorous, that can fight against cold and hunger.

The third OBSERVATION.

Amongst all the parts of the Roman Discipline, their Watch deserveth a particular description; supplying in the Army, the office of the natural eye in the Body, which is, to give notice of any approaching danger, for the preventing of the same. Polybius hath left it to posterity in this manner: Of each fort of the Legionary foot, as namely the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, and likewise of the Horse, there was chosen one out of the tenth and last Maniple, that was made free from Watch and Ward. This party, as the Sun began to decline, came daily to the Tent of the Tribune, and there had given him a little Tablet, wherein the Watch-word was writ; which Tablet they called *Tessera*; and then returning to his Company, delivered it to the Centurion of the next Maniple, and that Centurion to the next, and so in order, until it came to the first and chiefest Company, which was lodged next unto the Tribunes; and by the Centurion thereof was returned to the Tribune before Sun-setting.

And, if all the Tablets were brought in, then did the Tribune know the word was given to all, if any wanted, they made inquiry, and by the notes of inscription finding which was missing, they punished the default as they saw cause. And this was their Watch-word, by which their Party was distinguished from an Enemy; and in likelihood (for Polybius doth not affirm so much) was, by the Centurion, given to such of his Maniple as were to Watch that night.

Their night-Watches were thus ordered; A Maniple, or Company, was always appointed to watch at the General's Pavillion. The Treasurer

had three Watches, and every Legat two. A Watch consisted of four men, according to the general division of their night into four parts: each of those four having his turn appointed him by lot, for the first, second, third, or fourth Watch, and the rest sitting by. The *Felites* kept Watch without the Camp, and the *Decuriones* of Horse at the Gates. Besides, every Maniple had private Watch within it self.

Of those that were appointed to Watch, a Lieutenant of each Maniple did bring to the Tribune in the evening, such as were to keep the first Watch of the night: and to them were delivered lesser Tablets, than were given out at particular Watch; one for himself, and three other for his fellows.

The truth of going the Round was committed to the Horsemen: for it belonged to the first Commander of Horse in each Legion, to give order to his Lieutenant, to appoint before dinner four young men of his Troop, to go the Round the next night; and in the Evening, to acquaint the next Commander to appoint Rounders for the night following. These Horsemen being thus appointed, did call Lots for the first, second, third, and fourth Watch, and then repaired to the Tribune, of whom they had order, what, and how many Watches to visit, having received the Watch-word before from their Commander; and then all four went to attend at the Tent of the Primipile, or Chiefest Centurion of a Legion, who had the charge of distinguishing the four Watches of the night by a Trumpet.

When time served for him that was to go the Round the first Watch, he went out accompanied with some of his Friends, and visited those Watches which were assigned unto him. And if he found the Watchman waking, and in good order, he then took that Tablet from him which he had received of the Tribune, and departed. But, if he found him sleeping, or out of his place, he took Witness thereof, and departed. The same did the rest of the Rounders, as their Watches fell out in course. And, as the day began to break, all the Rounders brought in the Tablets to the Tribunes. And if all were brought in, there were no more to do: but if any wanted, it was found out by the Character, what Watch had failed; which being known, the Centurion was called, and commanded to bring those that were faulty. If the offence were in the Watchman, the Rounder was to prove it by Witnesses; if not, it fell upon himself; and a Council of War being presently called, the Tribune gave Judgment to kill him with a Club. And in this manner did the Romans keep Watch in the Camp.

CHAP. XIX.

A Relation of divers encounters that happened between both Parties.

IN the mean time Pub. Sylla, whom Cæsar (at his departure from the Camp) had left to Command the Army, being certified thereof, came with two Legions to succour the Cohort: at whose approach, Pompey's

There is a great part of the History in this place omitted.

assume unto himself a commanding authority; and thereupon breed such a jealousy, as would keep Pompey and him sunder.

Nevertheless, it is every way worth a Mans labor, to make overtures of peace howsoever: especially considering, how it changeth the relative in the condition of men, which in War is *Homo homini Lupus*, One man a Wolf to another; and in Peace, *Homo homini Deus*, One Man a God to another, and proving good, will doubtless continue; if inconvenient, the sooner broken, and to the case is the same it was before.

Secondly, we may note, that there is nothing so difficult, but pertinacity and selfless labor, directed with diligence and intent care, will in the end overcome it. For *Cæsar*, that at the first seemed to undertake impossibilities, going about to besiege a great part of a Country, and to shut up a huge Army in an open place, did nevertheless (by end-avor) bring them to such extremity of want, that if as *Demetrius* said, the body should have put the mind in suite, for reparation of loss, which his ambition and wilful obduracy had drawn upon it, she should never be able to pay damages.

Touching the *Isthmus* which *Rutilius Rufus* went about to fortify, is a neck of earth, joining an Island unto the Continent. For as the In-let of the sea, between two Lands is called *Portus*, (whereupon the Town of *Portsmouth* in Hampshire, hath that appellation, as fitted upon the like In-let) for any small langet or neck of earth, lying between two Seas is called *Isthmus*. Whereof this of *Achaia* is of special note in Greece, being the same that joined *Peloponnesus* to the Continent and was of special fame for the site of *Corinth*.

These necks of earth called *Isthmi*, are of the nature of those things, as have been often threatened, and yet continue the same. For albeit the ambition of great Princes hath sought to alter the fashion of the earth in that behalf, yet I know not how their desires have sorted to no end. *Perfodere navigabili aëre has angustias tentaverit Demetrius Rex, Didator Cæsar, Caius Princeps, & Domitius Nero, insuavis, ut omnium patuit exitu, incepto*; King *Demetrius*, *Cæsar* the Dictator, *Caius* the Prince, and *Domitius Nero*, all of them attempted to draw through this neck of land with a navigable channel, without any success, as appears by the issue. In the time of King *Sesylus*, and since in the Empire of the *Ottomans* they went about to bring the *Red Sea* into Nile; but fearing it would be a means to drown the Land, one Sea being lower than another, they gave over the enterprise. And it may be upon like consideration, or otherwise, fearing to correct the works of nature, they forbore to make a passage between *Nombr de Dios* and *Panama* and so to join one sea to the other, as was said to be intended.

CHAP. XXII.

An accident which fell out by two Brethren of Savoy, in *Cæsar*'s Army.

Here were in *Cæsar*'s Camp two brethren of Savoy, *Roscellus* and *Egus* the Sons of *Adbucillus*, who for many years together, was accounted the principal and chief man of that State: these were

men of singular worth, and had done *Cæsar* very great service in all the Wars of Gallia, and in that respect, *Cæsar* had advanced them to great and honorable charges in their Country, and caused them extraordinarily to be taken in the number of the Senators, and bestowed much of the enemies lands upon them, besides great sums of ready money, and of poor had made them rich.

These men were not only well respected by *Cæsar*, but were in good account throughout all the Army. Howbeit, relying too much on *Cæsar*'s favor, and puffed up with foolish and barbarous arrogance, they disdained their own Men, deceiving the borsemen of their pay, and averring all pillage from publick distribution to their own particular. The borsemen provoked with these injuries, came all to *Cæsar*, and complained openly thereof: adding farther, that their Troops were not full, nor answerable to the List or Muster-role, by which they required payment.

Cæsar thinking it no fit time of punishment, and withall, attributing much to the worth of the men, put off the whole matter, and chid them privately, for making a gain of their Troops of Horse; willing them to expect a supply of all their wants from his favor, according as their service had well deserved. Nevertheless, the matter brought them into great scandal and contempt with all men, which they plainly perceived, both by the speeches of other Men, as also by that they might judge themselves, their own consciences accusing them. With which reproach and shame, they were so moved (and thinking peradventure that they were not quit thereof, but deferred until some other time) that they resolved to leave the Army, to seek new fortunes and make proof of other acquaintance. And having imparted the matter to a few of their followers, to whom they durst communicate so great a disloyalty, first they went about to kill *C. Volusenus*, General of the horse (as after the War was ended was discovered) that they might come to Pompey upon some deferred service: but after they found it hard to accomplish, they took up as much Money as they could borrow, as though they meant to have paid their Troops, what they formerly had defrauded them of; and having bought many horse, they went to Pompey, together with such as were acquainted with their purpose.

Pompey finding them Gentlemen of sort, liberally brought up, attended with a great retinue, and many horse, and both of them very valiant, and in good account with *Cæsar*,

far, and withall, for that it was an unusual and strange accident, he led them about the works, and shewed them all the fortifications: for before that time, no Man, either souldier or borseman, had fled from *Cæsar* to Pompey; whereas daily they came from Pompey to *Cæsar*, especially such as were enrolled in Epirus and Etolia, which countries were at *Cæsar*'s devotion.

These two Brethren exactly understanding all things in *Cæsar*'s Camp (as well concerning such works as were perfect, as such others wherein men skilful in War might find defect, together with the opportunity of time, and distances of places, as also the diligence of the Guards, with the nature and endeavor of every man that had a charge) related all particularly to Pompey.

OBSERVATION.

WE may here observe the sincerity and direct carriage of inferior Commanders in the Roman Army by the scandal these two Savoiens ran into for making false Murders and defrauding the Souldiers of their due: A matter so ordinary in these our times, as sufficient to justify the Abuse. For what more common in the course of our modern Wars, then to make gain of Companies, by mustering more then they have in pay, and by turning that which is due to the Souldier to their own benefit? The first whereof, if it be duly weighed, is an offence of a high nature against the State; and the second, such an injury to the souldier, as can hardly be answered.

It is merrily (as I take it) said by *Columella*, That in foro concessum latrocinium, Robbery is lawful in courts at Law. But for those, to whom is committed the safety of a Kingdome, to betray the trust reposed in them, by railing their means with dead pay, and consequently, stealing the cause with dead service; as also, by disabling their companions and fellow souldiers from doing those duties which are requisite, for want of due entertainment: is a thing deserving a heavy censure, and will doubtless fall out unto them, as it did to these two Brethren. The sequel whereof will appear by the story, and confirm that of *Xenophon*, *Dii haud impunita relinquunt impietatem*, *summa fides*: The Gods do not suffer the impieties and wickednesses of men to escape unpunished.

CHAP. XXII.

Pompey attempting to break out, putteth *Cæsar*'s party to great loss.

Cæsar.

Pompey being informed of these things, and having formerly resolved to break out, as is already declared, gave order to the souldiers to make them coverings for their Morions of Officers, and to get some store of Bavins and fagots, which being pre-

pared, he shipped a great number of the light armed Souldiers and Archers, together with those fagots, in Skiffs and Gallies. And about mid-night he drew threescore Cohorts out of the greater-Camp, and the places of *Gari-fon*, and sent them to that part of the fortification which was next unto the Sea, and farthest off from *Cæsar*'s greatest Camp. Thither also he sent the Ships before-mentioned, filled with light-armed Men and Fagots, together with as many other Gallies as were at *Dyrachium*; and gave directions how every man should employ himself.

Cæsar had left *Leutulus Marcellinus*, the Treasurer, with the Legion newly enrolled, to keep that fortification; who for that he was sickly, and of an ill disposition of body, had substituted *Fulvius Posthumus* as his coadjutor.

There was in that place a Trench of fifteen foot deep, and a Rampier against the enemy often foot in altitude, and as much in breadth. And about six hundred foot, from that place was raised another Rampier, with the front the contrary way, but somewhat lower then the former. For some few days before, *Cæsar* (fearing that place, lest our Men should be circumvented with their ships) had caused double fortifications to be made in that place; that (if peradventure) they should be put to their shifts, they might nevertheless make good resistance. But the greatest of the works, and the continual labor they daily endured, the fortifications being carried eighteen miles in circuit, would not suffer them to finish it. Whereby it happened, that he had not as yet made a Rampier along the Sea-shore, to join these two fortifications together, for the defence thereof: which was informed Pompey by these two Savoiens, and brought great damage and loss to our people. For as the Cohorts of the ninth Legion kept watch and guard upon the Sea, suddenly by the break of day, came Pompey's Army; which seemed very strange unto our men, and instantly thereupon, the Souldiers from a ship-board assaulted with their weapons the inner Rampier, and the rest began to fill up the Trench.

The legionary Souldiers appointed to keep the inner fortifications, having planted a great number of Ladders to the Rampier, did amuse the enemy with weapons, and Engines of all sorts; and a great number of Archers were thronged together on each side. But the coverings of Officers which they wore on their head-pieces, did greatly defend them from the

St bonam
desiderit,
salam &
perpetuam;
si malum,
hanc dis-
turbam.
Liv. lib. 8.
Nihil est
quod non
exspectet
peritiam
opera, & in-
tentia & di-
ligent cura
Senec. lib.
6. Epist. 51.

Plin. lib. 4.
cap. 47.

Pompey
semper ante
oculos ver-
fari putant
qui peccat-
verunt Cæ-
sarem.
in orat. pro
Milonæ.

Lib. 5. C.
rep.

Cæsar

the blowes of stones, which was the only weapon our men had for that purpose. And as our Men were overlaid with all these things, and did hardly make resistance, they found out the defect of the fortification, formerly mentioned: and landing their men between the two Rampiers, they charged our people in the rear, and so driving them from both the fortifications, made them turn their backs.

This alarm being heard, Marcellinus sent certain Cohorts to succor our men, who seeing them fly, could neither re-assure them by their coming, nor withstand the fury of the Enemy themselves: inasmuch as what relief sooner was sent, was distracted by the fear and astonishment of them that fled away. Whereby the terror and the danger was made much the greater, and their retreat was hindered through the multitude of people.

In that fight the Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded, and fainting for want of strength, looking towards the horsemen; This have I, said he, in my life time carefully and diligently defended for many years together, and now dying, with the same fidelity, do restore it unto Cæsar: suffer not (I pray you) such a dishonor, the like whereof never happened in Cæsar's Army, but return it unto him in safety. By which accident the Eagle was saved: all the Centurions of the first Cohort being slain; but the first of the Maniple of the Principes. And now the Enemy with great slaughter of our men, approached near Marcellinus Camp.

The rest of the Cohorts being greatly astonished, M. Antonius holding the next Garrison to that place, upon notice thereof, was seen to come down from the upper ground with twelve Cohorts. Upon whose coming Pompey's Party was repressed and staid, and our men somewhat re-assured, giving them time to come again to themselves out of that astonishment. And not long after, Cæsar having knowledge thereof by smoke made out of the Forts, according to the use of former time, came thither also, bringing with him certain Cohorts out of the Garrisons.

OBSERVATION.

It is an old saying, that Thieves handle is always naught, but Traytors handle is much worse: as appeareth by the falling away of these two Senators, who were the first that left Cæsar in this War, and the first that brought Pompey good fortune: themselves standing culpable of as great an offence, as if they had alienated the whole Army,

In the course whereof we may see plainly that which I have formerly noted, that it is an excellent thing to befall attempting upon an Enemy. For it is done upon good grounds and cautions; for while Pompey stood upon the defensive ward, the honor of the contention fell continually upon Cæsar. And doubtless, he that observeth Cæsar's proceedings in the carriage of all his Wars, shall find his fortune to have specially grown from his active and attempting spirit.

In this Eagle-bearer we may see verified that which Paterculus affirmeth of Mitridates, That a valiant spirit is sometimes great by the favor offering, but always great in a good courage.

For these titles of degrees, as *Principes* prior, and the rest here mentioned, having formerly discoursed at large of the parts of a Legion, and the Hierarchy of their discipline, I will rather refer the Reader thereunto, then bumbast out a Volume with distasteful repetitions.

CHAP. XXIII.

Cæsar purposed to alter the course of War, and attempted to cut off one of Pompey's Legions.

Cæsar understanding of the loss, and perceiving that Pompey was got out of the Fortifications, and was incamped upon the Sea, in such sort as he might freely go out to forrage, and have no less access to his shipping then formerly he had, changing his course of War, which had not succeeded in his expectation, he incamped himself fast by Pompey. The works being perfected, it was observed by Cæsar's discoverers, that certain Cohorts, to the number of a Legion, were brought behind a wood into the old Camp. The site of the Camp was after this manner. The days before, Cæsar's ninth Legion opposing themselves against Pompey's forces, and working upon the fortifications (as is before declared) had their Camp in that place, adjoining unto a wood, and not distant from the Sea above four hundred paces. Afterwards, Cæsar changing his mind for some certain causes, transferred his lodging somewhat farther off from that place. A few days after, the same Camp was possessed by Pompey. And forasmuch as he was to lodge more legions in that place, leaving the inner Rampier standing, he enlarged the fortification, so that the lesser Camp being included in the greater, served as a Castle or Citadel to the same. Besides also, he drew a fortification from the right angle of the Camp, four hundred paces out-right, to a River, to the end the Soldiers might water freely, without danger. And he also changing his mind, for some causes not requisite to be mentioned, left the place too: so that the Camp stood empty

Vir virtute,
eximius
aliquando
fortuna,
semper animi
mox malis
mus.

Cæsar.

* Eritius.

for many dayes together, and all the fortifications were as perfect as at the first.

The Discoverers brought news to Cæsar, that they had seen an Ensign of a Legion carried thither. The same was likewise confirmed, from certain Forts which stood upon the higher grounds. The place was distant from Pompey's new Camp about five hundred paces. Cæsar hoping to cut off this Legion, and desirous to repair that day's loss, left two Cohorts at work, to make a shew of fortifying, and he himself (by a contrary way, in as covert a manner as he could) led the rest of the Cohorts, in number Thirty three (amongst whom was the ninth Legion, that had lost many Centurions, and was very weak in soldiers) towards Pompey's Legion, and the lesser Camp, in a double battel. Neither did his opinion deceive him, for he came thither before Pompey could perceive it.

And albeit the fortifications of the Camp were great, yet assailing it speedily with the left Cornet, wherein he himself was, he drove Pompey's Soldiers from the Rampier. There stood a Turn-pike in the Gate, which gave occasion of resistance for a while: and as our men would have entered, they valiantly defended the Camp: T. Pulcio, by whose means C. Antonius Army was betrayed, as we have formerly declared, fighting there most valiantly. Yet nevertheless our men overcame them by valour, and cutting up the Turn-pike, entered first into the greater Camp, and afterwards into the Castle, and slew many that resisted, of the Legion that was forced thither.

But Fortune, that can do much in all things, and specially in War, doth in a small moment of time bring great alterations; as it then happened. For the Cohorts of Cæsar's right Cornet, ignorant of the place, followed the Rampier which went along from the Camp to the River, seeking after the Gate, and taking it to be the Rampier of the Camp: but when they perceived that it joined to the River, they presently got over it, no man resisting them; and all the Cavalry followed after those Cohorts.

OBSERVATION.

Pompey having cleared his Army of that Siege, it booteth not Cæsar to prosecute his purpose any longer: for when the end is missed for which any course is undertaken, it were folly to seek it by that means. We must rather chuse new ways, that may lead us to the end of our hopes, then follow the old track, which led to

no effect. And yet nevertheless the sufficiency of the General is no way disabled: for, albeit a wise man doth not always keep one pace, yet still he holdeth one and the same way.

Secondly, that of Xerxes appeareth to be true; that great attempts are always made with great difficulty and danger. Wherein the wisdom of the Heathen World ascribed all to Fortune, as the sole cause of all remarkable events, and that which filled up both the Pages of all the Books, wherein men noted the course of things. *Clades in bello accipit, non semper ignavia, sed aliquando Fortuna temeritati sunt imputanda.* Losses received in war, are not always to be imputed to slothful carriage, but oftentimes to the temerity of Fortune, saith *Arcbidamus*; and is that which is aimed at by Cæsar.

CHAP. XXIV.

The fight continueth, and Cæsar loseth.

In the mean while Pompey, after so long a respite of time, having notice thereof, took the first Legion from their Work, and brought them to succor their fellows: and, at the same time, his Cavalry did approach near our Horsemen, and our men that possessed the Camp, did discover an Army imbattelled coming against them; and all things were suddenly changed. For Pompey's Legion, assured with a speedy hope of success, began to make resistance at the Decumane Gate, and voluntarily charged our men.

Cæsar's Cavalry being got over the Rampier into a narrow passage, fearing how they might retreat in safety, began to fly away. The right Cornet, secluded and cut off from the left, perceiving the terror of the Horsemen (least they might be endangered within the fortifications) betook themselves to the other side from whence they came: and most of them (least they should be surprised in the straights) cast themselves over Works of ten foot high into the Ditches; and such as first got over being striden under foot by such as followed after, the rest saved themselves in passing over their Borders.

The Soldiers of the left Cornet, perceiving from the Rampier that Pompey was at hand, and that their own side fled away, fearing least they should be shut up in those straights, having the Enemy both without and within them, thought it the best course to return back the same way they came. Whereby there happened nothing but tumult, fear, and flight: in so much, as when Cæsar caught hold with his band of the Ensigns of them that fled, and com-

P p mandated

Sapientis non
semper it
uno gradu,
fida una via.
Magna ue-
gotia mag-
nis cum pe-
riculis ful-
cipiuntur.
Hæc dicitur.
Fortunæ
omnia ex-
ponit, om-
nia ferunt
accepta:
& in tota
ratione mor-
taliū, sola
pugnam fac-
cit. Plin.
lib. 3. cap. 7.

Arma alie-
næ grave
crimen est,
& ea pœna
desertionis
exequatur.
utique & to-
ta alienavit.
Lib. 14.
de re mili-
tari.

manded them to stand; some, for fear, left their Ensigns behind them, others forsaking their Horses, kept on their course: neither was there any one of them that would stand. Notwithstanding, in this so great a calamity and mishap, these helps fell out to relieve us, when the whole Army was in danger to be cut off; that Pompey fearing some Treachery (for that, as I think, it happened beyond his expectation, who a little before saw his men flee out of his Camp) durst not, for a good while, approach near the Fortifications; and our men possessing the narrow passages and the Ports, did binder the Horsemen from following after. And so a small matter fell out to be of great moment, in the carriage of that accident, on either side. For the Rampier, which was carried from the Camp to the River (Pompey's Camp being already taken) was the only binderance of Cæsar's expedite and easie victory: and the same thing bindering the speedy following of their Horsemen, was the only safety and help of our men.

In those two Fights, there were wanting of Cæsar's men Nine hundred and three-score; and Horsemen of note, R. Felginas, Tullianus Gallus, a Senators son, C. Felginas of Placentia, Agravius of Puteolis, Sacrativirius of Capua, ten Tribunes of the Soldiers, and Thirty Centurions. But, the greatest part of these perished in the Trenches, in the Fortifications, and on the River banks, prest to death with the fear and flight of their fellows, without any blow or wound given them. There were lost at that time Thirty two Military Ensigns.

Pompey, upon that fight, was saluted by the name of Imperator; which Title he then obtained, and so suffered himself to be fluted afterward: howbeit he used it not in any of his Missives, nor yet more any Lawrell in the bundle of Rods carried before him.

Labienus having begged all the Captives, caused them (for greater ostentation) to be brought out in publick; and to give the more assurance to such as were fled thither from Cæsar's Party, calling them by the name of fellow-soldiers, in great derision asked them, Whether old Soldiers were wont to flee? and so caused them all to be slain.

Pompey's party took such an assurance and spirit upon these things, that they

thought no farther of the course of War, but carried themselves as though they were already Victors: not respecting (as the cause of all this) the paucity of our men, nor the disadvantage of the place, and the freightness thereof, the Camp being possessed, and the doubtful terror both within and without the Works; nor yet the Army divided into two parts, in such sort as neither of them were able to help or succor the other. Neither yet did they add to this, that the fight was not made by any valiant encounter, or in form of battel, but that they received more hurt from the narrowness of the place, and from their own disorder, then from the Enemy.

And, to conclude, they did not remember the common chances and casualties of War: wherein oftentimes very small causes, either of false suspicion, or of sudden fear, or out of scruple of Religion, do infer great and heavy losses; as often as either by the negligence of the General, or the fault of a Tribune, the Army is misordered. But, as though they had overcome by true force of their prowess, and that no alteration of things could after happen, they magnified that dayes victory, by Letters and report throughout the whole World.

The first OBSERVATION.

Sometimes we may think to repair a loss, and thereby hazard a greater misfortune. For, albeit the saying be common, that a man must seek his Coat where he lost it, as Dicars do; yet there is alwayes more certainty in seeking, then in finding. For the circle of humane affairs being carried round in a course, doth not suffer happiness to continue with one Party. And thereupon it was, That Pittacus dedicated a Ladder to the Temple of Mylene, to put men in mind of their condition; which is nothing else but going up and down. The life of a soldier is a mere Hermaphrodite, and taketh part of either sex of Fortune; and is made by Nature to beget Happiness of Adversity, and mischances of Good: as if the cause of all causes, by intermingling sweet with bitter, would lead us to his Providence, and consequently to himself, the first Mover of all Motions.

The diversity of these events are so inlatched together, as one seemeth to have relation to the other. For this task admitted not of *veni, vidi, vici*. I only came, and saw, and overcame; nor went on with Alexander, marching over the Plains of Asia, without rub or counterbaffle: but the business was disposed, here to receive a blow, and there to gain a victory. And so this loss at Dyrrachium made the Battel at Pharsalia the more glorious, and beautified the course of this War with variety of chances. The best use of these Disasters is that which Cæsar made of his cross fortunes

Humanarum rerum circulus est, qui rotatur semper, coldest fortunatus esse non finit. Herodot. lib. 1. Hæbet hæc victis moraliū, ut adversa ex felici, felici ex adversis nascuntur. Plin. in Paneg.

Herodot. lib. 1.

Mei casus, eis ingrati, mihi tamen existerere disciplina. My mishaps, though they be unpleasant enough, yet they have still taught me something.

The second OBSERVATION.

AS the Mathematicks, by reason of their certainty, do admit Demonstration, as well from the conclusion to the principles, as from the principles to the conclusion: so in the actions of mans life, it is not hard to assign the precedent causes by the sequels; the event being oftentimes an understanding Judge of things that are past. And although it do no where appear what was the cause of Labienus leaving Cæsar; yet his instant carriage towards the Captives, may make at least a probable conjecture, that his revolt proceeded from his own disposition, rather then from any cause on Cæsar's behalf. For, where a man hath once done an injury, he will never cease heaping one wrong after another, and all to justify his first error: whereas on the other side, a noble spirit, free from all defect, will demean himself answerable to his first innocency.

CHAP. XXV.

Cæsar speaketh to the soldiers concerning this mishap; and forsaketh the Place.

Cæsar.

Cæsar being driven from his former purposes, resolved to change the whole course of the War; so that at one and the same time omitting the Siege, and withdrawing the Garrisons, he brought all the Army into one place, and there spake unto the Soldiers: exhorting them not to think much at those things that had happened, nor to be amazed therewith; but to counterpoise this loss (which was in a mediocrity) with many happy and fortunate Battels they had gained.

Let them thank Fortune, that they had taken Italy without blow or wound; that they had quieted and put in peace both the Provinces of Spain, full of Warlike Men, and directed by skillfull and pacified Commanders; that they also had subdued the fertile bordering Provinces; and likewise, that they should remember, with what facility they were all transported in safety through the midst of the Enemies Fleets; and only the Haven and Ports, but all the Coast being full of shipping.

* If all things fell not out prosperously, Fortune was to be helped by their industry. The loss which was received, might be attributed to any man rather then unto him: for he had given them a secure place to fight in, had possessed himself of the Enemy Camp, driven them out, and overcome them in fight.

* The Philosopher Cæsar was wont to say, that, To be no occasion of an ill hap, is a great comfort in any manner of Adversity. Plut. in Cæsar. Apo.

But, whether it were their fear, or any other error, or Fortune her self, that would interrupt a Victory already gained, every man was now to labour to repair the damage they had sustained, with their valour; which if they did endeavour, he would turn their loss into advantage, as it formerly fell out at Gergovia, where such as before were afraid to fight, did of their own accord offer themselves to Battel.

Having ended his Speech, he disgraced and displaced some Ensign-bearers. The Army thereupon conceived such a grief of the blow that was given them, and such a desire they had to repair their dishonour, that no man needed the Command either of a Tribune or Centurion; every man imposing upon himself as a punishment for his late fault, greater labours then usual, and withall inflamed with an earnest desire of fighting: in so much, as many of the higher Orders thought it requisite to continue in the place, and reverse the cause to a Battel. But contrariwise, Cæsar was not assured of the terrified Soldiers, and thought it expedient besides, to interpose some time for the healing of their minds; fearing likewise lest he should be straitened through scarcity of Corn, upon the tearing of his Fortifications. And therefore, without any farther delay, giving order for such as were wounded and sick, as soon as it was night, he conveyed all the Carriages secretly out of the Camp, and sent them before towards Apollonia, forbidding them to rest until they came to their Lodging, and sent one Legion withall to Convey them.

That being done, he retained two Legions within the Camp; and the rest, being led out at divers Ports, about the fourth Watch of the night he sent the same way. And, after a little pause (for the observing of Military order, and to the end his speedy departure might not be discovered) he commanded them to take up the cry of tramping up their baggage, and presently setting forward, overtook the former Troop, and so went speedily out of the sight of the Camp.

Pompey having notice of his purpose, made no delay to follow after: but aiming at the same things, either to take them incombred in their March, or affrighted with fear, brought forth his Army, and sent his Horsemen before to stay the Rearward. But Cæsar went with so speedy a march, that he could not overtake them, until he came to the River Ge-

Ignominia novavit.

hufus; where, by reason of the high and uncassie banks, the Cavalry overtook the tail of the Army, and engaged them in fight. Amongst whom Cæsar opposed his Horsemen, and intermingled with them Four hundred expedite soldiers, of whom that had place before the Ensigns; who so much prevailed in the encounter, that they drove them all away before them, slew many of them, and returned themselves in safety to their Troops.

Cæsar having made a just day's March, according to his first determination, and brought his Army over the River Genusus, he lodged in his old Camp over against Asparagus; and kept all the Soldiers within the Rampier, commanding the Horse that went out to Forrage, to be presently taken in by the Decumane Port.

The First OBSERVATION.

Albeit that of Cato be true, that an error in light is not capable of amendment: yet out of that which happeneth amidst, may always be somewhat gathered to repair the disadvantage, and to dispose a Party to better carriage for the future. Accordingly we may note Cæsar's notable temper and demeanour, after to great a loss; recalling the courage of his soldiers, and setting their minds in a course of good resolution, with as many valuable reasons as humane wisdom was able to afford him: without which, all their other advantages, either of valour, or experience and use of Arms, or their assuredness after so many victories, or what other thing forever that made them exceed all other Armies, had been utterly buried in this overthrow. For his better furtherance whereina, he thought it fit to use the help of time, before he brought them to the like trial. For that which is said of grief, if reason will not give an end unto it, time will, is to be understood of any other passion of the mind; which cannot possibly be so great, but time will consume it.

The second OBSERVATION.

The second thing which cometh to be handled, is the manner of Cæsar's retreat; being as exquisite a pattern in this kind, as is extant in any story; and is the rather to be considered, for as much as it is one of the principal points of Military Art, and worthiest the knowledge of a General, to be able, upon all occasions, to make a safe and sure retreat. For those that can do nothing else, can easily put themselves into a War: but, to return them home again in safety, is that which concerneth the honour of a Leader.

Many are the causes that may move a Commander to dislodge himself, and to leave his Adversary for a time: but the means to do it safely depend chiefly upon these two points. The one is, to advance himself onward at first, as far as possible he can, to the end he may get the start, before

the Enemy be ready to follow him: and is taught by Xenophon's who, after the death of Cyrus, in the Battle against King Artaxerxes, brought back a Thousand men into Greece, from an Army of two hundred thousand Horse, that pressed hard upon them, for Five hundred Leagues together. Which retreat is exactly storied by the said Author, in seven Books, containing all the difficulties concerning this point: amongst which, we find this passage.

It much imported us, said he, to go as far as first as possible we could: to the end we might have some advantage of space before the Enemy, that pressed so near behind. For, if we once got before, and could out-strip them for a day's journey or two, it was not possible for them to overtake us; for as much as they durst not follow us with a small Troop, and with great Forces they could never reach us: besides the scarcity and want of victuals they fell into by following us, that consumed all before them.

Thus far goeth Xenophon. And, according to this rule, Cæsar ordered his retreat: for he got the start of Pompey so far the first day, by that eight miles he gained in the afternoon: as it followeth in the next Chapter, that he was never able to overtake him.

The second thing for the affuring of a retreat, is, So to provide against the incumbrances of an Enemy, that he may not find it easy to attack him that would be gone. Of all retreats which may any way be taken from example of Beasts, that of the Wolf is most commended: who never flies, but with his head turned back upon his Adversaries; and shews such Teeth, as are not to be trusted.

After the Wolf's manner marched Cæsar: for howsoever the body of his Army retreated one way, yet they turned so terrible a countenance towards the Enemy, as was not to be endured. And, upon these two hinges, is turned the carriage of a skillful retreat.

Howbeit, for the better furtherance hereof, it shall not be impertinent to add hereunto some inventions, practised by great Commanders, which may serve to amuse an Enemy, while a General doth prepare himself to observe the former points.

King Philip of Macedon, desirous to leave the Roman Army, sent a Herald to the Consul, to demand a Cessation of Arms, while he buried his dead, which he purposed to perform the next day, with some care and solemnity. Which being obtained, he dislodged himself secretly that night, and was got far on his way before the Romans perceived it.

Hanniball, to clear his Army from that of the Romans, which was commanded by the Consul Nero, about midnight made many Fires, in that part which stood next the Roman Camp; and leaving certain Pavilions and Lodgings, with some few Numidians, to shew themselves upon the Rampier, he departed secretly towards Pucelin. As soon as it was day, the Romans (according to their custom) approaching the Counter-camp, the Numidians shewed themselves; and then suddenly made after their fellows, as fast as their Horses could carry them. The Consul finding a great silence in the Camp, sent two Light-Horsemen to discover the matter: who returning, told him of the Enemies departure.

Lib. 3. de bello Civili.

Front. lib. 1. cap. 1.

Lib. 2.

In like manner Varus (as is formerly related) left a Trumpeter in the Camp near Uicia, with certain Tents; and about midnight carried his Army secretly into the Town. Misistrates willing to leave Pompey, that cut him off short, the better to cover his departure, made shew of making greater provision of forage than he was accustomed, appointed conferences the next day, made great store of fires in his Camp, and then in the night escaped away.

The Persians, in the Voyage which Solymas the Turk made against them, in the year one thousand five hundred fifty four, being driven to a place where the Ottomans thought to have had a hand upon them, gathered every man a fagot; and making a great heap thereof, set them all on fire, in the passage of the Turks Army: which burned so furiously, as the Persian escaped, before the Enemy could pay by the fire.

CHAP. XXVI.

Cæsar goeth on in his retreat: Pompey ceaseth to follow him.

Cæsar.

In like manner Pompey having that day marched a full journey, betook himself to his former lodging at Asparagus. And for that the Soldiers were not troubled with fortifying their Camp, by reason all the works were whole and entire, many of them went out far off to get wood, and to seek forrage: others rising hastily, had left a great part of their luggage behind them; and induced by the nearness of the last night's lodging, left their Arms, and went back to fetch those things that were behind. Inasmuch as Cæsar seeing them thus scattered (as before he had conceived how it would fall out) about high noon gave warning to depart, and so led out his Army; and doubling that day's journey, he went from that place about eight mile, which Pompey could not do, by reason of the absence of his Soldiers.

The next day Cæsar having in like manner sent his carriages before; in the beginning of the night, set forward himself about the fourth watch; that if there were any sudden necessity of fighting, he might (at all occasions) be ready with the whole Army. The like he did the days following. By which it hapned, that in his passage over great Rivers, and by difficult and cumbersome ways, he received no detriment or loss at all. For Pompey being staid the first day, and afterwards striving in vain, making great journeys, and yet not overtaking us, the fourth day gave over following, and betook himself to another resolution.

Cæsar, as well for the accommodating of his wounded men, as also for paying the di-

my, re-assuring his Allies and Confederates; and leaving Garrisons in the Towns, was necessarily to go to Apollonia: but he gave no longer time for the dispatch of these things, then could be spared by him that made haste. For fearing lest Domitius should be engaged by Pompey's arrival, he desired to make towards him with all possible celerity: his whole purpose and resolution insisting upon these reasons; That if Pompey did follow after him, he should by that means draw him from the Sea-side, and from such provisions of War as he had stored up at Dyrrachium; and so should compel him to undertake the War upon equal conditions. If he went over into Italy, having joined his Army with Domitius, he would go to succor Italy, by the way of Illyricum. But if he should go about to besiege Apollonia, or Oricum, and so exclude him from all the Sea-Coast, he would then besiege Scipio, and force Pompey to relieve him.

And therefore having writ and sent to Cn. Domitius, what he would have done (leaving four Cohorts to keep Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at Oricum, and disposing such as were weak through their wounds in Epirus and Acarnania) he set forward.

OBSERVATION.

Considèrò jussu tenerè ejus diè, having marched a full day's march, or gone a just day's journey, said the story. Which giveth occasion to inquire, how far this just day's journey extended. Lissus said, it was twenty four miles, alledging that of Pegasus; Militari gradu (said he) viginti milia passuum boris quinque duntaxat aestis consistenda: plenus autem gradu qui chator est, totidem boris viginti quatuor. As soldiers march did usually rid 20 miles in five summer hours, and if they marched with speed 24 miles in the same time: understanding justum iter, a just journey, to be so much as was measured militari gradu, by soldiers march. But he that knows the marching of an Army, shall easily perceive the impossibility of marching ordinarily twenty four miles a day. Besides this place doth plainly confute it: for first, he said that he made a just day's journey; and then again, rising about noon, doubled that day's journey, and went eight miles. Which shews, that their justum iter was about eight miles: and so fixeth the flow conveyance of an Army, with more probability than that of Lissus.

Lib. 5. de Milit. Rd. cap. 14. Lib. 1. cap. 1.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVII.

OBSERVATION.

Pompey hasteth to Scipio, Domitius hearseth of the overthrow.

Cæsar.

Pompey also conjecturing at Cæsar's purpose, thought it requisite for him to hasten to Scipio, that he might succor him, if Cæsar should chance to intend that way; but if it so fell out, that he would not depart from the Sea-shore and Corcyra, as expecting the Legions and Cavalry to come out of Italy, he would then attack Domitius. For these causes both of them made halt, as well to assist their Parties, as to surprize their enemies, if occasion were offered. But Cæsar had turned out of the way to go to Apollonia; whereas Pompey had a ready way into Macedonia by Candavia. To which there happened another inconvenience: that Domitius, who for many days together had lodged hard by Scipio's Camp, was now departed from thence, to make provision of Corn, unto Heraclea Senticæ, which is subject to Candavia; as though Fortune would have thrust him upon Pompey, this Cæsar was at that time ignorant of. Moreover, Pompey had writ to all the States and Provinces, of the overthrow at Dyrrachium, in far greater terms than the thing it self was: and had noised it abroad, that Cæsar was beaten, had lost all his forces and fled away.

Which reports made the ways very hard and dangerous to our men, and drew many States from Cæsar's party: whereby it happened, that many Messengers being sent, both from Cæsar to Domitius, and from Domitius to Cæsar, were forced to turn back again, and could not pass. Howbeit some of the followers of Roscius and Egus, (who as is before shewed, had fled unto Pompey) meeting on the way with Domitius discovered whether it were out of their old acquaintance, having lived together in the Wars of Gallia, or otherwise out of vain glory related all what had happened; not omitting Cæsar's departure, or Pompey's coming. Whereof Domitius being informed, and being but scarce four bowes before him, did (by the help of the enemy) avoid a most imminent danger, and met with Cæsar at Eginium, which is a Town situate upon the Frontiers of Thessalia.

Joy is an opening and dilating motion, and oftentimes openeth the body so wide, as it leaveth out the Soul, which returneth not again. And in like manner, the causes of all such exultations do, for the most part spread themselves further then is requisite.

Pompey having victory in hope, rather then in hand, boasted as though all were his: not considering, that the happineis or disaster of human actions, doth not depend upon the particulars rising in the course thereof, which are variable and divers, but according as the event shall censure it. Whereupon the Ruffes have a saying in such cases, that he that laughs afterwards, laughs then too: as Cæsar did.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Cæsar sacketh Gomphi in Thessalia.

Cæsar having joined both Armies together, came to Gomphi, which is the first Town of Thessalia, by the way leading out of Epirus. These people a few days before, had of their own accord sent Embassadors to Cæsar, offering all their means and abilities to be disposed at his pleasure; requiring also a Garrison of Souldiers from him. But now they had heard of the overthrow at Dyrrachium, which was made so great, and so prevailed with them, that Androtichenes, Prator of Thessalia (choosing rather to be a partaker of Pompey's victory, then a companion with Cæsar in adversity) had drawn all the multitude of Servants and Children out of the Country into the Town, and shutting up the Gates, dispatched Messengers to Scipio and Pompey, for succor to be sent unto him, in that he was not able to hold out a long siege. Scipio understanding of the departure of the Armies from Dyrrachium, had brought the Legions to Larissa: and Pompey did not as yet approach near unto Thessalia.

Cæsar having fortified his Camp, commanded Mantlets, Ladders, and Hurdles to be made ready for a surprize. Which being fitted and prepared, he exhorted the Souldiers, and shewed them what need there was for the relieving of their wants, and supplying of all necessities) to possess themselves of an opulent and full Town; as also by their example, to terrifie the other Cities: and what they did, to do speedily, before it could be succoured. Whereupon, by the singular industry of the Souldiers, the same day he came thither, giving the assault after the ninth hour, (notwithstanding the exceeding height of the walls) he took the Town before setting,

Humana.
rum adu-
sum felici-
tas infelici-
taque non
est singula-
bus rebus
particulis,
quæ multæ
sunt & variæ
sed ex even-
tus judican-
tur. Dionys.
Hal. lib. 3.

Cæsar.

CHAP. XXIX.

Pompey cometh into Thessalia; his Army conceiveth assured hope of Victory.

Cæsar.

Pompey a few days after came into Thessalia; and there calling all the Army together, first gave great thanks to his own men; and then exhorted Scipio's Souldiers, that the victory being already obtained, they would be partakers of the booty and of the rewards: and taking all the Legions into one Camp, he made Scipio partaker both of his honor and authority, commanding the Trumpets to attend his pleasure for matter of direction, and that he should use a Prætorial Pavilion.

Pompey having strengthened himself with an addition of another great Army, every man was confirmed in his former opinion, and his hope of victory was increased: so that the longer they delayed the matter, the more they seemed to prolong their return into Italy. And albeit Pompey proceeded slowly and deliberately in the business, yet it was but a days work. But some there were that said, he was well pleased with authority and command, and to use men both of consular dignity, and of the Prætorian order, as his vassals and servants.

And now they began to dispute openly, concerning rewards and dignities of Priesthood; and pointed out those which from year to year were to be chosen Consuls. Others begged the houses and goods of such as were with Cæsar. Besides a great controversy that farther grew between them in open council, whether L. Hirrus were not to be regarded at the next election of Prætors, being absent, and employed by Pompey against the Parthians. And as his friends urged Pompey with his promise given at his departure, requiring he might not now be deceived through his greatness and authority; the rest, running a course of as great danger and labor, saw no reason (by way of contradiction) why one man should be respected before all others. And now Domitius, Scipio, and Spinther Lentulus, began to grow to high words in their daily meetings, concerning Cæsar's Priesthood: Lentulus alledging by way of ostentation, the honor that was due to his age and authority: Domitius vaunting of the credit and favor he had at Rome; and Scipio trusting to Pompey's alliance. Moreover, Attius Rufus, accused L. Afranius to Pompey, for betraying the Army in Spain. L. Domitius gave out in counsel, That after the War was ended, all such as were of the rank,

setting, and gave it to the Souldiers to be rifled: and presently removing from thence, came to Metropolis, in such sort, as he went out as well Messengers, as news of taking the Town.

The Metropolitans, induced with the same respects, at first shut up their gates, and filled their walls with armed men: but afterwards, understanding by the Captives (whom Cæsar caused to be brought forth) what had befallen to them of Gomphi, they presently opened their gates; and by that means were all preserved in safety. Which happineis of theirs being compared with the desolation of Gomphi, there was no one State of all Thessalia (excepting them of Larissa, which were kept in with great forces by Scipio) but yielded obedience to Cæsar, and did what he commanded. Cæsar having now got a place plentiful of Corn, which was now almost ripe, he refused to attend Pompey's coming, and there to prosecute the residue of that War.

OBSERVATION.

Lois faith, that the Siege of that place which we would quickly take, must be prosecuted and urged hard. Which rule Cæsar observed for he followed it so hard, that he took the Town fortified with exceeding high walls, in four hours space, or thereabouts, after he began to assault it. Which Plutarch faith, was so plentifully stored of all necessary provision, that the Souldiers found there a refectory of all the miseries and wants they suffered at Dyrrachium: inasmuch as they seemed to be new made, both in body and courage, by reason of Xenophon, Lex inter omnes homines perpetua est, quando belligerantium urbs capta fuerit, cuncta eorum esse cum ea ceperint, & corpora eorum qui in urbe sunt & bona: It is a general Law amongst all Men, that when an Enemies Town is forcibly taken, all that is found in it, as well bodies as goods, is at their disposal who have taken it.

Appian faith, that the Germans were so drunk, that they made all men laugh at them: and that if Pompey had surprised them in these disorders, they might have paid dear for their entertainment. He addeth moreover (to shew the stiffness of the Inhabitants against Cæsar) that there were found in a Surgeons Hall, twenty two principal Personages, flung dead upon the ground, without appearance of any wound, having their gobbets by them: and he that gave the poison, sitting upright in a Chair, as dead as the rest. And as Philip, having taken Aegle in the Country of the Iliarians, drew all the rest to his obedience, through the fear they conceived of their rage: so the consideration of the calamity which befel Gomphi, and the good treaty which the Metropolitans found by yielding unto Cæsar, brought all the other Cities under his command.

Lib. 5.
Obisidicijus
urbis quam
eio capere
velis, & ut
gratia & ut
premeda.

Lib. 4. de
Indit. Cyt.

Bello lex
acquirendi
iustissima.
Dionys. Ha-
licarn. in
esper. legat.

Polyb. lib. 8.

After three
of the clock
in the after-
noon,

rank of Senators, should be inquired upon by a triple Commission: and that those which were personally in the War, should be of the Commission to judge the rest, as well such as were at Rome, as those that did no service in this War. The first Commission should be, to clear such as had well deserved, from all danger. The second, Penal: and the third Capital. And to conclude, every man labour'd either to have a reward, or to be avenged of his Enemy. Neither did they think so much of the means how to overcome, as how to use the Victory.

The First OBSERVATION.

Cominus.

The tale which the Emperor Frederick related to the Commissioners of Lenz the eleventh, King of France, (concerning the parting between them of the Territories of Charles Duke of Burgundie) not to fill the skin before they had killed the Bear, might well have fitted these of Pompey's party, that contended for offices before they fell, and disposed of the skins ere they had took the Bears: not sparing out of their impatience to tax Pompey of spinning out the War, for the sweetness he found in authority and command; as Agamemnon did at Troy, inasmuch as *Plutarcho* reporteth, that one *Favonius* imitating *Cæsar*'s severity and freedom of speech, went about throughout all the Camp, demanding whether it were not great pity, that the ambitious humor of one man, should keep them that year from eating the figs and delicate fruit of *Trigulium*? And all men generally stood to affected, as Pompey could not withstand their importunings. For as *Florus* saith, *Milites oisum sibi moram, principes antiumum Ducis increpabant*. The soldiers blamed the sloth, the confederates found fault with the delay, and the chief Commanders with the ambition of their General. Only *Cato* thought it not fit to hazard themselves upon a desperate man, that had neither hope nor help, but in Fortune. But as in most things besides, so in this he stood alone, and could not prevail against a multitude.

The Second OBSERVATION.

Placere sibi ternas tabellas dari, ad indicandum in, qui erant ordinis Senatorii. They agreed that all such were of the rank of Senators, should be inquired upon by a triple Commission, saith the story. *Tabellas*, I have translated Commissions, as best fitting our English phrase, but the meaning was as following.

It appeareth by history, that the Roman people, as well in election of Magistrates, as in causes criminal, did give their voices openly and aloud, for six hundred years together; until one *Gabinus*, a Tribune of the people, perceiving that the Commons, for fear of the great Ones, durst not dispose of their voices freely as they would, published an Edict, That the people should give their voices by Balloting. Which Law *Tully* commendeth, *Grata est tabella quæ frontes operit, hominum mentes tegit, datque eam libertatem quod vultis faciant*; It is

an acceptable Law, which hides the faces and meanings of men, and gives all liberty to do what they please. And in another place, he calleth it *Priscipium justissime libertatis*, the foundation of most just liberty. Upon an election of Magistrates, the balls were given according to the number of the Competitors; that every man might chuse as he pleased.

In criminal Causes, every Man had three: one marked with A. signifying Absolution, and another with C. for Condemnation, and another with N. L. for *Non liquet*, which they called *Auspicium*, desirous to be farther informed, which our Grand Juries do express by an *Ignoramus*. And in this manner would *Domitius* have had his fellow Senators, either quitted or condemned. The balls which were given upon the making of a law, were two, one marked with V. R. which signified *Ut rogas*, that it might go on, and the other with A. signifying *Antiquo*, rejecting it; for as *Festus* noteth, *Antiquare est in modum pristinum reducere*. To Antiquate, is to make the thing be as it was before.

And in this manner they would have proceeded against *Cæsar*'s Partizans, being altogether mistaken in the assurance of their happiness; the continuance whereof depended upon Virtue, and not upon Fortune.

CHAP. XXX.

Cæsar finding the Enemy to offer Battle in an indifferent place, prepareth to undertake him.

Provision of Corn being made, and the soldiers well resolved, to which end he had interposed a sufficient space of time, after the Battle at *Dyrachium* *Cæsar* thought it now time to try what purpose or will Pompey had to fight. And therefore drawing the Army out of the Camp, he imbatel'd his Troops, first upon the place, and somewhat removed from Pompey's Camp: but every day following, he went farther off his own Trenches, and brought his Army under the hills whereon the Enemy lay incamped. This made his Army daily the more bold and assured. He kept continually his former converse with his horsemen; who because they were left in number by many degrees then those of Pompey's party, he commanded certain lusty young men, chosen out of them that stood before the Ensignes, for their nimble and swift running, to fight amongst the horsemen, who by reason of their daily practice, had learned the use of that kind of fight. So that one shew'd off our Cavalry, in open and champion places, would when need were, undergo the charge of seven thousand of theirs, and were no much terrified with the multitude of them. For at that time they made a fortunate encounter, and slew one of the two *Savoicens*, that had formerly fled to Pompey, with divers others.

Pompey

Pompey having his Camp upon a hill, imbatel'd his Army at the lower foot thereof, to see if he could get *Cæsar* to thrust himself into an unequal and disadvantageous place. *Cæsar* thinking that Pompey would by no means be drawn to Battle, thought it the fittest course for him to shift his Camp, and to be always in moving: hoping, by often removing from place to place, he should be better accommodated for provision of Corn; and withall, might, upon a March, find some occasion to fight; besides, he should weary Pompey's Army, not accustomed to travel, with daily and continual journeys. And thereupon he gave the sign of dislodging.

But, as the Tents were taken down, it was a little before observed, that Pompey's Army was advanced somewhat further from their Trenches, then ordinarily they were accustomed; so that it seem'd they might fight in an equal and indifferent place. Whereupon *Cæsar*, when his Troops were already in the Gates setting out, It behoveth us, saith he, to put off our removing for the present, and bethink our selves of fighting, as we have always desired; for we shall not easily bereave find the like occasion: and presently drew out his Forces. Pompey also, as it was afterwards known, was resolv'd (at the instance of all that were about him) to give Battle; for he had given out in Council some few dayes before, that he would overthrow *Cæsar*'s Army, before the Troops came to joyn Battle.

And as many that stood by wondered at it; I know, saith he, that I promise almost an incredible matter: but take the ground whereupon I speak it, that you may undergo the business with more assurance. I have persuaded the Cavalry, and they have promised to accomplish it, that when they come near to joyn, they shall attack *Cæsar*'s right Corner on the open side; and so the Army being circumvented behind, shall be amised and routed, before our men can cast a weapon at them: whereby we shall end the War without danger of the Legions, or almost without any wound received. Which is not difficult or hard to do, for us that are so strong in horse. And withall, he gave order, that they should be ready against the next day, for as much as the occasion was offer'd (according as they had often intended) not to deceive the opinion which other men had of their prowess and valour.

Labienus seconding this Speech, at condemning *Cæsar*'s Forces, extol'd Pompey's resolution to the skies. Do not think, Pompey, saith he, that this is the Army wherewith he conquer'd Gallia, or Germania: I was present my self at all those Battels, and do not speak rashly what I am ignorant of. There is a very small piece of that Army remaining: a great part of them are dead, as it cannot otherwise be, in so many Battels. The Pestilence (the last Autumn) in Italy consumed many of them; many are gone home, and many are left in the Continent. Have ye not heard, that the Cohorts which are now at *Brundisium*, are made and raised of such as remained behind there to recover their healths? These forces that ye see were the last year gathered of the Masters made in the bitter Gallia; and most of them, of the Colonies beyond the Po: and yet all the flower and strength of them was taken away in the last two overthrows at *Dyrachium*.

When he had spoke these things, he took a solemn Oath, not to return into the Camp but with Victory, exhorting the rest to do the like. Pompey commending him, took the same Oath: neither was there any man that refused it.

These things being thus carried in the Council, they rose up and departed, with great hope and joy of all men; as having already conceived Victory in their minds: and the rather, because they thought that nothing could be spoken vainly by so skillful a Commander, in so weighty and important a Cause.

OBSERVATION.

Concerning the fashion of the Cavalry, in which either party repes'd so much confidence, we are to note, that the Romans had two sorts of Horsemen; the one completely armed (according to their manner) and incorporated in the body of their Legions, whose entertainment was thrice as much as the Footmen. *Æque impotens postulat fuit* (saith *Livius*) *ut de stipendio equitum* (merebant autem triplex ex tempore) *are demerentur*; It seem'd as unreasonable a motion, that the Horsemen pay, which at that time was triple, should be lessened. And the other were as Light-horsemen, which they called *Alarii*.

The first sort were thus armed, as *Josephus* witnesseth: They wore a Sword on their right side, somewhat longer than that of the Footmen, and carried a long staff or Spear in their hand, a Target at their Horse-side, and three or more Darts in a quiver, with broad heads, and not much less than their flaves; having such head-pieces and corselets as the Footmen had.

Q. 9

The

Virtus militaris non fortuna
Dio Hist. carn. lib. 8.

Cæsar.

Prima egrorum
duo stipendia
equitum
am sine
petulo comparare.
Pompey lib. 1. strag.

Lib. 7.

Lib. 7.

Acid.

In erat pro
Planco.

■ Offic.

The light-armed men, had either light Darts, or Bow and Arrows. And doubtless, their chiefest service was with their casting-weapons. And accordingly Tully putteth his son in mind, of the praise he had got in Pompey's Army (where he Commanded a Wing of horse) *Equitando, jaculando, omni militari labore tolerando*, in riding, casting Darts, and undergoing all Military duty.

And as their service consisted in breaking their Staves upon an Enemy, and in calling their darts: so we exercise the practice of the former, in our Triumphs at Tilt; and the Spaniards the later, in their *Foco de cane*.

Our modern Horsemen are either Lanciers, Petronelliers, or Pistoliers. The Petronelliers do discharge at distance, making their left hand, that holds the Bridle, their rest: which is uncertain, and to no great effect.

The Pistolier, that will do somewhat to purpose, doth come up close to the other, and discharge his Pistol in his enemies neck, or under the corselet, about the flank or feat of a man; and commonly misseeth not.

I have seen a device to use a Musket on Horseback, which, if it prove as serviceable, as is by some conceived, will be of great advantage.

CHAP. XXXI.

The manner of imbatelling their Armies.

Cæsar.

AS Cæsar approached near unto Pompey's Camp, he observed his Army to be imbatelled in this manner: There were in the left Corner two Legions, which, in the beginning of these broils, were, by Order and Decree of Senate taken from Cæsar; whereof one was called the first, and the other the third: and with them stood Pompey. Scipio had the middle Squadron, with the Legions brought out of Syria.

The Legion of Cilicia, joyned with the Spanish Cohorts, which Afranius brought with him, made the right Corner. These Pompey held to be very strong. The rest of the Troops were interlaced between the middle Squadron and the Corners. All made One hundred and ten Cohorts, which amounted to Fifty five thousand men: besides Two thousand old soldiers, and men of note, whom he had called out to that War, and dispersed them over all the Army. The rest of the Cohorts, which were seven, he had left in the Camp, or disposed about the Forts near adjoining. The right Corner was flanked with a River, that had high and cumbersome banks: and thereupon he put all his Cavalry, together with the Archers and Slingers, in the left Corner.


Cæsar, observing his former custom, placed the Tenth Legion in the right Corner, and the Ninth in the left; albeit they were very much weakened in the fights at Dyrrachium: but to this he so joyned the Eighth, that he seemed almost to make one of two, and commanded them to succor each other. He had in all about Eighty Cohorts, which made Twenty two thousand men: two Cohorts he left to keep the Camp. He gave the left Corner to Antonius, the right to Pub. Sylla, and the middle Squadron to Cn. Domitius, and put himself opposite to Pompey. And withall, having well observed these things (according as I have formerly declared) fearing lest the right Corner should be inclosed about with the multitude of the Cavalry, he speedily drew six Cohorts out of the third Battel, and of them he made a fourth, to encounter the Horsemen, and shewed them what he would have done; admonishing them withall, that the Victory of that day consisted in the valour of those Cohorts: commanding the third Battel, and likewise the whole Army, not to joyn Battel without order from him; which when he thought fit, he would give them notice of by an Ensign.

And going about to incourage them to fight, according to the use of War, he put them in mind of his favours, and his carriage towards them from time to time; and specially, that they themselves were witness, with what labour and means he had sought for Peace, as well by Treaty with Vatinus, as also by employing A. Clodius to Scipio: and likewise how he had endeavoured at Oricum with Libo, that Embassadours might be sent to treat of these things. Neither was he willing at any time to mispend the Soldiers blood, or to deprive the Commonwealth of either of those Armies.

This Speech being delivered, the Soldiers both requiring and longing with an ardent desire to Fight, he commanded the Sign of Battel to be given by a Trumpet.

In manibus
vestris
quantus sit
Cæsar habet
Lucan. lib. 7

OBSER-



OBSERVATION.

Concerning the order used in disposing these Armies, for the trial of this Cause, it appeared by the story, that Pompey set two Legions in his left Corner, which are here named the first and the third. Howbeit Lucan saith, that those Legions were the first and the fourth.

— *Cornus tibi cura fuisse,*
Lentule, cum prima; qua sum fuit optima bello,
Et quarta legione datur.—

— The left Corners care,
Which the first Legion, (best in all that War)
And fourth made up, O *Lentulus*; was thine.

The middle Squadron was led by *Scipio*, with the Legions he brought out of *Syria*, which were also two; *Exspectabat cum Scipione ex Syria legiones duas*, he expected *Scipio* out of *Syria* with two Legions, as it is in the second Chapter of this Book.

In the right Corner was the *Cilician* Legion, with the Cohorts that *Afranius* brought out of *Spain*: which amounting to the number of a Legion, made that Corner equal to the rest. And so of these six Legions, which were the strength and sinews of his Army, he fashioned his Battel into a middle Squadron, and two Corners. His other Forces, being young Soldiers, he disposed in the distances, between the Corners and that middle Squadron.

Frontinus speaking of this point, saith; *Legiones secundum virum, firmissimas in medio, & in cornu locavit*; *spacia his interposita tyronebus supplevit*: He disposed his Legions according to their goodness and worth: the stoutest he placed in the middle Squadron, and the Corners; filling up the spaces betwixt these with his young Soldiers. His number of men, by our Text, was Fifty five thousand; but *Plutarch* maketh them not above Forty five thousand.

Caesar had not half so many men, and yet made a triple Battel; but not so thick or deep with Legions: for in the right Corner he put the tenth Legion, and in the left the ninth and the Eighth; being both weak and far spent, by the former overthrows. Of the other Legions he maketh no mention: but it seemeth they filled up the distances between the Corners and the body of the Army; and were as flesh to those sinews and bones, which out of the prerogative of their valour, took the place of the Corners, and the middle bulk of the battel. And fearing lest his right Corner should be circumvented by the multitude of their Cavalry, he drew six Cohorts out of his third or last Battel, to make a fourth Battel to oppose the Cavalry: which got him the Victory. For howsoever the Text saith, *Singulas cohortes detraxit*; yet *Plutarch* saith plainly, that those Cohorts he thus took were six, and amounted to Three thousand men; which re-

singulas cohortes detraxit.

seth to the number of so many Cohorts. And *Appian* agreeing herunto, saith, That his fourth Battel consisted of Three thousand men. *Frontinus* likewise affirmeth, he took out six Cohorts, & sent in *subsidio*, sed *dextro latere conversas in obliquum*; and kept them as a reserve, placing them off obliquely from the right corner. Whereunto that of *Lucan* agreeth;

— *Teneti obliquas post signa cohortes.*

He plac'd these Troops oblique behind the Battel.

Which is thus to be understood; that they turned their faces towards the left Corner of Pompey's Army, that they might be the readier to receive the Cavalry coming on to invade *Caesar's* Right Wing; as being sure of the other side, which was fenced with a River and a Marish.

Touching *Caesar's* Speech to the Soldiers, it seemed like that of *Themistocles* at the Battel of *Salamina*: where *Xerxes* made a long Oration to encourage the *Persians*, and lost the day; *Themistocles* spake but a few words to the *Greeks*, and got the Victory. Howsoever, one thing is not to be omitted, that *Plutarch*, and such others as have dipped their Pens, either in the sweat or in the blood of this Battel, do all agree, that *Caesar* had not above Twenty two thousand Men.

CHAP. XXXII.

The Battel begunneth, and *Caesar* overcometh.

There was one *Craffinus* in *Caesar's* Army, called out to this War, who the year before had led the first Company of the Tenth Legion, a Man of singular valour, who, upon the Sign of Battel given, Follow me, saith he, as many of you as were of my company, and do that endeavour to your Emperor, which you have alwayes been willing to perform. This is the onely battel remaining unsought: which being ended, he shall be restored to his dignity, and we to our liberty. And withall, looking towards *Caesar*, I will, saith he, O Emperor, so carry myself this day, that thou shalt give me thanks, either alive or dead. And when he had thus spoken, he was the first that ran out of the right Corner: and about one hundred and twenty chosen soldiers of the same Century followed voluntarily after him.

There was so much space left between both the battels, as might serve either Army to meet upon the charge. But *Pompey* had commanded his men to receive *Caesar's* assault, and to undergo the shock of his Army, without moving from the place whereto

in they stood (and that by the advice of C. Triarius) to the end that the first running out and violence of the Soldiers being broken, and the Battel defended, they that stood perfect in their Orders, might sit upon them that were scattered and dispersed: hoping the piles would not fall so forceably upon the Army standing still, as when they advanced forward to meet them: and that it would fall out withall, that Cæsar's Soldiers, having twice as far to run, would by that means be brought out of breath, and spent with weariness.

Which, in my opinion, was against all reason: for, there is a certain incitation and alacrity of spirit naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed with a desire to Fight. Neither should any Commander repress, or restrain the same, but rather increase it, and set it forward.

Not was it in vain of ancient time ordained, that the Trumpets should every where sound, and every man take up a sword; but that they thought these things did both terrifie the Enemy, and incite their own party.

But our Soldiers, upon the sign of Battel, running out with their Piles ready to be thrown, and perceiving that Pompey's soldiers did not make out to meet them, as men taught with long use, and exercised in former fights, stop their course of their own accord, and almost in the mid-way stood still: that they might not come to blow upon the spending of their strength: and after a little respite of time, running on again, threw their piles, and presently drew their Swords, as Cæsar had commanded them. Neither were Pompey's soldiers wanting in this business; for they received the Piles which were cast at them, took the shock of the Legions, kept their ranks, cast their Piles, and betook them to their Swords.

At the same time, the Cavalry, according as was commanded them, issued out from Pompey's left Corn, and the whole multitude of Archers, thrust themselves out. Whole shoals our Horsemen were not able to endure, but fell back a little from the place wherein they stood: whereby Pompey's Horsemen began to press them with more eagerness, and to put themselves in Squadrons, to inclose the Army about. Which Cæsar perceiving, gave the sign of advancing forward to the fourth Battel, which

he had made up of six Cohorts; who came with such a sing upon Pompey's Horsemen, that none of them were able to stand before them, but turning their backs, did not only give place, but fled all in haste as they could, to the highest Hills: whereby the Archers and Slingers being left naked without succour, were all put to the sword. And with the same violence, those Cohorts incircled about the left Corner, notwithstanding any resistance that could be made by Pompey's Party, and charged them behind upon their backs.

At the same time Cæsar commanded the third Battel, which as yet stood still, and were not removed, to advance forward, by means of which fresh and sound men, relieving such as were faint and weary, as also that others did charge them behind upon their backs, Pompey's Party were no longer able to endure it, but all turned their backs and fled.

Neither was Cæsar deceived in his opinion, that the beginning of the Victory would grow from those Cohorts which he placed in the fourth Battel, against the Horsemen; according as he himself had openly spoken, in his incouragement to the soldiers. For, by them, first the Cavalry was beaten; by them the Archers and Slingers were slain, by them Pompey's Battel was Circumvented on the left Corner, and by their means they began to flee.

As soon as Pompey saw his Cavalry beaten, and perceived the part wherein he most trusted, to be amused and affrighted, and distrusting the rest, he forthwith left the Battel, and conveyed himself on horseback into the Camp. And speaking to the Centurions that had the Watch at the Prætorian Gate with a loud voice, as all the Soldiers might hear, he said, Keep the Camp, and defend it diligently, to prevent any bad casualty that may happen. In the mean while, I will go about to the other Ports, to settle the Guards of the Camp.

And having thus said, he went into the Prætorium, distrusting the main point, and yet expecting the event.

26

The First OBSERVATION.

Pompey so carried himself in the course of this War, as he rather seemed a sufferer than a doer: never disposing his Army for any attempt or onset, but only when he brake out of the place, wherein he was besieged at *Durachium*. And accordingly he gave order, that in the main action and point of trial, his Soldiers should suffer and sustain the assault, rather then otherwise. But whether he did well or no, hath since been in question. Cæsar utterly disliked it, as a thing contrary to reason. *Est quidam* (saith he) *animi incitatio atque alacritas, naturaliter innata omnibus, que studio pugne incenditur; hanc non reprimere, sed augere Imperatores debent.* There is a certain incitation and alacrity of spirit naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed with a desire to fight. Neither should any Commander repress or restrain the same, but rather increase it, and let it forward.

Agreeable whereunto is that of *Cato* the Great, that in cases of battel an enemy is to be charged with all violence. And to that purpose it is requisite, to put the souldiers (at some reasonable distance) into a posture of vaunting and defiance, with menaces and cries of terror, and to spring forward in such manner, as may make them fall upon their enemies with greater fury. As Champions or Wrallers, before they buckle, stretch out their limbs, and make their flourishes as may best serve to assure themselves, and discourage their adversaries, according as we read of *Hercules* and *Anteus*.

Ille Cleonæi præcipiti iuga Leonis, Ausus Libyci; perfluid membra liquoræ Holpes, Olympiace servato more Palaestra. Ille parum fidens pedibus contingere marmem, Auxilium membris, calidatis infudit arenas.

The one throws by the *Cleonæan* Lyons skin, The others *Libyan*; and ere they begin, The one anoints himself from top to toe, As the *Olympian* Gamblers ule to do. Not sure his foe would let his feet touch ground, Himself with sand *Anteus* sprinkles round.

Howbeit, forasmuch as all men are not of one temper, but require several fashions to tune their minds, to the true note of a battel, we shall find several Nations to have several pances in this point. The *Romans* (as appeareth by this of *Cæsar*) were of ancient time accustomed, to found Trumpets and Hobbies, in all parts of the Army, and took up a great clamor and shout, whereby the souldiers (not their understanding) were encouraged, and the Enemy affrighted. Whereas contrariwise, the *Greeks* went always with a close and silent mouth, as having more to do then to say to their Enemies. And *Thucydides* writing of the *Lacedæmonians* (the flower of *Greece* for matter of Arms) saith, that instead of Trumpets and Cornets to incite them, they used the sweet harmony of Flutes, to moderate and qualifie their passions, least they should be transported with unbridled impetuosity.

It is reported, that *Marshall Biron* the Father seemed to dislike of our English march (hearing it beaten by the Drums) as too slow and of no encouragement: and yet it so fitteth our Nation (as *Sir Roger Williams* then answered) as we have divers times overrun all *France* with it. Howsoever, the event of this battel is sufficient to disprove Pompey's error herein, and to make good what *Cæsar* commanded.

The Second OBSERVATION.

These six Cohorts, which made the fourth battel, did so encounter Pompey's Cavalry, that they were not able to withstand them: It is said, that *Cæsar* gave them order not to bind their Piles, as commonly they did, but to hold them in their hands like a Pike or Javelin, and make only at the faces of those Gallants, and men at Arms on horseback. For the holding of them in their hands, I do not understand it, and cannot conceive how they could reach more then the next ranks unto them in that manner. But for making at the faces of the Cavalry, *Florus* saith, that *Cæsar* as he galloped up and down the ranks, was heard to let fall bloody and bitter words, but very pathological, and effectual for a victory: as thus, Souldier cast right at the face: whereas Pompey called to his men, to spare their fellow-Citizens.

Eutropius in his Epitome of *Suetonius*, affirmeth the same thing; both of the one and of the other; and *Lucan* seemeth to averr the same, concerning that of *Cæsar*;

Adversusque iubeo ferro commedere vulgus.

He bids them strike just at the Enemies face.

Frontinus hath it thus; *C. Cæsar, cum in partibus Pompeianis magna equitum Romanorum esset manus, eaque armorum scientia milites conficeret, ora oculoque eorum gladiis recte iussit, Ut sic adversum faciem edere cogeret.* Pompey having in his Army a great company of *Roman* knights, who being well skilled at their weapons made an end of their enemies; *Cæsar* commanded his men to make at their faces and eyes; and thereby compelled them to turn away their faces.

The Third OBSERVATION.

Amongst these memorials, *Crassus* may not be forgotten, being the first Man that began the battel, whom *Plutarch* calleth *Crassippus*, and saith, that *Cæsar* seeing him in the morning as he came out of his Tent, asked him what he thought of the success of the battel. *Crassippus* stretching out his right hand unto him; cried out aloud; *O Cæsar* thou art the victory; and this day shalt thou commend me either alive or dead. And accordingly, he brake afterwards out of the ranks; and running amongst the midst of his enemies, with many that followed him, made a great slaughter. At last one ran him into the mouth, that the sword's point came out at his neck, and so flew him.

By

By him, and others of like courage and worth, was Cæsar raised from the extremity of his wants, and the disgrace of his former losses, to the chiefest height of earthly glory: and herein might well assume unto himself, that which was formerly said of the people, *Magna populi Romani fortuna, sed semper in lais major rejuvexit*; Great is the fortune of the people of Rome; but it still grows greater, and increaseth by troubles: together with that of *Plutarch*, *Res invidia Romanorum arma, the Roman Arms are things invincible*. *Lucean* speaking of *Scæva* formerly mentioned, saith, he shewed a great deal of valor to get Rome a Lord. But upon *Craffinus* layeth a heavy doom.

Dii tibi non mortem, quæ cuiusvis pena paratur. Sed sensum post fata tunc dant, Craffine, morti, Cuius tota manus commissa lancea bellum, Præmque Thebællam Romano sanguine tinxit.

Maiest thou not only thy, which all men do; But day, and have thy senses after too. A lance thrown by thy hand the fight began, When with brave Roman blood Thebællan ran.

[CHAP. XXXIII.

Cæsar presseth hard after the Enemy, and taketh the Camp.

Cæsar.

Pompeys souldiers being thus forced to fly into their Camp, Cæsar thinking it expedient to give them no time of respite, exhorted the Army to use the benefit of fortune, and to assault the Camp: who notwithstanding the extremest heat (for the business was drawn out until it was high noon) were willing to undergo any labor, and to yield obedience to his commandments. The Camp was industriously defended by the Cohorts that had the guard thereof, but much more stoutly by the Thracians, and other succors of barbarous people. For such souldiers as were fled thither out of the battel, were so terrified in mind and spent with weariness, that most of them (having laid aside their Arms and Military Equipage) did rather think how they might best escape, then to defend the Camp. Neither could they longer endure the multitude of weapons; but fainting with wounds sought the place, and presently fled into the high Mountains adjoining unto the Camp, being led thither by the Centurions and Tribunes of the souldiers.

In the Camp were found Tables ready laid and prepared with linen, together with cupboards of plate furnished and set out, and their Tents strewn with fresh herbs and rushes; and that of *Lentulus* and divers others with Iule, and many other superfluities, discovering

their extremest luxury and assurance of Victory. Whereby it was easily to be conceived, that they nothing feared the event of that day, being so careful of such unnecessary delights. And yet for all this, they upbraided Cæsar's patient and miserable Army, with riot and excess: to whom there were always wanting such requisites, as were expedient for their necessary uses.

Pompey, when as our Men were come within the Camp, having got a horse, and cast away all Ensigns of Imperial authority, got out at the Decumane gate, and made towards Larissa, as fast as his horse could carry him. Neither did he stay there, but with the same speed (having got a few followers that escaped by flight) posting night and day, came at length to the sea side with a Troop of thirty horse, and there went aboard a ship of burthen, complaining that his opinion only deceived him; being as it were betrayed by such as began first to fly, from whom he hoped chiefly to have had the victory.

OBSERVATION.

Whereas it is said, that a dilatory course is very profitable and safe; we are to understand it as a chief and main point in the duty of an Ambassador, to temporize in things which are pressed hard upon him: as being accountable for words and time, but no way charged with expeditions of War; wherein Protraction is oftentimes the interrupter of absolute victory, and the only supplanter of that which is desired. *Finere scis Elamibal, sed victoria uti ne scis*, Thou knowest well enough how to get the Victory, *Elamibal*, but thou knowest not how to use it: was a common byword, and happened then well for the State of Rome. But now it fell out otherwise; having met with one that knew how to conquer, and knew how to follow victory to purpose.

For notwithstanding the battel he had fought, and the advantage he had thereby got, might have seemed sufficient for one day's labor, yet he would not let occasion pass, without taking the benefit that was then offered: and never ceased until he had forced the Camp, and overtaken those that escaped the battel: and so made victory sure unto him, by driving the nail home to the head. In regard whereof, he did not unskilfully use for his word or Motto, (as they call it) *Mors avaræ cadaveris*, BY DEFERRING NOTHING.

Utilitas et tuta res dilatio. Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 8.

Non committuntur legatis strictæ, aut loca aut legionæ, aut arces; sed verba et tempora. Demost. de falsa legatione.

1. Labor in negotiis.
2. Fortitudo in periculis.
3. Industria in agendis.
4. Celeritas in conficiendis, were Cæsar's properties.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Cæsar besegeth those that were escaped into the Hills.

Cæsar.

Cæsar having got the Camp, instantly required the souldiers not to look after pillage and booty, and let slip the means of ending the rest of their business. Which after he had obtained, he began to inclose the Hill about with works of fortification. They of Pompey's party distrusting the place, for that the hill had new water, left it in an instant. And all those that were partakers of that fortune, made towards Larissa. Which Cæsar observing, divided his forces, and commanded part of the Legions to remain in Pompey's Camp, and part he sent back into his own: and leading four Legions along with him, he took a nearer way to meet with them; and having gone six miles he imbatteled his forces. Which they perceiving, betook themselves unto a high hill, under which ran a River.

Cæsar persuaded the Souldiers, altho they were spent with continual labor all that day, and that night was now at hand, yet they would not think it much to cut off the River from the Hill by a fortification, to keep them from watering in the night. Which work being perfected, they began by Commissioners to treat of conditions of yielding themselves. Some few of the Senators escaped in the night time away by flight.

Cæsar, as soon as it was day, caused them all to come down from the hill into the plain; and there to cast away their Arms: which they performed without refusals, and casting themselves upon the earth, their hands spread abroad, with shedding of many tears, desired mercy. Cæsar comforting them, commanded they should stand up: and having spoken somewhat touching his clemency, a little to ease them of their fear, he gave them all their lives with safety; commanding the Souldiers not to hurt any of them, nor that they should want any thing that was theirs.

Those things being thus achieved with diligence, he caused other Legions to meet him from the Camp, sending those he had with him to rest themselves; and the same day came to Larissa. In that battel he lost not above two hundred Souldiers; but of Centurions, valiant men, he lost thirty. And *Craffinus* fighting valiantly was slain (of whom we formerly made mention,) with a sword thrust into the face. Neither was that false which he said as he went to the battel: for Cæsar was persuaded, that *Craffinus* behaved himself ad-

mirably in that fight, and did deserve as well of him as a man possibly could.

There were slain of Pompey's Army about fifteen thousand: amongst there were of them that yielded themselves above twenty four thousand. For such Cohorts as were in the Fore, did likewise yield themselves to Sylla: and many fled into the next Towns and Cities. Of military Enginiers there were brought out of the Battel to Cæsar one hundred and fourscore, with nine Eagles. *L. Domitius* flying out of the Camp into the Mount, fainting for want of strength, was slain by the horsemen.

OBSERVATION.

And thus we see the issue of that battel, and the victory which Cæsar obtained at as cheap a rate as could be imagined: for there were slain twenty three thousand of the enemy, and as many taken, by rendering themselves, with the loss of two hundred Souldiers, and thirty Centurions, amongst whom was *Craffinus*: whose death obliged Cæsar to make this honorable mention of his valor. But as it is observed by *Dionysius Halicarnensis*, *Non Deus quissimæ duellæ præfatus omnium qui certamen inuenit, sponsorem fuit: nec ea conditione imperium accepimus, ut omnes homines devincimus, nullo exceptis iustis*. No God can promise a General the safety of all his men: neither do we take commands upon that condition, to conquer all our enemies without the loss of a man.

CHAP. XXXV.

Lælius attempts to block in the Haven at Brundisium: and *Cassius* fetches Cæsar's Ships at Messina.

About the same time *D. Lælius* came with his Navy to Brundisium; and according as *Libo* formerly did, took the Island in the mouth of the Port. And in like manner *Vatinius*, Governor of Brundisium, having furnished and sent out certain Skiffs, incited out *Lælius* ships, and of them took a Galley, with two lesser ships, that were farther shot out into the straight of the Port: and also had disposed his Cavalry along the Shore, to keep the Mariners from fetching water. But *Lælius* having the time of the year more favorable and fitter for sailing, supplied his Army with water from *Corfu* and *Dyrachium*: neither could he be beaten off his design, nor be driven out of the Port, or from the Island, either with the dishonour of the Ships he lost, or with scarcity and want of all necessities, until he heard of the Battel in Thebællia.

About

Interdum majores cohortes numerantur à minoribus Dion. Halli. lib. 8.

OBSERVATION.

About the same time also Cassius came into Sicily, with the Navy of Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia. And whereas Cæsars ships were divided into two parts, Pub. Sulpitius Pretor, being Admiral of the one half, and lying at Vibone in the Straights, and M. Pomponius Admiral of the other half at Messana: Cassius came first to Messana, and was arrived before Pomponius heard of his coming: by which means he surprised him, distracted, and much amazed, without any order or guards. And finding a strong and favourable wind, filled the Ships of burthen with Rosin, Pitch and Tow, and like matter of firing; and sending them out to Pomponius Navy, he burned all the ships, being in number thirty five, amongst which there were twenty that had decks. By means whereof, they conceived such a terror, that albeit there was a Legion in Garrison at Messana, yet the Town was hardly kept. And but that certain Messengers coming post, brought news at the same instant of Cæsars Victory, most Men thought the Town would have been lost: but the news coming so opportunely, the Town was kept.

Confirata.

Cassius departed from thence, and went to Sulpitius Fleet at Vibone, where our ships being brought to shore, for fear of the like danger, he there did as he did before; for finding the wind good, he sent in forty ships of burthen, furnished with matter to burn the Navy. The fire having taken hold of both Cornets of the Fleet, five of them were burned down to the water. And as the flame began to be farther carried with the wind, the Souldiers of the old Legions which were left for the defence of the Shipping, and were of the number of them that were sick, did not induce the dishonour: but getting aboard of their own accord, put the Ships from the Shore, and setting upon Cassius Fleet, took two Gallies, in one of the which was Cassius himself: but he being taken out with a Skiff, fled away. And furthermore, they took two Tirmen. Not long after, certain news came of the Battel in Thessalia, so that Pompeys party believed it: for before that time, it was thought to be but a thing given out by Cæsars Legates, and other of his friends. Whereupon Cassius departed with his Navy, and left those places.

The branches of a Tree do receive life from the stock, and the stock is maintained by the root which being once cut off, there remaineth no life for stock or bough, leaf or branch. Accordingly it hapned with this large-spread party, the root whereof was then in Thessalia, and being broken off under by the violence of Cæsars forces, it booted not what Lælius did at Brundisium, or Cassius either at Messana or Vibone. For all the parts were overthrown with the body: and the fortune of the battel over-swayed other petty losses whatsoever, being so powerful in the opinion of the World, *Ut quo se fortuna, eodem etiam favor hominum inclinat.* That what way soever fortune goes, the same way goes the favor of the people: Or, as Lucan saith,

---Regimus, quo cuncta feruntur,

We're snatch'd that way that things are carried.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Cæsar pursueth Pompey, who is slain in Egypt.

Cæsar setting all other things apart, Cæsar thought it expedient for him to pursue Pompey into what parts soever he should betake himself, lest he should raise new forces, and renew the War again: and whereupon made forward every day, as far as his Cavalry was able to go; commanding one Legion to follow after by lesser journeys. There was a publication made in Pompeys name at Amphipolis, that all the youth of that Province, as well Greeks as Citizens of Rome, should come to be enrolled for the War. But it is not possible to discover, whether Pompey did it to take away all cause of suspicion, that he might the longer bide his purpose of flying away; or whether he went about by new levies to keep Macedonia, if no man pressed hard after him.

Howsoever, he himself lay at Anchor there one night. And calling unto him his ancient Hosts and Friends, he took so much money of them, as would defray his necessary charges: and understanding of Cæsars coming, within a few days he boisted sail and departed thence, arriving at Mitylene, where he was kept two days with foul weather, and there reinforcing his fleet with some Gallies he took to him, he went into Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus. There he understood, that by the general consent of the Antiochians, and such Citizens of Rome, as were there residing, the Citadel was already taken to keep him

Pompeius
Tropus,
lib. 6,
Lib. 8.

him out: and that Messengers were sent about, to those that were fled from his Party into the bordering Cities, forbidding them to come to Antioch: for if they did, they should hazard it with the danger of their heads. The like happened to L. Lentulus, who the year before was Consul, and to Pub. Lentulus, of Consular dignity, and to some other at Rhodes. For, as many as fled thither after Pompey, and came unto the Island, were neither received into the Town nor into the Haven; but were commanded by Messengers sent unto them, to depart from thence, and forced to weigh Anchor against their will. And now the fame of Cæsars coming was spread abroad throughout all the Cities.

Whereupon Pompey, leaving off his purpose of going into Syria, having taken what Money he found in Bank, besides what he could borrow of his private Friends, and putting aboard great store of Brast for the use of War, with Two thousand Armed men (which he had raised partly out of the Towns, and partly had forced up amongst the Merchants, and such others of his followers whom he thought fit for his business) he came to Pelusium. There, by chance, was King Ptolemy, a Child within years, with great Forces, making War against his Sister Cleopatra; whom, a few Months before, by means of his Allies and Friends, he had thrust out of his Kingdom. And Cleopatra's Camp was not far distant from his.

Pompey sent unto him, that, in regard of ancient Hospitality, and the Amity he had with his Father, he might be received into Alexandria, and that he would aid and support him with his Wealth and Means, seeing him now fallen into misery and calamity. But, they that were sent, having done their Message, began to speak liberally to the King's Soldiers, and to exhort them: that they would stand to Pompey, not desisting the low ebbe of fortune he was brought to. Amongst them were many that had been Pompey's Soldiers, which Gabinus had received out of his Army in Syria, and had brought them to Alexandria; and upon the ending of the War, had left them with Ptolemy, the Father of this Child. These things being known, such as had the promotion of the Kingdom in the minority of the Boy; whether they were induced through fear of gaining the Army, (as afterwards they conspired) whether by Pompey might easily seize upon Alexan-

dria and Egypt; or whether desisting his fortune (as for the most part, in time of misery a mans Friends do become his Enemies) did give a good answer publicly to such as were sent, and would him to come unto the King: but secretly plotting amongst themselves, sent Achilles, a Chief Commander, and a man of singular audacity, together with L. Septimius, Tribune of the Soldiers, to kill Pompey. They giving him good words, and he himself also knowing Septimius to have led a Company under him in the War against the Pirates, went aboard a little Bark, with a few of his soldiers, and there was slain by Achilles and Septimius. In like manner L. Lentulus was apprehended by Commandment from the King, and killed in prison.

The first OBSERVATION.

It is now demanded, Where was Cæsars desire of Peace? and, Why pursued he not a Treaty of Composition, at this time, when as his Tale would have been heard with gladness, and any conditions of atonement very acceptable to the vanquished? the Answer is already made in the beginning of this Commentary; That there was but one time of making Peace: and that was, when both Parties were equal; which was now past, and Cæsar too far gone, to look back upon any thing that might Work a reconciliation: The one was crept so high, and the other cast down so low, that they seemed not compatible in any Medium, although it were to the saving of the Empire. Howbeit, it is not denied, but that Pompey gave great occasion of these Wars. For Seneca saith; He had, brought the Commonwealth to that pass, that it could not stand, but by the benefit of servitude. And he, that will look into the reasons of this confusion, shall find all those *Causæ corruptæ*, or ruining causes, which are noted by Aristotle to threaten the Welfare of a State, in the excess of Pompey's exorbitancy. For, having nothing in the Mean, he held all his Fortunes by the Teucre of Aymium; and was overgrown, first, with too much honour, secondly, with too much Wealth, thirdly, with too much Power; whereby he exceeded the proportion of his Fellow-Citizens, and so blemished the beauty of that State, whose chiefest graces were in a lasting equality. And adding to these the convulsions of fear, he made no difficulty to engage Rome in a bloody War; as having no other hope, but in the confusion of Aims.

It is said, that at his arrival at Mitylene, he had much conference with Crassus, whom Tully mentioneth in his Offices; wherein, amongst other Remonstrances, the Philosopher made it plain, that his courtie of Government had brought a necessity of changing that State from the Liberty of a Commonwealth, to the condition of a just Monarchy. And such it fell to Cæsars fortune, if there were any error committed

Pompeius
to redege
tempus,
ut si ita esse
non possent,
non benefici-
um servitutis
esset, sed de
benef. 16.
s. Poll. c.
Nil enim
cuius, was
written in
Golden Let-
ters at Del-
phi.

Iustum bel-
lum esse in
quibus nisi
in armis spes
nulla.
Machiav.

Nuquam
genium
reperitur,
qui possit
penitus ap-
probare.

in the seizure, he may take the benefit of the general pardon, exemplified by *Trebellius Pollio*. That no Nation can shew a Man that is altogether blameless.

The second OBSERVATION.

Concerning the State of *Ægypt*, we are to note, that *Alexander* the Great being cut off by death, his Captains laid hold upon his Provinces and Kingdoms as were under their Commands: amongst whom, one *Ptolemaeus* the son of *Lagus*, a *Macedonian*, seized upon *Ægypt*, where he Reigned 40 years; and of him were all his Successors called by the name of *Ptolemy*. This first *Ptolemy* posset himself off *Ægypt* about the Year of the World 3640: which was 275 years before *Pompey's* overthrow. His Son that succeeded, by the Name of *Ptolemy Philadelphus*, caused the Bible to be Translated out of *Hebrew* into *Greek* by 70 Interpreters, which are called the *Septuagint*; and made the famous Library which was burned in these Wars.

The Father of this young *Pompey*, was the Ninth in Succession from the First, and, at his death, made the People of *Rome* Tutors to his Children. His eldest Son, and *Cleopatra* his Daughter Reigned together Six years; but, in the end, fell to strife and Wars, and were deeply engaged therein when *Pompey* arrived. But, shortly after, *Cæsar* lo ordered the differences, that he set the Crown upon *Cleopatra's* head; who held it peaceably, until she came to play that Tragical part with *Antony*: which being ended, the Kingdom was then reduced to a Province, under the obedience of the *Roman* Empire.

Concerning this miserable end of *Pompey*, it is truly said of *Seneca*, that Death is alike to all: for, although the ways are divers by which it happeneth, yet they all meet in the same end. And, for as much as *Plutarch* hath described particularly the manner of this Catastrophe, it shall not be impertinent to insert his relation thereof.

When *Pompey* heard news that King *Ptolemy* was in the City of *Pelusium* with his Army, making War against his Sister, he went thither, and sent a Messenger before unto the King, to advertise him of his arrival, and to intreat him to receive him. King *Ptolemy* was then but a young man, in so much that one *Pholusius* Governed all the whole Realm under him. He assembled a Council of the Chiefest and Wisest Men of the Court, who had such credit and authority as it pleased him to give them. They being assembled, he commanded every man in the King's Name to say his mind, touching the receiving of *Pompey*, whether the King should receive him or not. It was a miserable thing to see *Pholusius*, an Eunuch of the King's, and *Theodotus* of *Cyho*, an hired Schoolmaster, to Teach the young King Rhetorick, and *Achillas* an *Ægyptian*, to consult among themselves, What they should do with *Pompey* the Great. These were the Chiefest Counsellors of all his Eunuchs, and of those that had brought him up.

Now did *Pompey* ride at Anchor upon the shore side, expecting the resolution of this Coun-

sell: in the which the Opinions were divers; for, some would not have him received, others contented that he should be received. But, the Rhetorician *Theodotus*, to shew his Eloquence, periwaded them, That neither the one nor the other was to be accepted. For, quoth he, if we receive him, we shall have *Cæsar* our Enemy, and *Pompey* our Lord; and if we do deny him on the other side, *Pompey* will blame us for refusing him, and *Cæsar* for not keeping of him; therefore this would be the best resolution, he told them, to tend to kill him, for thereby they should win the good will of the one, and not fear the displeasure of the other. And some say moreover, that he added this mock withall: A Dead man bites not. They being determined of this among themselves, gave *Achillas* Commission to do it. He taking with him *Septimius* (who had Charge afore-time under *Pompey*) and *Salvius*, another Centurion also, with three or four Soldiers besides, they made towards *Pompey's* Gallies, about whom were at that time the chiefest of his Train, to see what would become of this matter. But when they saw the likelihood of their entertainment, and that it was not in Princely shew nor manner, nor nothing answerable to the hope which *Theophrastus* had put them in, seeing to few men come to them in a fisher-boat; they began then to mistrust the small account that was made of them, and Counsell'd *Pompey* to return back, and to launch again into the Sea being out of the danger of the hurling of a Dart.

In the mean time the Fisher-boat drew near, and *Septimius* rose, and saluted *Pompey* in the *Roman* Tongue, by the Name of *Imperator*, as much as Sovereign Captain: and *Achillas* also spake to him in the *Greek* Tongue, and bad him come into his Boat; b cause that by the shore side there was a great deal of mud and sand banks, so that his Gallies should have no Water to bring him in. At the very same time they saw afar off divers of the King's Gallies, which were Arming with all speed possible, and all the shore besides full of Soldiers. Thus, though *Pompey* and his company would have altered their minds, they could not have told how to have escaped: and furthermore, shewing that they had mistrusted them, then they had given the Murderer occasion to have executed his Cruelty. So, taking his leave of his Wife *Cornelia*, who lamented his Death before his end, he commanded two Centurions to go down before him into the *Ægyptian* Boat, and *Philip*, one of his slaves enfranchised, with another slave, called *Seyner*. When *Achillas* reached out his hand to receive him into his Boat, he turned him to his Wife and Son, and said these Verses of *Sophocles* unto them;

*The Man that into Court comes free,
Must there in state of bondage be.*

These were the last words he spake unto his People, when he left his own Gally, and went into the *Ægyptian* Boat, the Land being a great way off from his Gally. When he saw never a Man in the Boat speak friendly unto him, beholding *Septimius*, he said unto him; Me thinks my Friend, I should know thee, for that thou

hast

hast served with me heretofore. The other nodded with his head, that it was true, but gave him no answer, nor shewed him any countenance.

Pompey seeing that no man spake to him, took a little Book he had in his hand, in which he had Written an Oration that he meant to make unto King *Ptolemy*, and began to read it. When they came near to the shore, *Cornelia*, with her Servants and Friends about her, stood up in her Ship, in great fear, to see what should become of *Pompey*. So she hoped well, when the few many of the King's People on the shore, coming towards *Pompey* at his landing, as it were to receive and honour him. But even as *Pompey* took *Philip* his hand to arise more easily, *Septimius* came first behind him, and thrust him through with his Sword: next unto him also *Salvius* and *Achillas* drew out their Swords in like manner, *Pompey* then did no more but took up his Gown with his hands, and hid his Face, and many abode the wounds they gave him, he ly fighting a little. Thus, being 39 years old, he ended his life the next day after the day of his Birth.

They that rode at Anchor in their Ships, when they saw him Murdered, gave such a fearful Cry, that it was heard to the Shore: then weighing up their Anchours with speed, they hoisted sail, and departed their way, having Wind at will that blew a lusty Gale. As soon as they had gotten the main Sea, the *Ægyptians*, which were prepared to row after them, when they saw they were past their reach, and unpossible to be overtaken, they let them go. Then having flucken off *Pompey's* head, they threw his Body overboard, for a miserable Spectacle to all those that were desirous to see him.

Philip, his enfranchised Bond-man, remained ever by it, until such time as the *Ægyptians* had seen it their Bellies full. Then, having washed his Body with Salt-water, and wrapped it up in an old Shirt of his, because he had no other shift to lay it in, he fought upon the Sands, and found at length to Burn his naked Body with, but not all fully out. As he was busie gathering the broken pieces of this Boat together, thither came unto him an old *Roman*, who, in his youth, had served under *Pompey*, and said unto him; O Friend! What art thou that preparest the Funerals of *Pompey* the Great? *Philip* answered, That he was a Bond-man of his, enfranchised. Well, said he, thou shalt not have all this honour alone: I pray thee yet let me accompany thee in so devout a Deed, that I may not altogether repent me to have dwelt so long in a strange Country, where I have abidden such misery and trouble; but, that I recompense me withall; I may have this good hap, with mine own hands, to touch *Pompey's* Body, and to help to bury the only and most Famous Captain of the Romans.

The next day after, *Zucius Lentulus* (not knowing what had passed) coming out of *Cyprus*, failed by the shore side, and perceived a fire made for Funerals and *Philip* standing by it; whom he knew not at the first. So he asked him, What he knew that is dead, and buried there? But straight fetching a great sigh, *Alas*, said he, perhaps it is *Pompey* the Great. Then he landed a

little, and was straight taken and slain. This was the end of *Pompey* the Great. Not long after *Cæsar* also came into *Ægypt*, that was in great Wars; where *Pompey's* head was presented unto him; but he turned his head aside and would not see it, and abhorred him that brought it as a detestable Murderer.

Then taking his Ring, wherewith he Sealed his Letters, wherupon was graven a Lyon holding a Sword, he burnt out Weeping, *Achillas* and *Pholusius* he put to death. King *Ptolemy* himself also being overthrow in Battle by the River of *Nilus*, vanished away, and was never heard of after. *Theodotus* the Rhetorician escaped *Cæsar's* hands, and wandered up and down *Ægypt* in great misery, despised of every man. Afterwards *Marcus Brutus* (who slew *Cæsar*) conquering *Asia*, met with him by chance, and putting him to all the Torments he could possibly devise, at the length flew him. The Ashes of *Pompey's* Body were afterwards brought unto his Wife *Cornelia*; who buried them in a Town of hers, by the City of *Alba*.

And having in this manner paid the Tribute which the Law of Nature doth exact, the Law of the Twelve Tables did free his Sepulchre from any further disturbance; *Ubi corpus demoratur nonominis condus, sacer esto*. Let that place be Sacred, where the Body of a dead man is buried. Only this may be added; That as *Fabius* was called *Maximus*, *Scipio*, *Magnus*, and *Pompey*, *Magnus*, which Titles they carried as Marks of special Nobleness, to raise them above the common worth of men; so their ends made them even with the lowest of the State. According to that of *Seneca*; *Intervallis distingimur; exitu æquamus*: Here we are distinguished by Differences, but Death makes us all equal.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Prodigious Accidents happening upon the Battel in Pharfalia. *Cæsar* cometh into *Ægypt*.

Cæsar coming into *Asia*, found *T. Ampius* going about to take the Money out of the Temple of *Diana* at *Ephesus*; and for that cause to have called together all the Senators: that were in the Province, that he might use them as Witnesses in the matter. But, being interrupted by *Cæsar's* arrival, he fled away. So that two several times, the Money was saved at *Ephesus* by *Cæsar's* means. It was further found very certain, that at the Temple of *Minerva* at *Elis* (a just Calculation of the time being taken) the same day that *Cæsar* overbrow *Pompey*, the Image of *Victory*, which stood before *Minerva*, and looked towards her Portraiture, did turn it self towards the Portall and the Temple-gate. And, the same day likewise there was such a noise of an Army twice heard at *Antioch* in *Syria*, and such founding of Trumpets, that the City ran in

R r a

Armes

This that followed smeth of another Lib.

Mors Nuptia
re lea est.
Mors tribu-
tum effici-
umq; mor-
tuum Se-
nece. natu-
ral quæd
6. Fabius di-
ctus Mari-
mus, Scipio
Magnus, Po-
lynius, lib.
6. Epist.
100.

Armes to keep the Walls. The like happened at Ptolemais. And likewise at Pergamus, in the remote and hidden places of the Temple, which are called *αἰθρᾶς*, into which it is not lawful for any man to enter but the Priests, were Bells heard to ring. Besides at Tralles, in the Temple of Victory (where they had set up a Statue to Cæsar) there was shewed a Palm-tree, which in those dayes was grown from between the joints of the Stones, out of the Pavement.

Cæsar staying a few dayes in Asia, hearing that Pompey was seen at Cyprus, and conjecturing he went into Egypt, for the amity and correspondency he had with that Kingdom, besides other opportunities of the place; he came to Alexandria with two Legions, one that he commanded to follow him out of Thessaly, and another which he had called out of Achaia, from Fufius a Legate, together with Eight hundred Horse, Ten Gallies of Rhodes, and a few Ships of Asia. In these Legions were not above Three thousand two hundred men; the rest were either wounded in the Fight, or spent with Travel, and the length of the Journey. But, Cæsar trusting to the fame of his great Exploits, did not doubt to go with these weak Forces, thinking every place would entertain him with safety.

The Priests of Egypt said, That whenever the Axe and the Bundle of Rods came into Alexandria, the Power of their Kings should presently cease: according as it was written in a Column of Gold, at Memphis,

At Alexandria he understood of Pompey's death: and, as he was going out of the Ship, he heard a Clamour of the Soldiers, which the King had left to keep the Town, and saw a Concourse of people gathered about him, because the Bundle of Rods was carried before him; all the Multitude crying out, That the King's Authority was diminished. This Tumult being appeased, there were often uproars and commotions of the People for every day after; and many Soldiers were slain in divers parts of the City. Whereupon Cæsar gave order for other Legions to be brought him out of Asia, which he raised and enrolled of Pompey's Soldiers. He himself was stayed by the Winds called *Εἰφεῖς*, which are against them that sail from Alexandria.

In the mean time, for as much as he conceived, that if the controversy between the King and his Sister did appertain to the People of Rome, then consequently to him, as Consul; and so much the rather it concerned his Office, for that in his former Consulship, there was a League made by the Decree of Senate with Ptolemy the Father: in regard

hereof he signified, That his pleasure was, that both the King and his Sister Cleopatra, should dismiss their Armies, and rather plead their Cause before him, then to decide it by Arms.

There was at that time one Photinus an Eunuch, that had the Administration of the Kingdom, during the Minority of the Child. He first began to complain among his Friends, and to take it in scorn, that the King should be called out to Plead his Cause: and afterwards having gotten some assistance of the King's Friends, he drew the Army secretly from Pelusium to Alexandria, and made Achilles (formerly mentioned) General of all the Forces, inciting him forward, as well by his own Promises, as from the King, and instructing him by Letters and Messengers what he would have done.

Ptolemy the Father, by his last Will and Testament, had left for heirs the eldest of two sons, and likewise the eldest of two daughters: and for the confirmation thereof, had in the same Will charged and required the People of Rome by all the gods, and by the League he made at Rome, to see this accomplished. For which purpose he sent a Copy of his Will to Rome, to be kept in the Treasury, which, by reason of the publick occasions, that admitted no such business for the present, were left with Pompey: and the Original, signed and sealed up, was brought to Alexandria.

While Cæsar was handling these things, being very desirous to end these Controversies by Arbitrement, it was told him on a sudden, that the King's Army and all the Cavalry were come to Alexandria. Cæsar's Forces were not such, that he durst trust upon them, to hazard Battel without the Town; only it remained, that he kept himself in such places as were most fit and convenient for him within the Town, and to learn what Achilles intended. Howsoever, he commanded all the Soldiers to Arms; and exhorted the King, that of those which were nearest unto him, and of greatest Authority, he would send some to Achilles, to know his meaning.

Diofcorides and Serapion being deputed thereunto, having been both Embassadors at Rome, and in great places about Ptolemy the Father, they came to Achilles; whom as soon as they were come into his presence, and before he would hear or understand what they would have, he commanded to be taken away and slain. Of whom, one having received

a wound, was carried away by his own people for dead; the other was slain out-right. Whereupon Cæsar wrought to get the King into his own hands; thinking that his Name and Title would prevail much amongst his people: as also to make it appear, that this War was rather moved by the private practice of some seditious thieves, then by order and commandment from the King.

OBSERVATION.

The multiplicity of occasions and troubles which happen to such as have the ordering of any business of import, doth make that of Plinie often remembered; *Perturbat negotia nova accersunt, nec tamen prius peraguntur; tot nexibus, tot quasi catenis, majus indies occupationum agmen extenditur*. New businesses come in the neck of old, and yet the first are not dispatched: with so many ties and chains as it were, is the Troop of business every day made longer and longer. For albeit Pompey had now spent his malice, and was no more to appear in Arms against Cæsar: yet this hap was by flying, to draw him (as it were by way of revenge) into a place where he was necessarily to be intangled in a dangerous War.

To these prodigies here mentioned, may be added that of *Aulus Gellius*, that the same day the battel happened, there fell out a strange wonder at Padua, where a certain Priest called *Cornelius*, of noble race and Holy life, suddenly fell into an extasy, and said, he saw a great Battel afar off, Darts and Piles fly thick in the air, some flying and some pursuing, great laughter, accompanied with many lamentable groans and cries, and in the end cried out, that Cæsar had got the victory. For which he was mocked for the present, but afterwards held in great admiration.

Plinie maketh the small increase of Nilus, to be a fore-teller of Pompey's death; *Minimæque Phæratice bello; veluti necem Magni, prodigio quodam, flumine aversante*: The least increase of Nilus, was, at the time of the Phæratian battel, the very River prodigiously shewing (as it were) a detestation of the murder of the Great Pompey.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Cæsar landeth his Forces, taketh Pharos, and causeth Photinus to be slain.

The Forces that were with Achilles, were neither for their number, or fashion of Men, or use and experience in War, to be contemned. For he had twenty two thousand men in Arms. These Troops consisted of the Gabinian Soldiers: which were now grown into a custom of life and liberty of the Egyptians; and having forgot the name and discipline of the people of Rome, had there married wives, and most of them had children.

To these were added such as were gathered from the Thieves and Robbers of Syria, the Province of Cilicia, and other intimate Regions: besides many banished Men, and others condemned to die, that fled thither. And for all our fugitives, there was ever a sure and certain retreat at Alexandria, and a certain condition of life: for upon giving up of his name, he was presently enrolled a Soldier. And if one chanced to be taken and apprehended by his Master, he was presently rescued by the concourse of Soldiers, who being all in the same condition, did strive for him as for themselves. These required the Kings friends to be slain, these were accustomed to rob rich men of their goods to better their pay, to besedge the Kings house, to expel some out of the Kingdom, and to send for others home, according to an old custom and privilege of the Alexandrian Army.

There were besides two thousand horse, that had been of ancient continuance in many of the Wars held at Alexandria, and had brought back Ptolemy the father, and restored him to his Kingdom; had slain Bibulus two sons, and had made War with the Egyptians: and this use and knowledge they had of War, Achilles trusting to these forces, and contemning the small number of Cæsar's Troops, did take and possess Alexandria; and farther, assailing that part of the Town which Cæsar held with his men, did first of all endeavour to break into his house. But Cæsar having disposed the Cohorts in the Streets and ways, did bear out the assault. At the same time they fought likewise at the Port, and it came at length to a very forcible encounter: for having drawn out their Troops, the fight began to be hot in divers Streets and lanes; and the Enemy (in great Troops went about to possess themselves of the Gallies, of which there were fifty found there, that were sent to serve Pompey, and returned home again after the battel in Thessalia. These were all Triremes and Quinqueremes rigged, and ready to go to sea.

Beside these, there were twenty two, which were always accustomed to be best, for the defence of Alexandria, and were all furnished with decks: which if they had taken, together with Cæsar's shipping, they would have had the Haven and the Sea at their command, and by that means, hindered Cæsar from succors and provision of victual. In regard whereof they fought hard on both sides, Achilles expecting victory, and our men for their safety,

safety. But Cæsar obtained his purpose: and because he was not able to keep so many several things with so small forces, he set them all on fire, together with those that were in the Road, and presently landed some souldiers at Pharos, which is a Tower in an Island, of a great height, and built with strange workmanship, taking that name from the Island. This Island lyeth over against Alexandria, and so maketh it a Haven. But former Kings had insured it nine hundred paces in length, by raising great Mounts in the Sea: and by that means had brought it so near to the Town, that they had joined them both together with a bridge.

In this Island dwelt divers Egyptians, and made a Village of the biggest of a Town: and what Ships soever had fallen off their course, either by tempest or error, were there robbed by those Egyptians. For by reason of the narrow entrance, no ships can come into the Haven, but by the favor and leave of them that hold Pharos. Cæsar being afraid of this, while the Enemy was busy in fight, landed his Souldiers, took the place, and there put a Garrison. Whereby he brought it to pass, that both Corn and Succors might safely come by sea to supply him: for he had sent to all the adjoining Regions for ayde. In other places of the Town they so fought, that they gave over at length upon equal conditions, (which hapned by reason of the narrowness of the passages) and a few of each side being slain, Cæsar took in such places as were most convenient for him, and fortified them in the night. In this quarter of the Town was contained a little part of the Kings house (wherein he himself, at his first arrival, was appointed to lodge) and a Theatre joined to the house, which was instead of a Castle, and had a passage to the Port, and to other parts of the Road. The days following he increased these fortifications, to the end he might have them

as a wall against the Enemy, and thereby need not fight against his will.

In the mean time, the younger daughter of King Ptolemy, hoping to obtain the Crown now in question, found means to convey her self out of the Kings house to Achilles: and both jointly together undertook the managing of that War. But presently there grew a controversy between them, who should command in chief, which was the cause of great largest and rewards to the souldiers, either of them being at great charges and expences to gain their good wills.

While the enemy was busy in these things, Photinus, the Governor of the young King, and Superintendent of the Kingdome on Cæsars party, sent Messengers to Achilles, exhorting him not to desert in the business, or to be discouraged. Upon the discovering and apprehension of which Messengers, Cæsar caused him to be slain. And these were the beginnings of the Alexandrian War.

OBSERVATION.

Pharos is a little Island in the Sea over against Alexandria; in the midst whereof, Ptolemy Philadelph, built a Tower of an exceeding height, all of white Marble. It contained many Stages, and had in the top many great Lanterns, to keep light in the night, for a mark to such as were at Sea. The Architector engraved thereupon this inscription; *Solrates Gaudius, the Son of Desiphanes, to the Gods; Conservators, for the safety of Navigators.*

It was reckoned for one of the seven Wonders of the World. The first whereof was the Temple of Diana at Ephesus. The second was the Sepulchre which Artemisia, Queen of Caria, made for her Husband Mausolus, whose ashes she drank. The third was the Colossus of the Sun at Rhodes. The fourth was the Walls of Babylon. The fifth was the Pyramids of Egypt. The sixth was the Image of Jupiter Olympius at Elis, which was made by Phidias, and contained three score cubits in height; and was all of Ivory and pure Gold. And the seventh was this Pharos.

A

A
CONTINUATION
OF THE
WARS
IN
GALLIA.

Beginning where CÆSAR left, and deducing the History to the time of the CIVIL WARS.

Written by A. HIRTIUS PANSÆ.

With some short OBSERVATIONS thereupon.

Together with the Manner of our
Modern Training,
OR
TACTICK PRACTICE.

In the SAVOY,

Printed by Tho. Newcomb, for Jonathan Edwyn,
at the Three Roses in Ludgate-Street, 1676:

T H E
Eighth Commentary
 OF THE
WARS in GALLIA,
 Written by *AULUS HIRTIUS.*

CHAP. I.

The Gallies vasso new troubles in diuers places, Caesar scattereth and wasteth the Bituriges, and after that the Carnutes.



After that all Gallia was subdued, for as much as *Caesar* had rested no part of the former Summer from War, he was desirous to refresh his Soldiers after so great pains taken, the rest of the Winter season; when news was brought him, that many States at the self-same time, did lay their heads together again about War, and make Conspiracies, Whereof there was reported a very likely cause; in that it was known to all the *Gallies*, that there could not any power so great be assembled into one place, as should be able to withstand the *Romans*: neither if many States at once made War in diuers places at one instant, could the Army of the People of *Rome* have sufficient, either of aid, or of time, or of Men of War to pursue all at once: and thereought not any State to refuse the Lot of their Misfortune, if by the respite thereof, the rest might set themselves at liberty.

The which opinion, to the intent it should not settle in the minds of the *Gallies*, *Caesar* leaving *M. Antonius* the Quaestor with charge of his Winter Garrison, went with a strong Company of Horsemen the last day of *December* from *Bibracte* to his Twelfth Legion, which he had placed not far from the borders of the *Hadui*, in the Countrey of the *Bituriges*, and taketh thenceunto the Eleventh Legion which was next unto it, Leaving two Cohorts to defend his Stuff and Carriages, he led the rest of his Army into the most plentifull Fields of the *Bituriges*: the which being a large Countrey, and full of Towns, could not be kept in awe with the Garrisoning of one Legion amongst

them, but that they prepared for War, and made Conspiracies.

By the sudden coming of *Caesar*, it came to pass (which must needs happen to such as are unprovided and scattered abroad) that such as were tilling the ground without fear, were surpris'd in the Fields by our Horsemen, before they could get them into the Towns. For, at that time, the common token of invasion, which is wont to be perceived by burning of Houses, was by *Caesar's* commandment forbore, least they should either want forage and corn, if they were minded to make any further rode into the Countrey; or else, that their Enemies, for fear of the Fires, should convey themselves out of the way.

After that many Thousands of men had been taken, the *Bituriges* being fore afraid, such of them as could escape out of the *Romans* hands, at their first coming, upon confidence either of the old acquaintance and familiarity that had been privately between them, by reason of resorting as guests one to another, or of their mutual agreement and partaking in the same devices, fled into the next Cities: but all was in vain. For *Caesar*, by great journeys, came so suddenly upon all places, that he gave not any City leisure, to think of the safeguard of other Folks, rather then of themselves. Through the which speed, he both kept his Friends faithful unto him, and put the wavering fort in such fear, that he compelled them to be glad to receive Peace.

The matter standing in this case, when the *Bituriges* saw, that through *Caesar's* gentleness, there was yet a way for them to return into his favour again, and that the next States had delivered him Hostages, and were thereupon received to mercy, without further punishment, they themselves did in like wise. *Caesar*, because his men had patiently endured so great travel in the Winter dayes through most cumbersome wayes, in intolerable cold weather, and continued most resolutely in the same to the uttermost, promised to give to his soldiers Two hundred Sesterces a peece, and to the Captains 2000 apiece, in the name of a prey: and so sending his Legions again into their Wintering places, he himself returned to *Bibracte*, the fortieth day after his setting

ting forth. There, as he was ministering of Justice, the *Buiriges* sent messengers unto him, desiring help against the *Carnutes*, whom they complained to make war upon them.

Upon the receipt of this news, when he had not lain in Garrison past eighteen days, he drew forth the fourth and twentieth Legions out of Garrison from the *River Arar*, where he had placed them for the speedy pulverence of Corn and Vint, as was shewed you in the last Book; and, with those two Legions went to prosecute the *Carnutes*.

When our Enemies heard of the coming of our Army, the *Carnutes*, moved with the calamity of others, left their Towns and Villages that they dwelt in, which they had made upon the fudden, with little Carriages for necessity sake to keep off the winter; (for since they were conquered of late, they had lost many of their Valled Towns;) and fled scattering abroad. *Cæsar*, forasmuch as he would not put his Followers to the abiding of the unreasonable sharp frost which chiefly at that time fell, encamped himself with his Soldiers, partly in the Buildings of the *Gallies*, and partly in such Buildings, as being unfinished, they charched in haste with the straw that was brought in to cover their Tents and Cabines. Nevertheless, he senteth abroad his Horsemen and Auxiliary Footmen into all parts, whither he heard his Enemies retired; and that was not in vain; for commonly our men returned ever with a great booty.

The *Carnutes* being put to it with the hardness of the winter, and the terror of the danger, being driven out of house and home, and not daring to stay any where any longer time, the Woods being not able to defend them from the bitterness of the storms, were scattered abroad, and with the loss of a great part of them dispersed into the next Cities.

CHAP. II.

The *Bellovac* and other States under the leading of Corbous and Comius, invade the *Successions*; *Cæsar* marcheth against them.

Cæsar at that hard time of the year, thinking it enought to disperse the powers that were assembling, to the intent no beginning of war might spring up, and weighing how much it concerned him, to prevent any open War from breaking out the beginning of the next summer; he placed *C. Trebonius* in Garrison at *Genabum*, with those two Legions that he had there about him; and, for as much as he was by often messengers, certified from the men of *Rhemes*, that the *Bellovac* (who excelled all *Gallies* and the *Belgæ* also in Military fame) and the States adjoining unto them, under the conduct of *Corbous*, of *Beauvoys*, and *Comius* of *Aras*; levied men of war, and assembled them into one place, to the intent with their whole power, to invade the Borders of the *Successions*, which were appertaining to the men of *Rhemes*; thinking it good not only upon his Honour, but also tended to his own security for the future, to save his allies, which had suffered well of the Commonweal, from displeasure and damage, he called the Eleventh Legion again out of Garrison. Moreover he wrote to *C. Fabius*, to bring the two Legions that he

had, into the Confinnes of the *Successions*; and sent for one of those two Legions that were with *T. Labienus*. So, according as his Garrison lay for the purpose, and as the state of the war required, to his own continual trouble, he put sometimes out of his Legion, and sometimes another, to march from thence.

With this power that he had assembled, he went against the *Bellovac*; and encamping himself in their Country; sent abroad his Horsemen into all quarters to glean up some of them, by whose means he might learn what his Enemies purposed to do. His Horsemen doing their duty, brought word, how few were found in the Woods, and that not far had they fled, and that the ground, for they were purposely removed out of all places; but such as had been sent back again to try. Of whom, *Cæsar*, acquiring in what place the Forces of the *Bellovac* were, and what was their intent, found, that all the *Bellovac* were gathered together in one place; and that the *Ambiens*, *Abures*, *Cales*, *Pelocasses*, and *Atrebat* had chosen a very high ground to camp in, and enclosed with a troublesome Marish, and had conveyed all their stuff into Woods that were farther off. Of this while War there were many Noblemen that were Ringleaders, but the multitude obeyed *Comius* chiefly, because they understood that he bore most the name of the People of *Rome*. And that *Comius* of *Aras* was a few days before gone to fetch aid of the *Germani*, who were their next Neighbours, and returned in multitude of People. He learned how near at their hands, that the *Bellovac*, by the counsel of all the Noblemen, at the earnest instance of the Commonweal, were determined, if *Cæsar* came (as it was said he would), but with three Legions, to offer him Battel, least afterward, to more disadvantage and hindrance, they should be compelled to encounter with his whole Host. And, if he brought a greater power with him, then to keep the back with him in the same ground they had chosen, and, by ambushes to keep the *Romans* from Forrage (which by reason of the time of the year, was scarce, and also lay scattering), and from Corn, and other vituals and things necessary for their Army.

The which things when *Cæsar* understood by the concurring report of many, considering how full of wisdom this project was, and how far from the rashness that the Barbarous People are wont to use, he determined to make the best advantage of all things, to the intent his Enemies, disdaining his small Company, should make the more haste to come into the Fight. For he had three old pre-fight Legions, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth, of singular valour and prowess; and the Eleventh, which was of chosen young men of great hope and towardsness, which having at that time received eight years wages, was, notwithstanding, looked upon as not comparable to the other three, either for standing, or for valour and courage.

Wherefore, summoning an assembly, and there declaring all things that had been reported unto him, he confirmed the hearts of the common soldiers, if peradventure with the number of three Legions he might draw out his Enemies to fight with him in the Field. He set his Battel in this order: the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions went before the Carriages, and the Eleventh Legion in the rear thereof, the which notwithstanding was but small, as it was wont to be in such Expeditions;

ditions; and this he did, lest the Enemies should find a greater number than they expected. By this means, in a square Battel almost, he brought his Host in fight of his Enemies sooner than they looked for him.

When the *Gallies* beheld these Legions, so suddenly set in order, marching toward them apace, as it had been in a pitched Field (whereas it was reported to *Cæsar*, that they intended to carry on their business with confident boldness,) whether it were for the peril of the encounter, or the fiddleness of our coming, or that they looked to see what we intended to do, they set themselves in order of Battel before their Camp, and would not defend from the higher ground. Albeit that *Cæsar* was desirous to have fought with them, yet wondering at the great number of his Enemies, he pitched his Camp directly over against theirs, on the other side of a valley, which was more in depth downward, then in Wideness any way at the bottom. The Camp he commanded to be fortified with a Rampier of Twelve foot, and an open Gallery to be built upon it, according to the measure of the same height, and a double ditch to be made of Fifteen foot apiece, with sides plumed down, and many Turrets to be reared of three stories high, and to be joynted together with draw-bridges, to let down at pleasure, the fronts whereof were fenced with Grates of Wickers to the intent the Enemy might be repulsed with double rows of soldiers, of which, the one from the Bridges, the more out of danger they were by reason of the height, so much the bolder and the farther off might they fend their Darts; the other, the nearer they were placed to their Enemy upon the Rampier, so much the better should they be covered from the Artillery that might fall down upon them; and over the Gates he made high Towers. This kind of Fortification was to two good purposes: for, by the greatness of his Works, and the pretence of fear, he hoped to put the barbarous *Gallies* into a great confidence and whensoever he should have occasion to send out farr for Forrage or vituals, he saw that the Camp might be defended with a small power, the strength of the Fortifications was so great. In the mean while, parties on both sides would several times go out and skirmish in the Marish that was between our two Camps: the which oftentimes either the *Gallies* and *Germani* that were of our Host would pass, and eagerly pursue their Enemies; or else in like manner our Enemies passing over it, did fend our men farther off.

It happened in our daily forraging (as there was no other shift, for as much as we were fain to fetch Forrage at Houses that stood scattering farr alunder) that our Forragers being discovered in disadvantageous places, were entrapped. The which thing, as it was some loss to us of our beasts of carriage, and slaves, so it heightened the foolish courages of the barbarous *Gallies*; and that, so said before was gone to fetch aid of the *Germani* was returned with some Hosts of whom, although there was not above the number of Five hundred, yet the *Gallies* were puffed up at the coming of the *Germani*.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar strengthens himself with more Forces. The men of *Rhemes* worried by the Enemy, and they again by the Germans on *Cæsar*'s party.

When *Cæsar* perceived how his Enemies kept themselves many days together within their Camp, which was fortified both with a Marish, and also with advantage of the ground, and that he could neither assault them without manifest perill, nor inclose the place where they were with any Fortifications, without a greater Army; he directed his Letters to *Trebonius*, that he should, with all haste possible, send for the Thirteenth Legion which Wintered amongst the *Buiriges*, under *T. Sextius* the Legate, and so with three Legions make long Marches to come to him. In the mean season he sent out by turnes the Horsemen of *Rhemes*, and of the *Lingones*, and other States, of whom he had called forth a great number, to follow the Forragers, and to withstand the sudden assaults of the Enemy.

This being done day by day, and our men taking now less heed, because it was an ordinary matter with them, (which thing, for the most part, cometh to pass by daily custom) the *Bellovac*, with a Band of chosen Footmen, knowing the places where our Horsemen daily kept their standings, laid Ambushes in Woody places; and the next day they sent thither their Horsemen, first to draw out our men into the danger of their ambushment, and then to assail them as they were enclosed. The lot of this ill luck lighted upon the men of *Rhemes*, whose turn it was to perform the duty that day. For they, when they had spied the Horsemen of their Enemies upon the fudden, desisting them, because they were less in number, followed them over-greedily, and were enclosed by the Footmen. Whereby, being disordered, they retired more hastily then Horsemen are accustomed to do in Battel, with the loss of *Perisio* the Prince of their State, and Captain of their Horsemen. Who, being scarce able to sit upon a Horse, by reason of his age, would notwithstanding (according to the custom of the *Gallies*) neither seek to disburden himself of the Captainship by excuse of his age, nor suffer the encounter to be fought without him. With this lucky Battel, wherein they slew the Prince and Captain of the men of *Rhemes*, the courages of our Enemies were heightened and raised; and our men were taught by their own harm, to search the places better where they should keep their standings, and to follow their Enemy more advicely when he fled. In the mean while ceased not the daily skirmishes in the fight of both our Camps, which were made at the Woods and Passages of the Marish.

In this kind of exercise, when as the *Germani* (whom *Cæsar* had for the same purpose fetched over the *Rhene*, that they should fight intermingled with his Horsemen in the Battel) had all boldly passed the Marish, and slaying a few that made resistance, followed eagerly upon the rest of the multitude; not only they that were overthrown at hand, or wounded aloof, but also they that were wont to succour afar off, were so driven with fear, that they ran away shamefully; and he-

ver left flying from higher ground to higher, which they oftentimes lost, before they either recovered into their Camp, or (as some did for revenge) fled further off. With whose danger the rest of the Host was so troubled, that it can scarcely be judged, whether good success (were it never so small) would make them more arrogant, or a misfortune (were it never so mean) would make them more cowed and fearful.

CHAP. IV.

The Galles discamp, and are pursued by Cæsar. The routing of part of them, and the death of Corbæus.

After they had lurked many days in the same Camp, when the Captains of the *Bellocæ* understood that *C. Trebonius*, one of *Cæsar's* Legates, was at hand with more Legions, fearing the like Siege as was at *Alexia*, they sent away in the night all such as by reason of yeares, or otherwise wanted strength, and all such as wanted Armour among them, and with them they sent away also their Carriages. While they were sitting forth this troubled and confused company, (for the *Galles*, even when they go lightest, are wont to have a great multitude of Carts following them) day-light came upon them; and therefore they set their men in Battell-array in their Camp, lest the *Romans* should pursue, before the company of their Carriages could get any thing forward. But *Cæsar* thought it not good to assail them that were ready to defend themselves, having so high a Hill to climb up unto them; and yet he thought to come so near them with his Host, that they might not depart out of the place where they were without danger, our men being hard at hand ready to fall upon them. Therefore, whereas he perceived that the troublesome marsh parted Camp from Camp, (the difficult passage whereof might hinder the speedy pursuit of our Enemies) and that the same ridge of the Hill, which went from the farther side of the Marish, almost to the Camp of the Enemies, was parted from their said Camp with a small Valley: he made Bridges over the Marish and passing over his Army, got quickly into the Plain of the said ridge, the which, on two sides, was fortified with a steep descent. There embattling his men, he came to the farthest end of the ridge: and ordered his Battels in such a place, from whence, with an Engine, Artillery might be shot amongst the thickest of the Enemies.

The *Galles* trusting to the advantage of the place, when they would neither have refused the encounter, if perchance the *Romans* should have adventured upon the Hill against them, nor yet durst by little and little diminish their Battell, by severing themselves, least when they had been out of array, they might hap to have been set upon, kept themselves in order of Battell. Whole willingness *Cæsar* perceiving, kept Twenty Cohorts in a readines, and pitching his Tents in the same place, commanded his Camp should be fortified. As soon as the Works were finished, he set his Legions in array before the Rampier, and appointed the Horsemen to their standing, with their Horses ready bridled.

When the *Bellocæ* saw the *Romans* in a readines to pursue them, and that themselves could not, without perill, either lodge that night, or continue any longer in the same place where they were, they devised this shift to recover themselves. In the place where they were set together, (for it is declared in *Cæsar's* former Commentaries, how the *Galles* are wont to fit down in the Battell) they received from hand to hand one of another, bundles of Straw and Fagots, whereof there was great store in their Camp, and cast it all on a heap before their Battell, and in the latter end of the day, at a Watch-Word that was given, they set it on fire all at one instant: by means whereof the continual flame suddenly took away the sight of all their Army from the *Romans*: and therewithall the savage *Galles* fled away as fast as their legs could bear them.

Albeit that *Cæsar* could not perceive the departing of his Enemies, by reason of the flame that was betwixt them; yet notwithstanding, for as much as he suspected it to be a deceit practised by them, that they might the easier fly away; he marched his Footmen forward, and sent his Horsemen to pursue them. Howbeit, for fear of Treachery in the bushes, lest perhaps his Enemies should abide still in the same place, and only draw forth into a ground of disadvantage, he went the slower pace. His Horsemen fearing to venture into the smoke and thick flame (and if any were so resolute as to enter it, they could scarce see the foreparts of their own Horses) lest they should be intrapped, gave the *Bellocæ* free liberty to recover themselves whither they would. Thus our enemies, by their flight, which was mixt with fear and subtilty, escaping without any loss, went but Ten miles off, and encamped themselves in a very advantageous ground. From whence, by laying Ambushes both of Horse and Foot, in divers places, they did the *Romans* great displeasure as they went a foraging.

After this had happened, many and sundry times *Cæsar* learned of a Captive, that *Corbæus*, Captain of the *Bellocæ*, had chosen out of his whole host, six thousand of the valiantest footmen, and a thousand horsemen, which he had laid in ambush in the same place whether (for the plenty of provision and corn that was there) he judged the *Romans* would find a foraging.

This being known, *Cæsar* brought forth more Legions than usual, and senteth his horsemen before as he was wont to do, to safe-conduct his foragers. Among them he mingled for their assistance, many light-armed foot-men, and himself with his Legions followeth as near as possibly he might. The Enemies that were laid in ambush, having chosen a field for their purpose, not above a mile over every way, environed round about, either with cumbersome woods or else a very deep river, beset it with their ambushment, as it had been with a toil.

Our Men, forasmuch as they were privy to the design of their Enemies beforehand, being ready both with heart and hand to fight, seeing their legions followed hard after them, would refuse no encounter: but went rank by rank down into the said place. At whose coming, *Corbæus* thinking an occasion of doing some good to be fallen into his hands, first did overtake himself with a small number, and giveth charge upon the next Troops, Our

Our Men stoutly withstand the brunt, and flock not many into one place at once; which in skirmishes of horse is wont commonly to happen through fear, and their clustering together, turneth to their own loss. They being thus engaged in small parties, and having a care still that their fellows should not be circumvented, the rest brake out of the woods whilst *Corbæus* was fighting. Then was the Encounter hot and doubtful. After it had continued indifferent a good space, by little and little came their footmen in array out of the woods, which compelled our horsemen to give back. But they were quickly relieved again by the light-armed footmen, which was laid were sent before our Legions, who being intermixed among the horsemen fought stoutly.

The encounter continued a good while doubtful. But as the course of War requires, they that had withstood the first brunt of them that lay in ambush for them, had thus much the advantage, that they received not unawares any foil at their hands. In the mean while our Legions drew nearer, and divers Messengers brought word both to our Men and to our Enemies, at one and the same time, that the General was at hand with his Army in battell array. Which thing being known, our horsemen trusting to the help of the Cohorts, lay about them very eagerly, lest if they should have delayed the matter, they might have given the footmen part of the honor of the Victory. Upon this our Enemies heart began to fail; and they fought to fly by several ways, but all was in vain. For by the disadvantage of the same places in which they would have enclosed the *Romans*, were they themselves taken tardy and could not get out. Notwithstanding, being vanquished and altogether out of heart, when they had lost the greater part of their company, like men amazed they brook themselves to flight: and some made toward the Woods, others toward the River, where being overtaken by our men that followed eagerly after them, they were all slain. In the mean time *Corbæus*, whose heart could by no misfortune be daunted or overcome, never departed out of the battell, nor made toward the woods, neither could by the entreaty of our men be persuaded to yield himself: but fighting most valiantly, and hurting many of our Men, he so far exasperated the victors, that they could not forbear to throw their darts at him, and dispatch him.

CHAP. V.

The remainder of the Galles submit themselves to Cæsar. Comius in danger to be slain by treachery.

The matter being brought to this pass, *Cæsar* pursuing his newly got victory, forasmuch as he thought that his Enemies being discouraged with so great a misfortune, would immediately upon the news thereof, forsake the place where they were encamped, which was laid to be not above eight miles from the place where the slaughter was made, although he saw it would be some trouble to him to pass the River, yet passed he his Army, and marched toward them. But the *Bellocæ* and the other States, upon the return of a few of their Men, and those wounded out of the chafe, which had escaped the mischief

by means of the woods, understanding by their own great misfortune and misery, by the death of *Corbæus*, the loss of their horsemen, and the slaughter of their choicest footmen, and mistrusting that the *Romans* would out of hand come upon them; immediately called an assembly, by the sound of a Trumpet, and cried all with one voice, to send Ambassadors and hostages to *Cæsar*.

When *Comius of Arras* perceived that this motion would be entertained, he fled to those *Germani*, of whom he had borrowed assistance to the War. The restless Ambassadors presently unto *Cæsar*, desiring him to content himself with that punishment of his Enemies, if he might have laid upon them without battell in their chief prosperity, they were well assured that of his clemency and censure he would not have done it. The *Bellocæ* said, that their power was weakened by the loss of their horsemen, many thousands of their choicest footmen were cut off, scarce any escaping to bring tidings of the slaughter; yet notwithstanding their great misfortune, they had by that battell received this happiness, that *Cæsar* the Author of the War, a ruler of the multitude was slain. For as long as he was alive, the Senate could never bear so great away in the City, as the rude and unskillful commonalty.

As the Ambassadors were speaking these things, *Cæsar* put them in mind, that about the same time the last year, the *Bellocæ* and other States of *Gallia* raised War, and that they above all others should most stiffly in their opinion, and would not be reduced to obedience by the submission of the rest. He told them, he knew and understood it was an easy matter to lay the fault of their offence upon him that was dead, but he was sure that there was no Man of so great power, that against the Noblemens wills, the Senate rescinding him, and all good men withstanding him, could with a weak handful of the commonalty, raise a War, and go through with it. Nevertheless, he was satisfied with the punishment which they had brought upon themselves.

Thenight following, the Ambassadors returned this answer to those that sent them, and forthwith they gave hostages. Then also the Ambassadors of other States, which waited to see what giving the *Bellocæ* would have, came to *Cæsar*, giving hostages, and performing his commands: only *Comius* stood off, who durst not for fear trust his life into any mans hands. For the year before *Titus Labienus* perceiving how while *Cæsar* was ministering justice in the higher *Gallia*, *Comius* stirred up the States and made confederacies against *Cæsar*, thought he might without being accounted a faith-breaker, revenge his treacherous carriage. And thereupon, because he thought he would not at his sending for come into the Camp, least he should by such a Message make him more cautious, he sent *C. Volusenus Quadratus*, to murder him, under pretence of communing with him: and for the performance of the matter, he sent with him certain selected Centurions for the purpose. When they came to conference, and that *Volusenus* (as it was agreed upon) had caught *Comius* by the right hand, one of the Centurions, as if he had been moved at the strangeness of the matter, gave *Comius* a shrewd blow on the head with his Sword; howbeit he could not dispatch him

him; because his friends slept in and saved him. By and by was drawing Swords on both sides, and yet none of both parties were minded to fight, but to fly away: our Men, because they believed that *Comius* had had his death wound; the *Gallies* because perceiving the treachery, they feared there had been more behind than they saw. Upon which business it is reported, that *Comius* vowed he would never come in the fight of any *Roman*.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar dispossess his Forces into several parts of *Gallia*, and himself assaulteth the Countrey of *Ambiorix*.

When *Cæsar* had subdued the Nations that were most warlike, perceiving there was now no City that prepared War to stand against him, but that many to eschew the present yoke of the *Roman* Empire, left their Towns and fled out of the *Roman* Empire, he determined to send his Army abroad in to divers quarters. At *Ambiorix* the Quæstor with the eleventh Legion he took to himself. *C. Fabius* the Legate with twenty five Cohorts he sendeth into the farthest part of all *Gallia*, because he heard say, that certain States were there in Arms, and that he thought *C. Caninius Rebilus* the Legate had not a sufficient strength of those two Legions that were with him already. *T. Labienus* he called unto him from the place where he was, and the twelfth Legion which wintered under him he sent into *Gallia Togata*, to defend the Towns that the *Romans* had there peopled with their own Citizens, least any such harm should happen to them by invasion of the barbarous people, as had happened the summer before to the *Tergestini*, who were surpris'd and spoiled of their goods, by their sudden invasions.

He himself set forward to wait and spoil the borders of *Ambiorix*; who flying before him for fear, from place to place, when he saw there was no hope to get him into his hands, he thought it was most for his honor, to depose his Country of people, buildings and cattle, that his Countrymen might loathe him, (if fortune reserved any contrivance for him) that for the calamities he had brought upon his Countrymen, he might never have access thither again.

After he had sent abroad his host into all parts of *Ambiorix* his Country, and waited all places with slaughter, burning and rapine, having slain and taken prisoners a great number of men, he sent *Labienus* with two Legions among the *Treviri*: whose Country, by reason of the nearness thereof unto *Germany*, being daily injured to the Wars, is not much unlike to the *Germani* in rudeness and savageness of life; neither did they obey the Commandments of *Cæsar* at any time longer than we had an Army in their Country to compel them.

CHAP. VII.

A new War raised in the Territories of the *Pidgones*. *C. Fabius* pursued to flight the Forces of *Dumnaeus*; subdueth the *Carnutes* and *Arenacori*.

IN the mean season *C. Caninius* the Legate, understanding by the messengers and letters of *Duracius*, (who had continued always firm to the friendship of the People of *Rome*;) that a great number of Enemies were assembled in the borders of the *Pidgones*; for as much as a part of that City had renounced their obedience, went to the Town of *Lemovicum*. When he came near the Town, and underlooked by his Prisoners, how that *Dumnaeus*, Captain of the *Andes*, with many thousands of Men, had enclos'd *Duracius*, and that *Lemovicum* was besieg'd; he durst not with his weak Legions adventure upon his Enemies, but pitched his Camp in an advantageous ground. *Dumnaeus* hearing of the approach of *Caninius*, turned all his Power against the *Roman* Legions, determining to set upon them in their Camp. After he had spent many days in the assault, and had lost many of his men, and yet could not break down any part of their Fortifications, he returned again to besiege *Lemovicum*.

At the same time *C. Fabius* receiveth many Cities by composition, and assureth them with hostages; and is advertised by *Caninius* Letters, of those things that were done among the *Pidgones*. Upon the knowledge whereof, he leaveth forth to relieve *Duracius*.

But *Dumnaeus* understanding of *Fabius* coming, so far as he thought that he should hazard the losing all, if at once he should be compelled both to abide the *Romans* his Enemies without, and also to have an eye to, and stand in fear of the Town, retired suddenly with all his forces from the place, and could not think himself to be sufficiently in safety, before he had pass'd his Army over the River *Loire*, which by reason of the greatness thereof, was to be pass'd by a bridge, and not otherwise.

Although *Fabius* was not yet come within sight of his Enemies, nor had joined with *Caninius*, yet so far as he was thoroughly informed by such as knew the Coast of the Country, he suspected that his Enemies would take that way, which they did. Therefore he marcheth with his Army to the said Bridge where his Enemies had pass'd, and commanded his horsemen to go no farther before the footmen, then that they might upon occasion retire into the same Camp without tiring their horses. Our horse, as was commanded them, overtook the Host of *Dumnaeus* and set upon them; and assaulting them flying and amazed, as they march'd with their luggage at their backs, slew a great number, and took a great prey: and so with good success retired into their Camp.

The night following *Fabius* sent his horsemen before, to provide, that they might encounter the enemy, and stay all the whole Army until he should overtake them. *Q. Atius Varus* the Commander of the horse, a Man of singular courage and wildness, having encouraged his Men, and overtaken the body of his enemies, dispos'd cer-

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certain of his Troops in places convenient and with the rest of his Horsemen gave charge upon his Enemies. The Cavalry of the Enemy fought so much the more boldly, because their foot were ready to assist them, who being mingled through the whole Army, as often as occasion was, did succor them against our Men. The encounter was very sharp. For our Men despising them whom they had vanquish'd the day before, and remembering that the Legions followed at their heels, alighted to give ground, and desirous to get the day before their coming, fought very valiantly against the footmen. On the other side, our Enemies believing that no greater forces of ours were behind, according as they had seen the day before, thought a fair opportunity offered them to destroy our Cavalry utterly.

When they had fought a good while very eagerly, *Dumnaeus* made a Battell to relieve his Cavalry, when occasion should be. But on the sudden our enemies espied our Legions coming up close together: at the sight of whom their horse were stricken into such a fear, and the foot so amazed, that breaking through their carriages, with great clamor and confusion they betook themselves every where to flight. Then our Cavalry, who a little before had their hands full, being heartened with joy of the Victory, raised a great shout on all sides, and calling themselves amongst them as they fled, made slaughter of them, as far as their Horses breaths would serve to pursue them, and their Arms were able to strike them. In so much that having slain above twelve thousand men, armed and such as for fear had cast away their Arms, they took all their carriages, none escaping.

Out of the which chafe so far as it was certainly known that *Duratus* the *Senon* was escaped, (who when *Gallia* first began to rebel, gathering to him men of desperate fortunes out of all places, setting bondmen at liberty, entertaining outlaws of all Countries, and receiving high-way thieves, had cut off the carriages and victuals of the *Romans*) was going toward the Province with five thousand men at the most, which he had raised after the chase; and that *Lutarius* of *Cobris* joined himself with him, who is the former Commentator, is said to have attempted an invasion of the Province, at the first institution of *Gallia*; *Caninius* the Legate with two Legions pursued after them, least some great terror might be received by those look fellows dreadful and harassing the Province.

C. Fabius with the rest of the Army went against the *Carnutes* and the other States, whose power he knew to be crushed in the battel that was fought against *Dumnaeus*. For he doubted not but he should find them more tractable to deal with, by reason of the late overthrow: whereas if he should give them time of respite, by the institution of the said *Dumnaeus*, they might be raised again. *Fabius* with marvellous good luck and speed, brought those States to subjection. For the *Carnutes*, who had been oftentimes before ill-handled by us, yet would never listen to peace, now gave hostages, and came into subjection. And the rest of the States situate in the farthest parts of *Gallia*, bordering upon the Sea, which are called *Armorice*, following the example of the *Carnutes*, at the coming of *Fabius* with his Legions amongst them, performed his commandments without delay.

Dumnaeus thus driven out of his Country, wandering and lurking in corners alone, was compelled to betake himself to the uttermost Countreys of all *Gallia*.

CHAP. VIII.

Drapes and *Lutarius* seize upon *Llxlodunum*. *Caninius* pursueth them, overthroweth their Forces, taketh *Drapes* prisoner, and with *Fabius* besiegeth *Llxlodunum*.

ULT *Drapes* and *Lutarius*, whom they under stood that *Caninius* approach'd with his Army, perceiving they could not without manifest peril enter the bounds of the Province, considering how the Army pursued them, nor yet range abroad on shew of their pleasures, stayed together in the Countrey of the *Cadurci*. There *Lutarius* (who in times past, whilst he was in prosperity, was able to fly greatly with his Countrymen) and had gotten great estimation among the rude people, as one that was ever a beginner of new designs took with his own and *Drapes* his Forces, a Town called *Ullodunum*, which had been formerly in his tuition, a place excellently well fortified by the natural situation thereof, and caused the Townsmen to join with him.

To this Town *Caninius* forthwith came; and perceiving that all parts of the same were fortified with craggy cliffs, in so much that though no Man were there to defend it, yet were in a hard matter for men in their Armour to get up; knowing also that the mereables of the Townsmen were great, which if they should go about to carry away privily, they could not escape either by general consent, that leaving part of the Army, to three parts, and divide these Camps upon a yearly ground; from which by degrees, as his Army was able, he determined to draw a Rampier and Trench round about the Town.

The Townsmen perceiving that, and remembering the miserable condition of *Alexia*, feared the like Siege. *Lutarius* especially, who had tasted the smart of that misfortune, advised them to lay for Corn beforehand; whereupon they determined by general consent, that leaving part of the Army, for the defence of the Town; *Lutarius* and *Drapes* with the best provided, should go forth to fetch in Corn. This Council being approved of, the next night *Drapes* and *Lutarius*, leaving two thousand men behind them, drew the rest out of the Town. After a few days being abroad, they brought in a great quantity of grain out of the Countrey of the *Cadurci*, who partly were willing to help them therewith, and partly durst not withstand their taking it, as not being able to make their part good against them. Oftentimes also they would fly out in the night, and assault the Calles of our Camp. Upon which consideration *C. Caninius* stay'd the making of Fortifications round about the Town, lest he should not be able to defend the circumvallation, when it was finished, or else should be forced to set but weak watches in so many places at once.

When they had gotten together a great quantity of grain, *Drapes* and *Lutarius* took up their baggage, not above ten miles from the Town, the better at times to convey it in; and they parted

CHAP. IX.

the charge between them. *Drapes* tarried behind with part of the Army to keep the Camp: *Luterius* drove the beasts with their carriages toward the Town, and setting Guards there for his defence, about ten of the clock in the night, purposed by narrow ways through the Woods, to convey the Corn into the Town. The Watchmen of our Camp hearing the noise of their feet, and the shouts which were sent out, reporting what was a doing, *Cassius* caused his Cohorts to arm themselves quickly, and about break of day made attempt out of the next Castles upon the foragers. Who being frightened with the suddenness of the mischief, fled to their Guards. Which as soon as our Men perceived, they flew more fiercely upon them, and suffered none to be taken alive. *Luterius* fled from thence with a few, but returned not to his Camp.

After this good success, *Cassius* understood by his prisoners, that part of the Army was behind in the Camp with *Drapes*, not above twelve miles off. Which when he had learned by many to be truth, believing that one of the Generals already put to flight, the remnant of the Army being terrified, might easily be overthrown; he thought it a great piece of happiness, that none escaped from the slaughter into the Camp, to carry tidings of the mishap to *Drapes*. And forasmuch as he saw there was no danger in putting the matter to trial, he sent all his horsemen and the *Germans* footmen, swift and nimble fellows before to the Camp of his Enemies. One of his Legions he left in his Camp, and the other eldest of all carriages, he took with him.

When he came near his Enemies, his scouts that he had sent before, brought word, that (as the custom of the barbarous Nations commonly is) they had abandoned the higher ground, and encamped themselves by the River side; and that our Horie and the *Germans* had flown upon them suddenly ere they were aware, and charged them. Upon the receipt of this news, he halted forward with his Legion well armed and well appointed: so the sign being given suddenly on all sides, the higher places were taken by our men. At the doing whereof, the *Germans* and our Cavalry seeing the Ensigns of our Legion, fought very stoutly: and by and by all our Cohorts charged upon them round; so that in the conclusion, they were all either slain or prisoners, and a great booty taken. *Drapes* himself was also taken in the same conflict.

Cassius having done his work successfully, without almost any hurt at all to his Souldiers, returned to besiege the Town: and having now destroyed his Enemy without, for fear of whom he could not before divide his Garrisons, nor environ the Town with fortifications; he commanded the works to be carried on round about the Town. The next day came thicker, *C. Fabius* with his forces, and took another part of the Town to besiege.

Cæsar having punished *Guturvatus*, for the revolt of the Carnutes, joined with *Caninius* and *Fabius* before *Uxellodunum*. Upon his departing them of water the Town yielded. *Cæsar* cutteth off their right hand.

In the mean time, *Cæsar* left *M. Antonius* the Quæstor with fifteen Cohorts among the *Belovaci*, to prevent any new confederacies among them for the future: and he himself visited the other States, charging them with no Hostages, and with comfortable words raising the fearful hearts of them all.

When he came amongst the *Carnutes*, in whose Country (as *Cæsar* hath declared in his former Commentary) the War first of all began, in much as he perceived them to be chiefly afraid, as being conscious to themselves of their fault, to the intent he might the more speedily deliver the rest of the State from far, he demanded *Guturvatus*, the ring-leader of that mischief, and raiser of the Rebellion, to be delivered unto him to be punished: who albeit he trusted not himself with his own Countreymen, yet all men made to diligent search for him, that he was soon found out, and brought to the Camp. *Cæsar*, contrary to his own nature, was compelled to punish him whether he would or no, by the importunity of his Souldiers, who imported all the dangers and losses that they had sustained by this War, unto *Guturvatus*: inasmuch that his body after it was in a manner whipped to death, was beheaded.

While *Cæsar* tarried here, he was advertised by several Letters from *Cassius*, what was done to *Drapes* and *Luterius*, and how the Townsmen persevered in their resolution: the small number of whom, although he despised, yet he deemed their wilfulness merited of severe punishment, least they might give occasion to all *Gallia*, to think that they wanted not strength, but constancy and resolution to withstand the *Romans*; or least by their example, other Cities of *Gallia* trusting to the advantage and strength of places, should attempt to recover their liberty: especially seeing he was sure that all the *Gallies* knew his Commission: but one summer longer, which if they could hold out, they should need to fear no danger after. And therefore leaving *Q. Calenus* the Legate behind with two Legions to follow leisurely after him by easy marches, he himself with all his Cavalry made halt to *Cassius*.

When *Cæsar*, contrary to all mens expectation, was come to *Uxellodunum*, and saw the Town environed with Fortifications, perceiving that it was not for him to break up his Siege on any condition, and learning moreover, by run-aways, that the Town had great abundance of victuals: he chafed to cut off the water from his Enemies.

There was a River that ran through the bottom of the Valley, which environed well near all the Hill, whereon the Town stood, from whence the descent was rough and steep on all sides. The nature of the place would not suffer this stream to be turned any other way. For it ran in such fort at the very foot of the hill, that there could be no ditch cut low enough to drain it. The Townsmen had hard and very steep coming down to it, inasmuch,

in so much, that if our men withstood them, they could not, without wounds, or danger of their lives, either come down to the River, or get up the steep hill again. Which distress of theirs *Cæsar* well knowing, placed Archers and Slingers, and other Artillery also, against such places where the easiest coming down was, to keep the Townsmen from the Water of the River: who afterwar came for Water all to one place. For, under the very Walls of the Town there gushed out a great Spring of Water, on that side where there was a space almost of three hundred foot, not encompassed with the River.

Now, whilst all the rest withstood, and only *Cæsar* perceived, that this Spring might be taken from the Town, though not without great damage; he began to raise Vines directly against it toward the Hill, and to make Mounts, with great labour and continual fighting. For the Townsmen came running down from the higher ground, and fought with our men at a distance without danger, wounding many of them that pressed up too forwardly. Notwithstanding, our men were nothing deterred from bringing forward their Vines, endeavouring to overcome the crabbedness of the place, with their Labour and Works. At the same time they drew privy Mines to the Head of the Spring, which kind of Work they might do, without any danger or mistrust of their Enemies. A Mount was cast up fix foot high, and thereupon was raised a Tower of ten stories; not such a one as might equal the height of the Walls (for that was not possible to be done any way), but such a one as might exceed the top of the Spring. From which, conveying darts with Engines to the brim of the Spring, so that the Townsmen could not fetch Water without danger, not only all sorts of Cattel, but also a great number of Men died for thirst.

The Townsmen greatly astonished heretofore, filled Barrels with Grease, Pitch, and Shingles, and setting them on fire, rolled them down upon our Works, and at the same time also fought very desperately, with the peril of fighting, to keep the *Romans* from quenching the Fire. Suddenly there was a great Flare in our Works. For, whatsoever was thrown down from that steep place, the flame staying against the Vines and Rampier, took hold upon the things that flayed them. On the other side, our Soldiers, albeit they were hindered both with the dangerousness of the Encounter, and with the disadvantage of the place, yet they bare out all things with a stout courage. For the thing was done both in an eminent place, and also in the sight of our Army: and a great cry was raised on both sides. So that every man, as far as he could, especially the most daring, (to the intent his valour might the better be known and testified) ventured himself upon the Fire, and the Weapons of his Enemies.

Cæsar, when he saw many of his men wounded, commanded his Cohorts to climb up the Hill, on all sides of the Town, and to raise a shout, as if they purposed to scale the Walls. Wherewith the Townsmen being frightened, for as much as they saw not what was doing in other places, called back their men from assaulting our Works, and placed them upon the Walls. So our men having respite from fighting, did quickly, either quench the Works that were on fire, or else cut them off from the rest.

The Townsmen stubbornly flouting out, though they had lost a great part of their men by thirst, and continuing still unanimously resolved, as though the waters of the Spring were cut off within the ground by Mines, and turned another way: by means whereof the Fountain of running Water was presently dried up. Which so daunted the hearts of the defendants, who believed it could not be done by the wit of man, but came to pass, by the will of the gods; that when they saw there was no other remedy, they yielded themselves.

Cæsar being assured that his Clemency was sufficiently known to all people, and therefore he need not be so far that it would be imputed to the cruelty of his name; if he dealt something harshly with them; and besides that, considering with himself, that it might well be thought he little regarded the good success of his counsels and undertakings, if by suffering such things unpunished, others should be encouraged to rebel in divers places; he thought it requisite to hold the rest in awe, by the punishment of this War. And therefore he cut off the hands of as many of them as were able to bear Armes, and let them live still, that the punishment of such wicked men might be more manifest to the World.

CHAP. X.

Drapes dieth. *Lutetius* brought to *Cæsar*. *Labienus* good success against the *Treviri*. *Cæsar*, after his expedition into Aquitania, punisheth his Army in his Winter-quarters.

Drapes, whom I declared to have been taken by *Cassius*, whether it were for vexation and grief that he was in bands, or for fear of more heavy punishment, fasted a few days from meat, and so starved.

At the same time *Lutetius*, that escaped by flight from the Battle (as I shewed before) fell into the hands of *Epiphanus* the *Auvergnian*. For, in often shifting from place to place, he was fain to venture himself upon the courtesy and civility of many, because he thought he could never continue any long time in one place without danger, his heart musing him how much he had deserved to have *Cæsar* his Enemy. *Epiphanus* the *Auvergnian* being a friendly friend to the People of *Rome*, as soon as he had gotten him into his hands, brought him, without further delay, bound unto *Cæsar*.

In the mean time *Labienus* warreth prosperously against the *Treviri*; and having slain many both of the *Treviri* and also of the *Germans*, they were ready to assist any man against the *Romans*, got the chief of them alive into his hands; among whom was *Servus* the *Beduac*, a man of great valour and noble birth; who alone of the *Beduacs*, had, unto that day, continued in Armes against the People of *Rome*.

Cæsar knowing thereof, and for as much as he saw his Affairs went well forward in all parts of *Gallia*, weighing with himself how all Cities and *Belgæ* were, the former Summers, conquered and subdued, and that he had never all this while visited *Aquitania*, only he had made a kind of entrance into it, by certain victories gotten by *P. Crassus*; he marched thither with two Legions, with intent to bellow the latter part of the Summer there; Which thing (as he had done, all others

others before) he dispatched quickly and luckily For all the States of *Aquitania* sent Ambassadors unto him, and gave him hostages.

After the accomplishment of these things, he went to *Narbonne* with his guard of Horsemen, and sent his Foot into their Wintering places by his Legates. Four Legions he placed in *Belgium* under *M. Antonius*, *C. Trebonius*, *P. Vatinius*, and *L. Tullius*, Legates. Two he quartered amongst the *Heduians*, whom he knew to be of greatest Authority in all *Gallia*. Two more he placed amongst the *Treviri*, in the borders of the *Carnutes*, to be a stay to all the Country that lay upon the Sea-coast. The other two he placed in the borders of the *Lemovis*, not far from the *Arvernus*: that so there might not be any part of *Gallia* without an Army.

After he had tarried a few days in the Province, and there speedily taken cognizance of all their Courts, sitting upon Publick Controversies, and rewarded such as had deserved well, (for he had a great desire to understand, how every man had carried himself towards the Commonwealth, during the general Rebellion of all *Gallia*, which he had born out through the faithfulness and assistance of the said Province) as soon as he had dispatched those things, he returned to his Legions into *Belgium*, and Wintered at *Nemetocenna*.

CHAP. XI.

Comius of *Arras* overthrown in a Battel of Horse by C. Volusenus, submitted to M. Antonius, and receiveth Pardon.

While he was there, he understood that *Comius* of *Arras* had encountered with his Cavalry. For *Antonius* being come into his Winter quarters, and the City of *Arras* continuing firmly Loyal; *Comius*, who after his wound that we spake of before, was wont still to be ready at hand to his Countrymen at every stir, to the intent, that if they would begin any new Rising, they should not want a Head and a Captain for the War; as long as the City continued obedient to the *Romans*, he with his Horsemen maintained himself and his followers by thieving, for laying the Wayes, he cut off many Convoys that were going with Provision to the *Roman* Garrisons. *C. Volusenus Quadratus*, the General of the Horse, was appointed to Winter in the same place with *Antonius*: him did *Antonius* send to pursue the Horse of his Enemies. *Volusenus*, beside the singular valour that was in him, did also bear a great hatred toward *Comius*, and for that cause was the more willing to execute the thing that was commanded him. Wherefore, placing divers Ambushes, he oftentimes set upon *Comius*, Horsemen, and put them to the sword.

At last, when the contention grew more vehement, and that *Volusenus*, desirous to cut off *Comius* himself, followed him somewhat more eagerly with a small party, and *Comius* on the other side fled the faster away, thereby to draw him the farther from his Company; at length espying his advantage, *Comius* suddenly cried out to all his men, That, as they were true unto him, they should stand to him, and not suffer the Wound that was given him basely, under colour of Friendship, to

be unrevenged: and thereupon turning his Horse, he runneth from the rest of his Company upon *Volusenus*. All his Horse followed, and became there were but a few of our men, they made them retreat, and purified them. *Comius* putting spurs to his Horse, encountered the Horse of *Quadratus*, and with his spear thrust *Volusenus*, by great violence, through the Thigh.

When our Horse saw that their Captain was wounded, they bestrid themselves, and turning again upon the Enemy, put them back. Many of the enemies by the violent charge of our men, were beaten off and wounded: of whom, some were overthrowen in the chafe, and some were taken prisoners. As *Comius* escaped any farther mishap by the swiftness of his horse; so, our General being by him in this Battel fore wounded, was carried into the Camp in such a case, that it was not likely he should have lived. And *Comius*, whether he thought himself sufficiently revenged, or because he had lost a great part of his men, sent Messengers to *Antonius*, giving hostages, and assuring him, that he would continue where it should please him to appoint, and do whatsoever he should command him. Onely one request he made, wherein he besought him to bear with his fearfulness, that he might not be forced to come in the sight of any *Roman*. Which request *Antonius* judging to proceed out of a real fear, and not without good cause, he pardoned him according to his desire, and received his hostages.

CHAP. XII.

While Cæsar is busy in quieting and ordering things in *Gallia*, and visiting some municipal Towns in *Italy*, his Enemies conspire against him at Rome.

During the time that *Cæsar* wintered in *Belgium*, his chief purpose was to keep the States in amity, and to take away all hope and occasion of war: for he intended nothing less, then the carriage of his business so, as he should be constrained to have war at the time of his departure: least when he should withdraw his Army, he should leave any troubles behind, which all *Gallia* could willingly engage in, so that it might be without present danger. And therefore, by entreating the Cities honourably, by rewarding the Noblemen highly, by burdening the Country with no new Impositions, he easily kept all *Gallia*, which now was tired out with so many unfortunate Battels, in quiet and obedience.

Winter being over, *Cæsar*, contrary to his custom, halseth into *Italy*, with as much expedition as might be, to Treat with the municipal Towns and Colonies, and to commend unto them the suit of his Quæstor *M. Antonius* for the Priesthood. For he made all the Friends for him he could, both because the same *Antonius* was his very dear friend, whom he had sent before to sue for that promotion, as also to oppose the factions and unreasonable proceedings of a few men, who, by putting *Antonius* beside his purpose, fought to displace *Cæsar* now going out of his Command.

Albeit he had tidings by the way, before he came near *Italy*, that *Antony* was made Augur, yet he thought he had as good reason as before, to visit the municipal Towns and Colonies, both to give them thanks for appearing in the business, and for their civility

shewed in the behalf of *Antony*; as also to commend unto them his own care, touching the honour which he purposed to sue for the next year: and that the rather, because his Adversaries proudly made their brag, that *L. Lentulus*, and *C. Marcellus* were created Consuls, to deprive *Cæsar* of all honour and authority; and that the Consulship was wrested from *Sergius Galba*, though he had more voices on his side, because he was a familiar friend of *Cæsar's*, and had been engaged unto him as his Legate.

Cæsar, at his coming amongst the municipal Towns, was entertained with extraordinary affection and respect: that being his first coming from the Wars in *Gallia*. Nothing was omitted that could be devised for the decking and adorning of their Gates, Wayes, and places where *Cæsar* should pass. All the People came forth with their children to meet him by the way; Sacrifices were every where offered; the Temples and Market-places were hanged with clothes of Taphery: so that a man would have thought, by the expressions of joy, there had been some great triumph expected and provided for. So great contentment was among the richer sort, and such hearty expression among the meaner sort.

When *Cæsar* had lightly passed through all the Countreys of *Gallia Togata*, he returned with all speed to his Army at *Nemetocenna*, and calling all his Legions out of their Winter-quarters into the Country of the *Treviri*, he went thither, and there mustered them. *T. Labienus* he made Governour of *Gallia Togata*, thereby to get himself the more favour and furtherance in his suit for the Consulship. He himself removed from one place to another, according as he found it necessary for health. And albeit he heard oftentimes that *Labienus* was solicited strongly by his Enemies, and was also advertised how it was carried by a small faction at Rome, to take away part of his Army from him by a Decree of the Senate: yet notwithstanding he neither gave credit to any thing that was reported of *Labienus*, nor would be drawn to do any thing contrary to the Authority of the Senate. For he believed, that if the Senators might give their Voices freely, he should easily obtain his purpose.

For *C. Curio* Tribune of the People, who had taken upon him the defence of *Cæsar's* Cause, and kept still in Dignity, had oftentimes propounded to the Senate, that if the fear of *Cæsar's* Army prejudiced any man, and feeling that the Authority and Power of *Pompey* did not a little keep the Courts in awe; that both of them might lay down their Arms and dismiss their Armies; and so should the City

be at liberty to use her own right as she pleased. This he not only propounded, but began to divide the Senate about it: which the Consuls and the Friends of *Pompey* commanded should not be done: and so ruling the matter as they listed, they departed. This was a great testimony of the whole Senate, and agreeable to their former act. For *Marcellus* the year before, opposing *Cæsar's* dignity, contrary to the Law of *Pompey* and *Craffus*, and having put up a Bill to the Senate for the discharge of *Cæsar*, before the time of his Commission was expired; when they had given their voices, *Marcellus*, who fought all his honour, by working spight against *Cæsar*, departed aside, and the Senate fell all of them quite upon other matters.

This did not at all daunt the spirits of *Cæsar's* Enemies, but rather stirred them up to strengthen their party, and thereby to compel the Senate to approve of that which they had determined. Hereupon a Decree was made, that *Cn. Pompeius* should send one Legion, and *Cæsar* another, to the War against the *Parthians*. But, it was easily discerned, that both these Legions were taken from *Cæsar*. For the first Legion, which *Cn. Pompeius* had sent unto *Cæsar* levied in the Province, he gave unto *Cæsar* as one of his number. Nevertheless, albeit, that no man need doubt, but that *Cæsar* was spoiled at the pleasure of his Enemies, yet he sent *Pompey* his Legion again: and, of his own Forces, he ordered the fifth Legion which he had in the latter *Gallia*, to be delivered to him according to the Decree of the Senate. In the room whereof he sent the thirteenth Legion into *Italy*, to lie in garrison in the same place from whence the fifteenth was drawn.

Then he distributed his Army into Winter-quarters. *C. Trebonius* with four Legions he placed in *Belgium*: *C. Fabius* with as many amongst the *Hedui*. For this he thought would be the best way to keep *Gallia* in most safety and quiet, if the *Belge*, who were the most valorous, and the *Hedui* who were of most authority, had Forces quartered among them to keep them in obedience. This done, he took his journey into *Italy*.

When he came thither, he understood that the two Legions which he had dismissed, which by the Decree of the Senate should have been employed in the *Parthian* War, were, by *C. Marcellus* in the Consul, delivered to *Pompey*, and kept still in *Italy*. Although by this dealing it was evident to all the World, what was intended against *Cæsar*, yet *Cæsar* determined to take all things patiently, as long as he had any hope left to decide the controversy, rather by the Law then by the Sword.

OBSERVATIONS

UPON THE

Eighth Commentary

OF THE

WARS in GALLIA.

Some attribute the frequent revolts of the Galles, to their changeable and impatient humour, which cannot endure to be Lorded over by strangers: and others, to the too great Clemency of Cæsar. I grant, that Clemency apt to Pardon, emboldens to revolt; for that we easily forget all benefits which do not entirely establish our liberty: but, if Cruelty causeth them, less frequent, yet it renders them more dangerous: for that when despair driveth men thereunto, and that the hope of Safety rests only in Victory, the revolted become all valiant, obstinate, constant, and faithful to the end; which never falleth out, where there is hope of the Enemies Clemency. We have here plentiful examples thereof. Cæsar, in the greater part of the revolts of the Galles, hath often found great facilities to reduce them to his obedience, by reason of his Clemency; which hath been a powerfull means for him to make divisions amongst themselves, and to prevent obstinacy in their revolts: and if sometimes it hath so happened, that he hath used severity, it hath been occasioned by foul and unworthy acts; as when the Veneti under Publick Faith imprisoned the Roman Officers, which came to them to buy Corn for the sustenance of the Army. But I cannot excuse that of Uxellodunum. On the contrary, the cruelties of the King of Spain, executed by the Duke of Alva, drove poor Fishermen so into despair, that they have shaken off his insupportable yoke; and, with an admirable constancy, have maintained and enriched themselves and are grown so Potent, as that they are

able to resist him by Land, and by Sea take from him his Treasure in the Indies.

Cæsar sheweth us also, by his care and industry to get intelligence of the Enemies proceedings (whether by taking Prisoners in the Field, or by having good Spies) the advantage which may be made thereof; many of his successful designs having been grounded thereupon, there being great advantage in the attempting them; for that he, which assaileth, hath more courage then he, which is assailed, and always believeth the assailant to be the stronger, not knowing what part he will assail, and ever jealous, that he hath some secret intelligence. Briefly, all that a well-exercised and well-disciplin'd Army is able to do in such a case, is to defend it self; but, where are new-leiv'd Soldiers, fall out great disorders: which was the reason he took so much care to fortifie his Camp very strongly, to the end he might defend it and all his baggage with a few men, and might, without danger, execute many brave designs, being always assured of his retreat. Let us further take view of the Siege of Uxellodunum: which Cæsar judging to be impregnable by force, and knowing it to be well provided of Corn, undertaking, by a great and dangerous labour, to keep them from Water, which was from a Fountain without the Town, from whence they were only supplied: which the Besieged perceiving, having set fire on Cæsar's Works, by a Sally, they bindred him from quenching it. Cæsar, not being able to repossess them, by reason of the advantage of the place, resolveth to make an Assault upon the Town; which apprehension causeth them to retreat.

The

The manner of our Modern Training, or Tactick Practice, by Clement Edmonds, Remembrancer of the City of LONDON.



As much as my purpose was to make this task of Observations, as a parallel to our Modern Discipline, I did not think it fit to mingle the Tactick Practice of these times, with the use of fore-going ages, but rather to shut up these Discourses therewith, as the second line of this warlike parallel, which is thus drawn in the best fashion of Modern Art.

In the knowledge of Marshalling an Army, there is nothing more especially to be regarded, then that from a confused company of Men, having chosen the fittest for the Wars, we should so place and digest a convenient number of them, that in Marches, in Incamping, in Battels, we may be able with a few well ordered-to encounter a far greater Army in confusion, and to overthrow them. From hence *Aeneas* did designe the Art of War, to be the knowledge of warlike motions.

Before this unexpert Army shall be able to be moved in such fashion, it shall not be amiss to acquaint it with the most usual terms, wherewith they shall be often commanded into divers postures, as occasion shall be offered. For as in the Art of Fencing, no Man shall be able to turn and wind his body for his best advantage to offend his enemy, or defend himself, unless first his Master shall instruct him in the several parts and postures thereof to every Souldier, or the whole Troop as one body, or one souldier, shall never be readily instructed to transform or turn it self by divers motions into different forms, unless they first understand what is meant by Fronts and Flanks, by Files and Ranks, what by Leaders and Followers, by Middlemen and Bringers up. By this means each Souldier understanding what the term doth signifie, shall readily both apprehend and execute such Commandments as the Captain or Officer shall direct him.

A File is a certain number of men following singly one Leader unto the depth of 8 or 10, as they shall be commanded. The ancients have called this File, *Seriem*, *ordinationem*, or *decuriam*. It consisteth of Leaders and Followers, placed according to their worth and valor; and especially there ought to be regarded the Leader or *Decurio*, the fifth, sixth, or middlemen, and the tenth and last called the Bringer-up or *Tergiductor*.

First therefore, every Souldier being aptly fitted unto his several Armes according to his worth, age, and stature, they are to be disposed into several files, wherein every one is especially to acknowledge his leader or foremost man to be the author of all his motions: and therefore duely attending what directions shall be commanded, each follower shall according to the motions of his leader or foremost man, order his own, and is to be excused, if he attend the motions of his leader, before he move himself.

When many files are thus disposed together, all the leaders making one and the same front, and their followers observing likewise one and the same proportion of distance before, and after, and one each side; these files thus joyned make one Battallion, the front whereof is called a Rank, and so likewise the second

Battallion,
A Rank of
Front,
Side-men,
and
Coad

cond and third in depth, according to the number of men in each file. The first second, and third, and so forward, in each file, are called sidemen, in respect of the same numbers in the next file. Neither must every souldier only regard the motions of his Leader, but he must also diligently respect his sidemen, and such as shall be placed on his right and left hand, called his ranks, so that both in files and ranks he may always be found in the same distance wherein he is commanded.

The number of souldiers in a Battalion uncertain. It should be impertinent to the purpose to prescribe a certain number of souldiers unto these Battallions, only thus much for the proportion, that it ought never to exceed so much, but that it may easily upon any occasion be changed into such a form or fashion to fight, as may be thought fittest for the present.

The length. The length of this Battallion is diversly termed amongst the Latines, as *Frons, Facies, Adstrutio, Jugum, &c.* but in our modern practice, most familiarly the front or rank.

Breadth or depth. The breadth of the Battallion, which is from the leader to the bringer-up, with the distance between all the followers, is said to be the length or depth of one file or flank.

Dignities in places to be observed. In the disposing of souldiers into files and ranks, besides their observing a right line in their places and standing, we must likewise especially respect the different worth and quality of the souldiers, that every one according to his worth may be fited unto his proper place, and accordingly receive advancement, as the death of his Leaders, and true value of his desert by his Commander shall give occasion.

The second and ninth rank. First therefore there must be especial choice made of the leaders of each file or first front or ranks of the Battallion, of the most expert, ablest, and best-armed men: because that as from them the rest are to receive directions of their after-motions; so in them the greatest hope of the day doth consist.

The bringers up or Tergiductores or last rank. Next unto the first it must be provided, that the bringers up or last rank, called *Tergiductores*, be little inferior, well experienced, wise and valiant, that they may both know when to reprehend their former Ranks, and urge them forward, if they see them declining or yielding upon false occasions; as also to be able upon any sudden alarm given in the rear, to turn faces about, and make themselves a front for the best resistance.

The second and ninth ranks. Neither must it be neglected concerning the second and ninth ranks, that they also may be furnished with the next most sufficient Men, both because of their nearness unto danger, as also that if their leaders or bringers up shall either be slain, or disabled by wounds, they may presently succeed in their places and make them good.

The fifth and sixth ranks. There is also a good decorum to be observed in the middlemen, or fifth and sixth ranks, both for the men themselves and their arms: that in our marches when the middlemen or sixth ranks shall be called up to front with their leaders, they may in some sort and proportion answer their places; as also when we double our front, by calling up middlemen to fight in a greater breadth, they may not be unfutable: but especially in marches, that they may be able to make the best resistance, when they shall become the flanks of the Battallions.

Files. The right hand file. As these respects ought to be observed in ranks, so the files also are not without their different degrees of dignity, As the leader of the right-hand file, is accounted to have the first place of honor in the Battallion; for he doth not only lead the rest in his own file, but he is the author and beginner of the motions of the whole Battallion.

The

The leader of the left-hand file hath the next place, because that he with the leader of the right-hand file do always in their marching and imbatteiling rectifie or rank the whole front of the battallion, and so consequently all the next of their files as they stand in order, even until the middle, who are accounted the last in dignity.

The left hand file.

The battallion being thus disposed into files and ranks, and each file and rank according to his worth and experience rightly advanced: it followeth that there should be a just distance proportioned between either, that at all times upon all occasions, they might be found ready, and in comeliest fashion, either to offend their enemy, or defend themselves. These distances which every follower must observe in respect of his leader, and every leader and follower, in respect of the sidemen, may be reduced into three several Orders, as followeth.

Distance between files and ranks.

The first is called open Order, the distance whereof is twelve foot between every follower and his leader, or between every rank; and six foot between them and the sidemen, or between every file. This order is commonly used upon marches, when the Enemy is known to be far off, as also in private exercising of souldiers for their several managing of their armies. It differeth somewhat from the *Ordinatus Miles* amongst the Romans who always observed but four cubits in files and ranks.

Open order.

The second distance is called Order, when we contract the battallion both in length and breadth, and gather the souldiers within a nearer scantling both in files and ranks, that is, by observing six feet in their files between the follower and leader, and three feet between the ranks or sidemen. This distance is used when we march toward an enemy near at hand, or in marches by reason of the opportunity of the place suspiciously dangerous. This is also near unto *Densatus ordo*, but only that that was but two cubits in both files and ranks.

Order.

The third and last order, is when either we attend the enemy his present assault, or that we intend to charge him upon our securest and best distance, when every follower standeth three feet, or his rapier length behind his leader, and a foot and half from the sidemen or files; or when every souldier occupieth but one foot and a half for his own station, joining pouldron to pouldron, or target to target. This differeth from *Constipatus ordo*, because that alloweth but one cubit for files and ranks, and this close order alloweth one cubit in the file, two in the ranks.

Close order; pouldron to pouldron.

This distance doth agree also best with the length of our pikes of 15 or 16 feet long, for it is thought fit oftentimes that the battallion consisting of ten ranks, there should not charge more at one time then the 5 formost, so that the pikes of the fifth rank might be three foot over the foremost shoulder; and the other five ranks should in this close order, or nearer if it be possible, follow the other charging, with their pikes advanced, until some occasion should require their charge. In the mean time they should perform their duty, in keeping the five formost ranks from retiring, and besides add strength unto the charge or shock.

The manner of charging with five ranks.

The manner of exercising of composed Battallions, with their different Motions.

THE files and ranks being thus understood, disposed and ordered, and all parts and members of the battallion being joined in their just proportion and distance, able and fit to be altered upon any sudden occasion (as if it were but one entire body) into several and divers postures, and to make resistance

resistance unto what forces soever shall oppugn the same: it might be thought needless to have made the dispositions of the Members so exact, unless by continual practice and exercise they might be made nimble and ready, not only to defend themselves and their whole body on all sides, but also to be able to offend whensoever they shall espie the least occasion of advantage.

The terms of direction or command, which are commonly used in this modern discipline of martial exercise, as they are not many, only answering to the different postures which are required in the Battalion, so they are and must be short and perspicuously plain, that by this means being suddenly uttered, easily apprehended and understood, they may as speedily be put in execution by those which shall be commanded.

First therefore, that the battaillon may be commanded into some one fashion or posture, from whence it shall be fit to convert itself into all other, the Captain or Officer shall bid them stand in front. When every particular souldier composing himself after his foremost leader, standeth commonly in file and rank, fronting unto some certain place, or to the Captain, as shall be thought best for the present.

In this and all other directions whatsoever, it shall be especially observed, that every follower attending what is commanded, mark his next leader, and accordingly move himself, as he shall see him move first.

The battaillon therefore thus fronting, if the enemy should suddenly either assault the right or left flank, it shall be commanded to turn faces to the right or left hand, when every souldier observing his leader, shall turn his face, and make his flank his front according to the direction.

There is also a doubled motion or declination to the right or left hand, when every souldier observing his leader, shall turn their bodies twice to the right or left hand, and by that means become turned with their faces where their backs were, as if they expected an Enemy in the rear, or being to perform some other motion that may be offered: beginning this alteration from the right or left hand as shall be commanded.

As every particular souldier in the Troop is thus commanded at sometimes to turn his face to the right or left hand, or about, the Battallion standing in order, that is, according to the distance before named, so the whole Battallion being reduced into their close order, is commanded to turn as one body to the right or left hand. It is performed thus: imagine the battallion stand first in order, it shall be commanded that they close their files to the right hand, when the right file standing still, the rest turning their faces to the right hand, march into their close order and return as they were: next that they close their ranks from behind, when every follower marcheth forward to his leader unto his rapiers point as is said before. This done, (the leader of the right file standing immovable) all the rest (as the body of a ship or a great gate) turn about that leader, as about the hinge or center, every one keeping the same distance and order wherein they were first placed, as if they were but one entire body.

When the same battaillon is to be restored into the same station wherein it was first, it is commanded, faces about to the left hand, and march into your order from whence you were closed. Then let your leaders or first ranks stand still, and the rest turning faces about, march ranks in order as before: then turn as you were, and you are restored.

When the whole Battallion being in their close order should turn about and make there the front, it is done by a double turning or declination, and commanded to wheel about, which is answerable to the former faces about or mutation.

There

There is also another wheeling in this sort, when the Front changeth the aspect thrice; for as wheeling about maketh the Front the Rear, so this wheeling from the right hand to the left, or contrariwise: which fashion is so seldom used, that we scarce afford it a name.

In all such motions and alterations, it is most fit that all men perform their directions with their Pikes advanced, being in that sort most easy to be commanded, as also less troublesome to their Followers and Leaders.

Countermarching Files and Ranks.

There is also another means to prevent the Enemy his assaulting us in the rear or flank, lest he should find our worst men least able to make resistance; and this is performed by countermarching both files and ranks three divers wayes apiece.

The first was used by the *Macedonians*, after this fashion: First the Leader turneth his face about towards the right or left hand, and so the next follower marching behind his Leader turneth also, and so the third and fourth, until the bringer up have carried himself out into a new place in the rear further from the Enemy, as he was before next unto him. But this neither was nor is accounted safe or secure, because it doth somewhat resemble a flying or running away from the enemy, which might give him no small encouragement, and therefore it is not much in practice.

Only at some times, the bringers up marching throughout beyond the Leaders, until they possess the same space before them which they did behind them, all turning their faces about, make their Leaders to affront the Enemy, who were before farthest from them.

The *Lacedemonians* used the contrary, as it were pursuing the enemy: the bringer up first being turned face about, and so the next marching before him, and so the third, until the Leader himself became also turned, and in the foremost front unto the enemy. Which with us is somewhat otherwise, but yet both affronting, and as it were pursuing the enemy: because our Leaders first begin this motion, and so countermarching through on the right or left hand, become in the front in a new space of ground, who were before in the rear.

The third and last was invented by the *Perians*, whom, when the place or near approach of the enemy would not suffer to change their ground, they were wont to countermarch the front to the right or left hand: and being come unto the depth of the bringers up, to stand still until the other half file had likewise marched forth, and fallen upon their Leaders in every file. In all these it is especially commanded, to march still in the same distance, and by whole ranks, to prevent confusion, which (especially the enemy at hand) must needs be most dangerous, and therefore carefully to be avoided.

In like sort the ranks may countermarch, when either the right wing would be strengthened by the left, or the left by the right, always marching by whole files towards the right or left hand, according as they shall have the direction, either changing the ground, or upon the same ground, as in the former counter-marches.

There is used also another kind of strengthening both the front and flank when occasion shall be offered, viz. by doubling either files or ranks. And this, either by doubling the number of soldiers in the same files or ranks, keeping still the same breadth and depth of ground; or else by doubling the ground, keeping the same number of soldiers. The files are doubled, when

U u the

Stand in front. In arrears flank.

Faces to the right or left hand. Declinate in battal vel in section. Faces about to the right or left hand. Duplicate declination or mutation.

Wheel to the right or left hand. Conversion battal in vel section.

As you were. Revolutio. Reversio.

Wheel about. In section mutation.

Reversio.

Files from the rear through. Evolutio Macedonico.

From the front through. Lacedemonico evolutio.

From the front and stand.

Chorica evolution.

Countermarching of ranks.

The doubling of files to the right or left hand.
By men.

the second file shall insert it self into the first, the Leader thereof putting himself a follower unto the Leader of the first, and the next follower, follower to the next in the first file, and so forwards. And likewise the fourth file inserting it self into the third, and the sixth into the fifth. And this is to be performed when the Battallion standeth in his order.

Duplicate all in order.
By ground.

To double the place or depth, is, when the same number of men shall put themselves out of their order into their open order, either by advancing forward, or by falling backwards, as they shall be commanded.

Doubling of ranks by inserting, or adding new Troops.

The ranks are doubled two manner of ways: either by inserting the second into the first, to the right or left hand, as before in the files; or else (the enemy being at hand) by joyning whole troops together to the right or left wing, according as occasion shall be offered: and this is held to be the safest when the Enemy is near, to avoid confusion. It is performed either in the same ground, or by doubling the ground, when either we desire to exceed the front of our enemy his Battallion, or to prevent left we our selves be included. The terms to both are; Double your files or ranks to the Right or Left hand: and when you would have them return again into their proper places, it is commanded; As you were.

Silence to be kept.

The ordinary directions which are especially given in these Martial Exercises, are; first, that no man, in the time of Exercising or Marhalling, shall be lower than his Officer: but every one attending to his place, when he is commanded, shall diligently hearken to such directions as shall be given. The Captain in the Front shall speak, and the Sergeants in each flank shall give the Word unto the Lieutenant or Ensign in the Rere: who, as in his proper place, seeth all things executed accordingly as the Captain shall command. It shall be impossible to perform any thing herein, unless first every one do exactly observe his Leader and his fideman: and, to this purpose, it is often commanded, Keep your files, Keep your ranks.

Of Marches.

In a Champain.

IN Champains there needs no great labour to Marhall particular Troops for their after-marches: because they may march either by whole Divisions, observing onely their course of indifferency, that every Division may every third day have the Vantguard; or else in such form and fashion as the General hath propoed for a day of Battel, according as the danger of an expected Enemy shall give occasion. But because all Countries will not afford a Champain for the marching of an Army, and therefore not possible to march far with many troops in front, nor many files of any one troop or division, by reason of often straits, and passages betwixt hills, woods, or waters; It is provided, though by long induction, the whole Army shall be extended into a thin length and few files, yet the soldiers well disposed shall be as readily able to defend themselves, and offend the enemy on their flanks (from whence only in such streights the danger is imminent) as if they were to affront an enemy with an entire Battallion in a Champain Country.

In streights or narrow passages.

First therefore a division or Battallion being ordered and drawn before the Quarter, into one even front of just files, ten in depth; the musketers equally divided on the right and left flanks of the pikes, all standing in their order, that is to say, six feet distant in files and ranks; the Captain carefully provideth, that the first, fifth, sixth and tenth ranks be always well filled and furnished with his most able and best-armed soldiers. Which done, he commandeth first the

How to marshall a division for such a march.

middlemen, or half files to become a front with their leaders; so that the division becometh but five in depth. Next he he commandeth to turn faces to the right or left hand, as direction shall be to march from that quarter: and so the whole division resteth ready in his fashion to march five in front, the one half of the musketers in the vanguard, and the other in the rere, the pikes in the battel, and both flanks well furnished with the ablest and best men to offend or defend as there shall be occasion: that is to say, the right flanks with the first and fifth ranks, and the left with the sixth and tenth ranks. If occasion afterwards shall be given of a halt in a champain or before, the quartering, the Captain commandeth first unto all, (they being first closed into their order) Faces as you were; next unto the half files; Faces about, and march out, and fall again upon your files. By which means the division becometh again reduced into the same front and fashion from whence it was first transformed, ready to encounter an enemy, or to be drawn into the Quarter.

To reduce them again into their first front.

The manner of charging pikes with pikes. Five ranks only.

When pikes are to charge pikes in a champain, it useth to be performed two several ways. First the whole division being commanded into their close order, the five first ranks charging their pikes, every follower over his leaders shoulder directeth his pike as equally as he can, and the first rank shall have three feet of his pike over the foremost shoulder. The other five ranks with their pikes advanced follow close up in the rere, either ready to second the foremost or to be employed in the rere as occasion shall be offered. Otherwise and most usual, when the whole depth of the files throughout the division shall charge together, all fast locked and united together, and therefore most able to make the strongest shock offensive or defensive: provided always that none mingle their pikes in other files, but the whole file one in another's shoulder.

By the whole depth.

To charge with Muskets.

In charging with musketers, it is observed no way convenient that there should be too many in a rank, or that the ranks should be too long. For the first rank is commanded to advance ten paces before the second, and then to discharge, and wheeling either to the right or left hand, falleth into the rere, and so the second advancing to the same distance, discharge and wheel as before, and likewise the third, and so forward as long as the Officer shall be commanded. Which shall not so well be performed the ranks being extraordinary long, because it will require so long a time to wheel from the front, that the second may succeed, unless by direction the rank may divide it self, the one half to the right hand, and the other to the left in wheeling to the rere.

There must not be too many in a rank.

In the retreat.

In the retreat the whole ranks having turned their faces about, are to march three or four paces forward: their chief officer coming in the rere, first commandeth the last rank to make ready, and then to turn faces about and discharge, and wheel about to the head or front of the division, and being clearly passed, the next rank to perform as much: and so the rest in order.

The manner of charging by files in narrow passages.

Where the passages are narrow, and the division cannot come to charge in front, as between two waters or woods, the manner of charging is different: for there being five or ten files led in the induction, that file which flanketh the enemy discharge first onely, and the rest marching continually forwards it standeth firm until the last rank be passed, and then fleeveth it self on the left rank and makes ready, and so the second file and the third, so long as the enemy shall continue, there being a continual discharging by files as before by ranks. Unless it be in the passes of Ireland, meeting with an irregular enemy where they use to intermingle their files of hot with pikes, that the one may be a defence for the other, when the enemy shall come up to the sword, as they use there very often.

In the passes of Ireland.

How

How directions are delivered in the Wars.

By signs.

ALl directions in the Wars have ever been delivered either by signs subject to the eye, by word of mouth, or the sound of a drum, or some such warlike instrument. Concerning those visible signs displayed unto the souldiers, the falling of mists, the raising of dust, showers of rain and snow, the beams of the Sun, hilly, uneven and crooked passages, by long experience have found them to be most doubtful and uncertain; as also because, as it was a matter of great difficulty to invent different signs upon all fuddain occasions; so it is almost an impossibility, that the common souldier (who oftentimes is found scarce capable of the understanding of plain words distinctly pronounced) should both apprehend and understand suddainly, and execute directly the true sense and meaning of his Commanders signs.

By drum or trumpet.

The Drum and Trumpet are yet used. But because many different sounds are not easily distinguished in souldiers understanding, without some danger of confusion, we only command by the inarticulate sounds, to arm, to march, to troop, to charge, and to retreat: with all which several notes the souldier is so familiarly to be acquainted, that so soon as he hears them beaten, he may be ready suddainly to put them in execution, as if he heard his Captain pronouncing as much.

By word of mouth.

The directions by word of mouth are infinite, according to the different occasions which shall be offered; yet always with this caveat, that they be short, yet periphrastic, without all ambiguity, and plainly pronounced, first by the Captain, then driven by the Sergeants through the division or Battalion. Though infinite, yet the most usual are these: To your Arms: Keep your Files: Keep your Ranks: Follow your Leader: Leaders look to your Files: Keep your Distance: Faces to your Right hand: Faces to your Left hand: Close your Files: Close your Ranks: Stand as you are: As you were: Faces about to the Right hand: Wheel about to the Right or Left hand: Double your Ranks: Double your Files: Leaders counter-march to the Right or Left hand and stand: Leaders counter-march through to the Right or Left hand: Middlemen come forth and fall upon your Leaders. Besides many fit termes commanded in managing particular armies, as pikes and muskets, which are omitted.

The most usual directing terms in exercising a battalion or division.

And thus much touching the Tactick practise of our Modern Wars: which I have the rather added, in regard that divers souldiers, as unacquainted both with the manner and the value thereof, do think a heap of people unarmoured to be as available for a great design, as any other number distinguished in files and parts, and disposed for facile and easie motions, according to the powerful circumstance of time and place. Wherein, howsoever the practise of the Turk and the Hungarian may seem to give warrant to that opinion, yet the use of Arms amongst the Grecians and the Romans, whose conquering Armies are pregnant witnesses of the excellency of their Military Discipline, shall speak sufficiently for order and Tactick motion, as most necessary parts in a well ordered War.

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